Southwire Co.Download PDFNational Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsMar 6, 1970181 N.L.R.B. 549 (N.L.R.B. 1970) Copy Citation SOUTHWIRE COMPANY Southwire Company and International Union of Electrical , Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO. Case 10-CA-7484 March 6, 1970 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS FANNING, BROWN , AND JENKINS On October 31, 1969, Trial Examiner Myron S. Waks issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner at the hearing and finds no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions, the brief, and the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the findings,' conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby adopts as its Order the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, and orders that the Respondent, Southwire Company, Carrollton, Georgia, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE MYRON S. WAKS, Trial Examiner: This case, tried at Carrollton, Georgia, on June 10, 1969, pursuant to a charge and amended charges filed on September 10 and 20, 1968,' and January 30, 1969, and a complaint issued on April 7, 1969, presents the question whether Respondent Company's issuance of a major warning notice to employee Jerry McColley, Sr., was because of his union adherence and activities and therefore violative of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. ' In its exceptions , the Respondent alleges bias and prejudice on the part of the Trial Examiner . Upon a careful analysis of the whole record, we find nothing to support Respondent 's allegations . Accordingly , they are rejected , as lacking in merit ' Unless otherwise indicated all dates referred to herein occurred in 1968. 549 Upon the entire record in this case including my observation of the witnesses, and after due consideration of the briefs filed by the parties, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY The pleadings establish, and I find, that Respondent is engaged in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of wire cable and related products at its principal place of business at Carrollton, Georgia; that during the calendar year preceding the issuance of complaint (a period representative of all time material herein), the Company sold and shipped finished products valued in excess of $50,000 to customers located outside the State of Georgia. Upon these admitted facts, I find that Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The pleadings further establish , and I find , that the International Union of Electrical , Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, herein called the Union , is, and has been at all times material herein , a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Background As background evidence bearing on the animus of Respondent toward the Union and employee McColley, I have taken official notice pursuant to the request of the General Counsel of the following unfair labor practice cases involving the Respondent : 133 NLRB 83, enfd. 313 F.2d 638 (C.A. 5); 145 NLRB 1329, enfd . as modified 352 F.2d 346 (C.A. 5); 159 NLRB 394, enfd . as modified 383 F.2d 235 (C.A. 5); 164 NLRB No. 135, enfd . 393 F.2d 106 (C.A. 5). These cases demonstrate that from at least 1959 the Respondent has openly opposed any attempt by its employees to be represented by a union , and in so doing Respondent has repeatedly and flagrantly violated the law by coercively interrogating its employees concerning their union activity , threatening to close the plant rather than deal with the Union , threatening to discharge employees for engaging in union activity and discharging employees for exercising their Section 7 rights under the Act More particularly , the Respondent has twice discriminatorily discharged McColley and has reinstated him only pursuant to court order .' McColley who was first employed by the Company in October 1961, was discharged for union activities on October 5, 1962. He was returned to work in January 1966 pursuant to court decree issued in November 1965.' On July 15, 1966, some 6 months following his reinstatement, McColley, who 'In the most recent case involving the discriminatory discharge of McColley, Trial Examiner Weil noted that "while a number of employees were found to have been discriminatorily discharged in the various cases involving Respondent , it appears that only McColley has accepted reinstatement" (164 NLRB No 135 ) 'In 164 NLRB No 135, the Trial Examiner noted that McCulley's employment between his first reinstatement and second discriminatory discharge was marked by the additional charges of unfair labor practices in that On May 31 (1966] McCulley was given a warning notice for five 181 NLRB No. 79 550 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD continued to actively seek union representation was again discriminatorily discharged Pursuant to court decree issued April 8, 1968, McColley was again reinstated July 15, 1968, some 2 months before the conduct complained of in this case. I have considered Respondent's history of past violations to the extent that Respondent's past conduct in the furtherance of its antiunion policy amply establishes Respondent's animus to union representation for its employees and to McColley because of his efforts toward this end.' B. The Disciplinary Warning Issued to McColley When McColley was reinstated by the Company on July 15, Foreman Brown' assigned McColley to work as a second class mechanic doing maintenance work on the first shift under the supervision of Clarence R. Harrison, supervisor of mechanical work in the reclamation and morgan mill area . Harrison , who has been in his present position for more than 3 years, was aware of McColley's previous discharge by the Company, and was told by Foreman Brown before McColley reported for work that McColley was being reinstated pursuant to court order. McColley was first assigned to work in the furnace area, and in August, upon his request, was assigned to the scrap area where he had previously worked. In the scrap or reclamation department there are '14 or 15 employees. McColley is one of five mechanics on the first shift working directly under the supervision of Harrison, who in turn reports to Foreman Brown; in charge of all maintenance and a vice president of the Company is Frank Holloday. As an employee in the reclamation department McColley is also responsible to Foreman Shealy who is in overall charge of that department. Following his return to work on July 15 and continuing to date McColley has continued his support for the Union. McColley has overtly declared his active interest in the union by wearing daily on the job an IUE badge, the legend of which states he is a "volunteer •Union organizer." McColley is the only employee in the department wearing an IUE badge and so far as disclosed by the testimony of witnesses at this hearing, McColley is the only employee in the plant 'wearing a union badge. Harrison testified and Respondent admits that at the time material herein it knew McColley continued to actively support the Union. As a mechanic assigned to the reclamation department McColley is responsible for the repair of the mechanical equipment in the scrap area, including the Moseley Shearer and adjoining conveyors, if they break down during his shift. The shearer is used to chop up scrap wire and feeds out to conveyor belts which lead to a pulverizer and ultimately to a furnace where the scrap is melted. Thus the operation in which the shearer is involved is alleged infractions of Respondent's rules A charge was filed alleging that Respondent' s action was discriminatory and the investigation resulted in the removal of the warning notice from McColley's file and the withdrawal of the charge. 'Contrary to the contention of the Respondent it is settled law that official notice may be taken of prior Board proceedings involving the same employer , and both the Board and Court have so indicated in prior cases involving successive violations of the Respondent While the cases thus noted herein establish the hostility of the Employer to unionism, it does not necessarily follow that all subsequent conduct is prompted by union animus However , p--,or findings of unfair labor practices and particularly those directed against McColley are considerations in determining the motivation underlying the conduct alleged as unlawful in this case See Sourhwire Co. 159 NLRB supra at 395; Kellwood Co. 175 NLRB No 79, fn. 4 'When McColley was first employed by the Company in 1961 he worked under the supervision of Frank Brown unconnected with the wire production of the Company, but is necessary to the disposal of scrap wire. The shearer and adjoining conveyors during the time relevant herein were shut down each week on Tuesday and on Saturdays during the last half hour of the second shift for maintenance. It is the responsibility of employee Jackson Chambers, who does mechanic's work on the second shift' not only to grease the machine and take care of the bearings, but also-if anything is wrong with the machine, to repair it during the downtime. Following McColley' s assignment to the scrap area in August, he noticed that the bolt in the adjustment mechanism of the conveyor for the Moseley Shearer was bent between'45 to 90 degrees; this made it impossible to turn the bolt and thereby adjust the belt on the conveyor if it became necessary. McColley brought this to the attention of Foreman Shealy as well as other employees in the area. When McColley asked Shealy if he wanted the adjustment bolt fixed, Shealy told McColley that he would decide when to shut the machine'down'to fix the bolt. Nothing was done to repair the adjustment bolt until September 13 when it became necessary to use the bolt to adjust for the shortened conveyor belt which had been spliced after the accident which occurred ,that day Sometime after 2 p.m. on the afternoon of September 13, an employee who was working at or near the shearer and its conveyor got his hand jammed between the roller and the adjustment mechanism of the belt. McColley and other employees went immediately to the assistance of the injured employee, removed the adjustment mechanism from the conveyor, and cut the belt to free his arm; the employee was then sent to the hospital. Immediately following the accident there were no supervisory personnel present. Shortly thereafter, about 2:40 p in., Foreman Harrison and Vice President Holloday appeared on the scene . At this time McColley, who had returned the adjustment mechanism to its mooring, was completing the task of tightening the connecting bolts which hold it in place Vice President Holloday, who noticed that the adjustment bolt was bent, asked McColley if he was aware previously, that it had been bent and McColley replied that he was. Holloday was "pretty well steamed up" about the condition of the adjustment bolt and told Harrison to get it, fixed. Harrison then turned to McColley and told him to fix the bolt. Upon being told to fix the adjustment bolt, McColley proceeded to again remove the connecting bolts on the adjustment mechanism. When Harrison asked him what he was going to do, McColley told Harrison that he was going to remove the adjustment mechanism and take it to the mechanics' crib and repair it. Harrison said "all right" and walked away. McColley then proceeded to remove the adjustment mechanism from the machine and took it to the mechanics' crib where he proceeded to cut through the adjustment bolt.' Just before 3 p.m., which was the time the shifts changed, Harrison, who was called by Shealy to 'Employee Chambers, who is 20 years old, has been with the Company for 22 months. In September 1968 Chambers ' classification was second class mechanic 's helper, at the time of the hearing he had been reclassified to third class mechanic 'The foregoing accounts of the conversations which occurred between Harrison, Holloday, and McColley, including the instructions given McColley regarding the repair of the bolt, are based on the credited testimony of McColley Harrison testified that he specifically instructed McColley to "straighten" the bolt Harrison did not testify as to the presence of Holloday or any statements made by Holloday, Harrison did not deny the exchange between McColley and himself following his instructions to McColley but did testify that after instructing McColley to "straighten " the bolt he walked away In question is what instructions were SOUTHWIRE COMPANY 551 discuss the repair of the adjustment bolt, appeared at the mechanics' crib. When Harrison arrived at the crib McColley had almost completed cutting through the bolt where it was bent, approximately 2 inches back from the head of the bolt ` Harrison asked McColley why he had not straightened the bolt (an operation which if workable would have taken only 10 to 20 minutes). McColley told Harrison that in his opinion this would have required heating the bolt which would have taken the temper out of the metal. According to McColley this would have caused the bolt to snap if pressure was applied; McColley also was of the view that the heat might have harmed the threads of the bolt. Harrison disagreed with McColley about the effect of the heat on the metal but since the bolt was nearly cut in two, he instructed Chambers, who had arrived for the second shift, to finish the job. Harrison told Chambers to take his time and do it right;' he also told Chambers to let him know how long the job took. According to Harrison it was necessary to enter in a log the time spent on all jobs which took in excess of 1 hour. given McColley and whether the further exchange between McColley and Harrison occurred I have credited the testimony of McColley rather than Harrison McColley's demeanor on the stand and the forthright manner in which he responded to questions put to him convinced me that he was a truthful witness McColley conceded that the precise language used by Harrison could have been either to "repair" or to "fix" the bolt but was certain he had not been told to "straighten" the bolt My observation of Harrison as a witness as well as the study of his testimony persuades me that Harrison was less than candid generally in his response to questions, particularly where it was unfavorable to himself or the Company' s position in this case Harrison's testimony was at times contradictory, at others equivocal or evasive, Thus, for example, with regard to his instructions to McColley, Harrison , on direct examination, testified that he told McColley to straighten the bolt and gave him no other instructions, later when pressed on cross-examination he testified he "[was] not sure" whether he mentioned to McColley that he should use some heat Harrison also testified he knew it was not lack of proper parts which caused delay in the repair of the bolt, but later admitted it was Again, on direct examination Harrison testified he had discussed the matter with his supervisor, Frank Brown, before issuing a warning slip On cross-examination when again asked if he had reported the matter to any superior he first replied, "I am not sure", Harrison then replied to the question whether he had reported it to Frank Brown - "I guess I did I told him on Saturday morning, I guess I did I told him I was going to give him a warning slip" When asked what Frank Brown said in response to his report, Harrison did not respond directly to the question but answered that Brown did not tell him whether to give the warning or not When again asked what Brown "said," Harrison replied "I don't remember " When the General Counsel pressed further and asked whether Brown had referred to McColley's two previous discharges, Harrison answered "no", when questioned further he replied "I don't think so" and finally testified "he could have " Finally, I note that while Harrison's repeated testimony was that he had specifically told McColley to "straighten the bolt" and that he thought McColley's failure to attempt to straighten the bolt warranted a major warning, Harrison did not assign as a basis rule 4 "Refusal or failure to carry out orders" but selected rule 2 "Improper use and care of company property," a rule never before invoked by him against any employee 'The point at which it was necessary to sever the bolt in order to remove the bent portion is in dispute . McColley testified that the bolt was bent 2 inches back from the head of the bolt and that he cut the bolt where it was bent . Harrison indicated while testifying , and Respondent urges in its brief, that the bolt was bent only 11/2 inches back from the head of the bolt Harrison estimated that the bolt extended out 2 1/2 inches to 3 inches from the flange (Respondent in its brief reduced its estimate to approximately 2 to 2 1/2 inches) and that the bolt was cut unnecessarily close to the flange of the adjustment mechanism, making it more difficult and time consuming to repair Chambers, who testified that the bolt had been cut next to the flange and behind the washer did not testify where the bolt was bent . White there was photographic evidence introduced at the hearing there was no photograph of the bolt in its damaged condition Thus, although it is undisputed that the bolt was cut next to the flange, a finding as to where the bolt was bent requires a resolution of the On the following day, Saturday, September 14, Harrison was told by Chambers that the job had taken 3 or 3 1/2 hours. While Harrison had the authority in appropriate circumstances to discipline McColley under the Company rules, nonetheless that day he spoke with his superior, Foreman Frank Brown, about the matter. On the following Monday, September 16, when McColley reported to work, Harrison issued him a major warning notice for conduct constituting "Improper use and care of company property," which is listed as rule 2 under "Major Infractions Of The Rules" of the Company. When Harrison asked McColley to sign the notice, McColley, who felt it was unjustified and at first refused to do so, signed the notice when assured by Harrison that he would receive a copy; however, McColley did not later receive a copy.' ° Under the Company' s rules a major warning notice is kept in the employee's file for a period of 18 months; if during the 18 months he receives a second major warning, or if within any 12 months during that period he receives two minor warnings, he is discharged." At the time of the hearing McColley had received no other warnings. C Contentions of the Parties The Company admits its knowledge of McColley's continued union activities; however, it denies that this in any way contributed to the decision to issue McColley a major warning notice. It is the position of Respondent that this decision was made by Foreman Harrison alone and that McColley's union activity was not a factor in his decision. According to Respondent the basis for the warning was the "carelessness " of McColley in following the procedures he did and the fact that it caused the shearer to be down an excessive period of time. As noted, Harrison's testimony that he had instructed McColley to straighten the bolt is not credited. Harrison testified further, however, that McColley as a mechanic "should have knew enough to straighten that bolt." Harrison repeatedly characterized the procedures followed by McColley in cutting the bolt to replace it rather than straightening it as "careless ." Thus according to Harrison a major warning was warranted ". . . because I thought the machine had been down that long just for him being careless in repairing it and cutting the bolt off"; again Harrison stated "The main reason I gave him the warning slip so that he wouldn't be careless again ." Later in his conflicting testimony of Harrison and McColley . For the reasons noted supra, I credit McColley rather than Harrison and rind that when McColley severed the bolt he did so where it was bent , approximately 2 inches back from the head of the bolt 'This instruction of Harrison to Chambers is based on the credited testimony of McColley Neither Harrison nor Chambers denied this statement and to the extent that their testimony may suggest it was not made , their testimony is not credited As indicated supra , I fourtl McColley a more credible witness than Harrison . Based on my observation of Chambers and his testimony , which on cross -examination I found to be at times evasive , e g , his testimony regarding his maintenance duties on the Mosely Shearer and his classification at the time of the bolt incident - I have concluded that McColley is a more reliable witness than Chambers "McColley was not given the 2-week suspension which under the Company's rules may be imposed on an employee who receives a major warning "While G.C Exh. 2 contains the list of "Major " or "Intolerable" offenses it does not set forth what constitutes "Minor " offenses under the Company 's rules . However , from Harrison's testimony that he had issued slips for tardiness it may be deduced that this constituted a basis for a minor warning. 552 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD testimony Harrison stated ". . . I considered it carelessness " This position was pressed further in Respondent's brief - i.e., that the major warning was issued because of the "careless and negligent manner" of McColley in following the procedures he did in the repair of the adjustment bolt," procedures which resulted in the bolt repairs taking about 2 1/2 to 3 hours longer than straightening the bolt would have required. It is the position of the General Counsel, that the procedures followed by McColley after the instruction to fix the bolt were neither "careless" nor "negligent" but at most may have represented a difference in judgment from that of Harrison as to the method which should have been followed; that in the circumstances where, as here, a mechanic in performing a job is left to exercise his own judgment in the procedures to be followed, McColley's work would not ordinarily have been viewed by Respondent as "careless" or as warranting a major warning; that no major warning would have issued had it not been for McColley's past and continued union activity. It is the position of the General Counsel that while a less direct method than the two previous discharges, the Respondent is attempting to effectuate the discharge of McColley by the technique of issuing warning notices D. Analysis, Additional Findings, and Conclusions Simply stated the issue in this case is whether the Company would have issued a major warning to McColley if it had not been for his past and continued activities on behalf of the Union. The Board's findings in, the prior unfair labor proceedings against the Company (affirmed by the courts) establish that the Company over an extended period of time has been openly opposed to the Union and has engaged in extensive activities in violation of the Act in its efforts to defeat the Union's attempt to organize its employees. More particularly, as noted, it has twice discharged McColley unlawfully and reinstated him only after court decrees enforcing the Board Orders were obtained, the most recent reinstatement having occurred only 2 months prior to the conduct complained of in this case. Furthermore, the record establishes that McColley, following his most recent reinstatement, continued in his open support of the Union. In view of the Company's open and continuous opposition to the Union over the years, it is reasonable to infer that its animus toward the Union has continued as has its hostility toward McColley, a hostility which could only have increased when upon his reinstatement he became the only employee in the reclamation department and so far as appears in the record in the entire plant to wear a union button declaring himself a "volunteer Union organizer." Accordingly, I find the record in this case sufficient to establish prima "In its brief, Respondent, in addition to arguing that McColley failed to follow instructions , urges that McColley was "careless" in the method he pursued in replacing the bent portion of the bolt Thus, Respondent argued first that the bolt had been cut too close to the flange so that additional work and time was required to replace the bent portion of the bolt, a position which raises a question of fact which I have resolved against Respondent Respondent also suggests in its brief for the first time that a more appropriate method of repair would have been for McColley to have screwed the bolt out of the mechanism rather than cut it, this apparently had not occurred even to Harrison, himself, either at the time of the incident or while testifying at the hearing, in the circumstances McColley's failure to screw the bolt out of the mechanism could hardly be viewed as "careless " facie that the issuance of the major warning notice was discriminatorily motivated " While an employer in the management of its business is free to impose whatever discipline on an employee it wishes and for whatever reason, an employer under the Act may not make employee discipline turn on whether the employee is a union adherent. And where, as I have found in this case, there is sufficient basis to support the inference prima facie that the discipline imposed was related to the employee's union adherence and activities, it becomes necessary to scrutinize the reason for the discipline advanced by the Respondent to determine whether that reason is the real reason or whether Respondent has merely seized on the employee's conduct as a pretext to mask the Employer's unlawful motivation In so doing the fact that Respondent's action is other than what one would expect reasonably to have followed from the incident out of which it arose, as well as Respondent's exaggeration of the alleged offense in an attempt to make the discipline appear reasonable in the circumstances, are relevant considerations in determining Respondent's motive in disciplining the employee. A review of the evidence relating to the incident which led to the issuance of the major warning to McColley, thereby placing his employment status in jeopardy under the Company's rules, persuades me that the penalty would not have been imposed had it not been for McColley's past and continued overt support of the Union. At the outset it is noted that the record is devoid of any suggestion that the procedure followed by McColley in repairing the bolt was undertaken to willfully impede the Company's operations; moreover, while Respondent repeatedly referred to McColley's conduct as "careless," the record does not reflect that McColley acted with negligent disregard for the Company's operations. There are no procedures set forth by the Company to be followed by a mechanic in the repair of company equipment, a mechanic generally is expected to exercise his own judgment in carrying out the job. Moreover, as Harrison admitted there had been no prior occasion when this bolt had to be straightened and he knew of no other occasion at the plant when a bolt required straightening. In these circumstances, when McColley had been told merely to "repair" or "fix" the adjustment mechanism, the very most that can be said of the procedures followed by him is that it represented a difference in judgment as to how the bolt should be repaired. Particularly in the "I find, contrary to the testimony of Harrison and the contention of the Respondent , that the final decision to issue a major warning to McColley was reached only after Harrison discussed the matter with his superior, Foreman Brown , and further that this action met with company approval Thus, Harrison , who had the authority to discipline McColley, nonetheless took the matter up with Brown before any action was taken Moreover, Harrison 's demeanor while testifying and his equivocation regarding his discussion with Brown as noted supra, footnote 7, persuades me that Brown played an active role in reaching this decision and that the prior discriminatory discharges of McColley were discussed N L R B v Walton Mfg Co , 369 U S 404, 408 Furthermore , my conclusion would be the same even if I accepted Harrison 's testimony that no superior directed his decision to discipline McColley and that the decision was his own Harrison , who was in his present position and knew McColley at the time of his last discriminatory discharge was fully aware of the Company' s union animus and its hostility to McColley because of his union activity He was also aware that McColley was reinstated only because the Company had been ordered to do so by court decree and that McColley on his return was a "volunteer Union organizer " In these circumstances the record would be sufficient to establish prima facie that a decision by Harrison to issue McColley a major warning notice was discriminatorily motivated SOUTHWIRE COMPANY 553 circumstances, the action of McColley in response to the instruction to repair the adjustment bolt appears reasonable both in his assessment of what the Company expected of him as well as in his judgment as a mechanic. As McColley himself testified, in view of the events preceding the incident involved herein, when told to repair the bolt he did not believe that the instruction contemplated that an attempt be made to straighten the bolt. The time necessary to straighten the bolt would have taken only about 10 to 20 minutes. In view of Shealy's statement in August upon being told by McColley that the bolt was damaged, that he would decide when to shut down the machine to fix the bolt, suggesting a problem of more than a 10 to 20 minute shutdown of a scrap disposal operation, and the fact that the machine was routinely shut down for 1/2 hour twice a week during this period for maintenance, McColley could reasonably conclude, as he did, that since the bolt had not been repaired during the preceding month, the Company wanted the bolt replaced and did not want an attempt made to straighten it Furthermore McColley also believed, and the matter is not free from doubt, that any attempt to straighten the bolt by applying,heat would adversely affect the temper of the metal or adversely affect the threads causing irreparable damage to the bolt if pressure were applied to straighten it. Harrison, himself, while he testified that it was his belief that this would not have happened conceded on cross-examination that it might happen, that straightening the bolt by heat would be "taking a gambling chance." Harrison's present testimony that the obvious procedure to have followed was to straighten the bolt on the machine by using a pipe for leverage seems at best an afterthought. In the first place it is undisputed that the bracket was on the machine when McColley had been told to fix the bolt - yet when McColley was asked by Harrison what he planned to do and McColley stated that he planned to remove the bracket and take it to the mechanics' crib Harrison said nothing ' 4 If, as Harrison would now have it believed, the obvious procedure would have been the simple expedient of using a pipe for leverage without removing the bracket from the machine, and time was a factor, his failure to instruct McColley to that effect when told by McColley that he was removing the bracket puts in question the validity of the method or that it had occurred even to him at that time. Of even more significance, however, if the desired method of repairing the bolt was to straighten it, a matter of 10 to 20 minutes, is the fact, as noted, that the machine was down for 1/2 hour twice a week for maintenance at the end of the second shift; this work was the responsibility of Chambers Yet, although Foreman Shealy who was in charge of that department had been made aware of the bent bolt it was not straightened during this routine downtime. The foregoing circumstances, cast substantial doubt that straightening the bolt was considered the desirable procedure by the Company and at the very least evidences that McColley's response to the instruction to "repair" or "fix" the bolt could not reasonably have been viewed by Harrison or the Company as being "careless."" "While this method could have been applied by placing the bracket in a vice, Harrison emphasized that this "is the onliest way you could have did it without taking the whole mechanism up." "As evidencing that the procedures followed by McColley were "careless" Harrison emphasized that this route required the shearer to be down 3 to 3 1/2 hours However, as Harrison admitted the total downtime was not a necessary consequence of the method itself, but in good part, was attributable to the lack of replacement parts causing extra time to be spent machining the parts available to fit the mechanism . Additional time Further doubt is cast on the Company's asserted reason for the discipline imposed on McColley by the rule selected as the basis for the major warning. An examination of the other rules listed under "Major Infractions" discloses that the conduct generally proscribed by these rules contemplates either willful conduct or conduct which constitutes continued negligence by an employee. The language of rule 2, "Improper use and care of company property" particularly in this context, appears inapplicable to the conduct of McColley. On its face this rule appears to be aimed at employee use of company property for purposes other than that for which it was intended, or its care in a manner which reflects a disregard for ordinary maintenance. McColley's conduct would not appear to fall within the scope of this kind of prohibition. For, contrary to the Company's characterization of McColley's conduct as "careless," an obvious effort to fit McColley's conduct to the rule, as noted, McColley's actions in the circumstances represented at most a difference in judgment from that of Harrison. This apparent inapplicability of rule 2 combined with the fact that this was the first time Harrison had invoked the rule for any reason in his more than 3 years as a supervisor, I find, evidences a strained effort to find a basis for issuing McColley a major warning under the Company's written rules and thereby cloak its real reason for imposing this penalty. Similarly Harrison' s issuance of a major warning to McColley so that McColley would not be "careless" again is unpersuasive. In the first place regardless of how McColley's conduct is characterized, it was not the kind of "mistake" which could be corrected by inducing greater attentiveness to his job, rather as indicated supra, McColley's action represented his judgment as a mechanic, a judgment which as a matter of practice he was expected to exercise. Secondly, a major warning was an unusual disciplinary measure for Harrison to take. Admittedly there have been other mechanics' "mistakes" and Harrison admitted he had given "quite a few" verbal warnings, indeed Harrison testified to only one other instance of a written warning for job performance (it is not clear whether this was a major or minor warning) and this was given for "slipping in the job." Yet although Harrison purportedly took into consideration errors of judgment and although McColley had never before received a written notice (major or minor) for his work (there is no evidence he had ever received even a verbal reprimand for his job performance), Respondent imposed the most severe class of warning provided by its work rules Finally, in examining the Employer's alleged reason for the discipline imposed, I note that McColley - who in the diligent performance of his job had reported the bent bolt to Foreman Shealey a month before the accident had injected any kind of urgency in the situation - was disciplined in a manner which puts his employment status in jeopardy under the Company's rules, while employee Chambers - whose responsibility it was to perform maintenance during scheduled periods of downtime on the machine, time which would have permitted straightening the bolt - appears to have been promoted I find this result particularly anomalous in light of Vice President Holloday's apparent displeasure that the bolt had not been repaired prior to the accident. Yet there appears to have been no effort made by the Company to fix responsibility apparently was also taken to shape parts so that a cover later added to prevent further damage would fit over the mechanism 554 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD for the situation the Company found itself in on September 13, a responsibility which significantly could not be assigned to McColley. In sum it is my conclusion that the Employer's asserted reason for the discipline of McColley does not withstand close examination. I find rather that that issuance of a major warning notice to McColley in the circumstances discussed was because of the Company's long continued opposition to the union representation of its employees and McColley's past and continued support of the Union. As noted in reinstating McColley for the second time, Foreman Brown made it clear to Harrison that McColley's reinstatement was undertaken only because the court had ordered it to do so. Harrison, who was aware of McColley's past discharge and the Company's opposition to the Union, was also aware that McColley continued his active support for the Union. In these circumstances, I conclude that when McColley proceeded to replace the bolt on the adjustment mechanism, an operation which Harrison anticipated would cause the close down of the Moseley Shearer for a substantial period of time, he recognized that this presented the Company with an opportunity to discipline McColley. Harrison who in his testimony emphasized the time factor and that straightening the bolt just enough so that it could be turned (even if not fully corrected) would have been enough, imparted no sense of urgency when discussing the repair with Chambers. Rather he told Chambers "to take his time and do the job right," at the same time instructing him to keep track of the time taken to do the job. Furthermore Harrison who had the authority to discipline McColley did not proceed at the time it occurred to either reprimand McColley or indicate the possibility that any disciplinary action would be taken. It was only after Harrison had the opportunity to discuss the matter with his superior that he issued the warning notice. For reasons noted supra, footnote 7, I conclude that Foreman Brown played an active role in that discussion and that McColley's past and continued union advocacy was the reason for the decision to issue a major warning.16 In sum , I conclude, that the Respondent, presented with a situation in which McColley played a part and which resulted in the loss of operational time, seized the opportunity to discipline McColley, not because of the role played by McColley in this matter but because of McColley's past and continued union activity and the potential opportunity it presented for his ultimate discharge. The Respondent's discipline of McColley for this reason constituted a violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Company set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with Respondent's operations described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. "For the reasons noted supra , I did not rind Harrison to be a credible witness, and do not credit his testimony that McColley's union activities were not a consideration in issuing him a major warning or that a similar warning would have been issued if any other mechanic had performed this job as McColley had V. THE REMEDY It having been found that the Company engaged in unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act, it will be recommended that the Company cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the purposes of the Act. It will be recommended that the Company withdraw the major warning notice issued to employee Jerry L. McColley, Sr., on September 16, 1968, and that it be given no force or effect. In view of the Company's past history of repeated violations of the Act, the commission of unfair labor practices generally is to be anticipated. It will be recommended, therefore, that Respondent be required to cease and desist from in any manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in this case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Company is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. The Company has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act, which unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and the entire record in this case, it is recommended that the Southwire Company, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Discouraging membership in, or activity in support of the International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, by discriminatorily imposing disciplinary action on any of its employees or by discriminating in any other manner in regard to their hire and tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment. (b) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any and all such activities, except to the extent that such rights may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, as modified by the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 2. Take the following affirmative action which will effectuate the purposes of the Act: (a) Withdraw the major warning notice issued to Jerry McColley, Sr., on September 16, 1968, and give it no force or effect. SOUTHWIRE COMPANY 555 (b) Post at its plant in Carrollton, Georgia, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."" Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 10, after being duly signed by Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 10, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps have been taken to comply herewith.18 "In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102 46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings , conclusions , recommendations , and Recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Section 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings , conclusions , and order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes in the event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " "In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order , what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith." APPENDIX NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board an agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT discipline or otherwise discriminate against employees to try to discourage them or other employees from being or becoming members of the International Union of Electrical , Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization. WE WILL NOT in any other way interfere with, restrain , or coerce our employees in their right to engage in activities on behalf of the International Union of Electrical , Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization. WE WILL withdraw the major warning notice issued to Jerry McColley, Sr., on September 16, 1968, and give it no force or effect. All our employees are free to become or remain union members. Dated By SOUTHWIRE COMPANY (Employer) (Representative ) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered , defaced, or covered by any other material Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions may be directed to the Board ' s Office, 730 Peachtree Street, N.E., Atlanta, Georgia 30308, Telephone 404-526-5760 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation