St. Jude Medical International Holding S.a. r.l.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 23, 2020

15303714 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Sep. 23, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/303,714 10/12/2016 Yelena Nabutovsky CD-946USO2/065513-001555 3283
67337 7590 09/23/2020
DYKEMA GOSSETT PLLC (STJ)
4000 Wells Fargo Center
90 South Seventh Street
Minneapolis, MN 55402
EXAMINER
PORTER, JR, GARY A
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3792
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/23/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ASJM_Patents@abbott.com
MN-IPMail@dykema.com
Patents@dykema.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte YELENA NABUTOVSKY and HODA RAZAVI
Appeal 2020-001110
Application 15/303,714
Technology Center 3700
Before JENNIFER D. BAHR, MICHAEL J. FITZPATRICK, and
BRANDON J. WARNER, Administrative Patent Judges.

BAHR, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–23.1 We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies St. Jude Medical International
Holding S.à r.l. as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 4.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Appellant’s invention is directed to “an electrophysiology apparatus
used to measure electrical and mechanical activity occurring in a heart of a
patient and to visualize the activity and/or information related to the activity
in a three-dimensional (3D) model.” Spec. ¶ 2. Claim 1, reproduced below,
is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A system capable of displaying mechanical activation
patterns for a heart, the system comprising the following:
a data input adapted to receive data from an
electrophysiology apparatus;
a processor electrically connected to the data input, the
processor configured to execute the following steps:
calculate mechanical activation parameters from
the data;
generate an anatomical representation of the heart
from the data;
divide the anatomical representation into
segments; and
generate a depiction that displays magnitudes of
the mechanical activation parameter relative to the
segments such that performance of a plurality of
segments can be simultaneously evaluated; and
an output adapted to transmit the depiction that displays
magnitudes of the mechanical activation parameter relative to
the segments to a display; and
wherein the display is configured and arranged to
facilitate clinician diagnosis based on the visualized magnitudes
of the mechanical activation parameter relative to the segments,
and the mechanical activation parameter comprises a time
or displacement parameter.

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REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Rosenberg US 2009/0254140 A1 Oct. 8, 2009
Ramanathan US 2014/0005563 A1 Jan. 2, 2014
Boeck Three-dimensional mapping of
mechanical activation
patterns, contractile
dyssynchrony and
dyscoordination by two-
dimensional strain
echocardiography: Rationale
and design of a novel software
toolbox, Cardiovascular
Ultrasound 2008, BioMed
Central Ltd., 6:22, (2008)2
May 30, 2008

REJECTIONS
Claims 1–7, 10–12, and 14–20 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)(1) and 102(a)(2) as anticipated by Boeck.
Claims 1, 7–9, 14, and 21–23 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)(1) and 102(a)(2) as anticipated by Ramanathan.
Claims 1 and 12–14 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)(1) and
102(a)(2) as anticipated by Rosenberg.
OPINION
Anticipation—Boeck
Appellant argues independent claims 1 and 14 together, and does not
present any separate arguments for dependent claims 2–7, 10–12, and 15–20

2 Available at https://cardiovascularultrasound.biomedcentral.com/
articles/10.1186/1476-7120-6-22, last visited Sept. 16, 2020.
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apart from their dependence from claim 1 or claim 14.3 Appeal Br. 9–16.
We decide the appeal of this rejection on the basis of claim 1, and claims 2–
7, 10–12, and 14–20 stand or fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (permitting the Board to select a single claim to decide the
appeal as to a single ground of rejection of a group of claims argued
together).
The Examiner finds that Boeck discloses a system as recited in
claim 1. Final Act. 9. Appellant argues that Boeck fails to teach aspects of
claim 1, including “the mechanical activation parameter comprises a time or
displacement parameter” and “generat[ing] a depiction that displays
magnitudes of the mechanical activation parameter relative to the segments
such that performance of a plurality of segments can be simultaneously
evaluated.” Appeal Br. 9, 14.
Appellant argues that the bulls-eyes of Boeck’s Figure 1 “do not
illustrate displacement of the segment from a nominal position, but instead
shortening/stretching/stagnation of the segment in response to an electrical

3 Appellant mentions dependent claim 3 in arguing that Boeck does not
anticipate the subject matter of claims 1 and 14. See Appeal Br. 12–13
(stating that “[c]laim 3 further emphasizes this distinction — ‘the
mechanical activation parameter is the time parameter which is indicative of
the relative activation times of the segments.’”). Appellant, however, does
not present a separate substantive argument as to why claim 3 would be
patentable if claim 1 were not patentable. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii)
(stating that “[a] statement which merely points out what a claim recites will
not be considered an argument for separate patentability of the claim”).
Rather, Appellant merely concludes that, in light of the recitation of
dependent claim 3, “Boeck does not teach [or] otherwise suggest visualizing
time or displacement parameters” as called for in claims 1 and 14. Appeal
Br. 13.
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stimulus (or lack thereof).” Appeal Br. 10. Thus, according to Appellant,
“instead of teaching displacement or position of the various segments, Boeck
appears to teach the equivalent of acceleration of the cardiac segments.” Id.
Further, Appellant contends that “the alleged ‘time periods’ in Boeck are
used as a constant for each of the visualizations, as opposed to presenting a
‘time parameter’ in the visualization itself.” Id.
The Examiner points out, correctly, that claim 1 does “not require the
limitation ‘displacement of the segment from a nominal position’ as argued”
by Appellant. Ans. 7. In response, Appellant submits that “Appellant’s
claim 4 does indeed recite the disputed language — ‘the displacement
parameter which is indicative of the relative distance of each of the segments
between a nominal position and a maximum displacement location.’” Reply
Br. 3. This argument is unavailing with respect to independent claim 1.
Under the doctrine of claim differentiation, “the presence of a dependent
claim that adds a particular limitation raises a presumption that the limitation
in question is not found in the independent claim.” Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v.
Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can. (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1275 (Fed. Cir.
2012). To the extent that Appellant now wishes to argue dependent claim 4
separately from claim 1, such an argument, made for the first time in the
Reply Brief, is untimely and will not be considered. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.41(b)(2) (“Any argument raised in the reply brief which was not raised
in the appeal brief, or is not responsive to an argument raised in the
examiner’s answer . . . will not be considered by the Board for purposes of
the present appeal, unless good cause is shown.”).
We do not find any evidentiary basis to support Appellant’s
contention that the bulls-eyes in Boeck’s Figure 1 display acceleration of the
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cardiac segments. The caption below Boeck’s Figure 1 describes
“[s]hortening and stretching patterns . . . represented by a series of colour-
coded bulls-eyes representing deformation-rate at 25 time points throughout
the entire cardiac cycle for each of the 36 segments,” with yellow denoting
shortening, blue denoting stretching, and green denoting no deformation.
Boeck 3. Further, Boeck’s Figure 1 shows darker and lighter shades of blue,
as well as darker and lighter shades of yellow/orange in several of the bulls-
eyes, thereby signifying not only the direction of deformation (stretching or
shortening), but also a quantitative indication of the deformation (or rate of
deformation). The use of various shades or colors to display the magnitudes
of the mechanical activation parameter, as Boeck does in Figure 1, is
consistent with Appellant’s disclosure of displaying the magnitudes of the
mechanical activation parameter “as various shades, colors, or cross-
hatching patterns.” See Spec. ¶ 65, claim 3. Whether the colors in the bulls-
eyes represent the quantitative degree of deformation or the quantitative rate
of deformation, Appellant does not persuasively explain why the
quantitative degree of deformation or the quantitative rate of deformation
would not be a magnitude of a “displacement parameter” as claimed.
Moreover, Boeck displays numerical indications of the strains in each of the
36 segments in the strain plot of Figure 3, which includes “36 separate
tracings.” Boeck 4.
Appellant does not dispute that strain may be considered a mechanical
activation parameter, but contends “it is not clear how the displayed
stretching and shortening strain rates of Boeck could be interpreted as the
claimed ‘magnitude of the mechanical activation parameter.’” Appeal
Br. 10. Appellant submits that, “to the extent that the Examiner is alleging
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the strain rate of Boeck is the same as a magnitude, such an interpretation is
completely non-sensical — a unit of change over time is not a magnitude.”
Id. at 11. Appellant’s argument is not convincing.
Consistent with a dictionary definition of “magnitude,” the Examiner
construes the magnitude of a quantity such as strain or strain rate to be
“simply the numerical value it represents.” Ans. 8. Appellant does not
specifically dispute the Examiner’s claim construction or persuasively
explain why it is flawed. Further, Appellant does not offer any evidence or
persuasive technical reasoning to explain why the quantitative value of
strain, or even a change of strain per unit time, as displayed in Figures 1 and
3 of Boeck, is not a “magnitude” of strain or deformation rate. To the extent
that Appellant may be arguing that strain rate or deformation rate may not be
considered a mechanical activation parameter, Appellant does not
persuasively explain why such a construction would be unreasonable,
especially in light of Appellant’s acknowledgement that strain is a
mechanical activation parameter. Moreover, as discussed above, Boeck’s
Figure 3 appears to plot quantitative numerical values of strain over time for
each of the 36 segments.
Appellant argues that “Boeck teaches that the bulls-eyes indicate the
extent of shortening/stretching (a change in dimension), and the term strain
refers to a force measurement. It is not clear how the mechanical activation
parameter of Appellant’s specification could visually indicate both a
dimension and a force simultaneously.” Reply Br. 5. This argument is
logically unsound and appears to be grounded on a layperson’s definition of
“strain” that is inapposite in the context of Boeck’s disclosure, which
discusses “myocardial deformation” (Boeck 2), “shortening and
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lengthening/thickening strain slopes” (id. at 3), deformation-rates indicative
of shortening or stretching (id., Fig. 1), and equates strain plots with
deformation curves (id. at 4, Fig. 3). It is clear to a person having ordinary
skill in the art that Boeck uses the term “strain” in the conventional
physics/mechanics sense of strain (a measure of deformation representing
the relative displacement between particles in a material body or a measure
of how much an object is stretched or deformed when force is applied to the
object), as distinguished from stress (a measure of force per unit area).
Boeck does not use the term “strain” as a measure of force as Appellant
contends.
Further, the Examiner also points out that Boeck displays time values
on bulls-eye plots in Figure 6. See Final Act. 4; Ans. 11. With particular
reference to Appellant’s claim 3, which recites that “the mechanical
activation parameter is the time parameter which is indicative of the relative
activation times of the segments,” the Examiner points out that “the varying
shades on the bulls eye plots correspond to time values . . . i.e., the
magnitudes of the mechanical activation parameter (time) are visualized as
various shades, colors, or cross-hatching patterns.” Final Act. 4. The
Examiner also explains that Boeck’s Figure 6 “is representative of
mechanical activation timing (wherein the numerical time is a magnitude)
over various segments as represented by the different sextants of the plot.”
Ans. 11. Appellant does not persuasively explain why the Examiner’s
finding is incorrect or why the display, using color-coding, of the
magnitudes of mechanical activation times for each segment in Boeck’s
Figure 6 would not satisfy the limitation of generating “a depiction that
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displays magnitudes of the mechanical activation parameter relative to the
segments” in claim 1.4
Appellant appears to argue that Boeck’s depiction of deformation
rates is not a depiction of a mechanical activation parameter that “is
indicative of ‘displacement of heart wall muscle [that] may be used in
conjunction with electrical mapping data to optimize the placement of leads
for cardiac resynchronization therapy (CRT) procedures,’ for example.”
Appeal Br. 14–15 (quoting Spec. ¶ 32); see id. at 15 (contending that “the
Examiner is making a conclusory leap between the measured shortening and
stretching of tissue in Boeck and the strain measurement as taught by
Appellant”). This argument is unavailing because it is not commensurate
with the scope of claim 1, which does not specify that the mechanical
activation parameter necessarily is indicative of displacement of the heart
wall muscle. See Ans. 13 (observing that “the mechanical activation
parameter as displacement of heart wall [muscle] is not recited in [claim 1]”
and that “Appellant is impermissibly reading limitations from [paragraph 32
of the Specification]”).
Appellant contends that “it is reasonable to conclude (in reference to
claim 1) that because a heart primarily consists of muscle tissue that the
claimed displacement parameter would inherently be indicative of

4 Appellant asserts that “the Examiner alleges that the visualizations of
FIGs. 1 and 6 are the same.” Appeal Br. 13. This is not the case. As the
Examiner explains, different figures of Boeck “can individually be
considered the claimed display as they each individually display a
mechanical activation parameter that includes either displacement
(stretching or shortening, see Fig. 1, 2) or time (mechanical activation time,
see Fig. 6), or both (strain over time, see Fig. 4).” Ans. 12.
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displacement of a heart wall muscle.” Reply Br. 6. To the extent that this
would be the case, the same could be said of the deformation and strain of
the heart tissue that Boeck plots. Appellant appears to attempt to support its
position as to the asserted claim construction by referencing claim 2, “which
recites ‘wherein the mechanical activation parameter is selected from the
group consisting of heart wall displacement distance.’” Id. Appellant’s
reliance on dependent claim 2 actually undermines Appellant’s claim
construction, rather than supporting it. The recitation of heart wall
displacement as a mechanical activation parameter in claim 2 merely
highlights the absence of such a limitation from claim 1, from which claim 2
depends, and indicates the broader scope of claim 1. As we point out above,
“the presence of a dependent claim that adds a particular limitation raises a
presumption that the limitation in question is not found in the independent
claim.” Bancorp, 687 F.3d at 1275. To the extent that Appellant may be
attempting, in the Reply Brief, to present a new argument for the separate
patentability of claim 2, this argument is untimely and will not be
considered. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2).
For the above reasons, Appellant does not apprise us of error in the
Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 as anticipated by Boeck. Accordingly, we
sustain the rejection of claim 1, and of claims 2–7, 10–12, and 14–20, which
fall with claim 1, as anticipated by Boeck.

Anticipation—Ramanathan
Appellant argues claims 1 and 14 together, and does not present any
separate arguments for dependent claims 7–9 and 21–23, apart from their
dependence from claim 1 or claim 14. Appeal Br. 16–17. We decide the
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appeal of this rejection on the basis of claim 1, and claims 7–9, 14, and 21–
23 stand or fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
The Examiner finds that Ramanathan discloses a system comprising
all of the features recited in claim 1. Final Act. 10. More specifically, the
Examiner finds, in relevant part, that Ramanathan discloses a
processor configured to calculate[] mechanical activation
parameters from the data, i.e. activation times (par. [0135]);
generate a 3D anatomical representation (par. [0034, 0039];
Fig. 14) of the heart from the data; divide the heart into
segments (par. [0131]); and overlay magnitudes of activation
times over the heart image (par. [0135]; Fig. 14). Lastly,
Ramanathan discloses an output 24 adapted to transmit the
images to a display (Fig. 1) wherein the display aids clinical
diagnosis.
Id.
The Examiner explains that because Appellant’s claims and
Specification do not “specifically define the term ‘relative[,’] the term is
given its plain meaning[,] which is that there exists some relation between
the displayed magnitudes and displayed segments.” Final Act. 7. According
to the Examiner, Ramanathan’s Figure 14 “indicates that displayed
magnitudes can be displayed in relation to the anatomical segments, i.e.[,]
adjacent to.” Id.
Appellant argues that “Ramanathan fails to teach, as claimed,
displaying the magnitudes of the mechanical activation parameter relative to
the segments on the anatomical representation.” Appeal Br. 17. In
particular, Appellant contends that, in Ramanathan’s Figure 14, “the
electroanatomical map is depicted on a second screen adjacent the
anatomical representation of the heart (which shows the segmentation).” Id.
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Appellant asserts that, by considering a display of magnitudes adjacent the
segments to be displayed relative to the segments, “the Examiner is
substituting the plain meaning of ‘adjacent’ in place of the actual claim
language — ‘relative.’” Id.
Appellant’s argument is not persuasive. Claim 1 does not specify any
particular spatial relationship between the display of the magnitudes and the
segments. See Ans. 15 (stating that “Appellant has not provided any specific
spatial relation regarding the type of relative placement” and positing that
“[a]s long as the parameters are placed in some sort of spatial relationship
with the heart segments, the parameters can be considered as being placed
relative to the heart segments, which Ramanathan discloses”). Appellant
does not point to any definition of “relative” in the record of the present
application that would refute the Examiner’s construction of the term as
conveying merely that there is some relationship between the magnitudes
and the segments. We appreciate that Appellant’s Figures 7 and 8, for
example, illustrate the magnitudes of the mechanical activation parameter
(timing or motion/displacement) by color coding overlaid on the segments to
which they pertain, but claim 1 does not recite displaying the magnitudes in
overlying relationship to the segments. It is well settled that the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) is obligated to give claim terms
their broadest reasonable interpretation, taking into account any
enlightenment by way of definitions or otherwise found in the specification.
In re ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(“[T]he PTO must give claims their broadest reasonable construction
consistent with the specification. . . . Therefore, we look to the specification
to see if it provides a definition for claim terms, but otherwise apply a broad
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interpretation.”). “[A]s applicants may amend claims to narrow their scope,
a broad construction during prosecution creates no unfairness to the
applicant or patentee.” Id. We must be careful not to read a particular
embodiment appearing in the written description into the claim if the claim
language is broader than the embodiment. See SuperGuide Corp. v.
DirecTV Enterprises, Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Though
understanding the claim language may be aided by the explanations
contained in the written description, it is important not to import into a claim
limitations that are not a part of the claim. For example, a particular
embodiment appearing in the written description may not be read into a
claim when the claim language is broader than the embodiment.”). The
challenge is to interpret claims in view of the specification without
unnecessarily importing limitations from the specification into the claims.
See E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. 3Com Corp., 343 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
Moreover, as the Examiner points out on page 15 of the Answer,
“Ramanathan also discloses that the magnitudes of activation can be
[overlaid] over the heart image.” See Ramanathan ¶ 135 (disclosing that
“[a] corresponding electroanatomical map can also be superimposed on the
surface of the heart . . . (e.g., an isochrome map depicted in the example of
FIG. 14)”). Thus, even if we were to construe claim 1 as requiring that the
magnitudes be displayed overlying the segments, this limitation would not
distinguish over Ramanathan. To the extent that the electroanatomical map
illustrated in Ramanathan’s Figure 14 is not deemed to be displayed in such
a manner, Ramanathan discloses doing so in paragraph 135. Thus,
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Appellant’s assertion with respect to the meaning of “relative to” does not
identify error in the rejection.
For the above reasons, Appellant does not apprise us of error in the
rejection of claim 1 as anticipated by Ramanathan. Accordingly, we sustain
the rejection of claim 1, and of claims 7–9, 14, and 21–23, which fall with
claim 1, as anticipated by Ramanathan.
Anticipation—Rosenberg
Appellant argues independent claims 1 and 14 together, and does not
present any separate arguments for dependent claims 12 and 13 apart from
their dependence from claim 1. Appeal Br. 18–19. We decide the appeal of
this rejection on the basis of claim 1, and claims 12–14 stand or fall with
claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
The Examiner finds that Rosenberg discloses a system as recited in
claim 1. Final Act. 11 (citing Rosenberg ¶¶ 92–96, 126–128, 138, 150–153,
188; Figs. 8–14).
Appellant argues that Rosenberg does not teach “‘generating a
depiction that displays magnitudes of the mechanical activation parameter
relative to the segments’ of the anatomical representation, as claimed” in
claim 1. Appeal Br. 18. According to Appellant, “[w]hile Rosenberg may
disclose dividing a heart into segments, the segmented representation does
not have an overlay of mechanical activation parameters, but instead
displays the position of electrodes relative to anatomical features of the
heart.” Id. (citing Rosenberg ¶ 103; Fig. 9).
Appellant acknowledges the Examiner’s findings that Rosenberg
teaches generating a 3D isochrome map and a 3D map of cardiac motion,
such as the mechanical activation data, but contends that “the Examiner fails
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to provide any evidence that the 3D map would be segmented, as claimed, or
that the cardiac motion may be displayed ‘relative’ to such a segmented
map.” Appeal Br. 18.
Rosenberg discloses that “[b]y visualizing the global activation
pattern seen on color-coded isopotential maps in the system, in conjunction
with the reconstructed electrograms, an electrophysiologist can identify the
source of an arrhythmia and can navigate to a defined area for therapy.”
Rosenberg ¶ 92. Rosenberg also discloses that “[i]nformation acquired may
be displayed as a 3-D isopotential map and as virtual electrograms.
Repositioning of the catheter allows for plotting of cardiac electrograms
from other locations.” Id. ¶ 93. Additionally, Rosenberg discloses that the
system “provides for interpolation (mapping a smooth surface) onto which
activation voltages and times can be registered.” Id. ¶ 96. These passages
indicate that the mechanical activation data is overlaid onto the mapping of
the heart, perhaps by color coding.
Rosenberg discloses dividing the heart into sections AS, A, AL, PL, P,
and PS, as shown in Figure 8. Rosenberg ¶ 126. Rosenberg then teaches
placing electrodes RV1, RV2, and RV-Tip at various positions in the right
ventricle and electrodes LV1–LV5 and LV-Tip at various positions in the
left ventricle. Id. ¶ 128; Fig. 9. Rosenberg points out that the electrodes are
located in five of the six radial sections (AS, A, AL, PL, P, and PS). Id.
¶ 128. Rosenberg discloses a local estimator map that “shows the ‘volume’
of motion of each mapped electrode” in a manner that allows comparison
between the volumes of movement at the electrode sites. Id. ¶ 138; Fig. 12.
As the mapped electrodes for which the local estimator map shows volume
of motion are in at least five of the six radial sections, it is not immediately
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apparent, and Appellant does not persuasively explain, why this does not
constitute “generating a depiction that displays magnitudes of the
mechanical activation parameter” (i.e., motion or strain data) “relative to the
segments such that performance of a plurality of segments can be
simultaneously evaluated,” as recited in claim 1.
Rosenberg also discloses introducing “segments” that connect
positions of various electrodes, thereby creating a mesh that links the
positions. Rosenberg ¶ 150; Fig. 14. According to Rosenberg, a mesh-
trajectory approach can analyze change in length of given segments, which
may indicate local or regional strain. Id. ¶ 151. Such strain data appears to
correspond to, or be related to, the segments Rosenberg discusses in
paragraph 150. Further, Rosenberg discloses that “[a] map or model of
cardiac motion may be displayed . . . based, in part, on 3-D heart information
and optionally 3-D torso information that facilitates interpretation of motion
information” and that “a heart map and all of the electrical activation data,
mechanical activation data, VE data, etc., may be recorded for subsequent
review.” Id. ¶ 188. Appellant does not persuasively explain why this does
not constitute “generating a depiction that displays magnitudes of the
mechanical activation parameter” (i.e., motion or strain data) “relative to the
segments such that performance of a plurality of segments can be
simultaneously evaluated,” as recited in claim 1.
Thus, Appellant does not apprise us of error in the rejection of claim 1
as anticipated by Rosenberg. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim
1, and of claims 12–14, which fall with claim 1, as anticipated by
Rosenberg.
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DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:

Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–7, 10–
12, 14–20
102(a)(1)/(a)(2) Boeck 1–7, 10–
12, 14–20

1, 7–9,
14, 21–23
102(a)(1)/(a)(2) Ramanathan 1, 7–9, 14,
21–23

1, 12–14 102(a)(1)/(a)(2) Rosenberg 1, 12–14
Overall
Outcome
1–20

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED