Sportee Corporation of North America

National Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsJun 25, 1969

176 N.L.R.B. 1055 (N.L.R.B. 1969)

SPORTEE CORPORATION OF NORTH AMERICA Sportee Corporation of North America and International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO. Case 11-CA-3759 June 25, 1969 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS BROWN AND ZAGORIA On April 22, 1969, Trial Examiner George J. Bott issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action,as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. The Trial 'examiner also found that the Respondent had not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices, and recommended dismissal as to them. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a supporting brief, and the Respondent filed cross-exceptions, a supporting brief, and an answering brief. Pursuant to provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions, the briefs, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the Trial Examiner's findings,' conclusions, and recommendations. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, and hereby orders that Respondent, Sportee Corporation of North America, Clarkton, North Carolina, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order. 'These findings are based , in part, upon credibility determinations of the Trial Examiner to which the General Counsel has excepted After careful review of the record, we conclude that these credibility findings are not contrary to the clear preponderance of all relevant evidence Accordingly, we find no basis for disturbing these findings Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc, 91 NLRB 544, enfd. 188 F 2d 362 (C A. 3) TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE GEORGE J. BOTT Trial Examiner Upon a charge of 1055 unfair labor practices filed by International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO, herein called the Union, on October 18, 1968, against Sportee Corporation of North America, herein called Respondent or Company, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board issued a complaint and notice of hearing on December 13, 1968, in which he alleged that Respondent had engaged in unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(l) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, herein called the Act. Respondent's answer admitted certain allegations of the complaint but denied the commission of any unfair labor practices. A hearing was held before me in Wilmington, North Carolina, on March 11 and 12, 1969, at which all parties were represented. Subsequent to the hearing, Respondent filed a brief which I have considered. Upon the entire record in the case and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. RESPONDENTS BUSINESS Respondent is a North Carolina corporation with a plant at Clarkton, North Carolina, where it manufactures ladies' and children's garments. During the 12-month period prior to the issuance of the complaint, Respondent sold and shipped from its Clarkton plant goods valued in excess of $50,000 to points outside the State of North Carolina. I find that Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Discharge of Mildred Williams Mrs. Williams was discharged by Respondent on August 28, 1968, the day after she attended what appears to have been the first union meeting of Respondent's employees held at the home of a fellow employee. The principal issue in the case involves Williams' alleged discriminatory discharge, which Respondent insists was unrelated to any union activity she may have engaged in and about which it had no knowledge in any case. Respondent is also alleged to have engaged in independent violations of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act by coercively interrogating employees, threatening them and promising them benefits, shortly after union activity began, all of which Respondent denies.' Williams began to work steadily for Respondent as a macl ine operator in July 1966. She attended the union meeting on August 27, 1968, at employee Cartrette's home. According to her, only she, Cartrette, employee McMillian and Union Representative Allen were present, and it appears that Allen gave each employee some union leaflets. Williams said that she took four leaflets and placed them on the front seat of her car when she left the 'The 8(a)(1) allegations of the complaint were amended at the hearing to add an allegation that Respondent , by Plant Manager Beresoff, violated the Act by promising an employee a benefit if said employee would "stop the Union." 176 NLRB No. 144 1056 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD meeting , where they remained overnight. On August 28, Williams drove to work as usual, but since the employees ' parking lot was full , she parked her car in front of the plant ' s boiler house . She testified that the union pamphlets were still on the front seat of her car when she entered the plant . A sample of the pamphlet is in evidence . On its front page , in bold letters , is the legend "Its Your Right to Have a Union ." Williams said she recalled that the four pamphlets were resting face up on the seat. According to Williams , but this is flatly contradicted by Assistant Plant Manager Grainger , Grainger came to her machine during the afternoon of August 28 and asked her for her keys so that he could move her car away from the boiler room door because it was necessary to "blow out" the boiler, an operation which requires shutting it down temporarily . Williams said she gave him the keys and told him to leave them in the ignition switch. Williams testified that Grainger informed her at quitting time on August 28 that he was discharging her because she had been absent from work 17 days during the last 7 weeks . Williams disputed this and asked to see the records . Grainger left the room and returned with Plant Manager Beresoff who conceded that his information was inaccurate and that Williams had not been away from work as much as he thought she had. Williams said that he added that it made no difference anyway because she had been doing bad work . Williams denied that she had been performing badly and denied that any supervisor had told her that she was. After her discharge on August 28, Williams left the plant and found her automobile parked in the parking lot. She said that as she drove from the lot she noticed that the union leaflets which she had left on the front seat were now scattered around the back of the car , some on the back seat and some on the floor. On August 30, Williams returned to the plant to get her pay check and a layoff slip which she said had been promised her in the previous meeting with Grainger. Grainger had given her a layoff slip on August 28, which she said gave the reason for her separation as "being absent too much," but she said she refused to accept the document and angrily tore it up because it was inaccurate. She said Grainger then said he would have another one prepared which would mention her "unsatisfactory work." Williams said she reached the plant around 9 a.m. on August 30 and saw Grainger first who she said presented her with a layoff slip that stated she had been fired because of "unsatisfactory work ." She refused to accept this paper also , she said , because it, too, was unacceptable to her because the reason stated was false. Williams left the second layoff slip on Grainger's desk and, at some point in the meeting , asked if she could have her job back , but Grainger suggested that this was something that she would have to see Beresoff about. Grainger and Williams went to Beresoff's office where, according to Williams , a relatively long conversation, lasting until 11 or 11:30 a.m. took place . It is not alsways clear in the record whether Williams is repeating in her description of events in Beresoff 's office, statements that might have been uttered in Grainger ' s, but it is clear that unions or union activity were first mentioned in Beresoffs office . A condensed version of what Williams said happened in Beresoff 's office, as I reconstruct it, and it is practically all denied by Grainger and Beresoff, is as follows: Williams asked Beresoff if she could come back to work. He made no immediate response , but turned the talk to her work, which he said she had been doing improperly for a long time , but he had kept her on, nevertheless , because he knew she had certain personal problems . Williams denied the bad work charge and noted that if it were true , someone would have told her about it earlier , but no one had. Sometime during the interview, a third layoff slip was produced . The third slip read "Could not meet our standards of quality" in th:, space reserved for "cause of separation ," but Williams said she refused this one too , and left it on Beresoff s desk when she left, because it meant the same to her as "unsatisfactory work" and was, therefore, not true. At some point in the Beresoff-Williams-Grainger meeting the conversation got around to unions and lasted for 2 hours, Williams said. It began by Beresoff asking her if she had signed a union card , which she admitted. He then asked how many employees had attended "the meeting ," but she refused to tell him , Beresoff asked if Alene Cartrette had anything to do with the Union, and Williams said that at first she resisted giving this information , but before she left Beresoff's office she had told him that "the meeting " had been at Cartrette's home and she had signed a union card. Beresoff then argued against the Union, pointing out that it would cause problems both for the Company and for employees and that the Company could not afford it. Rates were also mentioned , Williams ' in particular. During the course of his remarks, Beresoff stated that he was not against the Union but actually believed in unions . He did not think , however, that the Union was a good thing for the employees but thought an independent union would be better. He also voiced the thought that the plant "would not be here" in 2 years if it were organized. Williams summed the whole thing up by stating that, "Most of what we did was argue and fuss." As Williams left the plant she said she spoke to Grainger again and explained why she could not take the layoff slip last tendered her. She said he promised to give her a good reference if another employer telephoned him. Respondent ' s version of the circumstances surrounding Williams' discharge is diametrically opposed to hers in all important respects . A key issue in every case of discrimination is, of course , company knowledge of the union activity of the alleged discriminatee . Williams' testimony about the leaflets in her automobile suggested that Respondent knew she was active in the Union because Grainger must have seen the leaflets when he moved the car , but Grainger denied that he had asked Williams for her car keys on the afternoon of August 28 so that he could move the vehicle, which was blocking the boiler room, in order that the boiler might be shut off. Such a request would be unlikely, he said , for it is necessary to keep the boiler in operation until the end of the day, and he denied entering Williams' automobile for any purpose. There is also a serious conflict about the quality of Williams' work and what was said about it when she was discharged and on previous occasions. In effect, Williams testified that she had never been warned about defective production , and she specifically stated that she produced no poor quality garments on the day she was fired and that no supervisor said she did before she saw Beresoff, but the substance of all of this is denied by four company representatives. SPORTEE CORPORATION OF NORTH AMERICA 1057 Mrs. Dennis, who supervised Williams from the time she was first hired , testified that she talked with Williams frequently about her work and cautioned her about certain defects in the garments she worked on. Dennis was also dissatisfied with Williams' attendance record which she characterized as being as bad or worse than any other employee 's, and she said she recommended Williams' discharge to her superiors more than once on that ground and because of her inferior work . Although Dennis stated that Williams was an able operator who could perform fast and efficiently if she wanted to, her attendance and the uneven quality of her production outweighed her potential . Dennis named Harrelson , a general supervisor, and Grainger and Beresoff , higher officials , as persons whom she complained to about the employee . She said that Harrelson agreed with her about the nature of Williams ' work , but that Grainger and Beresoff responded that Williams had certain personal problems and needed the job, and that , in any case , experienced operators were hard to recruit. General Supervisor Harrelson contradicted Williams' account of what happened on August 28. As she was routinely checking operations she observed that certain blouses on which Williams had completed her task were sewn incorrectly . Harrelson called it to Williams' attention , but Williams indicated that she was unaware of the defect . Harrelson made a slight adjustment on the machine , which she said any experienced operator was capable of making , and the blemish (puckering) did not appear after that . Harrelson took the defective garments to Grainger and when they then checked other completed garments at the next step in the process, they found that of three bundles of garments which had passed through Williams ' machine , about 2 dozen garments in each bundle had the same defect she had found when she had checked Williams' production earlier . Harrelson told Beresoff about it, and it was agreed that the blouses had to be taken apart and reworked . Harrelson did this herself. She described the error as the largest that Williams had ever been responsible for and the most substantial in Harrelson 's experience at the plant. Harrelson had warned Williams about the quality of her production before , she said , and told her that she would be dismissed if she did not improve . Approximately 2 weeks before Williams ' discharge , as she and Beresoff were checking work in the plant on a Saturday while the plant was shut , Beresoff called Harrelson ' s attention to excess material in an employee ' s scrape box which turned out to be Williams'. Excess material may indicate that too much cloth has been cut off from a garment by an employee which will make it under standard . Beresoff checked a garment that Williams had produced and found that such was the case . Harrelson said she told Williams about her error later. Harrelson corrobrated Dennis' statements about their discussions of Williams' work and attendance , and said that she had also asked that Williams be discharged, but Grainger told her that Williams had certain "family problems." Harrelson is over Dennis and reports to Grainger, assistant plant manager . Grainger testified that on the morning of August 28 , Harrelson showed him some blouses that Williams had worked on and said they had to be reworked . He then told Beresoff that he had just gotten another report about Williams' work and the two discussed it very briefly before something interrupted them . Later that day he saw Beresoff again and after some discussion , Beresoff told him to discharge Williams at the end of the day. At 4 : 30 p.m ., he told Williams that he was goin to lay her off "for messing up so many garments and for being absent so much ." He agreed that Williams denied that she had been absent as much as he thought she had been , and he conceded that his information was inaccurate . He checked the records in Beresoff's office , and Beresoff returned with him to talk with Williams . According to Grainger, Williams somewhat emotionally pleaded for her job , but Beresoff said he was sorry, but he was going to put someone else on her machine . Grainger had had a layoff slip prepared and offered it to Williams , but she refused it, and left the plant. Grainger said that he, too, had in the past brought defects in Williams' production to her notice and she had promised to be more careful . He confirmed Dennis' and Harrelson ' s statements that they had recommended Williams' discharge because of her work and absentee record . He explained his inaction on the grounds that experienced operators were not readily available; he was aware of some of her personal problems and knew she needed a job ; and she could be efficient when she tried. The amount of spoilage on August 28 was too much, according to him , and he concurred in the decision to discharge Williams. He said he recalled no similar instance where so many garments had to be done over. Beresoff corroborated Grainger ' s and Harrelson's testimony that they reported defective machine work early in the morning on August 28. He made an investigation in the plant because Grainger had indicated that the error was extensive , and he found dozens of garments on which Williams had performed an operation that obviously had to be done over . The garments were actually taken apart and refinished . Beresoff testified that he had heard complaints about Williams ' work from supervisors before and because of the excessive amount of poor work involved in this instance he told Grainger to discharge her at the end of the day . Around 4 : 30 p.m ., Grainger told him that Williams had disputed being absent as many times as she was accused of having been and he went to Grainger's office and admitted that he had been in error on that, but he stated that Williams' attendance record was not good in any case . This was an added reason albeit a minor one , for her discharge . Beresoff said that a layoff slip indicating that Williams did not meet the company's standards of quality was handed to her, but she refused to accept it because she was not satisfied with the stated reason. Williams had testified about certain acts and conversations which took place when she returned for her pay on August 30, but here again she is sharply contradicted by everyone else involved . Besides going back for her pay, she said she also wanted to get a layoff slip which had been promised her. According to her, when Grainger first told her on August 28 that she was fired he gave her a separation notice which stated that her discharge was due to excessive absenteeism . She protested and tore this slip up , she said . Grainger prepared another which attributed her discharge to "unsatisfactory work." This one she also refused to accept , and she said that Grainger said he would have another or a third ready for her. Grainger , Mrs. Grainger, who is Grainger's wife and Respondent's bookkeeper and payroll clerk , and Beresoff testified that there was only one , not three , layoff slips prepared in Williams' case. One of Jeanette Grainger's duties is the preparation of layoff slips, and she testified that the layoff slip in evidence , which is dated August 28 and which gives the 1058 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD reason for Williams' separation as failure to meet Respondent's quality standards, was prepared by her on August 28 around 3 or 4 p.m. after Mr. Grainger told her to and instructed her what to put on it. The document is in her handwriting, and she said at no other time did she prepare any layoff slips relating to Williams. On August 30 she prepared Williams' pay check only, and Williams did not enter her office at all, as she had testified, but remained with Beresoff. Donald Grainger testified that there was only one layoff slip involved in Williams' case and that the exhibit in evidence, dated August 28 and identified by Mrs. Grainger, is it. He said he gave it to Williams on August 28, after Mrs. Grainger had prepared it at his instructions, but she refused to accept it, and left it on the table. As already indicated, Beresoff testified that Williams was given a layoff slip on August 28 stating that she was severed because she did not meet quality standards. Williams did not take it because she did not agree with the reason, but he denied that she tore it up and threw it on the floor, as she had testified. She left the slip, and it wound up on his desk, and later ended in her personnel file. In addition to the conflict about the layoff slip, or slips, other subjects relating to Williams' August 30 visit are in dispute. Briefly, she had stated that Beresoff interrogated her about the Union and union activities on that date, but Beresoff and Grainger deny it. Grainger's account of the August 30 meeting is a little more detailed than Beresoff's. Grainger was called off the plant floor around 11:30 A.M. and told that Williams wanted to see him in his office. When he saw Williams she asked for her regular pay check and also pay for the 3 days she had put in that week. Grainger approved the request, but when Williams asked him if she could return to work, he said this was something that Beresoff would have to decide. The two went to Beresoff's office, where, according to Grainger, Williams asked Beresoff to rehire her but he refused. Beresoff asked her if she wanted her layoff slip, but Williams said she did not because it was untruthful. She said that she knew the real reason she was fired, and when Beresoff asked her what it was, she claimed it was because she had tried to organize the company. According to Grainger, Beresoff's only response was a startled "what?". The only additional conversation, Grainger said, was a statement by Williams that she did not care about the job, but she resented being fired without even having been shown the work she had been accused of doing improperly. He said Beresoff said he had seen the work and was sure she was aware of it. Beresoff testified that on August 30 Williams asked to be paid in full and he instructed Mrs. Grainger to prepare her pay. While waiting for Mrs. Grainger, Williams stated that she did not believe that she had been fired for bad work. Beresoff replied that the reason for her separation was written on the separation notice, but Williams said that was false and claimed she was really discharged because she had been active in the Union' s organizing campaign. Beresoff said this information surprised him and all that he did was thank Williams for it, because he had no knowledge before that there was any organizing going on or that Williams was involved in any. This was the end of the conversation, according to him. B. Analysis and Concluding Finding in Williams' Case I find that General Counsel has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent discharged Mildred Williams because of her activity on behalf of the Union. This finding is compelled by resolutions against the General Counsel's theory in two basic areas, namely, company knowledge of Williams' union activity and the asserted unreasonable treatment of the alleged discriminatee. It is conceded that there was no union activity in the plant before September 4, and there is no evidence that Respondent had any idea that there was any organizing going on which Williams could have been involved in before August 27 or 28. Indeed, the key factor in General Counsel's case on company knowledge in Williams' case is the presence of union leaflets in her car on August 28, for the evidence could have been offered for no other purpose. But if there were no leaflets visible or if no company representative saw them before the decision to fire Williams was made then we never reach the question of the pretextual nature of the Respondent's reason for discharging the complainant. Accepting Williams' testimony that four leaflets remained on the front seat of her car in position to be read easily by a company official who unexpectedly would ask to move the vehicle which she had parked not in the normal area but in front of a boiler house less than 24 hours after she made her first overt move in the Union's direction, even if I have an uneasy feeling about these coincidences, I have no reason to discredit Grainger's testimony that he did not ask her for permission to move the car and did not enter it. The denial of a physical occurrence is a risky thing, but Grainger' s denial was unequivocal and not unimpressive. His request was supposedly made in the plant among a group of other workers, but there is no corroboration that he made it, took the keys, or touched the car. Indeed, there is no evidence how the car got from the boiler room area back to its normal spot, the employees' parking area. Moreover, if Williams is credited, Grainger said it was necessary to clean out the boiler, but his statement that such would be an odd thing to say in view of the fact that boilers are not shut down during the working day sounded plausible.' In sum , on credibility, Grainger's demeanor was as good as and his story more plausible than the complainant's, and it is his word against hers. As I have indicated, there is no reason to discredit him in respect to the auto incident or in regard to his statement that he had no knowledge about union activities before Williams blurted it out in their meeting on August 30, 2 days after her discharge. Even if Respondent knew or suspected that Williams was interested in the Union, this is not the kind of case where the presence of certain factors, such as the existence of anti-union animus, timing of the discharge, shifting or inconsistent reasons for it, or other defects in the reason offered to explain a termination , will support the conclusion that the asserted reason is pretextual and the real one discriminatory. '1f Grainger did move the car innocently then it would have been for the reason stated and there would have been an opportunity to investigate whether the boiler was shut down or not, but there is no testimony on this If Graninger 's request for the keys was not innocent and his excuse a subterfuge, then the only logical explanation for it, in a labor relations context , was that he knew or suspected that incriminating evidence was in the car , but there is nothing at all to support this theory SPORTEE CORPORATION OF NORTH AMERICA 1059 Apart from Williams' testimony about her conversations with Beresoff on August 30, which will be dealt with separately , there is some evidence , as will appear in greater detail in the next section , of employer hostility to unions , but very little . Beresoff made a speech to employees on Septembel 6 in which he told them that certain employees were "sneaking around at night" getting union cards signed at $10 a card . He mentioned a strike at a nearby plant , and suggested that if employees wanted a union they should form their own. In addition, there is some evidence of coercive interrogation occurring a week or so after Williams ' discharge . Beresoffs remarks in his speech to employees are not alleged as violative of the Act, and , in my opinion , there is little in the speech or the interrogation to give any real support to Williams' case. The timing of the discharge is somewhat suspicious, but it is almost too good . Grainger did not move Williams' automobile until approximately 2:30 p . m. on August 28, if she were credited , and she got word to see him less than 2 hours later. In that time Respondent 's officials would have had to have made a determination that the leaflets meant that Williams was active in or had been converted to unionism , discussed the matter among themselves , checked her attendance record , figured out a reason or reasons to give her, evaluated the entire union situation and decided that it was a serious threat permitting no delay, and then prepared Grainger and Beresoff for the exit interview - with or without legal advice . Rather than impressing one, the timing leaves one with the feeling that there are too many coincidences in the complainant 's case. General Counsel ' s use of the layoff slip evidence and his cross-examination of Respondent' s witnesses about absenteeism and the reasons given Williams' when she was discharged made it evident that shifting or inconsistent defenses were being relied on to show pretext, but the evidence will not support the theory for two main reasons. First, there never was a layoff slip which stated the reason for Williams' discharge as excessive absenteeism . This is so because I credit Mrs. Grainger particularly and also her corroborating witnesses, Beresoff and Mr . Grainger, and because the account about three layoff slips with different causes stated on them is unlikely and implausible . Second , Grainger ' s and Beresoffs references to absenteeism as well as quality when discussing Williams ' discharge with her was not a reliance on inconsistent defenses or a shift in reasons discrediting the asserted reasons, even though both admitted that there was some error in the original computations in respect to absences , because their explanation that absenteeism was not an important factor in their decision but a contributing one was reasonable , and the uncontradicted testimony is that Williams actually had a poor attendance record. If Williams carelessly spoiled as many garments as Respondent said she did then it would be the rankest form of second guessing to say that the penalty was harsh, especially when Respondent ' s witnesses said the error was the most substantial that this employee or any other had ever committed and when there is no evidence that this type of dereliction was customarily condoned . It is true that Williams denied that she had performed as accused on the day she was fired, claimed that she saw no defective work that day and no one brought any to her attention , and insisted that she had never been criticized or warned about the quality of her work . This is all a matter of credibility and the most difficult phase of the case. As indicated , four witnesses are against Williams in this area, and although Dennis' and Harrelson's testimony about the number of times they recommended Williams' discharge seemed somewhat exaggerated, I find that their testimony that they did is basically correct. Grainger and Beresoff were more low-keyed in their testimony regarding Williams' record in the quality area, but they confirmed the supervisors' testimony in essentials. Their explanation for retaining the employee for as long as they did in the light of her record also sounded logical and was not seriously attacked. In this state of the record, and since I have with greater certainty refused to accept the complainant's evidence in other areas, I credit the testimony against her here. Respondent's asserted reasons for her discharge, therefore, cannot be considered pretextual. For the reasons stated, I conclude that Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by discharging Williams.' C. Alleged Independent Violations of Section 8(aXl) of the Act Williams, as described in the statement of her case, testified that, on August 30, when she saw Beresoff to ask for her job back, he asked her if she had signed a union card, which she admitted. She said he also asked her about employee Cartrette and then spoke at length on the evils of unionism . I am unable to credit Williams, but I am also satisfied that there was more conversation about unions in that meeting than Beresoff and Grainger admitted. -My reason for not crediting Williams in this instance is that she admitted that she had been discharged on August 28 and that on August 30 it was clear from the beginning of the conversation that Beresoff was not revoking his decision, in fact the alleged third separation slip was presented to her before the long conversation on unions took place, as I read her testimony. It is extremely doubtful that an employer who had discharged an employee for union activity - as the complaint alleged - and who was staying with his decision, would then initiate a conversation which would be used against him to destroy the elaborate cover he had devised to conceal his motives. Williams said she told Beresoff that employee Cartrette had signed a card at "the meeting" at her home. This was supposed to be in response to his interrogation about Cartrette. But if Beresoff already knew about the August 27 meeting at Cartrette's home, the only way it can be explained on this record is that he learned it from Williams first. Beresoff and Grainger, it will be recalled, said that Williams volunteered the information that she was being discharged because she was active in organizing. I find that this happened, and I also find that if Williams told Beresoff that Cartrette had signed a card, as she says she did, then that information was volunteered too. I conclude that Beresoff did not coercively interrogate Williams on August 30 in violation of the Act as alleged in the complaint.' 'Pursuant to permission granted at the hearing, the record was left open only for the purpose of Respondent submitting an exhibit relating to a proceeding in the then Recorder 's Court of Braden County, North Carolina, involving the alleged discriminatee . The exhibit has been received, and General Counsel objects to its introduction . The exhibit is hereby rejected as having no probative value. 41f Williams volunteered information about her activity and attendance at a union meeting on August 27 as I am confident she did , and if Beresoff and Grainger did not know the plant was being organized until Williams told them , then Beresofl's silent reaction was almost too cool Something else was said, but a 2-hour conversation does not make sense . I also note 1060 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The complaint also alleged that Respondent, by Beresoff, violated Section 8 (a)(l) of the Act by informing employees that it had notes on their union activities, asking them if they would abandon the Union and by interrogating them in other ways about their union interests . Mrs. McMillian testified on these issues, but there is again a conflict about what was said and an issue about how it came about. Beresoff spoke to employees about the Union in the plant on September 6. In his speech he disparaged the persons who were soliciting for the Union by accusing them of cowardly doing it at night for a fee. Mrs. Cartrette understood these remarks to refer to herself and her husband, and to Mr. and Mrs. McMillian, for they were doing the soliciting at that time. September 6 was Friday, and that night Mr. Cartrette and Mr. McMillian, now fully informed about Beresoff's remarks, drove 30 miles or so to find him and speak with him, but when they reached the vicinity of his home and asked a policeman where he could be found , the officer suggested that it might be wiser to meet him on neutral ground in the Town Hall. It was agreed , and the policeman telephoned Beresoff at home who came to the Town Hall and spoke with the man for an hour or so. We have only Beresoff s account of the meeting, and he said that although there was no "argument," Mr. Cartrette made it clear that there were some statements which Beresoff made in his talk that day which he did not appreciate . Beresoff conceded that his choice of words might not have been the best. During the conversation, Cartrette told Beresoff that he would be charged with some offense involving wage payments to Mrs . Williams . He also stated that he was active in organizing Respondent and had secured 70 or 80 authorization cards, but was aiming for 60 percent of the employee complement . The Union' s goals were also mentioned , one of them being a $2 minimum . The item that interested Beresoff, however , was Cartrette's statement that Opal Watts , a supervisor of Respondent's pants department , was involved with the Union , and so on the following Monday , September 9, he saw Mrs. McMillian and Opal Watts together in his office. He said he could not remember whether it was "voluntary" but, in any case , the reason for the meeting was to find out from the two what Watts' role, if any, in the Union was. Grainger was also present at the meeting. Mrs. McMillian first thought her meeting with Beresoff took place on September 3, but she was straightened out on cross-examination, and it is clear that everyone had the same meeting in mind . She testified that Grainger asked her to go to Beresoff ' s office where she found Beresoff, Supervisors Watts and Grainger . McMillian said Beresoff asked her "how far" she was in the Union , and she told him "far enough" because she had signed a union card. Beresoff had with him certain records showing McMillian ' s earnings over a period of time, and proceeded to ask her what her complaint or grievance was. She explained that she was disturbed about the fact that she worked hard to make her wages but another employee "got it whether she made it or not ," Beresoff then asked her if she could get "out of ' the Union, and she told him that she believed that the matter "had gone that Williams said that Beresoff suggested the formation of an independent union and indicated that the plant would disappear in 2 years if organized, but there is nothing in the complaint about this conduct . This is another reason why it is suggested that while there may be some concealment on Respondent ' s side , there is exaggeration on the other. too far." There was also some reference to a list of employees, presumptively union adherents , in the conversation. McMillian said Beresoff had a piece of paper which he had originally torn up and thrown away, but which he reconstructed to show her that it contained Mrs. Cartrette' s name and Opal Watts', but not Mrs. McMillian's. Beresoff said that someone had left the list on his desk that morning. Beresoff was also aware that there would be a union meeting on the following evening , McMillian said, for he asked her if she were going to it. She said she was, and she invited him and Grainger to attend if they wished. Beresoff declined. McMillian said, and there is no dispute about this, that Beresoff asked her if her supervisor, Opal Watts, was involved with the Union. She assured him that she was not. Having called Mrs. McMillian to his office to find out only what Supervisor Watts' union role was, Beresoff said he asked McMillian about it, and being assured that his information was incorrect, took advantage of the opportunity to ask the employee what her grievance was. She complained about rates of pay, he made some mollifying remarks, and that was all that was said. I do not credit Beresoff 's version of the meeting . Recognizing fully that Beresoff had a reason to summon McMillian to his office in view of her husband's visit on the previous Friday and because a supervisor was mentioned in his earlier conversation with Mr. McMillian and Mr. Cartrette, I find that such was not the real reason but that Beresoff was trying to evaluate the state of the Union's campaign and to stem it if possible. By this time he had taken a position opposed to the Union and he knew that Mrs. McMillian and Mrs. Cartrette were involved. Respondent *anted to know how deeply they were involved, how far the movement had progressed and what it could do to stop it. In fact Beresoff asked McMillian if it could be stopped. Moreover, if Beresoff wished to find out if Supervisor Watts were in the Union he could have asked her privately about it, and it is also odd, in view of his statement that Mr. Cartrette was the one who did the talking the Friday before and who made the charge about Watts, that he should call Mrs. McMillian to his office to clarify the situation. Finally, if that were the reason, there would have been no need to refer to a list of union adherents or suspects , including a non-supervisor, that some unknown person had left on his desk, or to show awareness of a scheduled union meeting and to ask the employee if she intended to attend.' I conclude that Respondent ' s asserted reason for Beresoff' s meeting with McMillian and Cartrette is a subterfuge and that he coercively interrogated her about the Union, indicating at the time that he had written information about union adherents . ' By such conduct , Respondent violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act.' 'Granger ' s version of this meeting is not exactly in accord with Bercsoffs . He said that Beresoff asked McMillian to check with her husband about Watts and let him know . Beresoff said he was satisfied with McMillian ' s denial of any activity on Watts' part. Grainger 's version on this point, therefore, conforms with McMillian's. 'Although McMillian was originally clearly confused about the date of her conversation with Beresoff, there was nothing to indicate that she misstated the time in order to prejudice Respondent. 'Beresoff had a legal right to make the September 6 speech to employees, but the McMillians and Cartrettes had a right to resent it, and there was nothing in Mr. McMillian's and Mr. Cartrette 's conference with Beresoff to give legal color to his coercive interrogation of their wives. SPORTEE CORPORATION OF NORTH AMERICA Mrs. Cartrette said she was told to go to Beresoff's office by Grainger, which she did , and Grainger remained in the room while she and Beresoff had a conversation.' Beresoff testified that she asked to see him . Cartrette said that Beresoff opened by telling her that he appreciated the fact that her husband had not come to his home to make a "fuss" but had spoken to him at the police station the Friday before. He then stated that he would be willing to pay her "as much as $2 per hour to get the Union stopped." This remark is alleged as a promise of benefit in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Beresoff's version is that when Cartrette came in she said she wanted to apologize for her husband 's visit and he brushed it off by saying it was not necessary. He said he then asked her what her grievance was, and the conversation which resulted was similar to the one in McMillian 's case. If Beresoff was saying that there was no reference to $2 an hour in his talk with the employee , I discredit him. I credit Mrs. Cartrette, and I find that she was summoned to the office on the convenient excuse that her husband had been to see Beresoff and questioned about her grievance in the context of a promise that rates could be raised if that would solve the union problem. By such conduct, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.' McMillian also testified that Grainger asked her if she intended to attend a meeting of the Union at employee Cain' s home, and she admitted that she did." Grainger asked her if the employees could "stop" the union movement and she replied that it had "gone too far." A union meeting was held that night, and on the next day Grainger asked McMillian if they had "stopped" the union . Again she said they had not for it had progressed too far . Grainger denied that these conversations took place. Cartrette testified that she went to a union meeting at employee Cain' s home on September 4, and, on September 5, Grainger asked her if she had attended and how many persons were there . She refused to divulge this information , and he asked her if "it could be stopped." Grainger's statement that the only conversation he had about unions with Cartrette at her machine was one in which she told him that the Union was having a party at Myrtle Beach was unimpressive. Mrs. Cartrette denied that she had made such a remark . She also said there was no union meeting or party at Myrtle Beach in September , and Allen, Union representative , corroborated her. I credit Cartrette, and find that Grainger interrogated her as alleged. I find that Grainger interrogated both employees as alleged and asked them if the union activity could be stopped. By such coercive interrogation Respondent 'She fixed the date as September 11, but, from the content of the conversation and from Beresoff ' s testimony, it appears to have been September 9, the same day McMillian met with Beresoff. 'Once more Grainger ' s version of this meeting differs from Beresoffs. He added that after Mrs. Cartrette apologized for her husband 's conduct, she stated that "she knew about the Union , that there had been a meeting at her home , she was sorry she was involved in the union matter and her husband had no business being involved either ." Then Beresoff asked about her grievance , and she mentioned rates. I see no logical reason why Cartrette would tell Beresoff what he already knew in greater detail as was evident from Mr. Cartrette ' s visit and Beresoff's own speech accusing the Cartrettes, not by name, however, of soliciting by night Moreover, Grainger, like Beresoff, never denied the employee 's testimony about making the rate $2. "Although the complaint and the witness fix the date of this as September 5 or 4, it appears to have been on the same day that Beresoff talked with McMillian , that is, September 9. violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. 1061 IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE It is found that the activities of the Respondent set forth above in section III, occurring in connection with its operations described in section I, have a close , intimate, and substantial relationship to trade , traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY As it has been found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices , it is recommended that the Board issue the Recommended Order set forth below requiring Respondent to cease and desist from said unfair labor practices and to take certain affirmative action which will effectuate the policies of the Act. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in the case , I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization as defined in Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By engaging in the conduct found to be violations set forth in section III, C , the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. 4. Respondent did not discharge Mildred Williams in violation of law as alleged in the complaint. 5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor. practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and conclusions of law and upon the entire record in the case, it is recommended that Respondent , its officers , agents, successors , and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Interrogating its employees regarding their union membership or desires in a manner constituting interference , restraint , or coercion in violation of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. (b) Promising wage increases or other benefits to employees to discourage them from engaging in union activities. (c) Threatening employees by advising that Respondent has written information about their union activities and asking them whether union activity can be halted. (d) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the allegation of the complaint that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act be dismissed. 2. Take the following affirmative action which it is found will effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Post at its plant at Clarkton, North Carolina, copies 1062 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD of the attached notice marked "Appendix ."" Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 11, after being duly signed by its representative , shall be posted immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter , in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken to ensure that said notices are not altered , defaced , or covered by any other material. (b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 11, in writing , within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith." "In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "A Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "The Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice In the further event that the Board ' s Order is enforced by a decree of the United States Court of Appeals , the words "A Dcree of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "A Decision and Order." "In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read : "Notify the Regional Director for Region 11 , in writing , within 10 days from the date of this Order what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith." APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL NOT interrogate you or ask you about your union membership or desires in a coercive manner or under circumstances constituting coercion. WE WILL NOT promise you wage increases or other benefits to discourage you from designating International Ladies ' Garment Workers ' Union, AFL-CIO, as your representative for collective bargaining. WE WILL NOT threaten you by telling you that we have written notes on your union activities and asking you whether the union activity can be stopped. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with , restrain , or coerce you in the exercise of your right to self-organization , to bargain collectively through representatives of your own choosing, and to engage in any other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection , or to refrain from any or all such activities, except to the extent that such rights might be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in Section 8(aX3) of the National Labor Relations Act. Dated By SPORTEE CORPORATION OF NORTH AMERICA (Employer) (Representative ) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting , and must not be altered, defaced , or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions they may communicate directly with the Board ' s Regional Office, 1624 Wachovia Building, 301 North Main Street , Winston-Salem, North Carolina 27101, Telephone 919-723-2303.