Standard-Coosa-Thatcher

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jul 29, 1981

257 N.L.R.B. 304 (N.L.R.B. 1981)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Standard-Coosa-Thatcher, Carpet Yarn Division, Inc.
and Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Work-
ers Union, AFL-CIO, CLC. Cases 10-CA-
14634 and 10-RC-11707
July 29, 1981
DECISION AND ORDER
On July 7, 1980, Administrative Law Judge
Claude R. Wolfe issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, the Charging Party
and the Respondent, respectively, filed exceptions
and supporting briefs.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs, and has decided to affirm the rulings, find-
ings,' and conclusions2 of the Administrative Law
Judge and to adopt his recommended Order, as
modified herein.
Johnnie's Poultry Safeguards
As more fully described by the Administrative
Law Judge, the credited testimony shows that
Martha C. Perrin, the Respondent's counsel, ad-
vised employee Willis Langston that she was the
Respondent's lawyer and that her inquiry about his
authorization card was in preparation for hearing.
Perrin asked Langston whether he had signed the
card which was in front of them and whether em-
ployer Bobby Joe King described the purpose of
the card to Langston. Langston promptly replied
that he had read and signed the card and that there
was no need for having King explain the purpose
of the card because Langston knew what he was
signing. The credited testimony also shows that
Perrin neither read the prepared statement 3 to
Langston nor orally recited the safeguards therein.
'The Respondent and the Charging Party have excepted to certain
credibility findings made by the Administrative Law Judge. It is the
Board's established policy not to overrule an administrative law judge's
resolutions with respect to credibility unless the clear preponderance of
all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions are incor-
rect. Standard Dry Wall Products. Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188
F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find
no basis for reversing his findings.
In sec. IV,C,4(a), of his Decision, the Administrative Law Judge inad-
vertently referred to Plant Manager Jack Bowman as "employee
Bowman" and omitted Whisenant's question to Bowman. Thus, the third
sentence, immediately following the sentence ending with footnote refer-
ence 35, should read: "Whisenant asked Bowman 'if our benefits would
be taken away if the Union comes in.' Plant Manager Bowman acknowl-
edged that the leaflet was correct and continued that after negotiations
commenced benefits could go up or down or remain the same."
2 In the absence of exceptions, we adopt, pro forma, the Administrative
Law Judge's dismissal of the allegation that Lowery's interrogation of
Underwood, on or about April 19, 1979, violated Sec. 8(a)(l) of the Act.
I The prepared statement, set out in the Administrative Law Judge's
Decision, explains, inter alia, that Perrin's purpose in talking with the em-
ployees was to help the Respondent prepare for an unfair labor practice
hearing and that the interview was strictly voluntary on the employee's
part.
257 NLRB No. 45
The Administrative Law Judge found that the
only real issue is whether Perrin's failure to assure
Langston that there would be no reprisals rendered
her inquiry violative of the Act. Although the Ad-
ministrative Law Judge found that a strict applica-
tion of the Johnnie's Poultry4 standards would
appear to require finding a violation, he neverthe-
less dismissed the allegation. In so doing, the Ad-
ministrative Law Judge found that Perrin properly
advised every one of 70 employees interviewed
except Langston of the safeguards, that the content
of the meetings was widely known among the em-
ployees, and that "Langston was most likely fore-
warned about the content of the interviews."
Hence, the Administrative Law Judge found that
the coercive impact of Perrin's questions was mini-
mal and he dismissed the allegation. We disagree.
Compliance with Johnnie's Poultry safeguards is
the minimum required to dispel the potential for
coercion in circumstances where an employee is in-
terrogated concerning his intended testimony
before the Board.5 The effect of the Administrative
Law Judge's Decision here is to substitute a differ-
ent standard. He would excuse compliance where
an employee "was most likely forewarned about
the content of the interviews." But Johnnie's Poul-
try safeguards require the Respondent not only to
explain the purpose of the questions but also to
assure the employee "that no reprisal will take
place, and obtain his participation on a voluntary
basis - "6 It is plain that the Respondent failed
to satisfy these requirements in connection with
Perrin's interrogation of Langston. We are not pre-
pared to rely on speculation and surmise to infer
compliance or to excuse the failure to provide the
safeguards to Langston because the Respondent
satisfied them with respect to other employees. The
effect of the Respondent's failure to provide the
safeguards during the Langston interrogation is the
same whether by design or inadvertence. Hence,
we find that the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act by coercively interrogating em-
ployee Langston with regard to the verification of
the Union's majority.
The Bargaining Order
The Administrative Law Judge found, and the
record shows, that the Union represented a major-
ity of the Respondent's employees in the unit when
the Union requested, and the Respondent refused,
recognition in March 1979. The Administrative
Law Judge also found that "Respondent's conduct
'Johnnie's Poultry Co. and John Bishop Poultry Co., Successor, 146
NLRB 770 (1964).
Roadway Express, Inc., 239 NLRB 653 (1978).
6146 NLRB at 775.
304
STANDARD-COOSA-THATCHER, CARPET YARN DIVISION
had 'the tendency to undermine [the Union's] ma-
jority strength and impede the election processes,'
that the continuing impact of Respondent's coer-
cive conduct renders a fair election unlikely, and
that the authorization cards signed by employees
are a more reliable indication of their desire for
representation." We agree.
In adopting the Administrative Law Judge's
findings and recommendations, supra, we have
taken into account that the serious and extensive
unlawful activities by the Respondent commenced
immediately after the Union began its organization
drive and continued unabated right up to the elec-
tion and even after the election. Thus, between the
beginning of the organizational campaign in early
February and the election held on May 18, the Re-
spondent violated the Act by numerous instances
of interrogation of employees about their union ac-
tivities and those of other unit employees as well as
by numerous threats of reprisals against employees
because of their union activities. Such unlawful
threats included threats of discharge, plant clo-
sure,7 loss of access to management, and insistence
on contract terms unpalatable to unit employees.
Furthermore, the Respondent made unlawful im-
plied promises of benefits to employees conditioned
on the employees' abandonment of the Union. And
the Respondent violated the Act by telling employ-
ees that the timing of work-related warnings was
caused by the existence of union activities and by
threatening employees with discharge because they
engaged in concerted activity. After the election,
the Respondent violated the Act by threatening re-
taliation against an employee because of her union
activity and by the coercive interrogation of an
employee concerning his intended testimony before
the Board.
In addition to this plethora of acts of interfer-
ence, restraint, and coercion against employees, the
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act by
more rigidly enforcing company work rules for the
purpose of discouraging union activities. This
policy contributed directly to the discriminatory
discharge of union adherent Dennis Williams. As
the Administrative Law Judge pointed out, the Re-
spondent's enforcement of this policy after the
campaign began "would be the most effective way
to short-circuit all such union activities."
Based on the foregoing, and the entire record in
this case, we are persuaded that the Respondent's
' The Board has long held that the threat of job loss through plant clo-
sure or curtailment of operations interferes with employees' ability to
make a free choice in an election. Thus, the threat of plant closure is
among the most effective unfair labor practices for destroying election
conditions for a longer period of time than other unfair labor practices.
See Ste-Mel Signs. Inc., 246 NLRB 1110 (1979). See also N.L.R.B v.
Gissel Packing Co., Inc., 395 U.S. 575, 611. fn 31 (1969).
unlawful activities warrant a bargaining order
under Gissel.8
AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Insert the following as paragraph 2 and renum-
ber the subsequent paragraph accordingly:
"2. By coercively interrogating employees con-
cerning their intended testimony before the Board,
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act."
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge, as modi-
fied below, and hereby orders that the Respondent,
Standard-Coosa-Thatcher, Carpet Yarn Division,
Inc., Boaz, Alabama, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the
said recommended Order, as so modified:9
1. Insert the following as paragraph l(d) and re-
letter the subsequent paragraphs accordingly:
"(d) Coercively interrogating its employees con-
cerning their intended testimony before the
Board."
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the
Administrative Law Judge.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the petition in Case
10-RC-1 1707 be, and it hereby is, dismissed.
'On April 20, 1981, the Respondent filed a motion to have the Board
take administrative notice of a letter dated March 5, 1981, in which the
Regional Director for Region 10 declined to issue a complaint concern-
ing allegations contained in a charge in Case 10-CA-16538. In particular,
the Respondent relied on a statement by the Regional Director that "[nlo
evidence of animus occurring in the past six months was presented or ad-
duced during the investigation." The Respondent goes on to claim that
the Board is obligated to determine whether a fair election can be held
based on conditions as they exist at the time of the Board's decision.
The General Counsel has filed a response to the Respondent's motion
urging that the critical point for determining the appropriateness of a bar-
gaining order is when the Respondent's unfair labor practices began to
destroy the Union's majority status. Thus, the General Counsel contends
that the March 5 letter is irrelevant to the issues before the Board.
It is our view that the validity of a bargaining order in this case and in
similar cases should properly rest upon our analysis of the seriousness and
pervasiveness of the unlawful conduct at the time that the conduct was
first presented for our scrutiny. To conclude otherwise is "to put a pre-
mium upon continued litigation by the employer." NLR.B. v. L. B.
Foster Company, 418 F.2d 1. 4-5 (9th Cir. 1969). See also Gibson Products
Company of Washington Parish. La., Inc., 185 NLRB 362 (1970). Hence,
we hereby deny the Respondent's motion
Even were we to grant the Respondent's motion and consider the
letter that the Respondent seeks to introduce into the record, it would
not alter our finding that a bargaining order is required to remedy the
serious and extensive violations of the Act by the Respondent
I In accordance with his partial dissent in Olympic Medical Corporation,
250 NLRB 146 (1980). Member Jenkins would award interest on the
backpay due based on the formula set forth therein
305
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in
Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers
Union, AFL-CIO, CLC, or any other labor
organization, by discharging any of our em-
ployees or in any other manner discriminating
against them in regard to their tenure of em-
ployment or any term or condition of employ-
ment.
WE WILL NOT interrogate our employees
concerning their or other employees' union ac-
tivities, membership, or desires.
WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate em-
ployees concerning their intended testimony
before the Board.
WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with
discharge, plant closure, loss of access to man-
agement, insistence on contract terms unpalata-
ble to them, or other unspecified reprisals be-
cause of their union activities.
WE WILL NOT promise our employees bene-
fits conditioned on their abandonment of the
Union.
WE WILL NOT tell our employees that the
timing of work-related warnings was caused
by the existence of union activity.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees with dis-
charge because they engage in concerted ac-
tivities protected by the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended.
WE WILL NOT refuse to recognize or bar-
gain with Amalgamated Clothing and Textile
Workers Union, AFL-CIO, CLC, as the ex-
clusive representative of all employees in the
bargaining unit described below.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the
exercise of rights guaranteed them by Section
7 of the Act.
WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively
with Amalgamated Clothing and Textile
Workers Union, AFL-CIO, CLC, as the ex-
clusive bargaining representative of all the em-
ployees in the bargaining unit described below
with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, and other conditions of employ-
ment, and, if an understanding is reached,
embody that understanding in a written signed
agreement. The bargaining unit is:
All production and maintenance employees
employed by us at our Boaz, Alabama, fa-
cility but excluding all office clerical em-
ployees, professional employees, guards, and
supervisors as defined in the Act.
WE WILL offer to Dennis Williams immedi-
ate and full reinstatement to his former job or,
if that job no longer exists, to a substantially
equivalent position, without prejudice to his
seniority or other rights and privileges, and
WE WILL make him whole for any loss of
earnings he may have suffered as a result of
the discrimination against him, plus interest.
WE WILL rescind and expunge from our re-
cords all references to the four warnings
issued Dennis Williams and all other warnings
issued to employees on and after February 6,
1979, for violation of work rule 9 prohibiting
unauthorized absence from the work area or
the plant. Said work rule will be fairly en-
forced without unlawful discrimination.
All our employees are free to join Amalgamated
Clothing and Textile Workers Union, AFL-CIO,
CLC, or any other labor organization.
STANDARD-COOSA-THATCHER,
CARPET YARN DIVISION, INC.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
CLAUDE R. WOLFE, Administrative Law Judge: This
consolidated proceeding' was heard before me in Boaz,
Alabama, on January 7-10 and February 5-7, 1980, pur-
suant to charges 2 and amended charges timely filed,
complaint issued and properly amended, and an order di-
recting hearing on certain objections to election filed by
the Union. 3
The complaint, as amended, alleges violations of the
Act consisting of interrogation, various threats, promises
of benefit, promulgation, and enforcement of a rule re-
stricting the movements of employees, the issuance of
written reprimands to an employee, the discharge of an
employee, and a refusal to bargain collectively with the
Union which has been designated by a majority of Re-
' The name of Respondent was amended at the hearing by agreement.
2 When set for hearing this proceeding included a complaint in Case
10-CA-13462. On January 2, 1980, the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Alabama issued an order that, pending the
court's ultimate determination of its jurisdiction in the cause before it, the
National Labor Relations Board, "its officers, agents, servants and all em-
ployees and all others acting in concert with or for it," were restrained
and enjoined from holding a hearing on or adjudicating the unfair labor
practice charge in Case 10-CA-13462. On January 4. the Regional Direc-
tor for Region 10 issued an order severing Case 10-CA-13462. Accord-
ingly, I refused to take evidence on the allegations of Case 10-CA-13462
when the General Counsel requested permission to adduce it as back-
ground.
I The objections at issue are also alleged in the complaint as unfair
labor practices.
306
STANDARD-COOSA-THATCHER, CARPET YARN DIVISION
spondent's employees in an appropriate bargaining unit
as the exclusive representative of all employees in that
unit for purposes of collective bargaining. It is further al-
leged that one of Respondent's counsel unlawfully inter-
rogated two employees.
Respondent denies the complaint allegations. The
issues were ably litigated and ably briefed by all parties.
After careful consideration of the entire record, the
demeanor of the witnesses as they testified before me,
and the arguments and briefs of the parties, I make the
following:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
4
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent is an Alabama corporation engaged in
manufacturing yarn in Boaz, Alabama. Respondent,
during the calendar year preceding the issuance of the
complaint, a representative period, sold and shipped fin-
ished products valued in excess of $50,000 directly to
customers located outside the State of Alabama. Re-
spondent is, and has been at all times material herein, an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. LABOR ORGANIZATION
Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union,
AFL-CIO, CLC, herein called the Union, is a labor or-
ganization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
Ill. SUPERVISORS AND AGENTS
Respondent admits that the following individuals are
and have been, at all times material, statutory supervisors
and agents of Respondent: Earnest T. Bouldin-person-
nel manager; Jack Bowman-plant manager; Bennie F.
(Butch) Harris-shift supervisor; Bill King-shift super-
visor; Cecil King-shift supervisor; and Frank Lowery-
shift supervisor.
Respondent further admits that Richard Thatcher is a
director of Respondent. He testified he is Respondent's
president, and I find he is its officer and agent. The par-
ties stipulated that Mark Maddox is an agent of Respond-
ent, and it is clear he is the industrial relations director.
IV. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES AND OBJECTIONS TO
THE ELECTION
Preface
I have made some findings herein of unfair labor prac-
tices not specifically alleged or alleged to have occurred
on dates other than those pleaded. It is well settled that
violations not alleged in the complaint may be found
where they are closely related to allegations in the com-
' The facts found herein are a distillation of credible testimony, the ex-
hibits. and stipulations of fact, viewed in the light of logical consistency
and inherent probability, Although I will not in the course of this deci-
sion refer to every bit of record testimony or documentary evidence. I
have weighed and considered it. To the extent that any testimony or
other evidence not mentioned might appear to contradict my findings of
fact, I have not disregarded that evidence but have rejected it as incredi-
ble, lacking in probative worth, surplusage, or irrelevant. I will set forth
certain specific credibility findings as they may be required.
plaint and have been fully litigated.5 All violations found
are indeed related, "if not in actuality falling within," 6
complaint allegations and were fully litigated. Respond-
ent was not denied due process in any way, and the re-
ferred to violations were properly found.7 Moreover, I
am not precluded from finding violations on alternative
theories not alleged.8
A. General Context
The Union conducted a campaign among Respondent's
employees commencing in July or August 1977 and cul-
minating in a Board-conducted election on December 9,
1977, which the Union lost. There was no union organi-
zational campaign in 1978.
On or about February 6, 1979, 9 John Kissack, who
was then the assistant southern director for the Union,
conducted a meeting with several of Respondent's em-
ployees. At their request, he agreed to commence an-
other campaign. He advised these employees that the
Union did not want authorization cards anyone signed
only to have an election, and that signers should under-
stand they were signing to have a union and their cards
might be used to show they wanted the Union.
Within a day or two of this meeting, Union Interna-
tional Representative Virginia Keyser gave employees
authorization cards for the purpose of their solicitation of
other employees. The cards are unambiguous designa-
tions of the Union as the signer's collective-bargaining
representative. '°
Between March 21 and April 1, 1979, there were 147
employees in a unit of Respondent's employees alleged
and admitted to be appropriate for purposes of collective
bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the
Act. " The General Counsel placed 88 authorization
cards in the record which were signed by unit employees
on various dates from February 8 through March 17. Re-
spondent specifically contests the validity of 20 of these
cards.
On March 20, the Union filed a petition for representa-
tion election in Case 10-RC-11707, and the next day,
March 21, made an unequivocal demand for recognition
and bargaining. 12 Respondent agrees this demand was re-
C d E Stores. Inc.. C d E Supervalue Division, 221 NLRB 1321, fn. 3
(1976).
Omark-CCI. Inc., 208 NLRB 469 (1974).
7 See, e.g., The Estate ofAlfred Kaskel d/b/a Doral Hotel and Country
Club, 240 NLRB 1112, fn. 4 (1979).
s Joint Industry Board of the Electoral Industry and Pension Committee.
er al., 238 NLRB 1398, fn. 8 (1978); C & E Stores, supra.
9 All events hereinafter recited occurred in 1979, unless otherwise
stated.
° [The language of the cards is omitted from publication.]
: The appropriate unit description is:
All production and maintenance employees employed by Respondent
at its Boaz, Alabama, facility but excluding all office clerical employ-
ees, professional employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the
Act.
2 The telegram reads:
The majority of production and maintenance employees of your
plant have chosen ACTWU as their bargaining agent. We are pre-
pared to prove this majority. We call upon the company to com-
mence negotiations on hours, wages and working conditions
307
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ceived, and that it has refused to bargain with the Union
since March 21. Thereafter, the parties executed a Stipu-
lation for Certification Upon Consent Election on April
10 and a secret-ballot election was held on May 18. The
Union lost and filed objections to the election, certain of
which are now before me for resolution.
B. Challenged Authorization Cards-Authorization
Cards Allegedly Secured by Misrepresentation
Respondent contends that authorization cards signed
by the following employees may not be counted toward
a union majority because they were secured by misrepre-
sentation:
Ronald Bankston
Jackie Collins
James Collins
Michael Dobbins
Pat Hand
Jan Harris
Danny Hayes
Neil Langston
Richard Lybrand
Lawrence Parker
Robert H. Simpson
Mary Frances Smith
Wanda Windsor
In evaluating the validity of each of these questioned
cards, I have been guided by the following teachings of
the Supreme Court with respect to alleged misrepresen-
tations in securing signatures to union authorization
cards:
[E]mployees should be bound by the clear language
of what they sign unless that language is deliberate-
ly and clearly canceled by a union adherent with
words calculated to direct the signer to disregard
and forget the language above his signature. There
is nothing inconsistent in handing an employee a
card that says the signer authorizes the union to
represent him and then telling him that the card
will probably be used first to get an election. Elec-
tions have been, after all, and will continue to be,
held in the vast majority of cases; the union will
still have to have the signatures of 30% of the em-
ployees when an employer rejects a bargaining
demand and insists that the union seek an election.
We cannot agree . . . that employees as a rule are
too unsophisticated to be bound by what they sign
unless expressly told that their act of signing repre-
sents something else . . . in hearing testimony con-
cerning a card challenge, trial examiners should not
neglect their obligation to ensure employee free
choice by a too easy mechanical application of the
. . .rule. We also accept the observation that em-
ployees are more likely than not, many months after
a card drive and in response to questions by compa-
ny counsel, to give testimony damaging to the
union .... 3
Ronald Bankston signed an authorization card on
March 13. He read it before he signed it. Prior to his
signing he had attended a union meeting where it was
explained the cards were to join the Union and to get it
into the plant. When he signed the card at the solicita-
13 N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing Co., Inc., 395 U.S. 575, 606-608 (1969);
and see Jeffrey Manufacturing Division. Dresser Industries Inc., 248 NLRB
155 (1980). and Keystone Pretzel Bakery, Inc., 242 NLRB 492 (1979).
tion of Betty Underwood and an accompanying union
representative he was told that employees would prob-
ably have better working conditions, and Underwood
told him the card was needed to have an election and
only a few more were needed. Bankston clearly knew
prior to his signing that the card could be used for pur-
poses other than to get an election. He read it before he
signed, and I am satisfied he was not directed to disre-
gard the express language thereon or was otherwise as-
sured that it would be used only for an election. I find
his card is valid.
Jackie Collins testified that, when he signed a card on
March 13, Betty Underwood told him they only lacked a
few cards to hold an election to get the Union in and
that his card would be destroyed and no one would ever
know he signed it. He avers he "looked over" the card
but did not read it thoroughly.
[T]here is nothing in the circumstances surrounding
the solicitation of the card to indicate he was as-
sured that the card would be used for no purpose
other than to get an election. The absence of evi-
dence indicating that [Collins] read the entire card
does not . . . compel a conclusion that he did not
intend to designate the Union as a collective-bar-
gaining representative. 14
Indeed, a purpose communicated to him was to get the
Union in by means of an election. The promise to keep
the card and destroy it at some unspecified time does not
operate to destroy its validity. 15 I shall count his card.
James Collins signed a card on February 16 at the so-
licitation of Betty Underwood. He had seen the cards in
prior campaigns and testifies that Underwood asked him
to sign a card, and then, after he returned it, told him it
was just to get an election. I am persuaded by the se-
quence in his account that the election factor was men-
tioned after he signed. That being the case, I cannot con-
clude that his signature was induced by Underwood's al-
leged election statement. He did not read the card before
signing, but this does not establish he did not know what
it contained inasmuch as he had seen such cards in other
years and does not claim ignorance of its contents. I con-
clude that, since he signed the card before Underwood
mentioned an election, her statement was not an induce-
ment to sign. I find the card is valid.
Michael Dobbins signed a card on February 25 at the
solicitation of Bobby Joe King. He signed a card in 1977
during an earlier campaign, and there is no showing he
was not aware of its contents. Assuming as he claims
that he did not read the 1979 card it therefore follows
that it does not require a finding that he was unaware of
the card's content. Before he signed the card, King told
Dobbins that he thought the Union would help them and
that a union would improve working conditions. King
also told Dobbins that he was trying to get enough cards
signed for a union election at the plant. I find nothing in
King's statements amounting to an assurance that the
" Jeffrey Manufacturing Division, supra.
'" General Steel Products, Inc.. and Crown Flex of North Carolina,. Inc.,
157 NLRB 636, 645 (1966).
308
STANDARD-COOSA-THATCHER, CARPET YARN DIVISION
card would only be used for an election, and I shall
count it.
Patricia Hand signed a card on February 16 at the
behest of Sheila Whitehead who told her it was to get an
election. Although Hand claims she did not read the
card, I am convinced she was aware of its contents in
view of her testimony that she had solicited employees
to sign cards in 1977 which looked the same as the 1979
cards. A statement of the sort attributed to Whitehead
does not invalidate the card, and I shall count it.
Jan Harris signed a card on February 16. Betty Under-
wood, who solicited it, told Harris the card was for an
election. Harris says she did not read the card, but I find
this unlikely inasmuch as she filled out all of the spaces
on the card but for that reserved for a witness thereto.
In any event she was not told anything that would rea-
sonably lead her to believe the language on the card
would be used only for an election. Therefore, I find her
card is valid.
Danny Hayes filled out and signed a card on February
11. He testified that Joe Whitehead gave him the card
and said it was for an election, but he had earlier had a
conversation with Whitehead in which Whitehead said,
"Sign the blue card so we can get an election, get the
Union in the mill," thus clearly indicating a purpose of
the card was to secure a union. There is no evidence
Hayes did not read the card, and I conclude he is bound
by the language thereon. I shall count his card.
Neal Langston had signed cards in previous elections,
and I therefore find he was cognizant of the content of
the one he signed on March 8 even though he may not
have then read it. I observed card solicitor Patricia King
to be a more candid and believable witness than Lang-
ston, whose testimony was internally inconsistent, 6 and I
find that she did not mention an election to him when
securing the signed card. Accordingly, I shall count it.
Richard Lybrand signed a card on March 16 for Betty
Underwood. I credit Lybrand that he did not read the
card and Underwood told him it was "just for an elec-
tion." I therefore find his card is invalid as obtained in
reliance on Underwood's misrepresentation of its pur-
pose, and I shall not count it.
Lawrence Parker signed a card at his home on Febru-
ary 20 during a meeting with Bobby Joe King, Joe
Whitehead, and Kenneth Jones in which working condi-
tions were discussed. Either King or Whitehead asked if
he would sign a card, and he did. He was told the card
was to get a union election, but there is no evidence he
did not read it or was unaware of its contents. That
Parker may not have been specifically told the card's
purposes other than to secure an election does not con-
trovert the express language of the card, and I shall
count it.
Robert H. Simpson read a card and signed it on Febru-
ary 16. Although he testified it was his assumption the
card was for an election, he concedes that he cannot re-
member if the card solicitors told him that was the pur-
"' He first testified that King told him nothing about the card. but then
went on to say that King asked him to sign because they needed cards to
get an election whereupon he told her he would sign it so there could be
an election.
pose of the card. Nothing probative having been prof-
fered to invalidate Simpson's card, I shall count it.
Mary Frances Smith read, completed, and signed a
card on February 14. Her testimony that Betty Under-
wood told her they were trying to get enough cards for
an election does not affect the validity of her card, and I
shall count it.
Wanda Winsor completed and signed a card on March
17. She states she was told by the solicitors that the card
"would give a chance for the Union to come in there, to
hold our election." There is nothing in her testimony to
warrant a conclusion her signature was obtained by mis-
representation, and I shall count it.
Delora Copeland, Vera Garrard, and Elbert Havis
Respondent asserts that the signatures of Copeland and
Garrard on union cards have not been authenticated, the
primary reason being that they do not resemble those on
various company documents signed by them, pursuant to
Federal Rule 901(b)(3). I have compared the signatures
on the cards allegedly signed by Copeland and Garrard
with the signatures on documents proffered by Respond-
ent for comparison purposes. My examination convinces
me that Copeland and Garrard did indeed sign the au-
thorization cards which were received in evidence and
properly authenticated by the solicitor thereof. They are
both valid cards.
Jimmy M. Hopper gave Elbert Havis an authorization
card in early February. Havis, who has considerable dif-
ficulty writing his own name either legibly or correctly
spelled, took the card home. His wife signed it with his
name and filled out the rest of the card, including the
date of February 14. Havis returned the card to Hopper
the next day. The fact that Havis went to the trouble he
did to complete a card and return it to the solicitor per-
suades me his act was intentional and he knew what he
was signing. Moreover, I do not believe his wife would
have signed it for him had he not wished her to. There is
no showing that the purpose of the card was either un-
known to him or inadequately communicated to him, and
I cannot conclude, as Respondent would have me do,
that because Havis does not write well he cannot read. I
find that Havis' card is a valid designation of the Union,
and I shall count it towards the Union's majority.
Gloria Stanfield, Mary Hornbuckle, Bonnie
Caswell, and Glenda Finley
The validity of the authorization cards signed by these
four employees is challenged on the ground they were
signed prior to the union campaign which commenced
on or about February 6, 1979.
With respect to Stanfield's card, employee Betty Un-
derwood testified that she was present when Stanfield
signed it on March 13, 1979, at the water fountain in the
spinning room.
Stanfield states she signed the card in 1978, a couple of
months after the December 1977 election, and gave it to
Nellie Cook." She avers that she was asked to sign a
" Cook did not testify.
309
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
card a couple of times by Underwood, but does not say
when or where.
The date on Stanfield's card appears to have been
changed from "78" to "79." It is impossible to tell whose
handwriting is involved in this alteration, but the remain-
der of the front of the card, but for Underwood's initials
as the receiver and "S.C.T." in the company name space,
was completed by Stanfield. Underwood wrote the loca-
tion of the signing on the back of the card, dated it
March 13, 1979, and signed her name.
I observed Underwood to be a more believable wit-
ness on the subject of Stanfield's card than Stanfield, and
I note there was no union campaign in 1978. ' March 13
is a date falling in the midst of the 1979 campaign, and
the front and back of the card appear to have been com-
pleted with the same pen. Whether the date was changed
due to initial error by Stanfield or Underwood is not cer-
tain beyond the shadow of a doubt, but I conclude it is
more likely than not that the date originally entered by
Stanfield was in error and that she or Underwood cor-
rected it. I am persuaded that the General Counsel has
met his burden of proof in validating the card by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, and that it is most probable
the card was signed on March 13, 1979, rather than 1978.
I credit Underwood that it was and find it to be a valid
union authorization executed March 13, 1979.
Mary Hornbuckle's card is dated "2-16-79." It appears
that the "79" has been changed, but it is not clear on the
card itself what the year read before alteration. 9 Horn-
buckle testified she signed the card for Betty Underwood
in 1977, and did not sign one in 1979. Hornbuckle did
not remember where she was when she signed it, where
Underwood was when she gave the card to Hornbuckle,
whether other employees were signing cards or distribut-
ing cards or union literature at the gate about the time
she signed it, or when she signed the card in relation to a
home visit from Underwood and Bobby Joe King prior
to the signing.
Underwood states Hornbuckle signed the card in her
presence on February 16, 1979, and that Underwood
completed the rest of the card, changing the date to 1979
after she had erroneously written 1978. She attributes
this error to her inadvertence in continuing to write 1978
on various documents for a time after the beginning of
1979. Underwood further avers that she witnessed and
dated the card "2-16-79" on the reverse side, and her
signature and "2-16-79" do appear there. According to
Underwood, she had talked to Hornbuckle with respect
to the 1977 election but not again until she secured the
signed card in issue. I credit Underwood and shall count
the card.
Contrary to Respondent, the date on Bonnie Caswell's
card is not altered and clearly reads "2-9-1979." Caswell
does not claim any alteration in the date, but contends it
is in error because she did not sign a card for the 1979
18 The evidence so shows, and Respondent agrees in its post-trial brief
that there was no organizing campaign between December 9, 1977, and
February 6, 1979.
'' Although the Union argues that the underlying number was "78," I
do not believe from my careful examination of the card that a mere
visual observation can confidently determine whether "78" or "77," or
even "79," was first written down.
election. She does not remember who gave her the card
or to whom she returned it, states she does not know if
handwriting on the card other than her signature is hers,
and does not know whether she signed the card before
or after December 1977. Underwood testified that Cas-
well signed the card in her presence on February 9,
1979. I credit Underwood and shall count Caswell's
card.
Glenda Finley's card date has been altered from Feb-
ruary 26, 1978, to 1979. Finley says she signed the card
in 1978 after Patricia Hand gave her the card in the
parking lot and asked her to sign it. According to Finley,
Hand asked her several times to sign and told her it was
to try to get another election. Finley filled out all entries
on the front of the card. Underwood testified that Finley
signed the card in her presence in the Boaz Mall on Feb-
ruary 26, 1979. Hand says that Finley signed a card for
her in February 1977, before the December 1977 elec-
tion, in the parking lot, but Hand was not shown the spe-
cific card in issue when she testified. I do not believe the
card before me is the same one Hand is referring to be-
cause, although it may be that Hand obtained a card
from Finley before the December 1977 election, it is
plain that the changed entry was "1978," not "1977." As
heretofore noted, there was no organizing campaign in
1978, and I do not credit Finley that she signed the card
in 1978. I conclude that she signed the card in 1979, as
Underwood testified and noted on the back of the card,
but wrote "78" by inadvertence. The mere correction of
the date by her or Underwood does not destroy its valid-
ity. I shall count it as a valid authorization card for pur-
poses of ascertaining the Union's majority in 1979.
In view of my findings above, I conclude that the
Union represented a majority of Respondent's employees
in the unit found herein when it requested and was re-
fused recognition as exclusive bargaining representative
of said employees on March 21.20
C. Independent Violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
Preliminarily, I credit Patricia Whisenant's testimony
that on her hire in September 1978 she was told by Per-
sonnel Manager Earnest Bouldin that the Company did
not want a union and it would not be good for the Com-
pany or its employees. This statement occurred more
than 6 months prior to the filing of the first charge in
Case 10-CA-14634, and therefore may not be found to
be an unfair labor practice. It may, by long-established
precedent, be considered as background evidence shed-
ding light on events within the statutory period.2
20 I have found 19 of the 20 cards challenged by Respondent valid.
The remaining 68 cards were properly identified and authenticated on the
record and may therefore be relied on as evidence of the Union's major-
ity status. In all 87 of 147 employees signed cards, a clear majority, by
March 17, and a simple majority of 74 valid cards was secured by the
Union on February 20.
21 Local Lodge No. 1424. International Association of Machinists. AFL-
CIO. et al. [Bryan Manufacturing Co.] v N.L.R.B., 362 U.S. 411, 416
(1960).
310
STANDARD-COOSA-THATCHER, CARPET YARN DIVISION
1. Conduct of Supervisor Bennie F. (Butch) Harris
(a) On or about February 13, Harris took Kathy
Cahela Holland from her work station to the nurse's sta-
tion and locked the door behind them. I credit Holland's
account of what then happened over that of Harris be-
cause she was the more impressive witness, and for the
further reason that as a current employee she would not
likely deliberately fabricate testimony injurious to her
employer who controlled her employment future. 22 I also
note that Harris concedes he was trying to find out if
Holland was still prounion.
Holland asked what she had done. Harris replied she
had done nothing and he just wanted to know why she
wanted a union. She gave reasons and they then engaged
in colloquy as to what the Union could do about senior-
ity. Harris then opined that they would all be out of a
job if the Union got in at Boaz. She disagreed and asked
why he thought that. He said that the Company would
combine the Boaz and Guntersville 23 employees and
close the Boaz plant. She stated her disbelief, and Harris
said he knew it was true, had seen it in black and white,
and was fearful he would also lose his job.
I find that Harris violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
by interrogating Holland about her union desires and
threatening plant closure with resulting loss of jobs if the
Union got in at Boaz. This conduct was made even more
coercive by the context in which it occurred, mandatory
attendance in a locked room.
(b) In mid-February, Harris took Patricia Whisenant
off her job and into his office where he locked the door
and they conversed. 24 Harris showed her an enlargement
of a union card and asked her either if she had seen one
or if she knew what it was. She replied that she had not
and did not. Harris told her that he knew she had signed
a card and asked why she had signed, coupling this in-
quiry with a statement that by signing the card she had
signed away her rights to the Union. Harris concedes he
told Whisenant that there was a union at Guntersville,
and I find also that he also said that the employees
would be no better off at Boaz than at Guntersville and
that the Guntersville union president had traded employ-
ees' grievances for a pay increase. He went on that she
would have to go to a union steward rather than the
Company personally and that the Company would close
the plant if the Union got in. I find that Harris interro-
gated Whisenant about her union activity by asking why
she signed a card, threatened her with loss of access to
management,25 and threatened plant closure, all individ-
ually and collectively violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act. I also find that such conduct is particularly coercive
when delivered in the privacy of the supervisor's locked
office to which the employee was peremptorily sum-
moned.
22 See, e.g., Sltaco. Inc., 244 NLRB 461 (1979).
23 Respondent has a plant at nearby Guntersville, Alabama, which is
covered by a union contract.
24 I credit Whisenant where her account and that of Harris differ. She
was a more believable witness in terms of comparative demeanor. In this
connection, I specifically note that Harris appeared to be uncertain and
reluctant on this incident whereas Whisenant did not.
25 Sacramento Clinical Laboratory, Inc., 242 NLRB 944 (1979); and see
Colony Printing and Labeling. Inc., 249 NLRB 223 (1980).
(c) Timothy White testified that Harris walked up to
him in mid-March and said that, if the Union came in,
the bench White sat on to rest in his work area would be
taken away and if employees overstayed a break by I
minute Harris would issue warning slips to them. Harris
denies making these statements. Although I do not credit
Harris on other matters I do credit him here. The credi-
ble evidence establishes to my satisfaction that there was
in fact no such bench in White's work area, and White's
testimony struck me as contrived evidence given in an
unconvincing manner. Accordingly, the General Coun-
sel's evidence on this allegation does not preponderate.
and I shall recommend that it be dismissed.
(d) Timothy White testified to certain events on or
about May 8. According to White, he was called into
Plant Manager Jack Bowman's office where, in the pres-
ence of employee James Collins and possibly Personnel
Manager Earnest Bouldin, Bowman said that White had
filed a charge against the Company. White avers he
denied this and Bowman showed him the charge filed on
May 4, 1979, in Case 10-CA-14634 by the Union which
contains the names of Collins and White as alleged dis-
criminatees. 26 White continues that Bowman gave him a
copy of the charge whereupon White asked how he
could find out more about it and received the answer it
would have to be investigated. Later the same day, says
White, he went into Harris' office to report on work as
usual, and Harris asked why he filed the charge, which
he denied. Harris then allegedly stated that he had had a
lot of reasons to fine White, and that he could tell White
was union, "that it showed."
Harris' version is in substance as follows. White and
James Collins asked him about a charge being filed. He
then told them he had seen it, and they said they filed no
charges against him and did not know how it had hap-
pened. They asked who would have filed the charges be-
sides them, and he said he did not know. Harris then
went and told Bowman that White and Collins knew
nothing about the charge, had not filed them, and had
not signed anything. Bowman offered to show it to
them. Harris went and got them. Bowman showed them
the May 4 charge and was unable to explain to them
how their names came to be on the charge. White and
Collins asked who to see to find out about it, and
Bowman referred them to the name and address on the
charge. I conclude Bowman was pointing out the name
and address of the Charging Party.
Harris denies any later conversation with White about
the Union or making the statements White claims he
made in his office later in the shift.
Neither Bowman, Bouldin, nor James Collins testified
about this incident. The absence of their testimony leaves
a straight credibility conflict on significant points be-
tween Harris and White. I doubt that Bowman would
have summoned White to the office for the purpose of
accusing him of filing a charge plainly showing the
Union as the Charging Party, and note there is no con-
tention Bowman similarly accused Collins whose name
precedes that of White in the body of the charge. More-
2, The complaint herein does not so allege.
311
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
over, I do not believe it probable that Harris would later
have inquired why White filed a charge which he had
already denied filing. On the whole, the testimony both
of Harris and White leaves something to be desired in
terms of exactitude, but that of Harris appeared to be de-
livered in a less tentative manner and with greater assur-
ance. In short, I observed Harris to be more believable
on the events of May 8, and I credit his affirmative testi-
mony as well as his denials of the statements attributed
to him by White. Accordingly, I find that the General
Counsel has not shown by a preponderance of the credi-
ble evidence that Harris made unlawful statements on
May 8 as alleged.
(e) I credit Patricia Whisenant that, on May 21, Harris
walked up to her and asked where her "god-damn"
union was and, after she replied it was coming and they
were going to court, further stated that she was not satis-
fied getting in as deep as she was but just kept on getting
in deeper and deeper.
I am persuaded that Harris' question and commentary
emphasized that Respondent strongly disapproved of the
Union and Whisenant's activity on its behalf, and con-
veyed that she was in deep trouble with Respondent, and
getting deeper, because of that activity. Harris' state-
ments were clearly calculated to make Whisenant fearful
of Respondent's reaction to her protected union activities
which it viewed in an unfavorable light. I therefore find
that Harris threatened Whisenant in violation of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act. That he did not specify what Re-
spondent's retaliation might be does not diminish the se-
riousness of the threat.
2. Conversation of employee Leon Taylor with
Personnel Manager Bouldin and Shift Supervisor
Cecil King
Around the first of May, Taylor, who has since quit
due to health problems, had been complaining that his
workload on his second-shift yarn service job was too
heavy. Unbeknownst to Taylor, Respondent had com-
menced a new timestudy on the yarn service job but had
not as yet reached his shift. I credit Bouldin that the
timestudy was motivated by the movement of machinery
and find that neither antiunion considerations nor Tay-
lor's complaining precipitated it.
During the first week in May, Bouldin approached
him and said he had heard Taylor was complaining
about his job. Taylor replied that he had too big a work-
load. Taylor testified on direct examination that Bouldin
then said employees would not have any additional bene-
fits if the Union came in, and mentioned the Guntersville
plant. On cross-examination Taylor stated that he does
not recall what Bouldin said after Taylor responded to
Bouldin's initial question about his complaint, and further
stated that he believed Bouldin's response to his com-
plaint of too much work was all that was said. Bouldin
testified that after Taylor said he was overloaded he
(Bouldin) advised him of the timestudy on the first shift
which would soon be extended to the second shift. Boul-
din denied that either the Union, benefits, or trouble for
Taylor were mentioned during this conversation than
Taylor who delivered his testimony in an uncertain
manner, obviously contradicted his own direct testimony
on cross-examination, and was not a convincing witness.
I therefore credit Bouldin and find that he did not, as the
General Counsel alleges, unlawfully threaten Taylor or
otherwise violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act by his state-
ments to Taylor.
Taylor testified to a conversation with Cecil King, at
or about the same time period as that with Bouldin,
wherein King told him that first-shift jobs had been
timed and his job was going to be timed next, and then
said that the Union would do him no good if it came in.
According to Taylor, he had another conversation
with King about a week later when King called him into
his office and told him he did not know what Joe White-
head (an active union proponent) was putting in Taylor's
head but the Union would not help Taylor, or get him
anymore benefits, or reduce his job duties. Taylor avers
that King added that if Taylor did not keep his job up he
might be fired. In response to my question, Taylor
placed this conversation before the May 18 election. On
cross-examination he first placed it before the election.
Then, when confronted with his pretrial affidavit given
to the Board, conceded that he had said therein the con-
versation occurred in the last week of May (which was
after the election), and stated his affidavit, given on June
10, 1979, was truthful. Unaccountably, Taylor then again
testified that the conversation happened before the elec-
tion, but also reiterated that his affidavit was truthful.
Cecil King testified that Taylor complained to him on
various occasions that he had too much work to do, and
received help from King. King denies any discussion of
the Union during these conversations about Taylor's job.
King did recall an occasion, approximately between May
8 and 11, when Taylor came to his office, told him
Whitehead was pressuring him to sign a union card, and
asked King what he thought about the Union. According
to King, he told Taylor what the existing company bene-
fits were, that if the Union came in more benefits would
have to be bargained for, and that King did not think the
Union would help at Boaz. King denies informing Taylor
he would lose benefits if the Union came in.
Taylor did not impress me as a candid or reliable wit-
ness as he testified in an uncertain and unconvincing
manner. I do not credit his testimony, and I do credit the
version of King who testified in a straightforward, be-
lievable manner. I find that none of Cecil King's state-
ments to Leon Taylor transgressed Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.
3. Statements of Personnel Manager Bouldin
(a) On a Saturday afternoon in mid-February, Bouldin
was having his car serviced, and walked toward the ad-
jacent Holiday Inn to have some coffee. Patricia Whisen-
ant, who was parked in the Holiday Inn lot conversing
with employee Jesse Roden who sat in another car next
to hers, saw Bouldin and became apprehensive that Boul-
din would think she and Roden were having an affair
rather than waiting to meet union organizers. She called
Bouldin to her car, as Roden drove off, and told him
that she was not there for a liaison with Roden. From
this point the accounts of Bouldin and Whisenant differ.
312
STANDARD-COOSA-THATCHER, CARPET YARN DIVISION
Whisenant's Version
Bouldin told her that he knew she was there to see
union people and that if she did not watch it she would
get in trouble, and she should be back at work. They
talked longer but she does not recall what was said.
About 10 minutes later she saw him in the coffeeshop.
Two friends, Finley and Lemons (neither of whom testi-
fied on this matter), went in to talk to Bouldin. One re-
turned and told Whisenant that Bouldin wanted her to
come in. She went in, does not remember everything
that was said, but knows Bouldin and the employees
talked about the Union and the presence of its organiz-
ers. She recalls that Finley or Lemons said it was Kathy
Cahela's fault, not Whisenant's, that Whisenant was at
the Holiday Inn.
Bouldin's Version
He replied to Whisenant's remarks about her relation-
ship with Roden by saying it was her business. He went
inside the coffeeshop. Whisenant, Lemons, and Finley
came in 5 or 10 minutes later. Whisenant again explained
that her meeting with Roden was not what it looked
like, and said that they were there to see a piece of paper
that employee Betty Underwood possessed. They all
then left. There was no conversation with Whisenant
about the Union and no mention of people being in trou-
ble.
But for Whisenant's concern that her relationship with
Roden might be misconstrued, the parking lot conversa-
tion would probably not have occurred. Bouldin was on
his way to get coffee and his attention was drawn to
Whisenant by her calling him over. I am persuaded that
Bouldin's presence at the Holiday Inn has not been
shown to have been prompted by any reason other than
chance and a hankering for a cup of coffee. Whisenant's
recitation struck me as manufactured to capitalize on the
unexpected presence of Bouldin, and I do not credit her
that Bouldin told her he knew she was there to see union
people," that she would get in trouble if she did not
watch out, or that she should return to work. Nor do I
credit her, in the absence of any corroboration, that
Bouldin sat talking about the Union and its organizers
with the three employees. I credit Bouldin's account be-
cause he was the more believable witness with respect to
the events of this day and because his account seems the
more likely to me to the extent that it reflects that the
topic of discussion was the true import of Whisenant's
meeting with Roden, rather than some meeting with
union organizers which has not in fact been convincingly
shown to have occurred or even been scheduled. The
General Counsel has not shown by a preponderance of
the credible evidence that Bouldin violated the Act in
any fashion on this occasion.
(b) I credit Whisenant's testimony that some time in
mid-February she was talking to Bouldin when Kathy
Cahela Holland walked by without speaking and Whi-
senant told Bouldin, when he asked what was wrong
27 I agree with Respondent that there is no evidence, or even a fair
inference or warranted suspicion, that Bouldin had any reason to believe
or assert that Whisenant was in the parking lot to meet with anyone
other than Roden
with Holland, that Holland was involved in the "Union
business," to which Bouldin stated that if Holland did
not watch it she would get fired. This statement by
Bouldin, in the context in which it was uttered, was a
threat of discharge for union activity and violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(l) of the Act.
(c) In early or mid-March, after Bouldin had advised
her that she was not getting a job she had applied for,
Whisenant became emotionally upset and told Bouldin,
"[Y]ou just hate me." He replied that he would like her a
lot more if she was on the right side, a transparent refer-
ence to her prounion posture. Bouldin does not directly
deny this testimony and I credit Whisenant.2 8 Neverthe-
less, I do not agree with the General Counsel that Boul-
din's statement was a threat advising Whisenant that
benefits were contingent upon her being opposed to the
Union.
Bouldin's statement certainly made it clear that he
knew or believed she was for the Union, but I discern no
element of threat in the statement. I do find, however,
that Bouldin's comment reasonably tended to convey to
Whisenant that she would be in Bouldin's good graces
were she against the Union. It seems to me that this was
an invitation to abandon the Union in order to obtain
whatever benefits might flow from the improved rela-
tionship with management thereby obtained. I find this
to be interference with Whisenant's union activities and
violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
(d) I do not credit Martha Houchin White, an uncer-
tain and unimpressive witness,29 that, in mid-March while
she thinks she was changing her insurance, Bouldin said:
Just something about the union; if I knew who was
union-who was company. He was telling me that
if the union came in that they would take all of the
benches out of the smoking areas throughout the
plant.
This testimony consists of conclusions bereft of ade-
quate specificity. Bouldin's testimony in contravention
impressed me as more believable. Accordingly, I find
that Bouldin did not on this occasion unlawfully interro-
gate or threaten Martha Houchin White as the General
Counsel alleges.
(e) Martha Houchin White testified that, in mid-April
during a conversation whose start she does not remem-
ber, Bouldin and Plant Superintendent Jack Bowman,
which one she does not recall, told her that if the Union
came in it would30 be a while before employees got a
raise and they might lose some vacations and insurance
benefits.
Bowman, a methodical and precise witness who testi-
fied without hesitation, avers that White asked to talk to
2 I1 do not consider Bouldin's bare denial that he ever indicated to
Whisenant that she had a better likelihood of getting the job she applied
for if she was on the right side as an adequate response to Whisenant's
specific testimony.
29 White was discharged by Respondent for falsifying her age on her
job application. Both the discharge and the falsification are relevant fac-
tors in evaluating her credibility, but I would not credit her on demeanor
alone if these factors were not present.
"' She conceded on cross-examination that she does not recall whether
they said "would" or "might" with respect to the raise
313
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
him and Bouldin while they were in her area. They
agreed. White asked if it were true employees could lose
certain benefits if the Union came in. Bouldin started to
respond,"' but Bowman interrupted and told her Re-
spondent was not saying she would lose anything if the
Union won the election, but if it won there would have
to be negotiations where she could get a little more,
remain the same, or lose some. He named several benefits
of which this would be true, with unknown results until
negotiations were complete. He also mentioned that the
negotiations at Respondent's Guntersville plant had taken
about a year, but Respondent did not know how long ne-
gotiations would take, maybe a short time or maybe
quite some time.
I credit Bowman's version on the basis of comparative
demeanor, certainty of testimony, and believable detail. I
am inclined to the conclusion that White misconstrued
what was actually said and testified to this misconstruc-
tion. I conclude and find the General Counsel has not
shown by a preponderance of the credible evidence that
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act during
this mid-April conversation. Belcher Towing Company,
238 NLRB 446 (1978); Wex-Tex of Headland, Inc., 236
NLRB 1001, 1004 (1978).
(f) I credit Patricia Whisenant's straightforward recita-
tion that she went up to Bouldin on May 17 and told
him she was sorry that she had to work against him in
the Union and that she would be on the gates the next
morning. 2 Bouldin asked what the Company had done
to her and what did she have against the Company. She
told him, "Nothing." He then asked why she was work-
ing for the Union, and she replied that she believed in it.
Such inquiry into Whisenant's reasons for supporting the
Union tended to coerce her in the exercise of her Section
7 rights, even though she had openly declared her union
adherence. I therefore conclude that Bouldin's probing
into Whisenant's motives for supporting the Union con-
stituted coercive interrogation in violation of Section
8(a)(l) of the Act. 3
4. More conversations of Plant Manager Jack
Bowman with employees
(a) On or about May 11, Bowman and Patricia Whi-
senant had a conversation at work.34 Whisenant had a
union leaflet in her possession which recited that a com-
pany could not unilaterally discontinue employee benefits
after a union wins a Board election. 35 Whisenant asked
'' I do not credit Bouldin that he had no conversation with White
about the Union or benefits after his mid-March conversation. What he
said is unknown, but, to the extent he was a party to this conversation,
his claim of no such talks is discredited.
32 She had previously distributed literature at Respondent's gate.
3 17I Automotive Electrical Products Division. 231 NLRB 878 (1977).
" The recitation of what was said is a composite of the credited por-
tions of the testimony of each. I am persuaded that what is here present
is a failure of communication. Bowman's recitation is consistent with
what he had earlier told Martha Houchin White with regard to the fate
of benefits if the Union won the election. Whisenant's version appears to
be. in large part, her subjective understanding of the meaning of what
Bowman said rather than an accurate report as to what he actually said. I
credit Bowman, where there is testimonial conflict with Whisenant, be-
cause he appeared the more certain and candid of the two.
a5 Respondent introduced this document in evidence. It bears the
Union's logo and recites, with supporting excerpts from Board cases, that
Bowman if employee Bowman acknowledged that the
leaflet was correct and continued that after negotiations
commenced benefits could go up or down or remain the
same. He also mentioned that negotiations at Respond-
ent's Guntersville plant had taken about a year and it
was an unknown as to how long negotiations would last
but they could take a short time or a long time. He fur-
ther stated that negotiations would start at zero. After
Bowman's comments, Whisenant said she knew he was
not lying and left the area.
Noting that Bowman's comments were generated by
Whisenant's inquiry, I am persuaded that his remarks
were designed to advise Whisenant of the various possi-
bilities with respect to benefits which might result from
negotiations. He neither predicted nor threatened adverse
consequences with respect to benefits. I find his com-
ments with respect to the possibility that benefits might
be reduced as a result of negotiations were protected ob-
servations under Section 8(c) of the Act, and did not vio-
late Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Wex-Tex of Headland,
supra.
(b) Although the testimony of Kathy Cahela Holland
is entitled to considerable deference where it is adverse
to her current employer, Respondent, she appeared to be
straining and attempting to embellish the events of May
18, when she and Bowman had a conversation. Bowman
was more believable than Holland with respect to this
conversation. I credit him, and I find that on the morn-
ing of May 18, before the election, Holland commenced
a conversation with Bowman by saying that she had read
a copy of the Guntersville contract and could find noth-
ing in it which would benefit employees. Bowman then
told her that he wanted her to understand that the Gun-
tersville contract was the first thing Respondent's lawyer
would insist on in negotiations if Respondent lost the
election.
I agree with Respondent that Bowman's testimony
does not establish that Respondent would not bargain in
good faith with the Union, but that is not the question.
The question is whether Bowman's statement to Holland
was a threat that Respondent would not bargain in good
faith with the Union if it was selected. I believe this
question requires an affirmative answer. The Respond-
ent's argument that Bowman only referred to Respond-
ent's "initial" position in bargaining adroitly attempts to
resolve the issue through semantical argument. I do not
believe that Holland was required to know or suspect or
even hazard a guess that Respondent's first insistence on
the Guntersville contract terms was not immutable. The
burden was on Bowman to explain this if it were true. I
find that the statements of Bowman had a reasonable
tendency to impress on Holland that Respondent would
insist on the terms of its Guntersville contract as a condi-
tion of a Boaz contract and thus render bargaining a
futile exercise insofar as achievement of employee goals
benefits may not be taken from employees as punishment for their union
activities. Union International Representative Virginia Keyser testified
that although this is a stock union leaflet it was not used in the 1979 cam-
paign. Whisenant was uncertain as to whether or not she had the leaflet
with her. Whether the leaflet was distributed during the 1979 campaign
or at an earlier time does not determine whether or not Whisenant had it
in her possession. I credit Bowman that she did.
314
STANDARD-COOSA-THATCHER, CARPET YARN DIVISION
was concerned. That the statements were made within
hours of the upcoming Board election and were directed
at an employee who Respondent knew considered the
Guntersville contract of no benefit to Boaz employees in-
creased their impact. I conclude that Bowman's threat of
insistence on unpalatable contract terms interfered with,
restrained, and coerced Holland in the exercise of her
Section 7 rights, including the right to freely cast a ballot
in a Board election without being intimidated by Re-
spondent in the exercise of that franchise, and thus vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. There is no credible evi-
dence Bowman unlawfully interrogated Holland.
5. Conduct of Shift Supervisor Frank Lowery
(a) On February 25, 1979, Lowery called employee
Melinda Kennedy from her work into his office. Lowery
concedes that he asked Kennedy if she had seen one of
the union authorization cards and did she know what she
was signing when she signed one of them. This com-
pound question by a supervisor in a locus of supervisory
authority away from the employee's work station consti-
tuted coercive interrogation of Kennedy with respect to
her protected activity of signing a union card and her
motives in so doing, without any assurances of no repri-
sals, and served notice on her that Respondent knew she
had signed a union card Lowery's interrogations violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Kennedy's testimony on this meeting with Lowery
merely adds that Lowery solicited questions about the
Union from her and gave generally noncommital answers
when she inquired about benefits of a union label, an in-
centive system, etc. Kennedy credibly avers that Lowery
volunteered that if the Union came in employees would
get paid no more because the Company would only pay
so much. I do not believe that this latter volunteered
statement on wages constitutes a threat in the usual
sense, but it does convey the idea that the selection of
the Union would be a futile gesture insofar as wage in-
creases were concerned. To that extent, Lowery's state-
ment tended, in some degree at least, to interfere with
and restrain Kennedy in the exercise of her Section 7
rights, and its import was exacerbated by the context of
a closed meeting with a supervisor in his office wherein
he had already coercively interrogated her. Accordingly,
I find the comment on the future of wages violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(l) of the Act.
(b) On or about March 17, 1979, Rebecca Stephenson
asked Lowery for permission to take some time off
work. He responded that since she had not signed a
union card he would let her be off. She told him that she
had signed one. I credit Stephenson that Lowery then
told her that if she signed a card she automatically had
to join the Union if it came in. I credit Lowery that he
also told her that if she needed to be off he would still
"work with you" whether or not she had signed a card.
In my view, Lowery's initial comment indicating he
thought Stephenson had signed a union card amounted
to a solicitation of a response as to whether or not she
had signed one. This is interrogation into union activities
prohibited by Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.3 6 I do not agree
with the General Counsel that Lowery's implied ques-
tion was also a threat of reprisal against employees who
designated the Union to represent them. It might be con-
strued as a grant of benefit because Lowery thought Ste-
phenson was not a card signer. In either case, grant or
threat, Lowery's subsequent statement amounts to a
promise to treat her leave requests as he had in the past,
regardless of whether or not she signed a card and effec-
tively erased any coercion that may arguably be inferred
from his initial statement. Moreover, Lowery granted
her leave requests on several occasions thereafter. I note
that Alabama is a right-to-work State and Lowery's
statement of the requirement to join the Union amounts
to the dissemination of misinformation, but I am persuad-
ed his erroneous comment on this topic does not rise to
the stature of a threat violative of the Act.
(c) Some time in March 1979 employees Joe White-
head and Bill Renfroe were discussing what the Union
could do for them. Lowery was present and commented
that either "it'll hurt you," as Whitehead first testified or
that "it could hurt," as Whitehead acknowledged on
cross-examination.3 7 It is questionable whether the first
version constitutes a threat and the second clearly does
not. In view of Whitehead's modified testimony, I find
that the General Counsel has not shown by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that Lowery threatened employees
in violation of Section 8(a)(1).
(d) It appears that Respondent has a rule against drop-
ping hard waste on the floor. On March 5, 1979, 38
Lowery issued a verbal warning to Betty Underwood, an
outstanding union protagonist, for an infraction of this
rule.
According to Underwood, Lowery spoke to her about
dropping hard waste, said that he knew she was in a
union campaign and would do nothing to break a rule
during this time period, and recited that he was going to
break her from a bad habit while the Union was in town.
Lowery testified that he reminded Underwood that he
had several times spoken to her about the hard waste,
told her he was giving her a verbal warning and making
it part of her record, and stated that he felt it would be a
good time for her to break the habit of throwing hard
waste on the floor. This was the only verbal warning he
ever gave her for this offense.
Neither witnesses' demeanor provided me with any
convincing clues as to which gave the more accurate ac-
count, but the fact that Underwood was still employed
by Respondent and supervised by Lowery at the time
she testified persuades me that she was not likely to be
deliberately fabricating testimony reflecting adversely on
Lowery's conduct, and Lowery does not specifically
36 That Lowery may have thought he was joking does not mean Stc-
phenson did.
37 Lowery says he probably said it could hurt hut denies aying it
would hurt.
3' Underwood claims she received the warning in late March or early
April, but I am persuaded by the written record of the warning. which
Lowery convincingly authenticated, that the warning was given on
March 5. Underwood's erroneous testimony on the date is insufficient to
collaterally discredit her on other matters
315
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
deny mentioning the Union. I therefore credit her ver-
sion where it varies from that of Lowery.
There is obviously nothing unlawful about reprimand-
ing an employee for violation of what appears to be a le-
gitimate company rule, but it is unlawful to advise the
employee that the timing of the warning was precipitated
by the presence of the Union because this clearly puts
the employee on notice that union activities not only
caused this warning but may cause other adverse actions
to be taken by the employer. I find that Lowery did
make an implied threat to Underwood of reprisals for
union activitiy and the issuance of the warning on March
5 was motivated by the presence of union activity. Both
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.39
(e) On or about April 19, 1979, Lowery and Under-
wood had another conversation. The Union had distrib-
uted a notice of the time and place of its next meeting,
but left the space for the agenda vacant. I credit Under-
wood that Lowery jokingly said that it was no wonder
there were not more people at the meeting if this were
all that was on the agenda. Underwood told him not to
worry about it because there would be something on the
agenda. Lowery rejoined, "No kidding, what have you
got on the agenda for Sunday?" She asked why he did
not come to a union meeting and find out inasmuch as he
had been a union person, and that he might enjoy it.
I am aware that tortuous reasoning can wring ominous
nuances out of the slightest statement, but I cannot in
good conscience conclude that this conversation con-
tained anything more than good-natured banter and in-
nocuous repartee, or had any reasonable tendency to in-
fringe on Underwood's statutory rights. I therefore find
that Lowery did not unlawfully interrogate Underwood
as the General Counsel alleges.
(f) On or about April 24 or 25 or some time in May,40
Lowery told Elizabeth Sharp that he knew she was
friendly with Betty Underwood, but thought Sharp was
on his side. She replied that she did not know what he
was talking about. He said she knew what he was talking
about, and that he still thought she was on his side.
Considering that the record fairly establishes that Un-
derwood was a leading supporter and there appears to be
no other reason for Lowery to refer to Sharp as being
on some side or other, I conclude that Lowery's enig-
matic statement translates into an effort to elicit a state-
ment from Sharp as to whether she was for or against
the Union."4 This is unlawful interrogation into her sym-
pathies vis-a-vis the Union and violates Section 8(a)(l) of
the Act.
(g) On or about May 3, 1979, employees Dingier and
Renfroe started discussing the Union in Lowery's pres-
ence.42 I find Lowery's version more believable and his
a9 It is not alleged in the complaint that the warning was given in vio-
lation of Sec. 8(a)(3), and the remedy would be the same in any event.
'4 The record is not clear as to which was the date of this incident.
" If Lowery's statement is susceptible of several meanings, as Re-
spondent argues, the burden of clarifying any ambiguity fell on Lowery
not Sharp. She in effect asked him what he meant, but he elected merely
to repeat himself, stating that she knew what he was talking about. Inas-
much as his comment could reasonably be construed as unlawful interro-
gation, and he made no effort to clarify to show it was not but chose to
remain mysterious, there is no reason to assign it another meaning.
"' Renfroe had been walking with Lowery.
delivery more convincing than that of Dingier. Lowery
interjected into the conversation that his wife had not
been helped by being a union officer when she worked
at a union plant and was changed to a lower paying job.
It is not clear whether he also said that he had kidded
his wife by asking her why she did not go to her Union
if she were being so mistreated, or if this comment was
tacked on at the hearing as a side remark to the judge. I
got the impression the latter was the case. In any event,
I find nothing unlawful in Lowery's comments to
Dingier and Renfroe. He interrogated no one on this oc-
casion, and I shall recommend the allegation of interro-
gation be dismissed. Nor do I find that his comments
were an unlawful effort "to impress upon Dingier the fu-
tility of supporting the Union."
(h) On May 11, 1979, several employees, including Un-
derwood, were short $2 in their paychecks because of a
computer error. On May 12, they protested to Plant
Manager Bowman who explained the computer error
and promised the mistake could be corrected on their
next paycheck.
That evening, May 12, Lowery approached Under-
wood at her work station and asked what had happened
with respect to the pay problem.43 Underwood told him
that the Company had been going to take the employees'
5-cent premium pay for the shift away from them.
Lowery said, "Just raise hell, Betty . . . if you'll notice,
Dennis Williams raised hell for a couple of weeks, and
he's not here any longer." (Williams had been discharged
about a week before this.) Underwood told Lowery that
if that were a threat she would not be as easy as Wil-
liams to get rid of. Lowery pointed out it was a "one-on-
one" conversation and his word was as good as hers. She
retorted that they would let the government decide
whose word was as good as hers and whose word was
best. That ended the conversation.
I agree with Respondent that Lowery did not threaten
Underwood with discharge "if they joined or engaged in
activities on behalf of the Union" as the complaint al-
leges. Underwood was, however, engaged in protected
concerted activity when she and others protested the pay
shortage, and Lowery's statement was a threat of dis-
charge because she was complaining of that shortage.
Her complaint was a direct continuation of her concert-
ed activity. Lowery's statement was patently interfer-
ence, restraint, and coercion of Underwood in the exer-
cise of her Section 7 rights. The matter was fully litigat-
ed and the threat was alleged as a violation of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act. Respondent had ample notice of the
nature of the violation from her testimony of January 7,
1980, and adduced evidence from Lowery, which I have
not credited, in response thereto on February 6, 1980.
Accordingly, I am persuaded that the incident was ade-
quately covered by the allegations of the complaint and
the general 8(a)(1) allegations of the amended and second
amended charges, was litigated, and may be found a vio-
lation of Section 8(a)(l), which I now find Lowery's
threat to be.
" I credit Underwood on this topic.
316
STANDARD-COOSA-THATCHER, CARPET YARN DIVISION
6. Conduct of Respondent's president, Richard C.
Thatcher, Jr.
The General Counsel alleges that Thatcher threatened
loss of benefits in an address given to several employees,
and proffers employees Kathy Holland, Elizabeth Sharp,
Betty Underwood, and Melinda Kennedy as witnesses in
support thereof.
The meeting in question was conducted by Thatcher
with six employees in the plant's laboratory about 6 a.m.
on May 8. Mark Maddox, Respondent's industrial rela-
tions director, was also present.
Holland testified as follows:
Mr. Thatcher asked us about, you know, why we
were wanting a Union and stuff like that. And I re-
member one thing that he said specifically when we
were talking about what would happen if we got a
Union; he said that everything would just be
cleared from the table, and we would start from
scratch. We would not have any contract; we
would not have any wage rights or anything.
He said it would be minimum wage, and we
would work from there-no vacation pay, no holi-
day pay, no nothing. That they would negotiate
from that.
Sharpe testified on direct examination:
[Thatcher] said that he would sit down and negoti-
ate with us if we voted a Union in, but he didn't
want a Union to come in, that we would start from
scratch. And we would not have any paid holidays,
not have any pay raises.
Q. Do you recall anything else?
A. He said that he wanted to explain the plan,
and he wanted to make it a happy place to work.
On cross-examination, Sharp testified:
Q. Now, at this meeting, according to your testi-
mony, Mr. Thatcher indicated that if the Union was
voted in, he would sit down and negotiate with the
Union, isn't that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And isn't it also true that he said that there
would be no guarantee that your wages or holidays
or insurance would be improved as a result of nego-
tiations?
A. Yes, sir.
Kennedy testified on direct examination that Thatcher
said, "We were not guaranteed even what we were get-
ting paid now-that we would have nothing, that we'd
just sit down and negotiate from nothing." On cross-ex-
amination she verified that on May 24, 1979, she gave an
affidavit to the Board in which all she reported about
Thatcher's comments was that, "He said that they tried
to keep up with industry standards and gave us a raise
when the rest of the industry did." She claims that her
affidavit just does not contain everything.
Underwood recalls that Maddox made opening remarks
that the employees did not need a union and he did not
want them to have one. She recalls nothing else that
Maddox said and recalls only the following with respect
to what Thatcher said:
Well, he told us that if we voted a Union in, he
would sit down and negotiate with us, but that we
would go back from scratch-we would start from
scratch in negotiations. And I said, Mr. Thatcher,
what do you mean by starting from scratch?
And he said he would go back like the day we
were hired in, we would not have any paid holidays
or any vacation or any pay raises-that we would
go back and start from scratch and negotiate from
there, and there would be no guarantee that we
would even be making the amount of money that
we were now making.
Thatcher remembered that the meeting where the
above employees were present lasted about 45 minutes
and he started it by making a speech adhering to pre-
pared notes.44 After the speech he opened the session up
for questions. He testified that the only statement he
made about negotiations was that if Respondent negotiat-
ed it would do its utmost to negotiate a contract which
would protect management's interest in properly running
the plant. He does not recall that Underwood asked
what would happen if the Union won the election, and
states that most of the employees' questions were com-
plaints about Supervisor Frank Lowery. The arguably
relevant portions of Thatcher's notes read as follows:
III Our position on the Union
A. The question at Boaz is not whether unions
are good or bad but whether you need one.
It costs money to belong to a union, so you don't
get one unless you need it.
B. I think the Company has done everything it
can to make this plant the kind of place people
should enjoy working in.
It is one of the highest paid plants in the Compa-
ny.
All hourly jobs at Boaz have a guaranteed day
rate. There are no incentive jobs. This is what you
said you wanted. That is not the way we have han-
dled union plants in S-C-T.
We brought the Behavioral Science people to
Boaz first-to help us improve communications and
efficiency.
You are paid wages and benefits which are com-
petitive in the textile industry-this has always been
the case.
There is nothing in wages or benefits that the
Union has been able to get out of negotiations with
S-C-T that you have not gotten without a union at
least as quick.
If a company is doing all it can do-or all it is
willing to do-there is no reason to pay a union to
represent you. I believe S-C-T is doing all it can do
" He used the same notes at the 12 or 13 meetings he addressed that
day. There is no contention or evidence he made any unlawful remarks
at an' other meeting.
317
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
at this time and remain competitive, and I am not
going to let any union make us noncompetitive.
That could cost all of us our jobs.
I am sure you have individual problems at Boaz
from time to time. There are always those days
your supervisor doesn't act just the way you want
him to. But we must recognize that supervisors are
human beings, and they have bad days just like we
do-whether there is a union in the plant or not.
I don't think unions help improve relations be-
tween the supervisors and the employee. They
make them more difficult by adding a third party to
the discussion. The third party, who is either a
union steward from the plant or a paid professional
union organizer, always thinks it is their job to
cause dissension. Look around this plant-you
know who the union stewards would be. Do you
want them speaking for you?
I think the facts show that you have been heard
more and better by the management of this Compa-
ny at Boaz without a union than the employees at
Guntersville and Chattanooga have with a union.
IV Our experiences with this Union
A. This Company's past experiences with this
Union have not been pleasant ones.
The two things that stand out most in our rela-
tionship with the Union are: (1) the bitter strikes
and (2) the long, drawn out negotiations in which
the Union has always come out on the short end of
the stick.
Chattanooga and Guntersville employees got
their wage increases in 1977 and 1978 after you did.
For example, in 1977 Guntersville got their increase
13 weeks after you did. Also, no Guntersville or
Chattanooga employees got any increase in Febru-
ary 1978, like you did. You have had three in-
creases since early 1977, whereas Union employees
in this Company have had only two. And the aver-
age wage at Boaz today is substantially higher than
at Guntersville.
There have been two strikes at Guntersville and
two strikes at Chattanooga. The 1978 strike in Chat-
tanooga was the most bitter strike I have ever wit-
nessed. It was like something out of the early
1930's. There were Union goons on the picket line
with clubs and knives and that sort of thing. Many
people were injured. Twenty-three employees were
fired for misconduct. For all of the damage that
was done, the Union got nothing out of the strike.
They got the same wage increase you did-only
much later.
Maddox testified that the meeting lasted about 30 to 45
minutes and the general topic of employee discussion
was complaints by Kennedy and Underwood about
Frank Lowery. In response to leading questions, he
denied that Thatcher said negotiations would start from
scratch or that employees would lose benefits if the
Union got in. He recalls no questions by Underwood
concerning the Union.
I am satisfied that Thatcher did not merely read his
notes verbatim, but made comments relating thereto and
answered employee questions. An examination of the em-
ployees' testimony, making allowances for normal differ-
ences which often arise when several people hear the
same thing but put different interpretations on it and
become convinced that their perceptions are what was in
fact said, persuades me that Thatcher did advise the em-
ployees that negotiations would start from scratch, there
would be no guarantees that present benefits would
remain the same and they would all be subject to negoti-
ations. Underwood's testimony most probably makes the
closest approach to what was said in this regard by
Thatcher, but I find it was colored by her subjective
conclusions.
There is no showing Thatcher's notes contained un-
truths, and I find, assuming arguendo that he did in fact
read them aloud, that they contain no threats, improper
promises, or proven material misrepresentations. I do not
agree with the General Counsel that Thatcher's com-
ments about the bargainability of benefits were either
threats of loss of benefits or clearly intended to convey
to employees the futility of union support. I find that the
thrust of these comments was that the selection of the
Union would not necessarily mean increases in wages or
other benefits and that all wages and benefits were sub-
ject to bargaining. Such advice is not in violation of the
Act. 45
The opening remarks by Maddox, related by Under-
wood, are protected free speech under Section 8(c) of
the Act.
7. Conduct of Industrial Relations Manager Mark
Maddox
On May 14, Maddox met with a group of about 10
employees in the plant laboratory where he put on a
slide presentation with accompanying taped narrative.
The slides were in major part quotations from cases de-
cided by the Supreme Court and the Board. I credit
Maddox that there was no slide of a blank piece of
paper. The narrative outlines the law on the duty to bar-
gain and arrives at the following conclusion on this sub-
ject:
So, it is easy to see that voting for a union does not
-guarantees that your wages, benefits or work-
ing conditions will be better than they are today;
-in fact, there is no guarantee that through good
faith bargaining your wages, benefits and working
conditions will even remain the same as they are
today. When you sit down to negotiate with a
union, you start off with a blank piece of paper and
you don't write anything down on the paper until
both parties agree.
The only evidence proffered by the General Counsel
to support the allegation that Maddox threatened em-
ployees with loss of benefits if they selected the Union is
4" Coach and Equipment Sales Corp.. 228 NLRB 440, 441 (1977).
318
STANDARD-COOSA-THATCHER. CARPET YARN DIVISION
the testimony of Melinda Kennedy. Kennedy, a some-
what confused witness, testified that during one meeting
there was talk about having a union and a blank piece of
paper appeared on the screen while employees were
told, "When we sit down to negotiate, you know, we
would start from scratch. We wouldn't have anything
that he had had before." She altered this testimony on
cross-examination to reflect that employees were told in
haec verba that when negotiations commenced "there
was no guarantee that we would even be making what
we had now, or even have at all what we have now."
I conclude that Kennedy's testimony is a paraphrase of
the narrative excerpt set forth above, that there was no
slide shown of a blank piece of paper, and that Respond-
ent did not violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by either its
slide presentation or accompanying narratives.
8. Interrogation by Respondent's counsel
The hearing was in recess from January 10, 1980, to
February 5, 1980. On February 7, the General Counsel
amended the complaint to allege that Respondent's coun-
sel, Martha C. Perrin, unlawfully interrogated two em-
ployees on January 28, 1980. The employees were Jeff
Tillman and Willis Langston.
Perrin credibly testified that she questioned employees
on January 2, 3, and 28, about 70 to 75 in all. She sta-
tioned herself in the first aid room and no one else was
present during her meetings with individual employees.
Her procedure was to introduce herself as an attorney
for Respondent preparing for hearing who would only
speak to them regarding authorization cards. She routine-
ly advised that the employee did not have to speak with
her and read a prepared statement as follows:
My name is Martha Perrin and I am an attorney
for Standard-Coosa-Thatcher. My purpose in talk-
ing with you is to help the company prepare for the
unfair labor practice hearing which will begin next
week. I have prepared a list of questions to ask you
in regard to the blue union authorization cards.
I want you to understand that this interview is
strictly voluntary on your part. If you do not wish
to talk with me you are free to go, either now or at
anytime during the interview. No reprisal or any
other action will be taken against you by me or the
company because of your talking with me, your re-
fusal to talk with me or because of anything that
might be said during the interview.
If you agree to talk with me under these condi-
tions, please sign below:
The above statement has been read to me; I un-
derstand that this interview is voluntary; and I
am agreeable to this interview
Approximately 50 or 55 employees interviewed signed
this statement. Of the remainder some refused to talk to
her while others agreed that they understood the state-
ment and talked with her, but refused to sign the state-
ment. The General Counsel does not allege that anyone
other than Tillman and Langston were unlawfully ques-
tioned, and I find that the above statement incorporates
safeguards endorsed by the Board as appropriate for the
conduct of such interviews. 46
I credit Perrin that she interviewed Tillman on Janu-
ary 2 or 3, rather than January 28 as Tillman testified.
She was the more believable witness in terms of demea-
nor, and I found her testimony more convincing in con-
text than that of Tillman. Further, Tillman's timecard
shows that he was not at work during the hours from II
p.m., January 28, to 7 a.m, January 29 when Perrin con-
ducted the employee interviews. Crediting Perrin as I
do, I find that the interview with Tillman opened with
her self-introduction and explanation that she was only
inquiring about the cards. She then advised him he did
not have to talk to her, and read the above-prepared
statement aloud. Tillman expressed his understanding
that his presence was voluntary, but declined to sign the
statement. Perrin inquired further as to whether or not
he understood what he had read. Satisfied that he did,
she noted, after Tillman left, on a copy of the statement
that Tillman would not sign but had said he understood.
She asked him if he had signed an authorization card. He
first answered he had not, but then amended his answer
to say that he had but later torn the card up.4 7 He ex-
panded that he had torn it up because a supervisor had
seen him and he wanted no one to know he had signed
one. It does not appear anything further was said. Till-
man characterizes the talk with Perrin as a friendly con-
versation.
Perrin talked to Willis Langston on January 28.
4 s
Perrin expressed concern about Langston's injured arm,
and introduced herself as Respondent's lawyer. She then
mentioned that she recently had to have her cat treated
by a doctor. The testimony of Langston and Perrin dif-
fers as to what was then said and done.
Perrin's version is that she explained she was only
there to inquire about authorization cards in preparation
for the hearing, and that she would like to talk to him
about a card with his signature on it that had been intro-
duced in evidence by Bobby Joe King. A copy of that
card was lying in front of her. She continues that Lang-
ston then responded that he had signed a union card,
whereupon she thanked him, and he left with her last
words being a statement of concern that his arm im-
proved.
Langston states that Perrin told him she had a picture
of a card he had signed and asked if he had signed it or
if it was his signature. She showed it to him, and he eri-
fied that it was his signature. Perrin then advised him
that Bobby Joe King had turned the card in, and in-
quired if King had told Langston what he was signing.
Langston answered that King did not have to because he
read it and knew what he was signing. At this point,
Perrin told him that would be all, and expressed a hope
that his arm would be alright. Langston denies that
Perrin read anything to him or told him he did not have
" See Johnnie's Poultry Co. 146 NLRB 770, 775 (1964)
These statements to Perrin were admittedly untrue.
Although Perrin was earlier told by a supervisor. during the January
2 and 3 interviews, that Langston had refused to talk to her, Langslto
denies this. Apart from Perrin's hearsay testimony on the matter there is
no probative evidence to refute Langstorn's denial. and I credit him ini
this point.
319
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
to talk to her or that no reprisals would be taken against
him for anything he talked about.
As I observed Perrin and Langston, it was my distinct
impression that both were testifying truthfully to the best
of their respective recollections. I consider any variance
between their versions to be due to normal frailties of
memory about a conversation which neither had any
reason at the time to consider important enough to care-
fully commit to memory verbatim for future retrieval. I
am persuaded that their testimony is complementary
rather than contradictory, and find that the following
summary is a fair and reasonable resume of what most
probably occurred during this meeting: Perrin advised
that she was Respondent's lawyer there to inquire about
authorization cards in preparation for the hearing, and
wanted to know whether Langston had signed a card
which King had introduced in evidence and what King
had said was its purpose. The card was in front of Perrin
and Langston promptly stated he had signed it, had read
it, had known what he was signing, and there had been
no need for King to explain it. She thanked Langston
and told him that would be all, expressing concern about
his arm as he left. I am satisfied Perrin neither read the
prepared statement to Langston nor orally recited the
safeguards therein.
With respect to the Tillman conversation, I find that
Perrin carefully observed the Board-approved safeguards
applicable, properly advised Tillman of his rights, limited
her interrogation to reasonable and necessary inquiry
solely designed to assist in the presentation of Respond-
ent's defense at the hearing, and did not violate Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
The only real issue to the Langston incident is wheth-
er or not Perrin's failure to assure him there would be no
reprisals rendered her inquiry violative of the Act. A
strict application of the Johnnie's Poultry Co. 49 standards
would appear to require a finding of a violation. I am
not, however, convinced that either the Board or the
courts intended the standards to be mechanically applied
in every case without resort to reason in the light of the
surrounding circumstances. Here we have a situation
where, so far as the record shows, Perrin properly ad-
vised every one of 70 or so employees interviewed with
the single exception of Langston. Whether Perrin was
prevented from advising Langston in accordance with
the Johnnie's Poultry rules by the rapidity of his response
to her initial statement of purpose or by inadvertence is
speculative. I believe, however, that a fair inference may
be drawn that the content of the meetings was widely
known among the employees. The hearing itself most
certainly had to be a topic of conversation among them,
and it is probable there was an exchange of experiences
among those interviewed by Perrin. I am of the opinion
that Langston was most likely forewarned about the con-
tent of the interviews. I do not suggest that this hearsay
knowledge was equivalent to direct communication from
Perrin, but I do suggest that the circumstances herein,
where 70 people are interviewed and all but one appro-
priately reassured, support an inference that Langston
49 146 NLRB 770, 775 (1964).
was not totally unaware of what Perrin's purpose and
procedure was before he entered the room.
The purpose of the Johnnie's Poultry safeguards is not
to penalize attorneys for legitimate pretrial preparation,
but to "minimize the coercive impact" of the questioning
involved in such preparation. Perrin's announcement to
Langston that his card was in evidence via the testimony
of King truthfully advised Langston of what was public
information with respect to his card, and her request for
his verification was legitimate trial preparation. I am
convinced that the coercive impact of Perrin's questions
was minimal, if any, and that no violation should be
found just because Perrin varied her uniform practice I
time out of 70. The evidence warrants no inference that
the variance was either planned or unlawfully motivated.
D. Alleged 8(a)(3) Violations of the Act
I. The rule against leaving the department
Respondent has a work rule prohibiting "Unauthorized
absence from your work area or the Plant" which was in
effect at least as early as April 1, 1978. Inasmuch as this
rule was promulgated considerably more than 6 months
before the filing of the first charge in the instant case,
said promulgation may not be found to be a violation of
the Act.
The real issue is whether or not the rule was enforced
in a manner designated to discourage union activity
among Respondent's employees. Evidence that Respond-
ent had utilized this rule in such a fashion during an ear-
lier union campaign is found in Donna McWhorter's
credible testimony that in November 197750 Plant Man-
ager Bowman stopped her as she was going to visit an-
other employee, asked if she had permission to leave her
department, and told her that it looked bad for her to be
roaming around because Respondent was trying to stop
union adherents from roaming around because they were
getting union authorization cards signed. He also advised
her that she should tell anyone who asked that he had
"gotten on" her for going to the other plant.
There is no evidence that anyone was warned for vio-
lating this rule between the time of Bowman's statements
to McWhorter and December 11, 1978, when Barbara
Lemons and Glenda Finley were given warnings for
leaving the mill without permission. The next warning in
evidence was issued to employee Talley on February 2,
1979, for leaving the job too long.
I credit Patricia Whisenant that Supervisor "Butch"
Harris gave her a written verbal warning in March 1979
against leaving the department, and told her that, al-
though she had done nothing as yet, the warning was to
insure that she could not claim she had not been warned.
Whisenant credibly testified that employees had previ-
ously been allowed to come and go from the department
unhindered and that Harris said there was a new compa-
ny rule on leaving the department.
so I conclude November 1977 is most probably the date of this occur-
rence because this was the firstl ime McWhorter had seen Bowman, and
he testified that he had come to the plant about 2 years and 3 months
prior to his February 5, 1980. testimony.
320
STANDARD-COOSA-THATCHER, CARPET YARN DIVISION
Bobby Joe King and Patricia King credibly testified
that Supervisor Bill King, who did not testify, told them
(Bobby Joe in February 1979 and Patricia in March
1979) that they could no longer leave their department
without permission except to go to the bathroom or
breakroom, a clear change from the practice then exist-
ing of leaving the department without permission and
without discipline therefor.
Gloria Stanfield was issued a written verbal warning
for being out of her department on May 4, 1979.
Dennis Williams was issued written warnings on
March 29 and April 9, 1979, for, inter alia, leaving his
department without permission.
I am persuaded by the evidence before me that the
rule was honored in the breach between union cam-
paigns. Between November 1977, 1 month before a
Board-conducted election, and February 9, 1979, the
date the present union campaign began, the only proven
warnings given for infractions of the rule were Decem-
ber 11, 1978, and February 2, 1979. It is highly improb-
able that all 147 employees religiously abided by the rule
during this 13-month period, and there is credible em-
ployee testimony that they did not. Bill King's advice to
Bobby Joe King and Patricia King that they could no
longer leave without permission signaled a change to
more rigid enforcement, and Harris' prospective warning
to Whisenant emphasized a new insistence on strict com-
pliance with the rule. No persuasive reason was prof-
fered for this more stringent policing of rule violations,
and the reasons for the 1977 enforcement stated by
Bowman to McWhorter, combined with the timing of
the statements of Bill King and Harris shortly after the
commencement of the new campaign, led me to the con-
clusion that the emphasis on enforcement after the cam-
paign started was prompted by the new campaign and
was designed, as in 1977, to impede the acquisition of
signed authorization cards. Respondent's argument that
the rule was enforced against both pro and antiunion em-
ployees is not convincing because, even if this were true,
the mere fact that enforcement designed to forestall
union activities fell equally on all employees would not
make such unlawfully motivated enforcement lawful. In
point of fact, such blanket enforcement would be the
most effective way to short circuit all such union activi-
ties. On the evidence before me, I conclude and find that
the policy of rigid enforcement of the rule was instituted
in 1979, as in 1977, to combat union activities and there-
fore violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
2. The reprimands and discharge of Dennis
Williams
The plant rules provide that infractions thereof, in-
cluding the rule on "unauthorized absence from your
work area or the Plant" discussed above, "will result in
disciplinary action ranging from verbal warning to im-
mediate discharge, depending upon the type of violation
and the circumstances surrounding the offense." Re-
spondent's "corrective action" manual requires discharge
upon receipt of a fourth warning slip.
Williams received such warnings on March 29, April
9, April 24, and May 7, 1979, and was terminated on
May 7 on the ground he had received four warnings.
These warnings read as follows:
March 29, 1979-Leaving department without per-
mission left Mill no. 2 went to Mill no. I was talk-
ing to Spinner on her job
April 9, 1979-Leaving his department without per-
mission. leaving twister unattended.
April 25, 1979-Did not clean his twister like he
was asked to. Did not punched [sic] out his time
card two days on outside of building before Seven
o'clock AM. did not pick up his Dr. Pepper can
and papper [sic]
May 7, 1979-Failure to follow instructions (did not
punch out time card two times during week ending
5/5/79)
Inasmuch as the March 29 and April 9 warnings were
based on violations of the "unauthorized absence" rule
which I have found was enforced for unlawful reasons, it
necessarily follows that these warnings were violative of
Section 8(a)(3) and (1). Moreover, Lowery's account of
the alleged violations is not convincing. With regard to
the March 29 warning, Supervisor Lowery states that he
observed Williams away from his department and talking
to working employee Copeland for 5 to 10 minutes
before Lowery terminated the conversation. This implies
that either Lowery was not overly concerned about the
time so spent, or that he deliberately permitted the con-
versation to continue in order to build sufficient cause
for the warning later issued. Neither alternative affords
Respondent support for any contention that the absence
of Williams from his work was of vital concern. In any
event, I do not believe it likely that Lowery would
merely stand and observe a 5- to 10-minute conversation
on company time by an on-duty employee out of his de-
partment without earlier breaking it up. I find it far more
probable that Williams only stopped for a brief moment,
as he testified, before Lowery called him to the office. I
further credit Williams' account of what transpired in the
office over that of Lowery who recalls nothing of what
Williams said.5 ' In the office, Lowery told Williams he
would have to write him up for being out of his depart-
ment. Williams told Lowery that he had been on his way
to get cones for his machine, and asked if it were alright
for him to speak to his brother from time to time for a
few minutes because their mother had been operated on.
Lowery gave him permission to so do as long as it was
within reason.
Lowery's self-professed conduct on April 9 was even
more interesting. He avers that he watched Williams
talking to his brother and leading union adherent Betty
Underwood, away from Williams' department, for about
5 minutes, and then left to find another supervisor,
Buford Centers, whom he asked to wait in the supervi-
sors' office, then returned and watched the conversation
for another 5 minutes. Lowery did nothing to interrupt
the conversation, but later called Williams to his office
" I also note that the failure of Respondent to call Centers, a witness
to the first three warnings, warrants an adverse inference
321
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and issued him the warning. I do not believe Lowery
and credit Williams that he only stopped for 3 or 4 min-
utes to converse, returned to work, and was called in by
Lowery and issued his second warning. It would seem
that Williams' conversation with his brother was within
the ambit of Lowery's earlier permission, and the fact
that his brother was talking to Underwood when he
came up to them did not work to void that permission,
unless, as is quite likely, Lowery was opposed to Wil-
liams consorting with known union adherent Under-
wood. Indeed, the whole purpose of Respondent's en-
forcement of the rule was to halt such contacts.
The evidence preponderates that Williams did in fact
commit the infractions for which he received the April
25 warning. However, the failure to investigate Williams'
credible claim that Ray Hollis had been outside the plant
with Williams or to take any remedial action against
Hollis indicates an effort to enforce plant rules strictly
against Williams while ignoring the conduct of Hollis.
Hollis did not sign a union card, but Williams had signed
one on February 8 and credibly testified that he told
Lowery, some 2 weeks before his discharge, that he was
for the Union. Two weeks before May 7 would approxi-
mately coincide with the April 25 warning. The dispa-
rate treatment of Williams and Hollis suggests an effort
to concentrate on Williams without regard to other em-
ployees' conduct. In the absence of good reason for the
disparate application of the rule, I am persuaded the
warning was given in continuation of Respondent's ef-
forts to discourage Williams' union activity.
Williams did not punch his timecard twice during the
week ending May 5, 1979, and the fourth warning was
therefore for colorable cause, but it takes on an unlawful
color from the context of other unlawful warnings
within which it was given.
Respondent's hostility to union activities is abundantly
shown by its other violations of the Act heretofore
found. It was made explicitly aware of Williams' pro-
union attitude in mid to late April, and could have rea-
sonably inferred the direction of his sympathies from
Lowery's observation of his association with known
union adherent Underwood on April 9. Respondent's re-
liance on many rather minor infractions to support the
last two warnings, except for Williams being outside the
building which loses force by virtue of Respondent's fail-
ure to act against Hollis who apparently was not a union
supporter, indicates a straining to terminate Williams.
Respondent's efforts, via the testimony of employees
Wrenn and Hilley, to show that Williams suddenly
became an unsatisfactory employee were not convincing.
Although Wrenn traced his deterioration in terms of ab-
sences from the department to 3 months before his dis-
charge, Hilley pegged it around 14 to 15 months before
his discharge. Hilley is probably correct to the extent
that Williams credibly testified that prior to his first
warning he regularly left as he pleased without hin-
drance. My conclusion that the rule against leaving the
work area was not enforced except during union cam-
paigns confirms the testimony of Williams and Hilley in
this regard.
In sum, I find that the first two warnings were given
pursuant to a policy of discouraging union activity and
were therefore unlawful. But for these unlawful warn-
ings, Williams would not have been discharged and the
discharge was therefore violative of Section 8(a)(3) and
(I) of the Act as a product of rule enforcement designed
to discourage union activity. Moreover, Respondent, by
its agent Lowery, attempted to expand on the events
giving rise to the first two warnings and treated union
adherent Williams differently than nonunion employee
Hollis when they were absent from the plant together. I
conclude that the third warning was given to accelerate
the departure of Williams and the fourth to complete it.
The General Counsel has set forth a prima facie case,
which Respondent has not convincingly rebutted, that
the entire sequence of warnings was consciously de-
signed to remove a union adherent from the payroll.
Therefore all four warnings and the discharge are also
unlawful for this reason.
E. The Objections5 2
The objections to election set for hearing before me in
Case 10-RC-1 1707 read as follows:
1. Threats of adverse consequences of unioniza-
tion, including loss of benefits: April II, April 20,
May 4-19, May 7 and May 17.
2. Institution and enforcement of stricter rules:
April 10, 11, 12, 13, 17, 24 and 30.
3. Threat of adverse consequences up to and in-
cluding discharge for engaging in union activity:
April 3, May 2 and May 16.
8. Interrogation of employees concerning their
union activity: April 19 and March 22-May 18.
9. Promise of benefit to employees to discourage
union activity: March 24 and May 4.
10. Discharge of and/or refusal to re-employ em-
ployees for engaging in union activity: March 23,
April 10, April 11 and April 25.
I have found certain matters alleged as objections to be
unfair labor practices occurring during the critical period
between the petition and the date of the election, 53 and it
is well settled that unfair labor practices constitute objec-
tionable preelection conduct.5 Accordingly, I recom-
mend the objections be sustained and the election be set
aside.
F. The Duty To Bargain and the Refusal To Bargain
Having concluded that the election should be set aside,
it is now appropriate to consider the refusal-to-bargain
allegations. 55
52 Objections 4, 5, 6, 7, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15 were withdrawn by the
Union.
53 The Ideal Electric and Manufacturing Company, 134 NLRB 1275
(1961); The Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company. 138 NLRB 453 (1962).
"4 Dal-Tex Optical Company. Inc., 137 NLRB 1782. 1786 (1962).
5 Irving Air Chute Company, Inc.. Marathon Division, 149 NLRB 627
(1964).
322
STANDARD-COOSA-THATCHER, CARPET YARN DIVISION
The parties have agreed to the appropriate unit of Re-
spondent's employees set forth hereinabove, and further
agree that the Union made a bargaining demand on
March 21, 1979, and Respondent has refused to bargain
with the Union since that date. I have found that the
Union represented a majority of Respondent's employees
in the unit when it requested and was refused recognition
on March 21, 1979.
Considering all of Respondent's unfair labor practices
found herein, I am convinced that those unlawful acts
were aimed at discouraging employee support of the
Union and thus preventing the Union from attaining ma-
jority support, or destroying any majority status the
Union may have had. I find that Respondent's conduct
had "the tendency to undermine [the Union's] majority
strength and impede the election processes, "56 that the
continuing impact of Respondent's coercive conduct ren-
ders a fair election unlikely, and that the authorization
cards signed by employees are a more reliable indication
of their desire for representation. Consequently, I find
and conclude that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the Act by refusing to bargain with the Union
as of March 21, the date it demanded recognition.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions
based thereon, and upon the entire record in this case, I
make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Standard-Coosa-Thatcher, Carpet Yarn Division,
Inc., is an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union,
AFL-CIO, CLC, is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The following employees constitute a unit appropri-
ate for collective bargaining:
All production and maintenance employees em-
ployed by Respondent at its Boaz, Alabama, facility
but excluding all office clerical employees, profes-
sional employees, guards, and supervisors as defined
in the Act.
4. At all times since February 20, 1979, and continuing
to date, the Union has been the exclusive representative
of all the employees within said appropriate unit for pur-
poses of collective bargaining within the meaning of Sec-
tion 9(a) of the Act.
5. By coercively interrogating employees about their
union activities and those of others, Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
6. By threatening employees with discharge, plant clo-
sure, loss of access to management, insistence on con-
tract terms unpalatable to employees, and other unspeci-
fied reprisals because of their union activities, Respond-
ent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
7. By making implied promises of benefit to employees
conditioned on their abandonment of the Union, Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
6 Gissel Packing Co.. Inc.. 395 U.S. 575 at 614 (1969)
8. By telling employees the timing of work-related
warnings was caused by the existence of union activity,
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
9. By threatening employees with discharge because
they engaged in protected concerted activity, Respond-
ent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
10. By more rigidly enforcing company work rules for
the purpose of discouraging union activities, Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
II. By issuing warnings to Dennis Williams in reprisal
for his union activities, Respondent violated Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
12. By discharging Dennis Williams for engaging in
union activities, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and
(I) of the Act.
13. Respondent engaged in objectionable conduct re-
quiring that the election conducted on May 18, 1979, in
Case 10-RC-11707 be set aside.
14. By engaging in the above-described violations of
Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act for the purpose of un-
dermining and destroying the Union's majority status, or
to prevent it from attaining such status, Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
15. The violations of the Act found herein interfered
with the election process, had a tendency to undermine
the Union's strength, prevented the holding of a fair
election, and warrant the issuance of a collective-bar-
gaining order.
16. The unfair labor practices set forth above are
unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
17. Respondent did not commit any other unfair labor
practices alleged in the complaint.
THE REMEDY
In order to remedy labor practices found herein, my
recommended Order will require Respondent to cease
and desist from further violations, to post an appropriate
notice to employees, and to offer unconditional reinstate-
ment to Dennis Williams and make him whole for all
wages lost by him as a result of his unlawful discharge.
such backpay and interest thereon to be computed in the
manner prescribed in F W. Woolworth Company, 90
NLRB 289 (1950), and Florida Steel Corporation, 231
NLRB 651 (1977). 57 I will also recommend that Re-
spondent be ordered to rescind the four warnings used as
grounds for the discharge of Dennis Williams and all
other warnings issued to employees since February 6,
1979, the date of the inception of the union campaign,
for violation of its work rule prohibiting "Unauthorized
absence from your work area or the Plant," and remove
all references to said warnings from its records. This is
not intended to nor shall it preclude lawful, nondiscri-
minatory enforcement of said rule after this recommend-
ed Order has been complied with. I shall further recom-
mend that Respondent be ordered to recognize and bar-
gain with the Union as the exclusive collective-bargain-
ing agent of the employees in the unit found appropriate
herein.
" See, generally. Isis Plumbhing & lfatrlg ( J. 138 NI.RB 71h (192)
323
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
I am of the opinion that the variety and seriousness of
Respondent's unfair labor practices indicate a general
disregard for employee statutory rights sufficient to war-
rant a broad order," and I so recommend.
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue
the following recommended:
ORDER 5 9
The Respondent, Standart-Coosa-Thatcher, Carpet
Yarn Division, Inc., Boaz, Alabama, its agents, officers,
successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discouraging membership in the Union, or any
other labor organization, by discharging employees or
otherwise discriminating in any manner in respect to
their tenure of employment or any term or condition of
employment.
(b) Refusing to recognize and bargain with the Union
as the exclusive bargaining representative of all the em-
ployees in the above-described appropriate unit.
(c) Coercively interrogating employees concerning
their and other employees' union activities and desires.
(d) Threatening employees with discharge, plant clo-
sure, loss of access to management, insistence on con-
tract terms unpalatable to employees, or other unspeci-
fied reprisals because of their union activities.
(e) Making implied promises of benefit to employees
conditioned on their abandonment of the Union.
(f) Telling employees that the timing of work-related
warnings was caused by the existence of union activity.
(g) Threatening employees with discharge because
they engage in protected concerted activity.
(h) In any other manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing its employees in the exercise of rights guar-
anteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed to ef-
fectuate the purpose of the Act:
ss Hickmott Foods. Inc., 242 NLRB 1357 (1979).
s9 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of
the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided
in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and
become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto
shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
(a) Upon request, recognize and bargain with the
Union as the exclusive representative of all employees in
the aforesaid appropriate unit and, if an understanding is
reached, embody such understanding in a written, signed
agreement.
(b) Offer to Dennis Williams immediate and full rein-
statement to his former job or, if that job no longer
exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without prej-
udice to his seniority or other rights and privileges, and
make Dennis Williams whole for any loss of earnings he
may have suffered by reason of the discrimination
against him, in the manner set forth in the section of this
Decision entitled "The Remedy."
(c) Rescind and expunge from its records all references
to the four warnings issued Dennis Williams and all
other warnings issued to employees on and after Febru-
ary 6, 1979, for violation of its work rule prohibiting
"Unauthorized absence from your work area or the
Plant," and advise its employees in writing that it has
done so.
(d) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board and its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll records and reports, and all other records re-
quired to ascertain the amount, if any, of any backpay
due under the terms of this recommended Order.
(e) Post at its Boaz, Alabama, offices and facilities
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."1 °
Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 10, after being signed by Respond-
ent's authorized agent, shall be posted by it immediately
upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 con-
secutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including
all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to
insure that these notices are not altered, defaced, or cov-
ered by other material.
(f) Notify the Regional Director for Region 10, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
steps Respondent has taken to comply with this Order.
" In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursu-
ant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an
Order of the National Labor Relations Board."
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