Standard Oil Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 22, 1952

101 N.L.R.B. 1329 (N.L.R.B. 1952)

STANDARD OIL COMPANY 1329
the exercise of our jurisdiction. There are numerous taxicab com-
panieswhose operations, although not entirely unrelated to commerce
in that they serve depots or the terminals of interstate carriers, do
not have so close or so substantial an effect on commerce as to warrant
our asserting jurisdiction. In view of this, and upon reconsideration
of the Board's more recent decisions, we have concluded that it will
not effectuate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction over taxicab
companies, except in those instances where both of the following fac-
tors are present : (1) The employer is either the sole taxicab com-
pany operating in the area served by its cabs, which service instru-
mentalities of commerce, or is the holder of a contract, license, or fran-
chise from some instrumentality of commerce, granting to the em-
ployer the privilege or right to serve, either exclusively or concurrently
with others, a depot or terminal of such instrumentality; and (2) the
employer derives a substantial portion of its total revenue directly
from carrying passengers to and from terminals or depots of these
instrumentalities of commerce?
Because the operation of this Employer fails to satisfy the fore-
going requisites, the Board will not assert jurisdiction in this case.
Accordingly, the petition is dismissed.
Order
Upon the entire record in this case, the National Labor Relations
Board hereby orders that the petition filed herein by Charles W.
Sherman be, and same hereby is, dismissed.
a However, these standards do not alter the Board 's policy of asserting jurisdiction
where the taxicab company is found to constitute a single employer with another company
over which the Board asserts Jurisdiction . See, e . g. Oashman Auto Go., 98 NLRB 832.
STANDARD OIL COMPANY and OFFICE, ENGINEERING AND NON-CRAFT
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, PETITIONER. Case No. 13-RC-2924.
December X2,1955
Decision and Order
Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, a hearing was held before I. M. Lieberman, hearing
officer. The hearing officer's rulings made at the hearing are free
from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed.
Upon the entire record in this case, the Board finds :
1. The Employer is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the
Act.
101 NLRB No. 204.
1330 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
2. The labor organizations involved claim to represent certain
employees of the Employer?
3. No question affecting commerce exists concerning the representa-
tion of employees of the Employer, within the meaning of Section 9
(c) (1) and Section 2 ( 6) and (7) of the Act, for the following
reasons:
On August 29, 1952, the Petitioner notified the Employer by tele-
gram that it claimed to represent certain of its employees. On the
same day, the Petitioner filed a petition with the Board in which it
sought exclusive representation of a unit of clerical employees, both
in the office and in the plant, messengers, field and inspection engineers,
blueprint employees, chain and rod men, laboratory "mechanicians,"
industrial engineers, telephone operators, and members of the fire
department. However, when it filed its petition, the Petitioner had
not yet effected initial compliance with Section 9 (f), (g), and (h)
of the Act. On August 30, 1952, the Employer and CSPU executed
a collective bargaining agreement covering, among others, the classifi-
cations of employees sought in the petition. On September 9, 1952,
11 days after it filed its petition, and 10 days after the Employer
and CSPU had executed their contract, the Petitioner came into
initial compliance with Section 9 (f), (g), and (h) of the Act. On
these facts, CSPU moved at the hearing for the dismissal of the
petition asserting the contract as a bar. We agree.
In the normal situation a contract executed after the filing of a
petition in a representation case does not constitute a bar to an
election. In the present case, although the contract was executed
after the petitioning union filed its petition, the petitioning union
did not come into compliance with the filing requirements of Section 9
of the Act until after the contract between the Employer and CSPU
was made. The Act sets forth in precise terms that the Board may
not investigate a petition for representation unless the petitioner is
in compliance with the Section 9 filing provisions. Under the circum-
stances, and giving full effect to this statutory prohibition, we believe
that this Board should not question the validity of a bargaining agree-
ment because of a petition filed at a time when the Board could not,
under the Act, have investigated the question concerning representa-
tion purportedly raised by such petition. We believe that a non-
complying union which files a representation petition while it is unable
to use the Board's facilities because of its own failure to satisfy the
filing requirements of Section 9 (f), (g), and (h) of the Act, takes a
calculated risk that an employer and another labor organization may,
1 Central States Petroleum Union, Local 100, Inc., hereinafter called CSPU, and Research
and Engineering Professional Employees Association, hereinafter called REPEA, were
permitted at the hearing to intervene on the basis of contractual interests.
THE STOUFFER CORP. 1331
during the period of the petitioner's statutory incapacity, execute a
valid agreement which will serve as a bar. The policies of Section 9
of the Act will thus best be effectuated because labor organizations
will recognize the necessity of complying with the filing requirements
of that section before seeking recourse to the processes of the Board.
Accordingly, we find that the contract executed between the Employer
and CSPU on August 30, 1952, is a bar to a present determination
of representatives, and we shall dismiss the petition.
Order
IT Is HERESY ORDERED that the petition herein be, and it hereby is,
dismissed.
MEMBER HOUSTON took no part in the consideration of the above
Decision and Order.
THE STOUFFER CORP. and LOCAL JOINT EXECUTIVE BOARD, HOTEL &
RESTAURANT EMPLOYEES AND BARTENDERS INTERNATIONAL UNION,
AFL, PETITIONER. Case No. 7-RC-19492. December 22,1952
Decision and Order
Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, a hearing was held before William E. Rhodes, hearing
officer. The hearing officer's rulings made at the hearing are free
from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed.
Upon the entire record in this case, the Board finds :
1. The Employer contends that the Board should not exercise juris-
diction in this case. The Employer is an Ohio corporation, having
its main offices in Cleveland, Ohio. It purchases over $500,000 in
merchandise yearly, which is shipped directly in interstate commerce
to its restaurants in New York, Minneapolis, Chicago, Detroit, Cleve-
land, Pittsburgh, and Philadelphia. The two Detroit restaurants,
which are alone involved in this case, receive out-of-State shipments
in the value of more than $100,000.
Under these circumstances and upon the entire record, we find,
contrary to the Employer's contention, that the Employer's Detroit
restaurants are an integral part of a multistate enterprise, and that it
will effectuate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction in this
case'
1 The Borden Company, 91 NLRB 628 ; Childs Company, 88 NLRB 720.
101 NLRB No. 194.
242305-- 53 -85