Standard Oil Distributors

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Oct 18, 1973

206 N.L.R.B. 468 (N.L.R.B. 1973)

468 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
L.J. Folkins, d/b/a Standard Oil Distributors and
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Helpers & Delivery Drivers
Local No. 690, affiliated with the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauffeurs, Warehouse-
men & Helpers of America , Independent . Case 19-
CA-6351
Independent (herein called the Union). The complaint is-
sued May 18, alleging that L. J. Folkins, d/b/a Standard Oil
Distributors (herein called Respondent) violated Section
8(a)(l) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act.
II ISSUE
October 18, 1973
DECISION AND ORDER
By CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS KENNEDY
AND PENELLO
On August 17, 1973, Administrative Law Judge
Richard J. Boyce issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, the Respondent filed excep-
tions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby
orders that Respondent, L.J. Folkins, d/b/a Standard
Oil Distributors, Spokane, Washington, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall take- the action
set forth in the said recommended Order.
i The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by ,the
Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to overrule
an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to credibility unless
the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the
resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc, 91 NLRB 544,
enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (CA. 3, 1951) We have carefully examined the record
and find no basis for reversing his findings
DECISION
1. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
RICHARD J. BoycE, Administrative Law Judge: This case
was tried before me in Spokane, Washington, on July 10
and 11, 1973. The charge was filed April 11, 1973, by Team-
sters, Chauffeurs, Helpers & Delivery Drivers Local No.
690, affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America,
The issue is whether Respondent's discharge of its em-
ployee, Richard Smith, on February 13, 1973, was because
of his union membership or activities, violating Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
III. FINDINGS OF FACT
A. Business of Respondent
Respondent is a proprietorship engaged in Spokane,
Washington, in the distribution of petroleum products un-
der contract with Standard Oil of California. During the
year preceding issuance of the complaint, Respondent real-
ized commissions exceeding $50,000 under that contract, in
the course of delivering products of a value exceeding
$1,000,000 which had come to it directly from outside
Washington.
Respondent is an employer engaged in and affecting
commerce within the meaning of 'Section 2(2), (6), and (7)
of the Act.'
B. Labor Organization Involved
The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
C. Evidence Concerning the Alleged
Unfair Labor Practice
Summary and Position of the Parties. Smith was hired by
Respondent the morning of February 12,1973. The evening
of February 12, he and three other of Respondent's employ-
ees attended a meeting at the union hall during which they
signed authorization cards. The morning of February 13,
the Union furnished Respondent copies of Smith's and two
other bargaining cards and demanded recognition. Respon-
dent had five rank-and-file employees at the time. Smith
was fired later on February 13.
The General Counsel contends that the discharge was
prompted by Respondent's learning, incidental to the
Union's demand for recognition, that Smith had signed a
card, and was designed to destroy the Union's one-person
card majority in the five-employee unit. Respondent denies
such motivation, contending that Smith was hired "for a
day or two" to help straighten up the warehouse in anticipa-
tion of an inventory audit scheduled for February 14; and
that it developed on February 13 that an opening did not
exist in any event, Respondent having discovered not only
that the audit had been postponed, but that it had lost one
of its contracts with the city of Spokane, that the energy
crisis "was not hearsay," and that a tank truck that had
i During the trial, Respondent amended its answer to admit the jurisdic-
tional ,allegations of 'the complaint.
206 NLRB No. 35
STANDARD OIL DISTRIBUTORS
broken down the day before would be in repair for several
days.
The Evidence in Detail. On Sunday, February 11, 1973,
Smith was told by Ronald Bitts, a friend, that Bitts had just
quit his job with Respondent, and consequently that an
opening might exist for Smith should he present himself at
Respondent's premises, ready to go to work, the first thing
Monday morning. Bitts had been a delivery route driver for
Respondent.,
Smith followed Bitts' suggestion. Upon his arrival at
Respondent's Monday morning, February 12, he and L.J.
(Lee) Folkins, the proprietor, spent perhaps 2 hours togeth-
er. Folkins inquired of Smith's truckdriving experience,
learning among other things that he had driven a delivery
route for one of Respondent's competitors. in the midsixties.
Folkins then took Smith on a tour of the facility, explaining
in technical detail the operating procedures followed by
Respondent's drivers. As they passed through the ware-
house, Folkins stated that it needed to be rearranged, add-
ing that the drivers helped with that in their spare time.
Sometime during the 2 hours or so they were together,
Folkins offered Smith a job; and, in Folkins' office after the
tour, Smith filled out an application form. Their versions of
job content and duration are in substantial disagreement.
Smith testified that he was hired as a driver at a salary of
$600 per month, later to be raised to $625. Consistent with
that,-he further testified that, in Folkins' office after the
tour, Folkins gave him a brochure detailing the employee
medical plan; told him that Respondent's drivers wore uni-
forms, and that it would contribute $30 toward the initial
cost of Smith's; and, those details completed, directed
Smith to ride the remainder of the day with Larry Wilson,
a tanktruck driver. The medical brochure specified that, to
be eligible for coverage, an employee had to have "1 month
of continuous employment on a full time basis with the
employer."
Folkins testified, contrary to ,Smith, that Smith was "des-
perate" for any kind of a job, and in part to be "a good guy"
Folkins agreed to put him in the warehouse "for a day or
two" at $3 an hour in anticipation of the February 14 audit,
to be conducted by Standard Oil of California. In support
of Folkins' version, Respondent introduced in evidence
Smith's application form, on which Folkins had written at
some time or other "Part Time Whse" and "3.00 Hr." Fol-
kins explained in his testimony that the term "part -time" in
his parlance' means "temporary," and that $3 per hour is
Respondents standard rate for temporary employees. Fol-
kins conceded, under cross-examination, that he "could
have hit on some of the high points" of the medical plan
with Smith and "could have discussed uniforms," and that
he "most likely" mentioned the $30 uniform allowance. He
denied, however, that he gave Smith a medical brochure.2
Folkins testified that his time with Smith the morning of
2 Folkins testified in effect that he would not have given Smith the bro-
chure Snuth adverted to, even had Smith been hired on a permanent basis,
because he was "quite sure" that the plan described in that brochure by then
had been superseded. He testified elsewhere that it was his "best guess" that
a new plan went into effect in the "first part of the year," in January. Still
elsewhere, in response to a question by the Administrative Law Judge, Fol-
kins admitted that Respondent had records that would fix conclusively the
exact date of any new plan. Because of the vagueness of Folkins ' testimony
469
February 12 was cut short by his being called away; that,
as he left, he told Smith to "look the place over and I will
get back to you"; and that he pretty much lost track of
Smith after that. Folkins testified, - in explanation of his
taking so much time and trouble with a temporary hire, that
he thought Smith, as a former employee of a competitor,
might be interested in Respondent's operation; and that
Folkins in turn was interested in learning what he could
about the competitor's operation from talking to Smith.'
Smith began riding with Larry Wilson at about 10 or
10:30 a.m., February 12. Wilson's truck presently broke
down, after which, according to both Smith and Greg
Douglas, Folkins told Smith to ride with Douglas. Folkins
denied this, testifying that he did not even realize that Smith
had been accompanying the drivers until told by Larry
Hooper, Respondent's warehouseman.4 Regardless, Smith
spent the balance of the day riding with Douglas. Douglas,
a combination warehouseman-driver, had been assigned
Bitts' driving duties for the time being. While Smith rode
with him, Douglas mentioned the meeting to be held at the
union hall that night. After the last run of the day, according
to Smith, Folkins gave him for completion an order form for
uniforms and again mentioned the $30 employer contribu-
tion. Folkins denied this.'
That evening, Smith, Wilson, Douglas, and David Mut-
ton,,a driver, met at the union hall with Robert Kivett, the
Union's president, and Earle Wittner, its business represen-
tative. As mentioned above, each of the four signed union
authorization cards at the meeting. Wilson informed Witt-
ner later that evening that he wished to retract his signature.
Respondent had one rank-and-file employee at the time
who did not attend the meeting, the aforementioned ware-
houseman, Larry Hooper.
At about 7:45 the following morning, Kivett and Wittner
visited Folkins at his office. They furnished him with copies
of the cards signed by Smith, Douglas, and Mutton, and
told him that the Union desired recognition. They asked
Folkins to give them an answer sometime that afternoon;
otherwise, the Union would file for an NLRB election.'
After the union officials left, and being "completely igno-
rant as to what it involved," Folkins telephoned the offices
of Standard Oil of California, first in Spokane, then in Gali-
on the point and his general lack of testimonial reliability , as is discussed
below , and because of his failure to bring in the telltale records or to refresh
his most uncertain recollection with them, I do not credit Folkins that the
plan described in the brochure no longer was in effect when Smith was hired.
3 Resolution of the various conflicts in testimony between Snuth and Fol-
kins is made later in this decision.
4 Hooper , who as warehouseman would have been the principal benefi-
ciary had Smith been hued to help in the warehouse, testified that Folkins
told him, after talking to Smith the morning of February 12, that he possibly
would use Smith to rearrange the warehouse . I do not credit this testimony
because of my general impression that Hooper was attempting to shape his
testimony to support Respondent 's position, and because it does not square
well with his admitting, on cross-examination , that although he observed
Smith accompanying the drivers he did not question why Smith was not
helping in the warehouse
Smith testified that he returned the completed form to Folkms' unattend-
ed desk the following morning Having denied giving Smith such a form,
Folkins of course denied any knowledge of this.
6 Respondent never did answer. The Union filed a petition for NLRB
election February 14. Case 19-RC-6464 A decision and direction of election
issued March 12, and the election followed on April 9. A certification of
result issued June 18 , the tally being one vote for the Union and two against,
with Smith's remaining uncounted as a nondispositive challenged ballot.
470 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
forma, for guidance. Upon, advice thus received, he sum-
moned Smith, Douglas, and Mutton to his office mdividu-
ally, showed each a copy of the card purportedly bearing his
signature, and asked if the signature was genuine. Each
verified his signature, then was told to return to work. The
interrogation of Smith occurred at about 9 a.m.7
Smith rode with Douglas again on February 13. He and
Douglas testified that Folkins told him to do so, Douglas
adding tat Folkins raised the possibility of Smith's taking
over the driving in the afternoon. Folkins denied such a
conversation. At about noon, February 13, Folkins told
Smith that he "could see no opening." Folkins explained to
Smith that it appeared, from information received that
morning, that Respondent had lost the contract with the
city, that the energy crisis and attendant limitation of prod-
uct availability "was not hearsay," that Wilson's truck
would be "down',' for several days, and that the audit had
been postponed. The union situation was not mentioned. At
about 5 p.m., Folkins again spoke to Smith, telling him that
he had confirmed his "suspicion, the rumor, and that there
was not an opening as we had discussed." Again, the union
situation was not mentioned. Folkins then tendered Smith
a pay envelope. Smith was credited with 16 hours of work,
and paid $48.
Smith informed the Union February 14 that he had been
terminated. Union President Kivett made a telephonic in-
quiry of Folkins about the matter February 15. Folkins
stated, simply, that Respondent "had no more need for
Richard Smith," prompting Kivett to assert that the dis-
charge was for union reasons and to demand that Smith be
reinstated or the Union would file an unfair labor practice
charge. With that, Folkins blurted, "I don't know how you
God damned hoodlums operate," and slammed the receiv-
er.
Respondent learned "officially" at about 11 a.m., Febru-
ary 13, that its package lubrication contract with the city of
Spokane would not be renewed, and that it would cease
making deliveries under that contract February 16. Folkins
was aware of this prospect February 12, and perhaps soon-
6r.8 Folkins testified that the gross value of this contract to
Standard Oil of California had been $85,639 in 1972, and
that its commission value to Respondent was 10 percent of
that amount. Folkins also testified that Respondent' s total
1972 commissions under all contracts was $100,000. The
clear purport of his testimony, then, was that the loss of the
city package lubrication contract represented a loss of be-
tween 8 and 9 percent of Respondent' s business.
Folkins' testimony in this respect was contradicted by
that of the Spokane city purchasing agent , Ike Fetterman.
Fetterman first explained that the package lubrication con-
tract is awarded by bid each year, and that the consumption
figure specified in the call for bids is premised on the past
year's consumption, plus whatever increase is anticipated
for the coming year. Should the city order in excess of the
7 The General Counsel neither alleged nor contends that Folkins ' polling
of the card signers violated the Act.
S The bids were opened by the city February 1, 1973 On February 9, Skip
Kukla, a sales representative for Standard Oil of California , asked Ike Fetter-
man, the city purchasing agent, to defer awarding the contract to Shell, the
apparent low bidder, to permit Standard to show that its bid in fact was
lower.
quantity on which the bids are based, the oil company re-
ceives additional money ratably computed . With that as
background , Fetterman testified that the gross value to
Standard Oil of California of the package lubrication con-
tracts in 1971 and 1972 had been $8 ,853 each year, plus
whatever relatively small sums were paid by the city for
overrun consumption . Fetterman testified that the 1973
contract, awarded February 13 to Shell over Standard, had
a gross value of $11,865, again with provision for overruns.
Crediting Fetterman , as would seem necessary in the cir-
cumstances , it is apparent , even allowing for substantial
overruns , that Folkins exaggerated severalfold the value of
the package lubrication contract to Standard ; and that
Respondent's commission loss from the loss of that business
was more in the area of 10 percent of $10 ,000 or so than 10
percent of $85,639 . That is, the package lubrication con-
tract represented perhaps 1 percent of Respondent 's busi-
ness, not between 8 and 9 as Folkins indicated, This
comports with the testimony of David Mutton , who made
package lubrication deliveries both before and after the city
deliveries stopped. He stated that his workload scarcely was
affected.9
Stripped of their outerwear , Folkins' other stated reasons
for the discharge are similarly illusory. Regarding the loss
of Wilson's truck, which was in repair for about a week,
Folkins' testimony conveniently overlooked Wilson's being
shifted to a standby tanktruck , acquired by Respondent in
January 1973 for just such contingencies . 10 As for the energy
crisis, Respondent first learned that it "was not hearsay" not
on February 13, as Folkins testified , but some 3-1/2 weeks
earlier when, by form letter dated January 18, Standard OR
of California informed Respondent and its other sales rep-
resentatives of a "severe drain in our supplies of gas and oil
products ," and prescribed a 10-point program to cope with
the situation . I do not credit Folkins that he received an
additional , more confirmatory message by telephone on
February 13. Such a message , in the circumstances , surely
would have been written , and would have contained partic-
ulars prompting Folkins to testify of it in more detail than
simply to assert that he learned that the energy crisis "was
not hearsay." Concerning the audit , it was postponed 2
weeks. Folkins himself eventually helped warehousemen
Hooper prepare the warehouse for it.
Resolution of the Folkins-Smith Credibility Conflicts. I con-
clude, crediting Smith over Folkins, that Smith was hired to
9 Apart from the package lubrication contract , Respondent serves the city
under a 1-year gasoline contract , which runs to September 10, 1973. Fetter-
man testified that the gross value of that contract is $157,780. As if concealing
the continued existence of the gasoline contract , which was far the larger of
the two with the city, and consistent with the misleading character of his
testimony in many respects , Folkins testified at one point , "I was advised on
February 13th that we had lost the City of Spokane's business"; at another,
"I was informed that we were going to lose the city business"; and at another
that the loss was equivalent to a "one-man job " On questioning by the
Administrative Law Judge , Folkins clarified this latter statement by testify-
ing that the "one-man job" referred to all contracts with the city
On cross-examination , when asked if Wilson drove the standby truck
February 12 after the other broke down, Folkins testified , "I don't know
without checking the record." When asked if Wilson drove the standby truck
February 13, Folkins grudgingly admitted that he "most likely " did. Folkins
further conceded, on cross-examination, that Wilson might have driven the
standby truck the remaining days that the regular truck was being repaired
Greg Douglas credibly testified that Wilson drove the standby truck during
this period.
STANDARD OIL DISTRIBUTORS
be a permanent driver, presumably to permit Douglas to
return to the duties he performed before Bitts quit. Among
the factors underlying this conclusion are these: (a) Smith
was hired immediately after another driver, Bitts, had left;
(b) the substantial time Folkins spent with Smith incidental
to his hire is altogether inconsistent with Smith's being hired
for "a day or two" to perform unskilled warehouse tasks;"
(c) Smith at no time worked in the warehouse despite the
pressing pendency of the audit, spending all his time accom-
panying drivers; 2 (d) Folkins admittedly discussed with
Smith such matters indicative oflpermanence as the employ-
ee medical plan and uniforms, the latter also indicative
that Smith primarily was to be a driver; 11 (e) had Smith been
hired only for "a day or two," Folkins would not have been
prompted, on the second day of Smith's employment, to
state reasons why there would not be an opening for him "as
we had discussed"; (f) Folkins' explanations for the dis-
charge, except for that regarding postponement of the audit,
would have been of no relevance to a person hired to do
warehouse work on a temporary basis, and (g) Smith's wit-
ness stand demeanor was impressively believable, while
Folkins often evoked visions, as he weighed and measured
his words, of one groping blindfolded down a mountainside.
Folkins' testimony, moreover, was so fundamentally and
unanswerably impeached by the city purchasing agent on
the matter of the package lubrication contract as to render
it dubious generally when favorable to Respondent and
contradicted by others.15
D. Concluding Findings
I conclude, despite the meager explicit evidence of
Respondent's union animus, that its discharge of Smith vio-
lated Section 8(a)(3) and (1).
This conclusion is based on these considerations:
(a) The discharge occurred the same day Respondent
learned, incidental to the Union's demand for recognition,
that Smith had signed a union card.
(b) The Union having presented Respondent with three
cards in a five-person unit, the elimination of one signer
would effectively destroy the Union's majority unless the
unit were reduced to three. Smith, as much the newest em-
ployee among the signers, was the logical choice. 16 Beyond
11 Folkins' explanation that he was anxious to learn about the operations
of a competitor , based on Smith's having worked for the competitor some 8
years' previous , is not convincing
12 Follrins' testimony that he did not direct Smith to ride with Wilson, then
with Douglas, and that he did not know Smith was accompanying drivers
until told by warehouseman Hooper, is discredited because of its inherent
implausibility in the circumstances and because of the persuasive contrary
testimony of both Smith and Douglas.
13
Further in this vein, Smith is credited that Folkins gave him the medical
brochure and a uniform order form.
14 Hooper, primarily a warehousemen and only occasionally a driver, does
not wear a uniform
is
That Folkins made entries on Smith's application indicating that he was
hired as a temporary warehousemen is not accorded probative force, given
the overwhelming weight of contrary evidence, Folkms' generally poor credi-
bility, and the susceptibility of such entries to tampering Similarly, that
Smith was paid off at the temporary warehouseman's rate of $3 per hour is
overridden by the weight of contrary evidence.
16 Greg Douglas was hired in August 1971, David Mutton in February
1972.
471
that, Folkins might well have supposed from the temporal
proximity of Smith's hire to the Union's demand that they
were causally related.
(c) Folkins in his testimony willfully and seriously mis-
characterized the purpose and anticipated duration of
Smith's hire, and the impacts of losing the city contract and
of Wilson's truck breaking down , revealing an awareness
that the discharge would not stand legal scrutiny if the truth
were known.
(d) Of the four circumstances cited by Respondent for
the discharge, one-the energy crisis-was known to it
weeks before Smith's hire;" one-the loss of the city con-
tract-was known to be likely the day of hire and probably
sooner, and was of minimal consequence besides; one-the
several day loss of a truck-was neutralized by the availabil-
ity of the standby truck; and one-the postponement of the
audit-was irrelevant to the hire or retention of a truckdri-
ver. In short, Respondent's stated reasons for the discharge
are such an assortment of shibboleth, deceit, non sequitur,
and, in their aggregate, overkill, as to be devoid of persua-
siveness one and all, and to suggest another-and in the
circumstances, antiunion-true reason.
Explicit evidence that Respondent harbored union ani-
mus is not indispensable to a finding of violation. Like other
essentials of a Section 8(a)(3) violation , a finding of animus
properly can be based upon reasonable inference drawn
from circumstantial evidence . The requisite animus in the
present case plainly is inferable from the aggregate of cir-
cumstances itemized above.18
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. By unlawfully discharging Richard Smith, as found
herein, Respondent engaged in an unfair labor practice
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
B. The aforesaid unfair labor practice affects commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) end (7) of the Act.
REMEDY
To effectuate the policies of the Act, it is recommended
that Respondent be ordered to cease and desist from the
unfair labor practice found.
Affirmatively, it is recommended that Respondent be or-
dered to offer Richard Smith immediate and full reinstate-
ment to his former position or, if that position no longer
exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without preju-
dice to his seniority and other rights and privileges; and to
make him whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits
suffered because of Respondent's discriminatory discharge
of him.19 His loss of earnings shall be computed as pre-
17
Respondent's counsel did not deem the energy crisis worthy of mention
in his brief.
18 Folkins' "hoodlum" reference to Union President Kivett, when Kivett
inquired about Smith's discharge, is the only explicit evidence of animus. I
do not place heavy reliance on it. Perhaps explaining the dearth of explicit
evidence of animus , Folkins testified that he "made a very great point of not
discussing this union thing [with the employees[. . . I was directed by both
my attorney and by the company, . , ."
19 Folkins testified that, on March 16, 1973, he twice attempted, unsuccess-
X Continued'
472 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
scribed in'Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716, and
F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER20
Respondent, L. J. Folkins, d/b/a Standard Oil Distribu-
tors, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from discharging its employees be-
cause of their membership in or activities in behalf of Team-
sters, Chauffeurs, Helpers & Delivery Drivers Local No.
690, affiliated with-the International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America,
Independent, or any other labor organization.
2. Take the following affirmative action:
(a) Offer to Richard Smith immediate and full rein-
statement to his former position or, if that position no long-
er exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without prej-
udice to his seniority and other rights and privileges; and
make him whole, as set forth above in the section entitled
"Remedy," for any loss of earnings and other benefits suf-
fered because of the discrimination against him.
(b) Preserve and make available, upon request, to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll
records, social security payment records, timecards, person-
nel records and reports, and all records necessary to analyze
the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order.
(c) Post at its place of business in Spokane, Washington,
copies of the notice which is attached and marked "Appen-
dix." 21 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Re-
gional Director for Region 19, after being duly signed by
Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by
the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be
maintained for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspic-
uous places, including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by
the Respondent to insure that the notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 19, in writ-
ing within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps
the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
fully to telephone Smith to offer hum a job. Whether the purpose of this
testimony was to support an argument that any backpay obligation should
be tolled as of that date, or that such calling showed an absence of animus,
I do not credit it in view of Folkins' penchant generally for self-serving
falsehood
20 All outstanding motions inconsistent herewith are denied . In the event
no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102.46 of the Rules and
Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings , conclu-
sions, and recommended Order herein shall , as provided in Section 102.48
of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become its
findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
21 In the event the Board 's Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order
of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read "Posted
Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an
Order of the National Labor Relations Board.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The trial held in Spokane, Washington, on July 10 and 11,
1973, in which we participated and had a chance to give
evidence, resulted in a decision that we had committed an
unfair labor practice in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and this
notice is posted pursuant to that decision.
The National Labor Relations Act, as amended, gives
all employees the following rights:
To organize themselves
To form, join, or support unions
To bargain as a group through a representative
they choose
To refrain from any or all such activities.
In recognition to these rights, we hereby notify our em-
ployees that:
WE WILL NOT discharge our employees because of
their membership in or activities on behalf of Team
sters, Chauffeurs, Helpers & Delivery Drivers Local
No. 690, affiliated with the International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers
of America, Independent, or any other labor organiza-
tion.
WE WILL offer to Richard Smith immediate and full
reinstatement to his former position or, if that position
no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position,
without prejudice to his seniority and other rights and
privileges; and make him whole for any loss of earnings
and other benefits suffered because of the discrimina-
tion against him.
L. J. Folkins, d/b/a
STANDARD OIL DISTRIBUTORS
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) - , (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with
its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, 10th
Floor, Republic Building, 1511 Third Avenue, Seattle,
Washington 98101, Telephone 206-442-7542.