Standard-Coosa-Thatcher Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 19, 1949

85 N.L.R.B. 1358 (N.L.R.B. 1949)

In the Matter of STANDARD-COOSA- T:1-IATCZIER COMPANY and TEXTILE
WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA, CIO
Case No. 10-C4077.-Decided September 19, 1949
DECISION
AND
ORDER
On January 27, 1949, Trial Examiner James R. Hemingway issued
his Intermediate Report in this proceeding, finding that the Respond-
ent had engaged and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices
and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Intermediate Report
attached hereto. The Trial Examiner also found that the Respondent
had not violated the Act by certain other conduct alleged in the
complaint, including the discharges of Kenner Walker, Roy Bledsoe,
and William Grider. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed exceptions
to the Intermediate Report and a supporting brief. The Respondent
filed a brief designated as a "reply" to the General Counsel's excep-
tions.'
The Board has reviewed the Trial Examiner's rulings made at the
hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rul-
ings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Intermediate
Report, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in the case,
and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of
the Trial Examiner with the following exceptions, additions, and
modifications :
1. We agree with the Trial Examiner's findings that the Respondent
violated Section 8 (1) of the National Labor Relations Act and Section
1 The Respondent's "brief" concludes with the assertion that the record requires a
finding that the Respondent has not violated the Act "in any particular." Although It Is
not in conformity with the Board's Rules and Regulations, Sec. 203.46 (a) and ( b), Series
5, as amended, we regard this as a general exception to the Trial Examiner's findings. See
Matter of Ferguson Bros. Mfg. Co., 9 N. L. R. B. 189, 194.
85 N. L. R. B., No. 224.
1358
STANDARD-COOSA-THATCHER COMPANY 1359
8 (a) (1) of the Act, as amended ,2 by the statements of various super-
visory employees, including the following instances of interrogation :
a. Second Hand Stacey's questioning German and other section
men concerning their attendance at union meetings.
b. Second Hand Stacey's questioning Sain concerning attend-
ance at a union meeting of the section men.3
c. Overseer Brown's questioning Poole, and Second Hand Den-
son's questioning Gurley concerning their union membership.4
d. Second Hand Smith's questioning Parker and Second Hand
Crawley's questioning Womack concerning their union sym-
pathies 6
e. Second Hand Crawley's questioning Sparks and Johnson
concerning their reasons for joining or sympathizing with the
union s
f. Second Hand Crawley's questioning Posey and Johnson and
Overseer Peden's questioning German concerning their voting
intentions.7
g. Overseer Brown's questioning Frazier and Second Hand
Fisher's questioning Poole and Wood concerning their predic-
tions of the outcome of the pending Board-directed election.s
The Respondent contends that the circumstances of this case take
these instances of interrogation outside the proscriptions of the Act.
We disagree. We again affirm the position the Board has consistently
taken that Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act is violated when an employer
P References hereinafter made to sections of the amended Act refer also, when appro-
priate , to equivalent sections of the Act prior to amendment , unless the context clearly
indicates otherwise.
3Matter of Clover Fork Coal Co ., 4 N. L. R . B. 202, enfd . 97 F..2d 331 ( C. A. 6).
* H. J. Heinz Co . v. N. L. R. B ., 311 U . S. 514 , 518, 520 . The General Counsel excepted
to the Trial Examiner's failure to find that Second Hand Eugene Denson had interrogated
and threatened Gurley , Gann, and Merritt . To the extent that these findings were based
upon the Trial Examiner 's resolution of the credibility of witnesses who gave conflicting
testimony, we will not here overrule them. Matter of Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 81
N. L. R. B. 557. However , the Trial Examiner apparently credited Gurley's testimony
that Denson had asked her if she belonged to the Union and that she had replied In the
affirmative . Accordingly we find that Denson questioned Gurley as to her union membership.
5N. L. R. B. v. A. S. Abell Co., 97 F. 2d 951, 955-6 (C. A. 4), cited with approval
Virginia Electric & Power Co., et al. v. N. L . R. B., 115 F. 2d 414, 423 (C. A. 4).
ON. L. R. B. v. W. A. Jones Foundry & Machinery Co., 123 F. 2d 552, 554 (C. A. 7),
enfg . 30 N. L. R. B. 809 ; Texarkana Bus Co. v. N. L. R. B., 119 F. 2d 480 (C. A. 8).
7 Matter of Anderson Mfg. Co., 58 N. L . R. B. 1511.
8 Although the Trial Examiner treated these questions as intended to elicit from the
questioned employees information concerning their voting intentions , we think them equally
vulnerable as attempts to elicit information concerning the strength of the Union. See
Matter of Hagy, Harrington & Marsh, 74 N. L. R. B. 1455, 1456.
1360 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
interrogates his employees concerning any aspect of union activity 9'
The same considerations which require this uniform holding are con-
trolling in this case.
The express purpose of the Act is to protect the "exercise by workers
of full freedom of association, self organization, and designation of
representatives of their own choosing for the purpose of negotiating
the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or
protection." 10 Consonant with this objective, Section 7 of the Act
declares that employees have the "right" to engage in organization and
association, and Section 8 (a) (1) makes it an unfair labor practice for
employers to "interfere with, restrain, or coerce" employees in the ex-
ercise of that right.
The language and the legislative history of Section 8 (a) (1) show
that Congress intended the terms "interfere," "restrain," and "coerce"'
to have separate and distinct meanings." In banning "interference"
Congress clearly meant to proscribe any employer activity which would
tend to limit employees in the exercise of their statutory rights.12 In-
herent in the very nature of the rights protected by Section 7 is the
concomitant right of privacy in their enjoyment-"full freedom" from,
employer intermeddling, intrusion, or even knowledge.
Like the Trial Examiner, we believe that interrogation of employees.
as to union matters constitutes, at the very least, interference with the-
rights protected by Section 7. Whenever an employer directly or in-
directly attempts to secure information concerning the manner in
which or the extent to which his employees have chosen to engage in
union organization or other concerted activity, he invades an area
guaranteed to be exclusively the business and concern of his employees..
This Board, with the approval of the courts, has long recognized this,
right to privacy in condemning as unlawful interference such indi-
rect attempts by an employer to secure information about the union
9 Matter of Greensboro Lumber Company , 1 N. L. R . B. 629, 632; Matter of Sewell Mfg.-
Co., 72 N. L. R. B. 85, enfd. as modified ( on other grounds ) 172 F. 2d 459 (C. A. 5) ;
Matter of Ames Spot Welder Co., Inc., 75 N. L. R. B. 352, footnote 6; Matter of Wytheville
Knitting Mills, Inc., 78 N. L. R. B. 640, enfd . as modified ( on other grounds ) 175 F. 2d
, 238 (C. A. 3 ) ; Matter of Minnesota Mining f Mfg . Co., 81 N. L. R. B. 557.
10 Section 1 of the Act.
11 See Senate Committee on Education and Labor , Hearings on S. 1958, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. ( 1935 ) pp. 713-714, 558, 305 ; H. R. No . 245 on H. R. 3020 , 80th Cong ., 1st Sess._
(1947) p. 28.
12 Looking back after 4 years of experience under the Wagner Act, at a time when
amendments to Section 8 (1) were urged but not adopted , one of the major sponsors of-
the Act , Senator Wagner , made this observation on the need for continuing the prohibition,
against interference:
The ban against " interference" has been of central importance in protecting the-
right to organize . . . since it embraces a multitude of activities which would not
be reached by specific prohibitions within the law and would not be included within,
the range of such narrower concepts as "restraint " or "coercion ." 81 Cong . Rec.,_
76th Cong ., 1st Seas. ( 1939) A. 2053.
STANDARD-COOSA-THATCHER COMPANY 1361_
activities of employees, as resort to espionage or surveillance.13 Whenn
espionage is successfully concealed, "restraint" and "coercion" may
perhaps be absent, but the conduct is nevertheless vulnerable on the:
ground of "interference," if on no other.14 So it is in the case of inter--
rogation. The employer may not legally seek information on those-
subjects which the statute makes the sole concern of his employees.
Interrogation by an employer not only invades the employee's pri-
vacy and thus constitutes interference with his enjoyment of the rights-
guaranteed to him by the Act. Its effect on the questioned employee,
like that of open surveillance of union activity," is to "restrain" or to
"coerce" the employee in the exercise of those rights. The employee
who is interrogated concerning hatters which are his sole concern is
reasonably led to believe that his employer not only wants information
on the nature and extent of his union interests and activities but also
contemplates some form of reprisal once the information is obtained.
The finger which espionage might merely direct to him is actually-
pointed at him by the inquiry from his employer. He fears that a re-
fusal to answer or a truthful answer may cost him his job.16 He is also-
in effect warned that any contemplated union activity must be aban
doned, or he will risk loss of his job. Weighing these "subtle impon-
derables," the Board early characterized direct interrogation as "a par-
131V. L. R. B. v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 303 U . S. 261, 270; N. L . R. B. v.
Friedman -Harry Ill arks, 301 U. S. 58, 73; N. L. R. B. v . Baldwin Locomotive Works, 128.
F. 2d 39 , 50 (C. A . 3) ; N. L. R . B. v. Collins & Aikman Corp ., 146 F . 2d 454 , 455 (C. A. 4) ;
N. L. R. B. v. Atlas Underwear Co, 116 F. 2d 1020 , 1023 (C. A. 6) ; N. L. R. B. v . Vincennes
Steel Corp ., 117 F. 2d 169 , 172 (C . A. 7) ; N. L . R. B. v. Grower Shipper Vegetable Ass'n.
etc., 122 F. 2d 368, 376 ( C. A. 9) ; N. L . R. B. v. Northwestern Mutual Fire Ass'n,
142 F . 2d 866, 867 ( C. A. 9), cert. den . 323 U . S. 726 ; N. L. R. B . v. Fairmont Creamery
Co., 143 F . 2d 668, 670 ( C. A. 10 ), cert. den. 323 U. S. 752.
14 This Board has , however , recognized that secret espionage may amount to more.
. . our experience establishes that employers resort to labor espionage for the purpose
of obstructing and destroying self-organization . To be effective it must necessarily be.
secret ; it is nonetheless effective in restraining the employees in the exercise of their
rights' under the Act on this account." Matter of Virginia Electric & Power Co., 44
N. L. R. B . 404, 427 , enfd . 132 F. 2d 390 ( C. A. 4), affd. 319 U . S. 533. Sec LaFollette
Reports , 75th Cong ., 1st Sess. (1937 ) : Violations of Free Speech and Rights of Labor,.
Sen. Rep . 46, Pt . 1, p. 3, and Report on Industrial Espionage, id., Pt . 3, pp. 27, 29.
15 For example, Matter of Baldwin Locomotive Works, 20 N. L. R. B. 11 . 00, 1122, enfd.
128 F . 2d 39 ( C. A. 3) ; Bethlehem Steel Co. v. N. L. R . B., 120 F . 2d 641 , 646 (App . D. C.),.
enfg. 14 N. L . R. B. 539; Montgomery Ward & Co. v. N. L. R. B., 115 F . 2d 700, 703 (C. A..
8) enfg . 17 N. L. R. B. 191 ; Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 114 F. 2d 930,.
937 (C . A. 1), approved in N. L. R. B. V. Donnelly Garment Co ., et al., 330 U. S. 219, 231.
11 °.. . because of the widespread feeling that all employers hate unions , the employee
does not expect his admission of union activity or membership to be used as a basis for,
promoting him or voluntarily giving him a raise. " R. D. Morgan, Employer's Freedom of
Speech and the Wagner Act ( 1946) 20 Tulane Law Rev . 469, 499 . , The U . S. Bureau of
Labor , after extensive investigation and interviewing of workmen , found " . . . an
almost universal fear that any attempt at union organization or group action by employees,
would be immediately known to mana gement officials, and would result in the discharge
of the leaders and participants of the movement .' " S. Rep . No. 15 1_ 77th Cong., 1st-
Sess., Labor Policies of Employers ' Associations, Pt. IV : "The 'Little Steel' Strike and.
Citizens ' Committees" ( 1941 ) pp. 40-41.
1362 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
titularly flagrant form of intimidation of individual employees." 17
The Board assumed the violation "obvious. " 19 Many courts did like-
wise.19 As the Board said, in Matter of Indianapolis Power & Light
Co.: 20
. . . attempts to elicit information of this character . . .
necessarily would intimidate, restrain and coerce [employees]
in the exercise of their rights to organize. Such interrogation
constitutes a threat that the Employer's economic power and su-
perior position may be used to the disadvantage of the individual
employees disclosed to be members of or active in the union.
And in Matter o l Botany Worsted Mills: 21
Its effect is to create immediate, personal fear of loss of em-
ployment in present and prospective members of the Union, and
it obviously constitutes, therefore, flagrant and unlawful inter-
ference, restraint, and coercion of employees.
Our experience demonstrates that the fear of subsequent discrimina-
tion which interrogation instills in the minds of employees is reason-
able and well-founded. The cases in which interrogated employees
have been discharged or otherwise discriminated against on the basis
of information obtained through interrogation are numerous .22
These cases demonstrate conclusively that, by and large, employers
who engage in this practice are not motivated by idle curiosity, but
rather by a desire to rid themselves of union adherents. In prohibit-
ing interrogation, therefore, we are not only preserving the em-
ployees' right to privacy in their union affairs; we are not only
removing a subtle but effective psychological restraint on employees'
concerted activities; but we are also seeking to prevent the commis-
sion of the further unfair labor practice of discrimination by con-
demning one of the first steps leading to such discrimination.
17 First Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board ( 1936) 76.
18 Matter of Greensboro Lumber Co., 1 N. L. R. B. 629, 632 ; Matter of Harrisburg
Children's Dress Co., 2 N. L. R. B. 1058, 1063, 1069, and others.
19 For example, H. J. Heinz Co. v. N. L. R. B., 311 U. S. 514, 518, 520 ; N. L. R. B. v.
Botany Worsted Mills, Inc., 106 F. 2d 263, 267 (C. A. 3) ; N. L. R. B. v. Norfolk Southern
Bus Corp., 159 F. 2d 516, 518 (C. A. 4), cert. den.. 330 U. S. 844; N. L. R. B. v. Harris-
Woodson Co., Inc., 162 F. 2d 97, 100 (C. A. 4) ; N. L. R. B. v. Brown Paper Mill Co.,
133 F . 2d 988 , 989 (C. A . 5) ; N. L. R . B. v. National Plastic Products Co., 175 F. 2d 755
(C. A. 4), 23 L. R. R. M. 2312, enfg. 78 N. L. R. B. 699.
20 25 N. L. R. B. 193 , at 204-205, enfd. as modified (on other grounds ) 122 F. 2d 757,
760 (C. A. 7), cert. den. 315 U. S. 804.
214 N. L. R. B. 292 , at 297-298, enfd . as modified ( on other grounds ) 106 F. 2d 263,
267 (C. A. 3).
22 See for example , Matter of Ford Brothers , 73 N. L . R. B. 49, and Matter of Texas
Miller Products, Inc., 83 N. L. R. B . 616. In the latter case an employee who had been
discharged complained to a management representative that other union adherents had
not been discharged . She was askod the names of these others , and gave them . They were
discharged the next morning on a wholly unsupported pretext of incompetence.
STANDARD-COOSA-THATCHER COMPANY 1363
: The. Respondent contends, however, that when, as here, employees
openly profess their union sympathy by wearing union buttons, they
have demonstrated that they have no fear of disclosing their union
sympathies and affiliation and may therefore properly be interrogated
on union matters. This argument loses sight of the essential character
of the restraint involved. The subtle pressure created by interroga-
tion results from the realization by the interrogated employee that
his employer is concerned with his union affiliation or activities and
will, therefore, act to the employee's detriment. The restraint and
coercion are in no way dissipated because the employee knows that,
by observing the union button, the employer, if he cared to, might
have. obtained some information without direct interrogation.23 In
any event, the scope of the Respondent's inquiries went beyond the
fact of union membership and into the realm of other matters not
voluntarily disclosed by the display of union buttons.
Finally, we again reject the contention that interrogation is pro-
tected by Section 8 (c) of the amended Act.24 Interrogation cannot
be considered an expression of "views, arguments, or opinion," within
the meaning of that provision. Moreover, the purpose of that section
is to permit an employer to express his views, not to license him to
extract those of his employees. The employer is explicitly accorded
a right to "influence" his employees by verbal appeals to reason, but
not to fear.'
2. We agree with the Trial Examiner's finding that the Respondent,
through Second Hand Smith, further violated Section 8 (a) (1) by
threatening to impose an increased work load and to eliminate wash-
room and other privileges if the Union won the election. The Trial
Examiner found no violation in Second Hand Fisher's telling Wood
that "the Union would put more work on them" or in Second Hand
Crawley's telling Johnson, that if the CIO got in the employees would
be out half the time on strikes, on the ground that these statements
were merely prophecies of the consequences of unionization, without
a threat by the Respondent to use its economic power to make such a
a As the Supreme Court observed in N. L . R. B. v. Link Belt Co., 311 U . S. 584, at 588:
"It is indeed a rare case where the finders of fact could probe the precise factors of motiva-
tion which underlay each employee 's choice . Normally , the conclusion that their choice
was restrained. by the employer's interference must of necessity be based on the existence
of conditions or circumstances which the employer creates or for which he is fairly respon-
sible and as a result of which it may reasonably be inferred that the employees did not have
the complete and unfettered freedom of choice which the Act contemplates ." See also
N. L. R. B. V. Ford Brothers. 170 F. 2d 735 (C. A. 6) enfg. 73 N. L. R. B. 49, supra.
14 Matter of Ames Spot Welder Co., Inc. , 75 N. L . It. B. 352 , footnote 6; Matter of
Wytheville Knitting Mills, Inc ., 78 N. L. It. B. 640 , enfd . as modified ( on other grounds)
175 F. 2d 238 (C. A. 3), 24 L. It. It. Al. 2108 ; Matter of Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co.,
81 N. L. It. B. 557 ; Iii,ctter of U. S. Trailer Mfg. Co., 82 N. L. R. B. 112, and others.
25 Compare 81 Cong. Rec., 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) 9689.
857829-50-vol. S5-87
1364, DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
prophecy come true.20 As no exceptions were taken to the findings
with respect to these statements of Fisher and Crawley, we adopt them,
without necessarily approving the Trial Examiner' s reasoning
thereon.21
3. The Trial Examiner found that the Respondent's rule against
solicitation during working hours 28 did not violate Section 8 (a) (1)
of the Act. We disagree. In Republic Aviation Corp. v. N. L. R. B.,
324 U. S. 793, the Supreme Court approved the presumption the Board
adopted in the Peyton Packing case.29 The court said (at 844) :
The Act, of course, does not prevent an employer from making
and enforcing reasonable rules covering the conduct of employees
on company time. Working time is for work. It is therefore
within the province of an employer to promulgate and enforce a
rule prohibiting union solicitation during working hours. Such
a rule must be presumed to be valid in the absence of evidence that
it was adopted for discriminatory purpose. [Emphasis supplied.]
In this case there is evidence that the rule was adopted for a discrim-
inatory purpose. Numerous circumstances here present compel the
inference that the Respondent adopted its general rule against solici-
tation during working hours in bad faith and without reasonable rela-
tion to the efficient operation of the plant, merely as a device to
obstruct or impede self-organization .30 The rule was admittedly pro-
mulgated for the purpose of stopping union solicitation at the very
time when the Union was beginning organizational activities.31 Al-
though the Respondent claimed the rule was necessitated by "promis-
cuous solicitation" of union membership during working hours, sev-
eral overseers testified to ignorance of any union solicitation and, aside
from the self-serving statement of one of the Respondent's witnesses,
there is no evidence, that union solicitation had impaired efficiency or
occasioned disturbances.
Most important, however, is the fact that, although phrased as a
general rule against solicitation, the rule was applied only to union
23 See Matter of Mylan-Sparta Company, Inc., 78 N . L. R. B. 1144.
27 Matter of Vermont American Furniture Corp ., 82 N. L . R. B. 408.
12 The rule stated : No employee is permitted to solicit membership in any organization
or to solicit signatures on any petition or carry on any other type of solicitation during
working hours, unless specific permission has been secured from the Company. Any
employee violating the foregoing shall be subject to immediate discharge."
20 49 N. L. R. B. 828, at 843-844.
30 See Denver Tent & Awning Co . v. N. L. R. B. , 138 F. 2d 410 ( C. A. 10 ; Boeing Airplane
Co. v. N. L. R. B., 140 F. 2d 423, 435 (C. A. 10, and cases cited therein.
31 See Matter of The Letz Mfg. Co ., 32 N. L . It. B. 563, 569; Matter of William Davies
Co., Inc. . 37 N. L . It. B. 631 , enfd . as modified ( on other grounds ) 135 F. 2d 179, 181
(C. A. 7).
STANDARD-COOSA-THATCHER COMPANY 1365
solicitation 32 The Respondent permitted extensive 'solicitation for
various social and charitable purposes, with obviously greater concern
for the nature of the solicited cause than for the effect upon produc-
tion 33
Upon the entire record we are convinced that the Respondent pro-
mulgated and enforced this rule for the sole purpose of preventing
self-organization. Accordingly we find both the promulgation and the
application of the rule violative of Section 8 (a) (1).34
4. For the reasons appearing in the Intermediate Report, we agree
with the Trial Examiner's finding that the Respondent did not violate
Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act in laying off William Grider or changing
Roy Bledsoe's job 35 We similarly agree that the lay-off of Frances
Bailey was discriminatory. However, we find, contrary to the Trial
Examiner , that the discharge of Kenner Walker violated Section 8 (a)
(3) 36
32 Hatter of Botany Worsted Mills, 4 N. L. R. B. 292, 313 , enfd. as modified ( on other
grounds), 106 F . 2d 263, 268-269 (C. A. 3 ) ; Matter of William Davies Co ., Inc., supra;
Cf. Matter of Macon Textiles , Inc., 80 N. L. R . B. 1525. See Note 33, infra. The Re-
spondent contends that Matter of Goldblatt Bros ., Inc., 77 N. L. It. B . 1262, commits the
Board to holding that an , employer may specifically restrict union organizational activi-
ties during working hours while permitting any other . That case , and Matter of J. L.
Hudson Co ., 67 N. L. R. B. 1403, also cited by the Respondent , involve the distinguishable
issue of whether the prohibition of union solicitation on the selling floor of a department
store is permissible when applied to the employees ' nonworking time. See also Matter
of Marshall Field h Co ., 34 N. L. It. B. 1, 10-11.
33 Respondent's witnesses testified that, after the posting of the rule, there were solicita-
tions during working hours for the Red Cross, Community Chest, flower funds, sick funds,
Christmas presents for supervisors , and for an employees ' sportsmen 's club. Superintendent
Walker's comments on permissible solicitation have obvious significance :
Q. . . . Well, you have testified about the solicitation you permitted for mem-
bership in the Sportsmen Club. Did you ever permit solicitation for membership
in other clubs or organizations?
A. No, the decision you'd have to arrive there seems as to whether or not the
club has really any direct benefits that may be mutually enjoyed by you, might say,
the company and employees.
Q. Well, if you thought that union membership would be for the benefit of your
own people , would you permit that solicitation?
A. I don ' t think I will ever think that. [ Emphasis supplied.]
Asked whether he would have permitted any union solicitation , Walker replied :
Wouldn't have permitted that at all.
34 Member Murdock is not satisfied that there is a preponderance of evidence to overcome
Superintendent Walker's testimony that the no -solicitation rule was promulgated because
solicitation was interfering with work and the plant was littered with union application
cards ; accordingly , he does not join in his colleagues ' finding that the promulgation of the
rule was violative of Section 8 (a) (1). He agrees, however, with the finding that the
rule was subsequently discriminatorily applied in violation of Section 8 (a) (1).
96 No exception was taken to the Bledsoe finding.
80 -Member Murdock agrees that the discharge of Walker violated Section 8 (a) (3).
However , he does not join his colleagues in relying on their prior finding that the no-
solicitation rule was invalid per se; he relies only on the discriminatory application of
the no - solicitation rule.
1366 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Kenner Walker was allegedly discharged for violating the Respond-
ent's no-solicitation rule. In the preceding section we have found
the promulgation and enforcement of this rule to have been violative
of Section 8 (a) (1). A discharge for violation of a discriminatory
company rule cannot be justified by the rule, and automatically par-
takes of the discrimination inherent in it.31 We believe, moreover,
that even if we had not found the rule valid, it is doubtful if its
violation can justify Walker's discharge, for it is not at all clear that
Walker's acceptance of an unsolicited application constituted "solici-
tation" within the meaning of the rule.' Finally, even if Walker
might reasonably have been found guilty of violating a valid rule, we
believe that the application of the rule in this case was mere pretense
whereby the Respondent effectively eliminated the chief advocate of
concerted action and unionization. This is strongly suggested by :
(1) the fact that when the no-solicitation rule was promulgated, it
was specifically brought to Walker's attention; 39 (2) the evidence of
entrapment in the manner in which Walker was apprehended; 40 (3)
the summary dispatch with which Walker was fired without any inves-
tigation of his reasons for adamantly denying the charge; 41 and (4)
the fact that employee Jenkins although equally involved in the solic-
itation incident, was not laid off.42 On the basis of the foregoing
facts, we find that the Respondent discriminatorily discharged Kenner
Walker in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) and (3).
ORDER
Upon the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Standard-Coosa-
27 Republic Aviation Corp . v. N. L. R. B., 324 U. S. 793 , 805 ; Matter of I. F. Sales Co.,
82 N. L. R. B. 137.
38 Walker testified : "I wasn't signing nobody up on Company time. I handed him
[Jenkins ] the book ... He was then soliciting me as far as this is concerned ." Wallace,
the supervisor who apprehended Walker, may have believed he saw Walker "soliciting,"
but such belief does not establish the Respondent ' s good faith in the discharge.
so Superintendent Walker testified that he had received reports, prior to the promulga-
tion of the rule, concerning union solicitation by Kenner Walker. No other employee
was so mentioned.
O Jenkins, the employee who volunteered to join the Union , was known to be unsym-
pathetic toward concerted action, being the sole doffer who had remained on the job
during the walk-out led by Kenner Walker on the wage issue. He admitted he had seen
Wallace following Kenner Walker when Walker returned with his membership book.
Despite the fact that he knew Wallace was watching , he proceeded to sign his name
and address.
41 Matter of Illinois Tool Works , 61 N. L. R. B. 1129, enfd . 153 F . 2d 811 (C. A. 7) ;
hfatter of Carter Carburetor Corp. , 48 N. L. R. B. 354, enfd . 140 F. 2d 714 (C. A. 8) ;
Shell Oil Co. v. N. L. R. B., 128 F. 2d 206, 207 (C. A. 5), enfg. 34 N. L. R. B. 866.
42 We reject the Trial Examiner ' s conclusion that there is no discrimination in the
application of a valid company rule unless the rule is discriminatory applied as between
different unions. See N. L. It. B. v. Bradford Dyeing Ass'n, 310 U. S. 318, 330; N. L. R. B.
v. Link-Belt Co., 311 U. S. 584, 589.
STANDARD -COOSA-THATCHER COMPANY 1367
Thatcher Company, Ridgedale, Tennessee, and its officers, agents, suc-
cessors, and assigns, shall :
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Discouraging membership in Textile Workers Union of Anmer-
ica, CIO, or any other labor organization of its employees, by dis-
charging or in any other manner discriminating in regard to the hire
and tenure of employment of any of its employees, or any term or
condition of employment;
(b) Interrogating its employees concerning their union affiliations,
activities, or sympathies, or those of their coworkers, or in any other
manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the
exercise of the right to self-organization, to form labor organizations,
to join or assist Textile Workers Union of America, CIO, or any other
labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the pur-
pose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to
refrain from any or all such activities except to the extent that such
right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor
organization, as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the amended Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer to Kenner Walker immediate and full reinstatement
to his former or substantially equivalent position 43 without prejudice
to his seniority or other rights and privileges;
(b) Make whole Kenner Walker for any loss of pay suffered by
reason of the Respondent's discrimination against him, by payment to
him of a sum of money equal to the amount which he normally would
have earned as wages during the period from the date of the Respond-
ent's discrimination to January 27, 1949, the date of the Intermediate
Report herein, and during the period from the date of our Decision and
Order herein to the date of the Respondent's offer of reinstatement,
less his net earnings " during said periods.'°
4' In accordance with the Board's consistent interpretation of the term, the expression
"former or substantially equivalent position " is intended to mean "former position wherever
possible and if such position is no longer in. existence then to a substantially equivalent
position." See Matter of The Chase National Bank of the City of New York, San Juan,
Puerto Rico, Branch, 65 N. L. R. B. 827.
44 By "net earnings " is meant earnings less expenses , such as for transportation, room,
and board , incurred by an employee in connection with obtaining work and working else-
where , which would not have been incurred but for this unlawful discrimination and the
consequent necessity of his seeking employment elsewhere . Matter of Crossett Lumber
Company, 8 N. L. R. B. 440. monies received for work performed upon Federal, State,
county, municipal , or other work -relief projects shall be considered as earnings . Republic
Steel Corporation v. N. L. R. B., 311 U. S. 7.
45 In accordance with our practice , the period from the date of the Intermediate Report
to the date of the Order herein will be excluded in computing the amount of back pay to
which Kenner walker may be entitled , because of the Trial Examiner ' s recommendation that
the complaint be dismissed as to him . Matter of Union Screw Products , 78 N. L. It. B.
1107 ; Matter of E. R . Hagelfinger Company , Inc., 1 N. L. R. B. 760.
1368 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(c) Make whole Frances Bailey for any loss of pay she may have
suffered by reason of the Respondent's discrimination against her by
payment to her of the sum of money equal to the amount which she
normally would have earned as wages during the period from the date
of the Respondent's discrimination to the date of the Respondent's of-
fer of reinstatement, less her net earnings during that period.
(d) Post at its plant in Ridgedale, Tennessee, copies of the notice
attached hereto marked "Appendix A."" Copies of said notice, to
be furnished by the Regional Director for the Tenth Region, shall,
after being duly signed by the Respondent's representative, be posted
by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and maintained
by it for sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material;
(e) Notify the Regional Director for the Tenth Region in writing,
within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, what steps the Re-
spondent has taken to comply herewith.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be, and it hereby is, dis-
missed insofar as it alleges that the Respondent discriminated in
regard to the hire or tenure of employment of Roy Bledsoe and
William Grider in violation of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
MEMBER GRAY took no part in the consideration of the above De-
cision and Order.
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor -Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that :
WE WILL NOT interrogate our employees concerning their union
affiliations, activities, or sympathies or those of their coworkers
or in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our
employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to
form labor organizations, to join or assist TEXTILE WORKERS
UNION OF AMERICA, CIO, or any other labor organization, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of col-
lective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain
w In the event that this Order is enforced by decree of a United States Court of Appeals,
there shall be inserted in the notice, before the words : "A DECISION AND ORDER," the
words : "A DECREE OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ENFORCING."
STANDARD-COOSA-THATCHER COMPANY 1369
from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such
right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in
a labor organization as a condition of employment, as author-
ized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the amended Act.
WE WILL OFFER Kenner Walker immediate and full reinstate-
ment to his former or substantially equivalent position without
prejudice to any seniority or other rights and privileges previ-
ously enjoyed.
WE WILL MAKE the employees named below whole for any loss
of pay suffered as a result of the discrimination against them.
Kenner Walker
Frances Bailey
All our employees are free to become, remain, or refrain from be-
coming members of the above-named union or any other labor organi-
zation except to the extent that this right may be affected by an agree-
ment in conformity with Section 8 (a) (3) of the amended Act. We
will not discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of employment or
any term or condition of employment against any employee because of
membership in or activity on behalf of any such labor organization.
STANDARD-COOSA-THATCHER COMPANY,
Employer.
Dated-------------- By--------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and
must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
INTERMEDIATE REPORT
Mr. Shally 0 . Wise, for the General Counsel.
Mr. Frank A. Constangv, of Atlanta, Ga., and Mr. Jac Chambliss, of
Chattanooga, Tenn., for the Respondent.
Mr. H. S. Williams, of Nashville, Tenn., and Mr. John J. Brownlee, of Atlanta,
Ga., for the Union.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon a fourth amended charge filed on April 7, 1948, by John J . Brownlee, as
representative for Textile Workers Union of America, C . I. 0., herein called the
Union, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, herein re-
spectively called the General Counsel and the Board, by the Regional Director
for the Tenth Region (Atlanta, Georgia), issued a complaint dated April 7, 1948,
against Standard-Coosa-Thatcher Company, herein called the Respondent , alleg-
ing that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in unfair labor prac-
tices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8 (1) and ( 3) and Section
2 (6) and ( 7) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat . 449, herein called
the Act , and Section 8 (a) (1) and (3) and Section 2 (6) and ( 7) of the Labor
1370 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 136, herein called the Amended Act.
Copies of the complaint and charge, together with notice of hearing, were duly
served upon the Respondent and the Union.
With respect to the unfair labor practices, the complaint in substance alleges
that the Respondent on about September 16, 1946, discharged Kenner Walker
and on about March 14, 1947, discharged William S. Grider because of their
membership in, and activities on behalf of, the Union and that, after their respec-
tive discharges, the Respondent failed and refused to reinstate them ; that be-
cause of the union membership and activities of Roy Bledsoe and Frances Bailey,
the Respondent on about April 18, 1947, demoted said Bledsoe and thereafter
failed and refused to reinstate him to his former position, and on about October
15, 1946, laid off said Bailey and thereafter failed and refused to reinstate her
until October 19, 1946; that from about July 24, 1946, to the date of the com-
plaint, the Respondent, by and through its officers, agents, and supervisory em-
ployees, threatened its employees that if union activity continued they would
suffer financial loss, would have an increased work load, would lose rest-room
and smoking privileges, would be demoted, and that the Respondent would close
the mill ; that the Respondent questioned employees concerning union membership
and activity, questioned them concerning their voting intentions in an election
to be conducted by the Board ; that the Respondent threatened employees with
discharge for union activity, threatened them with loss of promotion rights for
union activity, and warned its employees to refrain from assisting, becoming
members of, or remaining members of, the Union. The complaint also alleged that
the Respondent threatened its employees with punishment after death for union
activity, but the complaint did not disclose what agency the Respondent would
engage to carry out this threat. On April 13, 194S, the Respondent moved the
Regional Director for a bill of particulars. The motion was "reserved for, and
transferred to the Trial Examiner" by order of the Regional Director. The Chief
Trial Examiner designated Trial Examiner Martin Bennett and referred the
motion to him. On April 27, 1948, Trial Examiner Bennett issued an order
granting in part and denying in part the motion for a bill of particulars. Pur-
suant to said order, the Respondent was furnished with particulars on May 5,
1948, and with additional particulars on May 14, 1948.
The Respondent's answer, duly filed on May 20, 1948, denies the commission
of all the alleged unfair labor practices and affirmatively pleads. in substance
that it discharged said Walker for violation of a specific, posted rule "against
solicitation or engaging in personal or outside business during working hours
while at work without express permission" ; that said Grider, along with 16
other employees, was "'separated" because of curtailment of operations in ac-
cordance with the requirements of the Respondent's business and in keeping with
its general policy as to reduction of force ; that Bailey was laid off as a dis-
ciplinary measure, in accordance with the Respondent's regular practice and
customs, for being absent without notice on a day when other employees of the
same department were required to and did work. The answer further alleged
that the complaint was issued in violation of Section 10 (b) of the Amended Act.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held from July 13 to 17, inclusive, 1948,
at Chattanooga, Tennessee, before the undersigned Trial Examiner, duly desig-
nated by the Chief Trial Examiner in lieu of Trial Examiner Bennett. The
General Counsel and the Respondent were represented by counsel' and the
Union was represented by its state director and by the assistant to its general
1 Counsel for the General Counsel will be herein referred to as G. C. counsel.
. STANDARD-COOSA-THATCHER COMPANY 1371
counsel. All participated in the hearing and were afforded full opportunity
to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce. evidence
pertaining to the issues.
At the opening of the hearing, G. C. counsel moved to amend paragraph IV
of the complaint by changing the word "officiated" to "affiliated." The motion
was granted. During the testimony of Kenner Walker, alleged in the complaint
to have been discriminatorily discharged, G. C. counsel moved to amend the
complaint by changing the date of the alleged discharge from September 16 to
September 23. The motion was granted. Near the conclusion of the evidence
offered by the G. C. counsel and upon his representation that any subsequent
testimony would not relate to the supervisors hereafter named, Respondent's
counsel moved to strike from paragraph II of the complaint the names of certain
supervisors alleged to have engaged in conduct violative of Section 8 (1) of the
Act, as reenacted in Section 8 (a) (1) of the Amended Act, viz, Charlie Walls,
Robert Womack, J. C. Wallace, Paul Hall, and Vice-President Gamble. The
motion was granted. At the conclusion of the General Counsel's case Respond-
ent's counsel moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it had been
issued in violation of Section 10 (b) of the Amended Act. The motion was denied
without prejudice to the right of the Respondent to argue the matter in its brief?
Respondent's counsel then moved to dismiss the complaint insofar as it
alleged in paragraph XI that the Respondent, through its official or supervisory
employee C. B. Walker, had violated the Act or Amended Act by threatening or
questioning employees as alleged in said paragraph. Ruling was reserved thereon.
It is hereby granted. Respondent's counsel next moved to dismiss the com-
plaint as to Roy. Bledsoe, who the complaint alleges was discriminatorily demoted.
This motion was denied without prejudice to the Respondent's right to make
a similar motion at the conclusion of the Respondent 's case. Respondent's
counsel then moved to dismiss the entire case. This motion was similarly denied
without prejudice.
At the close of the hearing, G. C. counsel moved generally to amend the
pleadings to conform to the proof as to formal matters, including dates and
specifically moved to amend the complaint to change the dates alleged for the
lay-off of Frances Bailey from October 15-19 to December 14-16, 1946. These
motions were granted. Respondent's counsel renewed his motion to dismiss the
2 The original charge, filed on September 24, 1946, alleged that the Respondent had dis-
charged one Elliott in violation of Section 8 (3) of the Act and thereby "and by other acts
and conduct" the Respondent had violated Section 8 (1) of the Act. The first amended
charge, filed October 11, 1946, added as an additional alleged violation of Section 8 (3) the
name of one Carroll, but made no other charge. The second amended charge filed May 12,
1947, was the same with the addition of the names of Kenner W. Wacker [Walker], Frances
Bailey, one Fawbush, William S. Grider, and Roy Bledsoe Jr., under the 8 (3) allegations
of the charge. The third amended charge was the same as the second except for the spelling
of one name; Kenner W. Wacker was changed to Kenner W. Walker. Copies of each of the
foregoing charges were served upon the Respondent by registered mail and were received
by it on July 2, 1947. The fourth amended charge on which the complaint issued was filed
on April 7, 1948. This charge added nothing new but dropped the names of all but Walker,
Bailey, Grider, and Bledsoe, and dropped part of the charge of discrimination as to Bailey.
The unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint were limited to those contained in the
fourth amended charge. Of these charges the Respondent was apprised by the third
amended charge on July 2, 1947, before the effective date of the Amended Act. The limita-
tion upon time for filing of the charge under Section 10 (b) of the Amended Act therefore
has no application here. Matter of Union Products Co., 75 N. L. R. B . 591 ; Matter of
Vanette Hosiery Mills, 80 N. L . R. B. 1116.
1372 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
complaint on the merits and on the ground that it had been issued in violation
of Section 10 (b) of the Amended Act. Ruling on the motion to dismiss on
the merits was reserved. It is now denied in part and granted in part as here-
inafter indicated. The motion to dismiss based on Section 10 (b) of the Amended
Act was denied, but the undersigned agreed to reconsider the ruling if he was
convinced by the Respondent's brief that the ruling was wrong.
Upon request of Respondent's counsel, a date was fixed for the filing of briefs.
The parties waived oral argument but cited authorities which they contended
supported their respective theories. A brief was received from the Respondent
on September 13, 1948. No other briefs were received. The undersigned has
considered the Respondent's argument for dismissal of the complaint on the
grounds of noncompliance with Section 10 (b) of the Amended Act as contained
in its brief and finds no reason to change his previous ruling.
Upon the entire record and from his observation of the witnesses, the under-
signed makes the following :
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The Respondent, a Tennessee corporation, has an office and place of business
in Ridgedale (a suburb of Chattanooga), Tennessee, known as the Ridgedale
plant, where it is engaged in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of textile
products. During the period of 1 year prior to the issuance of the complaint
the Respondent in the course and conduct of its business operations at the
Ridgedale plant purchased raw materials consisting principally of cotton, parts,
and supplies valued at more than $3,500,000, approximately 95 percent of which
represented purchases of such raw materials outside the State of Tennessee
which were shipped in interstate commerce to the Respondent's Ridgedale plant
in Chattanooga. During the same period, the Respondent processed, manufac-
tured, and sold textile products valued at more than $5,000,000, of which ap-
proximately 75 percent was from products which were sold and shipped to points
outside the State of Tennessee. The Respondent concedes that it is engaged
in commerce within the meaning of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Textile Workers Union of America, affiliated with the Congress of Industrial
Organizations, is a labor organization admitting to membership employees of
the Respondent.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Interference, restraint, and coercion
In April 1947 a Board-conducted election was held to determine whether or not
a union of employees in the Thatcher building of the Respondent's Ridgedale
plant wished to be represented by the Union for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining.' Before the date of this election, supervisors of the Respondent en-
gaged extensively in conversations with employees about the Union and the
coming election.
Sidney German,' a section man, somewhat reluctantly testified that in about
October 1946 he, along with another section man, attended a union meeting.
8 Case No. 10-R-2246.
4 Sometimes spelled Jerman in the transcript.
STANDARD-COOSA-THATCHER COMPANY 1373
About a week thereafter, at a regular meeting of three or four section men with
L. C. Stacey, their second hand, Stacey said he had heard that they, or some
of them, had attended a union meeting and that he wanted to learn the facts,
because if section men did go to the meeting the employees might be affected
thereby. A sweeper named Sain, who was claimed to have reported the fact to
Stacey, was present, and in response to a question by Stacey, he denied that he
had seen the two section men at the meeting. At the representation case hearing
on October 22, 1946, the Respondent took the position that section men were
supervisors 6 The Board decided otherwise in its Decision and Direction of
Election in April 1947 6 Although the Respondent may have honestly believed
that section men were supervisors, its mistake was one of law and is not an
excuse for unlawful conduct.' Its questioning of the section men as well as of
Sain constituted interference with the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
German also credibly testified that at another meeting between Stacey and his
section men beforq the 1947 election, Stacey asked them to talk to the employees
to find out how they felt about the Union and how they were going to vote.' It
does not appear that Stacey made any further inquiries of the section men or
that the section men acted on Stacey's request. It is reasonably inferable,
however, that Stacey in the first instance was requesting the section men to get
such information for him. By such request the Respondent attempted to interfere
with its employees' right to self-organization, in violation of Section 8 (1) of
the Act as reenacted in Section 8 (a) (1) of the Amended Act. It is immaterial
that the attempt may not have resulted in compliance by the section men.'
German further testified that his overseer, T. A. Peden, a month or two before
the 1947 election asked him how "we" were going to vote in the election. The
witness did not explain whether the word "we" referred to the section men or
to all the employees, but as already found, it would be immaterial since section
hands were nonsupervisory. Questioning of employees about union sentiments
and how they intend to vote in a union election is proscribed by the Act 10
According to employee Joseph Newberry, a sweeper, his second hand, Robert
Smith, on the morning of the election stopped Newberry, who was sweeping, and
said that if Newberry went out and voted for "that thing called Union, that
Communism, you will be on that broom until you are old and gray." 11 Newberry,
who was wearing half a dozen union buttons at the time, testified that he replied
6 At an election earlier in 1946, the Union had challenged German's vote as that of a
supervisor. This was an election conducted without a hearing and the status of the
section men was not then determined.
6 73 N, L. R, B. 123 at 126.
7 Matter of American Needlecraft8, Inc., 59 N. L. R. B. 1384.
8 Stacey admitted that he sometimes asked employees how the Union was going and
that he had probably done so at the time of the April 1947 election.
9 Matter of Dixie Shirt Co., Inc., 79 N. L. R. B. 127.
f0 Matter of Wytheville Knitting Mills, Inc., 78 N. L. R. B . 640; Matter of Artcraft
Hosiery Co., 78 N. L. R. B. 333; Matter of Differential Steel Car Company, 75 N. L. R. B.
714; Matter of A. B. Fletcher et at., 78 N. L. R. B. 1215; Matter of Wadesboro Full Fash-
ioned Hosiery Mills, Inc., 72 N. L. R. B. 1064; Matter of Magnolia Cotton Mill Co., Inc.,
79 N. L. R. B. 91.
Ernest Biddy, a section man, reluctantly testified to a conversation with Peden about
the Union. Biddy's unrefreshed memory was bad and his refreshed memory was conflicting
and unreliable. The undersigned has therefore made no findings on the basis of Biddy's
testimony.
11 On cross-examination Newberry testified that in December 1947 Smith transferred him
to a skilled job.
1374 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
that he was .a member and would vote for the Union, and then he quoted Smith
as saying that he should not do that-that there was "nothing but a bunch of
foreigners running it." He also quoted Smith as saying, "If you boys go ahead
and vote that thing in here, you will be sweeping, and it will be years before
you ever get off of it." He further testified that Smith said the employees would
have more to do, that "they would put more work on each one." Smith testified
that he had had only one conversation with Newberry and that was about 3
months before the election when Smith took Newberry off of twisting and made
him a sweeper ; that Newberry brought up the subject of the Union himself by
commenting that when the Union came in he would have a good job ; and that
he (Smith) replied that if the Union did come in, Newberry would probably
have to bid on a job that came open, and the man best qualified for the job would
get it regardless of seniority. If both Newberry and Smith were testifying as
to the only conversation they had relative to the Union, their differences as to
when and what was said indicates either that their memories were seriously
blunted by lapse of time or that one was deliberately altering the facts in his
testimony. From his observation of the witnesses, the undersigned concludes that
the former is the case. Reconstructing the facts with due allowances for for-
getfulness, the undersigned concludes that the conversation occurred between
the time of Newberry's assignment to sweeping and the time of the election in
April 1947. Slight deviations in Newberry's testimony lead to the conclusion
that Smith may not have said in so many words that Newberry would be on
the broom until he was old and gray, and that reference to Newberry's own work
was substantially as testified by Smith, but parts of Smith's later testimony
convince the undersigned, and he finds, that Smith indicated to Newberry that
more work would be put onto the employees if the Union came into the plant, i. e.,
won the election. This statement is coercive and as such violates Section 8 (1)
of the Act as reenacted in Section 8 (a) (1) of the Amended Act.
Employee Charles Parker testified that about a week before the 1947 election,
the same Smith came to him and asked how he felt about the Union, and that,
when he replied he did not know, Smith said that if the Union got in, the em-
ployees would not have the privilege of going to the washroom to smoke when
they were caught up on their work, as they then had, and that they would have
to work straight 8 hours. Parker also quoted Smith as saying in the same
conversation that before the Union got in at the Respondent's Sauquoit mill at
Gadsden, Alabama, there were seven doffers in the spinning room and after the
Union got in there the number of such employees was reduced to four. Smith
testified to having made similar statements in a different setting. He testified
that about the time of the election he walked into the washroom one night, that
there was a group of five or six employees, including Parker, sitting there
talking about the Union, "and it came in handy for me to tell them if a union did
come in that they could look to the way it happened down at Gadsden, that they
had seven doffers down there and they cut them down to three and a half, and
they could use their own judgment about what they thought about it." In the
same conversation, he testified, "I told them if it [the Union] come in they might
not have the same privileges they now have . . . of when they get around, why,
they can go smoke, have a rest period . . . that they might have some kind of
smoking card to punch in and out if they had the privilege of smoking." Accept-
ing Smith's version as substantially correct, the undersigned concludes that
Smith's remarks were designed to indicate to the employees that, if the Union
won the election, the Respondent would increase the work load and reduce the
STANDARD-COOSA-THATCHER COMPANY 1375
employees' rest and smoking privileges. This goes beyond the expression of
views, arguments, or opinions. Smith's remarks carry a threat which makes
them coercive in character.
Employee Thomas Womack testified that shortly before the April 1947 election
his second hand, Ben Crawley, came to him as he was working and asked what
he thought about the Union, that lie replied he would rather not say, that in
talking about the job, Crawley asked if he liked it, that he replied, "Pretty well,"
and that Crawley remarked, "You had better remember that on the date of the
election." Crawley admitted that be had asked Womack what he thought about
the Union or how he felt about the Union but testified that Womack replied he
did not think much of the Union and intended to vote against it, whereupon
Crawley commended him ; thus Crawley inferentially denied the latter part of
Womack's testimony. The undersigned finds that Crawley did not make the
statement quoted above in any form suggesting a threat. Even according to
Crawley's own version, however, his questioning of Womack about his union views
was improper and in violation of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
A few days before the April 1947 election, according to the testimony of em-
ployee Willie Sparks, who ran frames, Crawley came to where she was working
and asked how she was going to vote, that she replied she did not know, and
that Crawley then asked why she wanted a union and said that if a union came
in she might have to do her own doffing or might even have to go back to doffing.
Crawley denied that he had asked Sparks how she was going to vote but testified
that he had asked her why she was in sympathy with the Union or why she
wanted a union.12 Whether or not Crawley specifically asked Sparks how she
was going to vote, the undersigned concludes that Crawley asked Sparks about
her union sentiments at the time lie did for the purpose of learning how she
intended to vote and that by such questioning the Respondent interfered with
the rights of the employees guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.'a
Employee Robert Posey, a nephew of Overseer Luke Ezell, testified that about
a week before the April 1947 election, Crawley, his second hand, came to him and
asked him how lie was going to vote. On Posey's reply that he did not know,
Crawley asked him if he wanted to vote against Ezell . Posey replied in the
negative and Crawley asked if he had made up his mind how he was going to
vote. Posey replied that he did not know how he was going to vote and Crawley
said, "Let me tell you." Then Crawley told Posey that he was too young "to
fool with union," that he did not know what it was all about. Crawley admitted
that before the election he had asked Posey what he thought about the Union
but denied he had asked him how he was going to vote. In other respects
Crawley's account of the conversation was similar to Posey's. The undersigned
credits Posey's testimony and finds that Crawley did question him as to how he
intended to vote.
Viola Johnson, a doffer in the card room in 1947, testified that just before the
election in April, Crawley brought her a four-page letter about the Union and the
coming election signed by Respondent's president, R. C. Thatcher, and asked
her why she thought the employees needed the Union there , saying that he
thought the Respondent had been pretty nice to the employees. When Johnson
v Both Sparks and Crawley testified that he asked Sparks if she had enough money to
tide her over in the event of a strike , and when she said she had, he asked what about
the men with children . She replied that they did not think about her and she was not
worried about them . Crawley said that someday she would have to face her Master. The
undersigned finds no violation of the Act in this part of Crawley's statements.
is Matter of Sohio Pipe Line Company , 75 N. L. R. B. 858.
1376 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
said she thought she had been "done pretty dirty," Crawley said that if they got
the CIO in there they would be out of work half the time on strike, and that the
other companies would not buy from the Respondent because the employees had
been striking. Johnson further testified that Crawley asked how she was going
to vote, and that when she replied by asking what business it was of his, Crawley
had said that if they got the CIO in, they would be sorry, that they "should be
sure to know what they were doing before they voted." Crawley testified with
reference to this incident that he had given Johnson the letter she referred to
as he was distributing them to all the employees under his supervision, some 80
in number. Crawley denied that he had asked Johnson how she was going to
vote or that she had told him that it was none of his business but admitted that
he had asked her why she felt she needed the CIO in there and otherwise partially
corroborated Johnson's testimony. The undersigned finds that Crawley ques-
tioned Johnson as to her attitude toward the Union to learn how she intended
to vote in the election. As already stated, such questioning interfered with,
coerced, and restrained the employees in their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of
the Act as reenacted in Section 7 of the Amended Act.
According to the credited testimony of Henry Frazier, an oiler in the spinning
room of the Thatcher plant, a few days before the April 1947 election, first,
Overseer A. C. Brown, and later, Second Hand Roger Philpott came to him
while he was working and asked him what he thought about the election 14 To
each Frazier replied that he thought the Union would win. Brown asked Frazier
if he did not know that "all this stuff started over in Russia," and asked if he
knew any of the officials of the Union. Brown concluded his remarks by saying,
"Well, everybody to their own opinion." Frazier quoted Philpott as asking, in
addition to the question about the election, if he had not always treated Frazier
right. Frazier wore a union button at the time of the foregoing incidents and
might have been presumed to be a union supporter 16 The remarks of Brown and
Philpott were probably casual and, except for the questioning about the election,
were unquestionably noncoercive. Even though Frazier was wearing a union
button at the time Brown and Philpott asked Frazier what he thought about
the election, the questioning is not to be condoned.1° The undersigned finds that
by the questioning of Frazier by Brown and Philpott the Respondent violated
Section 8 (1) of the Act as reenacted in Section 8 (a) (1) of the Amended Act.
Edward D. Poole, a fixer in the spinning room, testified without denial that
Brown, who was also his overseer, came to him a few days before the April 1947
election and asked if he was a member of the Union. Poole's second hand, Wade
Fisher, according to Poole's credited testimony, asked Poole a few days before the
election what he thought about the election.
According to the credited testimony of employee Joe Wood, Second Hand Fisher,
in a conversation with him in the washroom about a week before the election,
asked if Wood thought the Union would win the election. Wood said he thought
it would. Fisher asked by how much, and Wood said he thought it would win
by 75 percent. Fisher said the Union would not lighten his work load. Wood
replied that they did not want to lighten the load, that they wanted to hold it the
way it was. Fisher said the Union would put more work on them. The last
statement was not further explained but does not in itself mean that the
14 Neither Brown nor Philpott testified.
15 Some employees wore ribbons bearing the printed words, "DON'T LET US DOWN
VOTE NO." Some wore both ribbons and union buttons.
16 Matter of Sohio Pipe Line Company, 75 N. L. R. B. 858 ; Matter of Wadesboro Full-
Fashioned Hosiery Mills, Incorporated, 72 N. L. R. B. 1064.
STANDARD-COOSA-THATCHER COMPANY 1377
Respondent would increase the work load. The questioning about the election,
however, is a part of the general pattern set by the Respondent of sounding the
employees out to learn their union views and is found to be part of the
Respondent's conduct of interference, restraint, and coercion 11
Employee Horace England, who is president of the local of the Union, in
September 1946 was passing out leaflets for the Union at the front gate of the
Thatcher plant about 6 a. in. one morning as the third shift was coming out of the
plant. At about this time, when the first shift had about all gone into the plant
and the third shift employees were leaving, Overseer Luke Ezell arrived. England
handed Ezell a leaflet and Ezell stood by the gate until most of the third-shift
employees had left. Then he entered the gate. As he passed England, he spoke
to him. According to England's testimony, Ezell said, "It don't look like you are
going to be here long." According to Ezell's testimony he said, "Horace , it looks
like you are about through." Ezell then entered the gate and went into the plant.
England testified that he replied to Ezell's comment by saying, "I have been here
a long time . May stay a good while yet." Ezell denied that England said that to
him. Ezell testified that he meant that, as the third shift was just about all out,
England was about through passing out his leaflets. The undersigned finds that,
whether England or Ezell gave the correct quotation of Ezell's words, Ezell meant,
as may reasonably be inferred, that England was nearly through passing out
leaflets for the change of shift. It is also found that, if England replied to
Ezell as he testified he did, Ezell did not hear him.
A few days before the election, Second Hand Eugene Denson spoke to a few
employees about the election. According to the credited testimony of employee
Elodict Gann, Denson came to her a few days before the April 1947 election as
she was working and said he wished she would vote against the Union, saying
that they did not need it. He asked her if the Company had not been good to
her and she replied that it had. Doris Gurley, Gann's daughter, testified that
Denson had come to where she was working 2 or 3 days before the election and
asked her if she belonged to the Union, that she had replied in the affirmative, and
that Denson had then said, "Well, you are going to have an election next Thursday
night ... I want you to help me vote this thing out." Denson testified that he had
had no conversation with Gurley but that she worked close to her mother and he
had stopped to talk with Gann one day when he found her crying. Upon inquiry,
Gann told him, he testified, that the section man had "jumped on" her for being
behind and that he was mad because she belonged to the Union ; he told her,
according to his testimony, that he said he did not care if she belonged to the
Union or did not belong to it, "just so she kept up her job." Although Denson was
somewhat guarded in his testimony at times, the improbability that he would,
immediately after having been informed that Gurley was a union member,
imperiously tell her that he wanted her to help vote the Union out, tends to
raise doubt as to the accuracy of Gurley's testimony 18 The undersigned , therefore,
makes no finding thereon. It is not improbable that both Gann and Denson
related that part of their conversation which each remembered, but in that
conversation, even as related by Gann, Denson made no coercive statements.
'T Matter of Wadesboro Full-Fashioned Hosiery Mills, Inc., 72 N. L. R. B. 1064.
19 Gurley testified further that Denson asked what she thought about "It" ; that she re-
plied that if she voted against the Union, she would have to think about it; that he said
it would make work harder, that they had a union at Piedmont (a plant of the Respondent
at Piedmont, Alabama) and the employees who ran lappers had to run five lappers instead
of four. Although the undersigned believes this statement may have been made to Gurley
by someone, he believes and finds that it was not Denson who made It.
0
1378 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
. Gurley, Gann, and employee Robert Merritt each testified that on the shift
before the election began Denson came to them individually and spoke to them
about the election. Gurley and Gann each testified that Denson came to them
and told them to stop their machines earlier than usual, punch out, and go vote.
Gurley also testified that Denson said, "Let's vote this thing out of here,"
and that when she shook her head, he had said, "I don't see why you want
to throw yourself down to something like that, you are too good of a hand."
According to Gann, Denson said, "Now, we want to keep this Union out of here
if we can . . . I am depending on you to help ine keep it out." No violation of
the Act is found in this statement. Merritt testified that Denson came to him
just before he went off work the morning of the election and asked how he was
going to vote; that he did not reply; that Denson had said, "Well, if it was
me, why, I would vote for the Company . . . As far as that nobody would never
know it but me and you." Merritt's memory did not appear to the undersigned
to be quite fresh on some of Benson's quoted statements. Realizing the varia-
tions in the manner in which Denson may have made inquiry of Merritt, that
Merritt did not quote Denson verbatim when testifying to Denson's question as
to how he was going to vote, and being of the impression that Merritt's memory
was not fully reliable, the undersigned makes no finding that Denson asked
Merritt specifically how he was going to vote. Denson had received orders to,
inform all the employees under his sape-rvision that they should punch out 10
minutes early to vote. In going the rounds, the evidence is convincing, Denson
urged them to vote against the Union. In doing so he may have asked questions,
but the undersigned is not satisfied that the evidence so establishes.
Two or three months before the election, England went to the cardroom
office to get his pay check. Denson, who was then substituting for Crawley,
gave England his check. Then, according to England's testimony, Denson asked
how the CIO was getting along; England replied "Fine" and Denson then
said, "Don't you know you don't have to be in a CIO . . . they like you here . . .
you can get something around here. That old CIO ain't no good." Denson's
version of the conversation differed. But even as given by England , Denson's
words were not coercive. The question of how the CIO was getting along, asked
of a leader of the Union, the undersigned construes under the facts here to be
no more than a greeting or a. question of how England was getting along.
On April 14, 1947, 3 days before the scheduled election, President Thatcher
wrote a letter which was distributed to employees in the mill. This letter,
which is copied in Appendix A hereof, clearly demonstrated that the Respondent
was opposed to the Union. The undersigned finds, however, that the letter
contains only such expressions of opinion as are protected by the constitutional
guaranty of free speech. Such expressions, not coercive per se, do not become
coercive because made in a setting of unfair labor practices."
In summary, the undersigned finds that by the questioning of employees con-
cerning their attitude toward the Union and their intentions in -voting, by
Stacey, Smith, Crawley, Brown, and Fisher, and by the threat of more work
and loss of privileges by Smith, the Respondent interfered with, restrained, and
coerced its employees in violation of Section 8 (1) of the Act as reenacted in
Section 8 ( a) (1) of the Amended Act. The Respondent in its brief argues
that such questioning was permissible free speech . Questioning is not itself an
expression of "views, arguments, or opinions" which, if noncoercive, are within
'9 Matter of Wrought Iron Range Co., 77 N. L. R. B. 48T; Hatter of The Bailey Company,
75 N. L. R . B. 941 ; Matter of Tygart Sportswear Company et at., 77 N. L. R. B. 613.
STANDARD-COOSA-'THATCHER COMPANY 1379
the recognized bounds of free speech. It could hardly be argued that a question
as to how an employee had voted in a collective bargaining election would not
be an unwarranted interference with the employee's rights. So, too, an em-
ployer is not privileged to question employees in advance of an election to ascer-
tain how they intend to vote. Questioning about union views and sentiments
is just one way of learning the employees' voting intentions. Although it has
been held that such questioning is per se coercive, it is the opinion of the under-
signed that Congress may proscribe other verbal acts than coercive statements
without impinging on the 'constitutional right of free speech 20 One test applied
to determine whether speech may be prohibited is the "clear and present danger"
test2' Inherent in questioning of employees by employers is the danger that
information elicited will be used for the purpose of discriminating against
union adherents. It is little comfort to employees that discrimination is pro-
scribed by the Act and Amended Act and that they may file a charge with
the Board in the event of such discrimination, since the existence of a remedy
and the ability to prove by substantial evidence that the facts exist which
call for an application of the remedy are.not the same' thing. Employees
should be protected not merely against proved discrimination but also against
any opportunity for discrimination. If coercion alone is the test of violation
of Section 8 (1) and Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act and Amended Act, it must
be presumed that Congress had no purpose in including the additional words,
"interfere with" and "restrain." u The undersigned does not construe the
Supreme Court decision in the Virginia Electric case 23 as holding either that
Congress intended nothing by the additional words or that Congress could not
constitutionally legislate against the dangers inherent in such interference with
the rights of employees as questioning them about their union membership,
views, voting intentions, and the like. The undersigned accordingly finds that
such questioning not only tends to have coercive effect but that, whether or not
it is coercive, it is an interference with the rights of employees safeguarded by
the Act and Amended Act and is a violation of Section 8 (1) of the Act, which
remains unchanged in Section 8 (a) (1) of the Amended Act.
B. The alleged discriminations
1. The discharge of Walker
(a) Background
Kenner Walker was first employed by the Respondent in 1929 and thereafter
was employed for short periods of time in 1931, 1934-5, 1941-2, and finally
1945-6, with most of the intervening time being spent in the Army. His last
period of employment by the Respondent began in 1945 when he received a
medical discharge from the Army. During the latter portion of his employment
lie was permitted to work in the afternoons from the time that he got off from
school. During August and September of 1946 Walker was a doffer in the
20 Campaign speeches in party politics by a certain class of Federal employees may appar-
ently be prohibited without regard to whether or not the speeches would have a coercive
effect. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75. The "sphere of communication"
may constitutionally be confined . Carpenters & Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U . S. 722.
21 Schenck V. United States, 249 U. S. 47.
22 It should not be forgotten that the language of Section 8 (1) of the Act and Section 8
(a) . (1) of the Amended Act is in the disjunctive, "interfere with, restrain, or coerce."
23 N. L. R. B. v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 314 U. S. 469.
857829-50-vol. 85-88
1380 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
spinning room of the Thatcher plant on the second shift, with hours from 2 p. m.
tolOp.m.
On a Friday in the latter part of August 1946, A. C. Brown, the overseer,
announced to the second-shift doffers that on the following Monday they would
be put on a piecework rate. Walker told Brown that when the piece rate went
into effect he would punch out. The following Monday Walker refused to do
the work on the piece-rate basis. Brown and Philpott, the second hand, came
and found all of the doffers sitting down. Brown told them to get on the job,
and Walker replied that he would get on his regular job, evidently meaning he
would work only on an hourly rate. Brown said that he would discharge him
if he did not doff piecework. Walker told him to go ahead and discharge him.
Brown did so, and sent a guard to escort Walker out of the plant. Most of the
other second-shift doffers went out with him.
These doffers were sitting in front of the plant gate at 10 p. m. at the time
when the third shift arrived to go to work. They explained to the third-shift
doffers that they were out there in protest of the piecework rate. The third-
shift doffers thereupon joined the second-shift doffers outside the plant. Soon
thereafter, Charles Walker, general superintendent of the Thatcher plant (here-
inafter called Superintendent Walker, while Kenner Walker will be called
Walker), sent for the speaker of the doffers. Although Walker had been elected
as speaker, he took the rest of the doffers with him. Walker acted as spokesman
for the doffers in the conference with Superintendent Walker which followed.
The Thatcher plant had two mills, known as the old mill and the new mill.
The doffers in the old mill had already been put on piece rate before the walk-out
of the new mill doffers herein related. Superintendent Walker said that if
enough of the doffers in the old mill wanted to go back on an hourly rate, he
would agree to an hourly rate for all, and he asked them to sign a petition.
The number of doffers used for piece work was four. At this time the doffers
also requested that there be five doffers. This request was granted, as well as
the request to go on an hourly rate. The second-shift doffers then went in with
the third-shift doffers and helped to get the work caught up.
Walker had joined the Union prior to the election in June 1946, but had not
been active. After the walk-out of the doffers in August of that year, he began
to sign employees up in the Union. At regular meetings of the overseers and
second hands, report was made that Walker had been soliciting members for
the Union in the plant. Superintendent Walker, who testified that people were
being interfered with in their work and that the plant was littered with blue
application cards of the Union, asked the Respondent's president, R. C. Thatcher,
for a notice prohibiting solicitation in the plant. The following notice was then
prepared:
NOTICE
2: 00 p. m., SEPTEMBER 9, 1946.
To OUR EMPLOYEES :
No employee is permitted to solicit membership in any organization or to
solicit signatures on any petitions or carry on any other type of solicitation
during working hours, unless specific permission has been secured from the
Company.
Any employee violating the foregoing shall be subject to immediate
discharge.
R. C. THATCHER, President.
STANDARD-COOSA-THATCHER COMPANY 1381
At about the date of this notice and before it was posted, Walker went to
Superintendent Walker's office with a petition signed by seven doffers request-
ing that the number of doffers be increased from five to six. Superintendent
Walker denied the petition and,- while Walker was there, showed him the fore-
going notice. Thereafter, at the time stated thereon, the notice was posted in all
departments of the Thatcher plant.
(b) The circumstances leading to Walker's, discharge
Doffers do not doff steadily. When. they, completed one doff, they have about
30 minutes before the next doff. During this period, they are given considerable
liberty in going about the plant and in talking to other employees. On Friday
night, September 20, 1946, at about 9: 45 p. in., Walker completed his work on
doffing, and as he would have no more work to do before the end of his shift at
10 o'clock he left the new mill in which he was working and crossed the passage-
way leading to the adjoining old mill to talk to other employees until the end
of this shift. In the old mill, Ernest Jenkins, a doffer, called to Walker and asked
if he could join the Union. Walker replied that he saw no reason why he could
not, and returned to the locker room in the new mill, got his book of applications
and receipts, and returned to Jenkins. At this time, Jenkins had finished doffing
and was engaged in "piecing his frame up." Walker handed Jenkins the book,
telling him to put his name and address in it. As Jenkins was writing his name
and address, Calvin Wallace, a second hand who was that evening substituting
for Philpott, the regular second hand, came up behind Walker and Jenkins.
Jenkins noticed Wallace and interrupted his writing. Wallace said to Jenkins,
"Go ahead and sign." Jenkins finished and then handed the book back to Walker
who tore out a slip and handed it to Jenkins. Wallace then asked Walker what
he was doing. Walker replied that he was getting Jenkins' name and address.
Wallace said, "You don't have to give him a receipt to get his name and address,
do you?" Wallace asked Walker if he knew he was subject to discharge. Walker
replied that he did not think so and walked off.
Wallace took no further steps to effect the discharge of Walker that night.
However, when he went outside to smoke with three other men including Second
Hand Denson, Wallace told them of his witnessing Walker's signing up Jenkins.
Denson passed the story on to Overseer; Ezell , and the next morning Ezell told
Superintendent Walker about it. The plant was not operating that day, Satur-
day, but Superintendent Walker called Wallace to the plant to tell him what had
happened. When he had heard Wallace's report, Superintendent Walker told
Wallace that they would have a meeting about the matter on Monday.
The following Monday, September 23, 1946, Superintendent Walker called a
meeting attended by Wallace, A. C. Brown, the overseer, Philpott, Walker's
regular second hand, and Industrial Relations Director Pike. Wallace again
related what he had seen, and it was decided to discharge Walker. Superin-
tendent Walker told Brown to notify Walker of his discharge when he came in
at 2 p. in. Shortly after Walker came to work that day, Philpott told him that
Brown wanted to see him. Walker went to Brown's office with Philpott, and
Brown asked Walker if he had signed someone up in the Union on Friday night.
Walker denied that he had. Brown said "Yes, you did." Walker again denied
it, and Brown said that he knew that Walker had, and that he was going to have
to discharge him. Brown had a discharge slip already made out and he
handed it to Walker. The discharge slip stated that the discharge was for
violation of a company rule. Walker asked Brown what the rule violated was
1382 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and Brown replied, "Signing up somebody in the Union." Walker and Brown
went to Superintendent Walker's office, and Walker asked Superintendent Walker
to change the reason for the discharge to state exactly what he was being
discharged for. Superintendent Walker told Walker that the slip stated all that
was necessary. When Walker got his coat to leave, the other doffers saw him and
followed him out. That precipitated a general strike which lasted for a week."
(e) Concluding findings as to Walker' s discharge
The rule against solicitation was, Superintendent Walker testified, made "to
stop the solicitation of union membership within the plant which was inter-
fering with the progress of our work . . ." Certain other types of solicitation
were not, apparently, sought to be prohibited. Superintendent Walker testified
that there was "a sportsmen club there at the plant that's an authorized club
that the employees may solicit each other into during membership drives." 36
Also permitted during working hours were solicitation for funds for Christmas
presents for supervisors, flower funds, and various charities.
In terms, the Respondent's rule against solicitation is proper. Insofar as it is
actually used for the purpose of preventing interference with production and is
not used merely as a device to impede employees in the exercise of their right
of self-organization it is a legitimate restraint upon union activities.26 The
evidence shows that during working hours the sportsman's club was permitted
to wage a campaign for members for a week or 10 days, that employees were not
restricted in their solicitation of moneys for Christmas presents for supervisors,
and that other types of solicitation were tolerated. Although such evidence
suggests that the Respondent may have been less interested in preventing inter-
ruption of work than it was in preventing the Union's organizing, it is com-
mon knowledge that' solicitation for union membership is not infrequently at-
tended by heated arguments stirring conflicting emotions. Often a union
campaign will be waged with greater intensity of effort, and by more wide-
spread and more constant activity than is the case with the other types of
nonproduction activity which the Respondent permitted. Superintendent Walker
testified that the Union's campaign in the fall of 1946 was even more intensified
than the one which preceded the June 1946 election. The typical cases in which
the Board has held that a presumptively valid rule was discriminatorily ap-
plied have involved toleration by the employer of solicitation by a rival union or
an antiunion group, while an unfavored union is prohibited by that employer
to engage in the same type of solicitation" This situation does not exist here.
The undersigned therefore concludes and finds that, although the matter is not
free from doubt, the evidence fails to prove that the Respondent either promul-
gated or applied its rule against solicitation for other than proper purposes.
" Walker testified that at a union meeting he urged the employees not to continue the
strike on account of him.
25 There was a membership drive for the club during working hours that lasted a week
or 10 days.
26 Matter of Burnside Steel Foundry Company , 69 N. L . R. B. 128 ; N. L. R. B. v. Denver
Tent and Awning Company, 138 F. 2d 410.
27 Matter of Reynolds Corporation, 61 N. L. R. B. 1446, 74 N. L. R. B. 1622; Matter of
Louisville By. Co ., 69 N. L . It. B. 691 ; Matter of Western Electric Co ., Inc., 72 N. L. It. B.
738; Matter of Atlantic Company, 79 N. L. R. B. 820; Matter of May Department Stores,
59 N. L. It. B. 976, enf'd as modified , 154 F . 2d 533.
STANDARD-COOSA-THATCHER COMPANY 1383
A number of factors give rise to a strong suspicion that Wallace and Jenkins
may have laid a prearranged trap for Walker,28 but the evidence as a whole fails
to establish that such was the fact. The failure of the Respondent to check
Wallace's report by interviewing Jenkins, in view of Walker's denial of rule
violation, together with the severity of the penalty for a violation of a rule which
occasioned no serious interference with production 29 also lead to the suspicion
that the Respondent may have been more concerned in checking union organi-
zation than in maintaining uninterrupted production. But since a second hand
could have made a discharge or an effective recommendation of discharge, it
was not essential that the Respondent make an independent investigation as it
would have done if a section man or nonsupervisory employee had made such a
recommendation. Superintendent Walker had good cause to believe Wallace's
account and to disbelieve Walker's. In the absence of a showing of disparate
treatment for violation of this rule, no substitute for management's judgment
as to what penalty should be imposed is warranted.
It is unnecessary to consider whether or not Walker technically violated the
rule against solicitation by handing the membership book to Jenkins for his sig-
nature at the latter's request to join inasmuch as the Respondent had reason to
believe that Walker, who was away from his place of work and was at the place
of work of another employee, was in fact soliciting for the Union. Although
Walker was through with his work and was therefore not neglecting his duties,
he was getting the signature of Jenkins, who was still working.
On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, the undersigned concludes and
finds that the Respondent did not discriminatorily discharge Kenner Walker.
2. The discharge or lay-off of Grider
William Grider was employed by the Respondent on April 8, 1942, in the Stand-
ard Mill, across the street from the Thatcher Mill. For about 3 months he worked
at greasing and cleaning up. Then he was given a job testing acid and holding
sticks. About a year after his employ he became a skein mercerizing machine
operator and retained that job until the date of his lay-off on March 14, 19478°
During that period, however, he had occasionally done such work as helping on
the skein dryer,31 running splitters, helping on the extractor82
In January of 1946 Grider was discharged, filed a charge of discriminatory
discharge with the Board, and was reinstated in about 2 weeks.
Prior to the June 1946 election, Grider was active in soliciting members for
the Union, and he wore a union button.
2 For example , the fact that Jenkins up to 2 hours before he asked Walker if he could
join the Union had been unfavorably disposed to the Union and in a conversation with
Walker in the washroom at that time had so indicated ; Jenkins' sudden change of mind ;
Wallace's coincidental appearance ; Wallace's failure to make an immediate discharge ; and
the manner in which Jenkins gave his testimony at the hearing, from which the undersigned
inferred that Jenkins was not making a full disclosure of the facts.
39 The penalty for failure to report for work on a scheduled Saturday (a more extensive
interference with production) was a lay-off of 1 day.
3° He was absent for about 8 weeks in the fall of 1946 because of his wife's illness.
3' Overseer Pursley, who determined who would be laid off , testified that he never saw
Grider operate the dryer. Grider testified that he helped on the dryer every week, some-
times for as long as half a day. That he helped on certain operations is not construed as
meaning that he performed the principal operation himself.
11 Grider testified he had about a week on the extractor.
1384 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
On Friday, March 14, 1947, Overseer Robert Pursley notified employees in-
cluding Grider that they were being laid off, that he could not say for what
period of time it would be, and that the lay-offs would be by seniority.
Of the 11 employees laid off in the skein mercerizing department, Grider had
the greatest seniority. Of the 11, at least 9 were identified as union members.
Of those retained as regular hands all had seniority over Grider n But although
all those who were retained as regular hands in skein mercerizing had seniority
over Grider, 2 employees from the same department, a machine operator and a
dryer operator with less seniority than Grider were retained but were trans-
ferred to other work. About 5 other employees who had been working in the
skein mercerizing department at the time of the lay-off, but who were not listed
as regulars, were retained although they had less seniority than Grider and less
than some of the others who were laid off.
The Respondent. at the time of this lay-off did away with the second and
third shifts in the skein mercerizing department and has since then operated
only one shift. No question is raised but that the Respondent reduced its force
for economic reasons. The only issue is whether the selection of employees to
be laid off was made in a discriminatory manner.
The evidence shows that the Respondent followed a policy of making lay-offs
on the basis of seniority "where qualifications and other factors were equal." Of
those retained who had less seniority than Grider, most had had diversified train-
ing and better physical qualifications than Grider. They were, therefore, better
qualified for transfer to other work. According to Grider's testimony, he had had
experience on other operations which would have qualified him for other work.
Pursley testified that Grider was not able to do the work at jobs for which he re-
tained junior employees. Grider's testimony does not furnish the undersigned
with a sufficient basis for comparing his qualifications with those of employees
retained. As between his judgment of his qualifications and Pursley's, the un-
dersigned believes that Pursley's must be accepted in the absence of evidence
that Pursley exercised his judgment in bad faith. The machine operator of
junior tenure who was retained, Gordon Bryan, was probably no more experienced
than Grider and no better qualified from a standpoint of skill to do the job he
was transferred to, that of bobbin boy, than was Grider, but this job required
more physical than mental effort. Grider is a man of slight physique and Over-
seer Pursley took physique into account in making his selection of men for
lay-off.
Two of the men laid off were later rehired, one in May 1947 and the other
in December 1947. The latter was a union member. These are the only two
of those laid off who were rehired. Grider made application for reemployment,
once about March 21, 1947, once about mid-April 1947, and once in about Janu-
ary 1948. Each time Pursley told him there was nothing open. Grider testified
that, at the time of the lay-off, Pursley had said. that the men would be laid off
in the order of seniority and would be given back their jobs by seniority. But
it does not otherwise appear that the Respondent had any practice of recalling
laid-off employees by seniority, and Pursley testified that the customary prac-
tice was to give a vacant job to the oldest man then employed or if no one
wanted it he would use his judgment about hiring a trainee or a man who
already had experience. Although Pursley's statement to the men laid off was
apparently not made in utmost good faith in view of his failure to explain the
98 One of those retained was identified as a union member, 4 were identified as nonmembers,
and 4 were not identified as either,
STANDARD-COOSA-THATCHER COMPANY 1385
exceptions he was making to his announced intentions and of his later action
in rehiring two men who were junior in seniority to Grider, there is no evidence
that the Respondent had in fact even established a policy or practice of laying
off or of rehiring laid-off employees in the order of straight seniority.
Many of the facts in this case combine to create suspicion that the Respondent
may have made its selection of employees for lay-off on the basis of ridding itself
of the greatest proportion of union members, but the evidence as a whole fails
to convince the undersigned that this was the case. Even the large proportion
of union to nonunion men laid off is not inexplicable as it is not unusual to find
greater interest in organization of a union among younger than among older
employees. Furthermore, it was not established what the proportion of union
members to nonunion men was among those retained by the Respondent. Since
the evidence fails therefore to establish that a discriminatory selection was made
of employees for lay-off, the undersigned finds that the Respondent did not violate
the Act or Amended Act by laying off William Grider.
3. The demotion of Bledsoe
Roy Bledsoe was employed by the Respondent in the latter part of 1945.
Just before the election of April 1947, Bledsoe was working as a creeler. It is
the duty of creelers to remove the empty spools, put them in a roller box, and
push them to a spool room to get a full container of spools, return with them
and put them up, brush down the creels and clean the frames. The section man
divides up his crew of seven men by assigning one man to the job of cleaning
rings on the under side of the frames and by dividing the others up on each side
of the frame. Cleaning the rings involves putting a piece of waste on the end
of a stick and running it around on the inside of the rings to get the grease off.
According to the testimony of Bledsoe, his section man, James Lawrence, 2 or
3 days before the April 1947 election told him that if he voted for the CIO, he
would put him to cleaning rings, that at the time of the election he went to
the polls with the union people, and that the day after the election he was
assigned the job of cleaning rings by Lawrence. Bledsoe further testified that
although the other creelers also would clean rings some of the time they did
not do so as much of the time as the one who was assigned to the particular
job of cleaning rings. It further appeared that the one who cleaned rings was
more closely confined to the various machines than were the other creelers who
from time to time would go on errands, such as carrying the empty spools to
the spool room and getting a new supply of full ones.
Lawrence denied that he had told Bledsoe that he would put him on the ring
cleaning job if he voted for the CIO. He testified that Bledsoe a few weeks
before the election developed the habit of "getting lost" and that he would have
to go after him. He testified that he warned Bledsoe three times to stay on the
job, telling him that if he did not he would have to assign him to cleaning rings.
He further testified that Bledsoe did not improve his ways, and that consequently
on May 7, 1947, he assigned Bledsoe to the job of cleaning rings to keep him
on the job.
A resolution of the conflict is rendered difficult by the fact that neither Bled-
soe's nor Lawrence's testimony is deemed to be wholly reliable. Although
Bledsoe appeared to be disposed to give honest testimony, his memory was
faulty in some respects and he was inclined to be rather vague. Lawrence's
testimony was less vague, but in one or two instances it appeared to the under-
signed that it did not merit belief. Lawrence was unwarrantedly positive about
1386 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the date he assigned Bledsoe to the job of cleaning rings, and the undersigned
does not credit this but finds that the assignment was made shortly after the
time of the election as testified to by Bledsoe. Lawrence also testified that he
did not speak to Second Hand Stacey about Bledsoe's cleaning rings. Sidney
German, a section man, and a reluctant witness for the General Counsel, testified
that one day before work he heard Lawrence talking to Stacey about the Bled-
soe matter. Lawrence's testimony to the contrary is not credited. On cross-
examination, Bledsoe said that although lie was not sure, it "seemed" that at
some time before the election Lawrence once told him that he wandered around
the room too much, and that he (Lawrence) was going to put Bledsoe to cleaning
rings all the time so that he would know where he was. On this state of the
record it appears likely and the undersigned finds that Bledsoe was confused
about the reason which Lawrence gave for assigning him to the ring-cleaning
job. No change in pay resulted from the change in assignment, and, from
Bledsoe's own testimony, the job of cleaning rings is found to be no more difficult
than the other work of creelers. The only difference was in the proximity
within which Bledsoe was confined. In view of Bledsoe's own admission on
cross-examination, and on all the evidence, the undersigned finds that, by as-
signing Bledsoe to the ring-cleaning job, the Respondent did not discriminate
against him because of his union membership or activity.
4. The lay-off of Frances Bailey
Frances Bailey was employed by the Respondent in the middle of August 1945
as a winder hand on the second shift, with hours from 2 p. in. to 10 p. in. She
lived in the country about 8 miles from Chickamauga, Georgia, and about 18
miles from the Respondent's Ridgedale plant. Because of her inability to meet
the bus schedule, Bailey was dependent for transportation on her uncle, also
an employee of the Respondent, who drove in daily. After she had been working
for the Respondent for a while, her uncle ceased to work regularly on Satur-
days. The Respondent did not always operate on Saturday, but from time to
time, as business required, Bailey's second hand, L. C. Stacey, would instruct
the section man, Charles Decker, that they would operate on Saturday and that
they would need a certain number of employees. On such occasions, Decker,
on Friday night, when he gave out the pay checks, would notify the required
number of employees that they would work the next day.
Bailey testified that when her uncle ceased to come in regularly each Saturday,
she told Decker and Stacey that she could not come in for work on that day
and that thereafter until October 1946 she was not required to work on any
Saturday. Decker testified that Bailey never said anything to him about
transportation or inability to come in on Saturday, and Stacey testified that
until December 1946 Bailey did not tell him she could not work on Saturday.
Both admitted, however, that they knew approximately where she lived, and
that she rode in her uncle's car, and Stacey was aware of the fact that the uncle
did not come in regularly on Saturday. The undersigned finds that Bailey
did tell Stacey of her inability to work on Saturday at about the time her uncle
discontinued working on Saturdays, and that, whether or not Bailey expressly
gave her dependence on her uncle as the reason for not coming in, Stacey under-
stood that that was the reason. This knowledge did not stop Decker from
notifying Bailey that the plant would operate on those Saturdays when a full
shift was desired, but Bailey would then tell Decker that she had no way of
getting in and she was, prior to October 1946, not penalized for such Saturday
absence.
STANDARD-COOSA-THATCHER COMPANY 1387
During the week of September 23 to 28 most of the employees were out on the
strike resulting from Kenner Walker's discharge as previously related. During
that week Bailey's uncle drove her to the plant each day; and each day, including
Saturday, Bailey and her uncle walked in the picket line for 4 hours. Stacey
saw her there.
When the strike was over, Bailey returned and worked for 1 week. At the
end of that week Decker, at Stacey's direction, told each of the four winders,
including Bailey, that the plant would run the next day. Bailey reminded him
she had no way of getting in." There is no evidence that Decker or Stacey
then notified Bailey that she would be penalized for failure to report on that
Saturday, October 5, 1946. Bailey's uncle did not drive in, and Bailey was
absent that Saturday.
According to Bailey's testimony, on the following Monday, Stacey called her
into his office and asked her why she did not work on Saturday. She answered
that she had no way of getting in. Stacey then pointed out that she was able
to walk the picket line on Saturday, referring to Saturday, September 28.
She explained that her uncle had driven in that day and that she had come in
with him. Stacey said he would have to lay her off and told her she was laid
off for a week. On Wednesday night, however, Stacey sent word by her uncle
to come back on Thursday. Consequently she was absent only for 3 days.
Bailey testified that this was the only time she was laid off and that after that
she was not asked to work on a Saturday again before the end of her employ
on January 29, 1947.
Except for the date and number of lay-offs , Bailey's account is substantiated
in most respects by Stacey's testimony. Testifying from a compilation of rec-
ords which he had prepared, Stacey fixed the date of the lay-off related by Bailey
as having occurred on December 16 instead of October 7. He testified from
the same data that on October 7 Bailey was given a 1-day lay-off but that he did
not speak with her at that time. When her Saturday absence was reported to
him on Monday, October 7, he testified, he told Decker to lay her off for 1 day '
Testimony of the Respondent's customary practice of giving disciplinary lay-
offs was somewhat at variance. On direct examination Stacey testified that it
was customary to lay employees off for 1 day when they were absent on Saturday
without permission, that no more than 1 day's lay-off was given for the first of-
fense, and that such 1 day's lay-off was imposed by the section man at his direction.
He pointed to instances of first offenders who were given a 1-day lay- off and of a
second-time offender who was given a 2-day lay-off. After examination and
cross-examination by counsel, the undersigned, who had misunderstood Stacey's
34 This finding is based on Bailey's credited testimony that each time Decker told her they
would run on Saturday , she told him she had no way of getting in. Stacey ' s testimony
tends to corroborate the fact ( except for date ) that Bailey did say she would not be able
to come in on Saturday.
11 Decker testified that Bailey failed to report for Saturday work only twice when she was
told to come in on a Saturday , that he thought the first time was before the strike, and that
on that occasion he had laid Bailey off for 1 day at Stacey's direction . In another part of
his testimony , Decker said that he never told Bailey to come in on a Saturday when he did
not tell the others to come in and that sometimes she would come in and sometimes she
would not . On cross -examination Decker, who admitted that his memory was not clear on
the matter , testified that he "imagined" the two times Bailey was laid off were the only two
times when she was requested to report on Saturday and failed to do so. A transcription
of the records for the period of August 1945 to May 1946 which was sent in on stipulation
after the close of the hearing, and which is hereby received in evidence , shows that Bailey
failed to report on Saturday , April 6, 1946, although requested to do so but that she was
not laid off for this absence.
-1388 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
testimony on direct examination, asked Stacey if he had testified that he did
.not discipline for the first offense. Stacey replied that he believed he had so
testified and in response to a further question testified that Bailey had, on an
earlier occasion, committed the offense of failing to report on a Saturday when
told to do so." Decker testified that it was customary to lay the employee
off for the first offense.
From all the evidence, the undersigned deduces and finds that, after Bailey's
uncle ceased to drive in regularly on Saturdays and until after the strike, Bailey
was not required to work on Saturday even though Decker would tell her that
the winders would work that day. It is further found that Bailey was not
-disciplined before the time of the strike because Stacey considered her excuse
for failure to come in to be a reasonable ones'
The undersigned finds it difficult to resolve the conflict in testimony as to
whether the 3-day lay-off occurred in October or December. Bailey, who im-
pressed the undersigned as an honest witness, although somewhat uncertain
as to some dates, appeared quite sure she had been laid off only once, and that
that was the instance she related, which she remembered as having occurred
either the first or second week after, the strike. Stacey was not asked to
testify from memory but only from the transcription which he had prepared
from original records. Decker's memory did not accord with the transcription
as to dates. Even when he was shown the transcription, it appeared to the
undersigned that he was stating the dates, not from a refreshed recollection,
but from what he saw on the paper. The undersigned is not inclined to give
full credit to the accuracy of the transcription prepared by Stacey in view of
the manner in which the three witnesses gave their testimony, the possibility
of error in' transcription, and the fact that Stacey was not asked about the
:manner in which the transcription was prepared or about its accuracy.as If the
lay-off occurred at the time related by Bailey, the undersigned entertains no
,doubt but that it was discriminatorily motivated by Bailey's picket-line activity
on behalf of the Union. But even if Bailey's memory of the date was faulty
.and the incident occurred in December, the undersigned believes that a discrim-
inatory motive was shown. The undersigned is convinced that Bailey was given
special consideration before the strike because of her travel difficulties and that
-she was not penalized for her absences when she was asked to work on a Saturday
-on which her uncle was not driving in. The abrupt reversal of this leniency by
Stacey after he had seen Bailey on the picket line during the strike and without
any warning that his policy was going to be changed is in itself suspicious. But
-when considered in the light of the circumstances admitted by Stacey as attend-
ing the lay-off which he testified he imposed in December, the evidence that the
earlier lay-off, if such there was, was itself discriminatory is fortified. Stacey
admitted that, before laying Bailey off in December, he had commented to her on
her ability to be on the picket line on Saturday. The comment was made in a
way which indicated that that was a motivating reason for the lay-off. It is
noteworthy also that Stacey imposed a heavier penalty (1 week's lay-off) than
ae See footnote 35, supra.
84 On cross-examination , Stacey admitted that Bailey 's excuse for failing to come in on
December 14 was "in the bounds of reason."
as Stacey testified only that the transcription of attendance which he prepared was "based
on records" in his department and that he had prepared it in the form of the exhibit at the
request of counsel.
STANDARD-COOSA-THATCHER COMPANY 1389
was shown to have been given either first or second-time offenders and that,
although he recognized the reasonableness of her excuse, he gave it no weight
because of her having been able to serve on the picket line on a Saturday. The
only evidence of a penalty imposed upon any other second-time offender shows
that Stacey gave a 2-day lay-off. The week's lay-off which Stacey gave Bailey
was reduced to 3 days, it is true, but Stacey testified that this was done after he
had discussed the matter with his overseer and the latter had told him that 3
days was enough. On all the, evidence, the undersigned is convinced and finds
that the 3-day lay-off which Stacey gave Bailey was discriminatorily motivated
by Bailey's union activity and was in violation of Section 8 (3) and (1) of the
Act as reenacted in Section 8 (a) (3) and (1) of the Amended Act.
TV. THE EFFECTcOF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The Activities of the Respondent set forth in Section III, above, occurring in
connection with the operations of the Respondent described in Section I, above,
have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce
among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes, burdening and
obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
It has been found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor
practices. The undersigned will therefore recommend that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies
of the Act and the Act, as amended.
It has been found that, by the lay-off which Stacey imposed on Frances Bailey,
the Respondent discriminated against her because of her union membership
and activity. Because Bailey complained only of a 3-day lay-off and the
fact that G. C. counsel moved to amend the complaint to show that the lay-off
occurred in December 1946, instead of October 1946, the undersigned will recom-
mend that the Respondent make Bailey whole for the loss of pay which she suffered
by reason of such discrimination by payment to her of a sum of money equal to
that which she would have earned during the 3 days of December 16, 17, and
18, 1946, less any sum she may have earned elsewhere during said time.39
The undersigned is of the opinion, upon the entire record, that the commission
in the future of acts of interference and of other unfair labor practices may be
anticipated from the Respondent's conduct in the past 10 It will therefore be
recommended that the Respondent cease and desist from the conduct which has
herein been found to be a violation of the Act, and from in any other manner
infringing upon the rights guaranteed to its employees in Section 7 of the Act
and the Amended Act.
Since it has been found that the Respondent did not discriminate in regard to
the hire and tenure of employment of Kenner Walker, Roy Bledsoe, or William
Grider, it will be recommended that the complaint be dismissed as to them.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in
the case, the undersigned makes the following:
ae See Matter of Crossett Lumber Company, 8 N. L. R. B. 440, 492-498.
60 N. L. R. B. V. Express Publishing Company, 312 U. S. 426.
1390 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Textile Workers Union of America, affiliated with the Congress of Industrial
Organizations, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the
Act and Amended Act.
2. By discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of employment of Frances_
Bailey, thereby discouraging the formation of, and membership in, a labor organ-,
ization, the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8 (3) of the Act, as reenacted in Section 8 (a) (3)
of the Amended Act.
3. By such lay-off and by otherwise interfering with, restraining, and coercing
its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act
and Amended Act, the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8 (1) of the Act, as reenacted in Section
8 (a) (1) of the Amended Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act and Amended
Act.
5. The Respondent has not engaged in unfair labor practices by discharging
Kenner Walker and William Grider or by demoting Roy Bledsoe.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, the under
signed recommends that the Respondent, Standard-Coosa-Thatcher Company,
Ridgedale, Tennessee, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Discouraging membership in Textile Workers Union of America, affiliated
with the Congress of Industrial Organizations, or any other labor organization
of its employees by in any manner discriminating in regard to their hire and
tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment ;
(b) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its em-
ployees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to join or form labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for purposes of collective bargain-
ing or other mutual 'aid or protection as guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act and
the Amended Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which the undersigned finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act and the Amended Act :
(a) Make whole Frances Bailey for any loss of pay she may have suffered by
reason of the Respondent's discrimination against her, in the manner provided
herein in the section entitled "The remedy" ;
(b) Post immediately at its plant in Ridgedale, Tennessee, copies of the
notice attached hereto and marked "Appendix B." Copies of such notice, to be
furnished by the Regional Director for the Tenth Region (Atlanta, Georgia),
shall , after being duly signed by the Respondent's representative, be posted by
the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof and maintained by it for sixty
(60) consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by the Respondent to insure thaj said notices are not altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material ;
STANDARD-COOSA-THATCHER COMPANY 1391
(c) Notify the Regional Director for the Tenth Region (Atlanta, Georgia),
in writing within twenty (20) days from the date of the receipt of this Inter-
mediate Report of what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
It is further recommended that unless on or before twenty (20) days from
the date of the receipt of this Intermediate Report the Respondent notifies the
said Regional Director in writing that it will comply with the foregoing recom-
mendations, the National Labor Relations Board issue an order requiring the
Respondent to take the action aforesaid.
It is further recommended that the complaint be dismissed insofar as it alleges
that the Respondent discriminated in regard to the hire or tenure of employment
of Kenner Walker, Roy Bledsoe, and William Grider.
As provided in Section 203.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National
Labor Relations Board, Series 5, effective August 22, 1947, any party may, within
twenty (20) days from the date of service of the order transferring the case
to the Board, pursuant to Section 203.45 of said Rules and Regulations file with
the Board, Rochambeau Building, Washington 25, D. C., an original and six copies
of a statement in writing setting forth such exceptions to the Intermediate Re-
port or to any other part of the record or proceeding (including rulings upon
all motions or objections) as he relies upon, together with the original and six
copies of a brief in support thereof ; and any party may, within the same period,
file an original and six copies of a brief in support of the Intermediate Report.
Immediately upon the filing of such statement of exceptions and/or briefs, the
party filing the same shall serve a copy thereof upon each of the other parties.
Proof of service on the other parties of all papers filed with the Board shall be
promptly made as required by Section 203.85. As further provided in said Sec-
tion 203.46, should any party desire permission to argue orally before the Board,
request therefor must be made in writing to the Board within ten (10) days
from the date of service of the order transferring the case to the Board.
In the event no Statement of Exceptions is filed as provided by the aforesaid
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, recommendations, and recom-
mended order herein contained shall, as provided in Section 203.48 of said Rules
and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions,
and order, and all objections and exceptions thereto shall be deemed waived
for all purposes.
JAMES R. HEMINGWAY,
Trial Examiner.
Dated January 27, 1949.
APPENDIX A
STANDARD-COOSA-THATCHER COMPANY
CHATTANOOGA 1, TENNESSEE
April 14, 1947
DEAR MR. JENICINS : Less than a year ago all the employees of the Ridgedale
plant of the Standard-Coosa-Thatcher Company by a decisive majority vote re-
fused to surrender to the CIO their right to act, think and decide for themselves
in all matters relating to their employment here. They decided, and voted to
keep for themselves all the rights and liberties that are part of American Citi-
zenship instead of placing any of these rights in the hands, and themselves
under the control of the CIO.
1392 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
That election was at the beginning of what the CIO calls "Operation Dixie,"
the Multi-million dollar "drive" to "unionize Southern workers." Since that
time the CIO has tried desperately to win the bargaining rights of the employees
of nearly every textile mill in the South, with so little success that the widely
advertised "drive" must be recognized as the most monumental failure. In many
of the largest and most important mills they have not even gained enough sup-
port to hold elections. With a very few exceptions, where they have, they have.
been so badly beaten that they have given up the attempt.
As one-sided as the result of the election here was last June, this is still
one of the very best "prospects" that they have by comparison with the great
majority of other mills, and one of the few left to them. They have therefore
asked for, and received from the National Labor Relations Board another chance
here-not in the entire plant, but confined solely to you employees in the
Thatcher Mill. They bitterly, and successfully, fought against including the
whole plant in this election. Whatever their reasons were for selecting you as,
an easier group to sell, I can not believe that this was any compliment to your
good sense and intelligence. I want you to know that I do not share, and the
Company does not share any idea, if it exists in anyone's mind, that you are
in any sense inferior to any other group of employees in this mill or any other.
I believe also that the CIO now realizes that this is true. It seems clear to
me that otherwise their organizers would not have insisted so desperately on
conditions in this election which can not have any purpose except to make it as
difficult as they could for you to vote. By flatly refusing to agree to a convenient
location for the election, or hours which would permit you to vote without
serious personal inconvenience, they hoped that so many of you would fail to,
vote that those who they now control, in one way or another, would be enough
to vote away the rights of all of you. If there were no other reasons (and
there are a great many) for you to be on guard against giving up your inde-
pendence and bargaining rights to the CIO, your common sense must tell you
that tactics such as this would never be adopted with your welfare in view.
When the CIO cost you about twenty-five thousand dollars in wages in the
work stoppage last September, you had a taste in advance of what you might
expect. That was a warning. The needless, expensive and unsuccessful strikes
by the CIO in nearly every newspaper you pick up is another warning. And the
tactics they have adopted in this election can not fail to be another and final
warning to any thoughtful man or woman of how little the CIO regards your
rights or welfare when they want something for themselves.
The Company, and I personally believe that since the personal rights of every
one of you are at stake, every one of you should have the full right to vote
without inconvenience or being penalized in any other way, and we intend to
make that possible, regardless of who may object.
You have the right to know what I and the Company think about the CIO
and I am going to tell you without wasting words. But I want you to know that
this is a question for you to decide, and no one in the Company is going to inter-
fere with your right to decide it as you see fit. We respect you, and we will
respect and defend your right to vote as you wish, to support or to oppose in
any proper manner this CIO Union or any other. You should understand that
neither I nor anyone else have the right to order you to join, or refuse to join, to
support or oppose the CIO. You are perfectly free to do whatever you think
best for yourself, and will remain free unless you willingly give away that
freedom.
STANDARD-COOSA-THATCHER COMPANY 1393.
I am fully convinced, without any doubt whatever, that if you, by your majority
vote, give up your bargaining rights and your independence, or any part of them.
to the CIO, and give the CIO the right to stand between you and the Company,
it will be a mistake that will seriously harm everyone connected with the Com-
pany, the Company itself for as far into the future as I can foresee, and that it.
will benefit no one except the CIO. By the CIO I mean to say that it will benefit.
only the paid officials, organizers and other employees of the CIO to whom your
money will go, and the political organizations that will benefit by your payments-
and your willing or unwilling support.
Many of you doubtless have been led to believe that you are being asked only
to give up your rights to your "Local" which you can control, and in which you
will select your own officers and those who will use your bargaining rights. This.
is not true. If you doubt this, take the trouble to read the sample ballots on the
official Government Notices. If the name of the Local is on the ballot, then I
am mistaken. If the name of the Textile Workers Union of America, CIO.
appears on the ballot, then what I say is correct, and if you vote for the CIO-
you will vote to give the Textile Workers Union of America, CIO, whose offices
are in New York City, all the bargaining rights you now have, to use as it sees fit.
You should know my reason for thinking that this would be a mistake. It is
not, as you will probably be told, because I fear that the CIO will or could get,
for you benefits that we are unwilling to give you, and even a minute's thought
on your part will prove that it is not. All of you know that we own and operate
the Sauquoit Mill at Gadsden. All of you know that the CIO for nearly four-
years has had the full, complete and exclusive bargaining rights of the employees.
there-the same rights they are now asking you to give them here.
You might be interested to know that the employees at Sauquoit have paid the
CIO in dues and initiation fees alone more than nineteen thousand dollars up,
to this time, and so far as anyone knows will have to continue these payments or
greater from now on. You might also be interested to know that although we.
intend to, and will correct it fully, the last 10% raise we gave you is not yet in
effect at Sauquoit because of difficulties in negotiations with the Union. You
might not know that in spite of the Union agreement that there would be no.
strikes at Sauquoit, which we insisted upon for the protection of our employees
there, they have lost more than ten per cent of tlae time in the last three months.
by "unauthorized work stoppages." You may well ask why they should continue-
such a situation-the answer is that they have given away their right to bargain.
for themselves or to help themselves, just as you are asked to give away yours,,
and they can not get these rights back, just as you could not.
I want you to understand that the Company has not tried to make a difference
in the treatment of the employees here and at Sauquoit ; we could not help our-
selves. It might be good politics for me to tell you that we would prefer to,
favor you, but it is not true, we do not like it, and are trying to correct it, and
we believe that we will correct it-except that of course we can not get back for
them the nineteen thousand dollars they have paid the CIO. We want to treat
all our employees alike, fairly as it is possible, and give them as much as possible,
union or no union, and we propose to do our best to do just that, under any
conditions.
I have no doubt the Union is promising you many things. Promises are cheap,
and campaign promises are cheaper than any other kind. I do not see how any
sensible person can-believe that the Union can get for you here, from us, what they
have not been able to get from us for our Sauquoit employees in nearly four years.
1394 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
I can not see how any sensible employee can believe that the Company or I would
do more for the CIO, or Mr. Rieve or Mr. Baldanzi, of New York City, than I
would for you.
In the last election campaign last June you were told that if you did not vote
the Union in you would not get any more wage increases, and that you might
get a reduction instead. You did not vote the Union in, and you have received
since that time two general wage increases, one of 8 cents per hour, and an-
other of 10%. Do you have any reason to think that the statements of hired
CIO organizers are any more reliable now than they were last June?
If the CIO even proposed to help you and the Company here to make a better
yarn, or more yarn with less effort, or to get more for what you and we work to
make here, I might feel differently. All the money that comes to us here comes
from the sale of what you and we make here. That is all there is to divide be-
tween us, and now it is divided two ways, a part to you employees, and a part to
the Company. The CIO has never even suggested that they might help us get
more to divide, or to add to what we have in any way-all the CIO is interested
in is how what you and we get for what we make is divided up. They are asking
you to vote them in fora share. They want a part of what is now divided between
you and the Company. And if you vote them in, they will see that they get it,
no matter what it may cost you or the Company.
You will understand more clearly what I mean if you read, as I did, in the
newspaper this week the U. S. Government figures on strikes during the past
year. CIO strikes made more people idle, losing all their pay, than any other
cause, and the greatest cause of strikes since the CIO has been organized has
been "Check off of Dues," Maintenance of Membership, or other demands to make
sure that the Union got their share in the form of dues.
It is only fair to say that there will be no check-off, union shop or maintenance
of membership here, since as you know the State of Tennessee has made them
illegal. No one will ever have to join the Union to keep their job at this plant.
Even if the CIO promised faithfully to help us all here make a living, I would
have no faith in it. The CIO has taken in from its members far more than enough
to buy or build many cotton mills. But the CIO does not own any, nor does it
have any money invested in any. It has never made a pound of yarn, nor any-
thing else useful that could beo sold to pay wages. It gets its money a much
easier way. It comes from those who do work and make things people need.
They are inviting you to pay your share.
I have talked about money. But money is not the most important thing to you
or to us. It is not as important as peace, friendliness, contentment, and happi-
ness-it is worth to us only what it will bring in those things. But not to the
CIO. To get your bargaining rights, for what they are worth in money and
power, the CIO will not hesitate to stir up hatred, to destroy friendships, to
turn brother against brother, to call strikes for no other purpose than to make
employees hate employers. They know that there is no room for them anywhere-
without hatreds and suspicion, distrust, bitterness, and discord. They thrive
where it exists ; they disappear where it does not. So it follows that it is the
principal part of their business to see that it does exist.
This election, please understand, is not a contest between the Union and the
Company. It is a contest the Union has brought about among you-between
those of you who want to keep the rights the Union wants, and those of you who
are willing to give those rights up to the Union. Boiled down, it is a contest, in
4
STANDARD-COOSA-THATCHER COMPANY 1395
that sense, between you and the Union, and if the Union should win the rights
it wants, it is you who will lose them.
In spite of the conditions the Union has demanded in this election, you will have
a full and free opportunity to vote. If you fail to do so, everyone concerned ex-
cept the Union will be hurt. However you may vote, I earnestly urge you to
vote. You owe it to yourself, to your neighbors and friends, and to your Company.
And if you vote as your conscience tells you, regardless of any pressure, prom-
ises or threats, I have every confidence that your decision will be a wise one.
Very truly yours,
(Signed) R. C. THATCHER,
President.
APPENDIX B
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Re-
lations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, we hereby notify our employees that :
WE WILL NOT in any manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our em-
ployees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form labor
organizations, to join or assist TEXTILE WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA, CIO,
or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.
WE WILL MAKE the employee named below whole for any loss of pay suffered
as a result of the discrimination.
Frances Bailey
All our employees are free to become or remain members of the above-named
union or any other labor organization. We will not discriminate in regard to
hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment against any
employee because of membership in or activity on behalf of any such labor
organization.
STANDARD-COOSA-THATCHER COMPANY,
Employer.
By ------------------------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
Dated --------------------
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must
not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
857829-50-vol. 85-89