Southern Bell Telephone

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 27, 1980

251 N.L.R.B. 1194 (N.L.R.B. 1980)

1194 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph and Lafaye
K. Shoemaker. Case 10-CA-13302
August 27, 1980
DECISION AND ORDER
On August 16, 1978, Administrative Law Judge
George Norman issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, the Respondent filed
exceptions and a supporting brief.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings,' findings,
and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge
and to adopt his recommended Order. 2
Contrary to the Respondent, we find the Admin-
istrative Law Judge's remedy appropriate. The Re-
spondent conducted an unlawful interview, im-
posed discipline for conduct which was the subject
of that interview, and thus, through its own
wrongdoing, put into issue the extent to which the
interview affected its decision to impose discipline.
Restoration of the status quo ante is, therefore,
prima facie, appropriate and the burden is on the
Respondent to establish that its decision to disci-
pline Shoemaker was not based on information ob-
tained during the unlawful interview.3
The Respondent contends it has met that burden
and therefore backpay and expunging the record of
Shoemaker's suspension are inappropriate remedies.
Our dissenting colleague agrees with this, apparent-
ly relying on the facts that (1) lawfully gathered in-
formation was available to the Respondent, and (2)
Garrett, Shoemaker's superior, gave uncontrovert-
ed testimony that the Respondent did not rely on
the interview. However, the Administrative Law
Judge found that Shoemaker's suspension was a
"result" of the interview and thus rejected Gar-
rett's testimony that t was not. Furthermore, our
colleague is mistaken if he believes that we are
bound to accept testimony on the question of ulti-
mate fact simply because it is not controverted.
' The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by
the Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy) not to
overrule an administrative law judge's resolutions with respect to credi-
bility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence con-
vinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products,
Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir 1951) We have
carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
2 In adopting the Admiri;.rt,tive Law Judge's Decision, we disavow
his statements that denial of an e:ployee's right to representation under
NVL.R.B. v J. Weingarten. Inc., 420 U S 251 (1975), without the subse-
quent imposition of discipline, is a denial ol rights without real substance
It is the employee's right to engage in protected concerted activity
through the presence of a representative that Weingarten addresses, not
the subsequent action of an employer.
a Member Jenkins would find the violation if the discipline is imposed
for conduct which is the subject of the unlawful interview. regardless of
any proof that it was not based on information garnered during the inter-
view
251 NLRB No. 159
Shattuck Denn Mining Corporation (Iron King
Branch) v. N.L.R.B., 362 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1966).
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that the Respondent, Southern Bell
Telephone and Telegraph, Atlanta, Georgia, its of-
ficers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the
action set forth in the said recommended Order.
MEMBER TRUESDALE, concurring in part and dis-
senting in part:
I agree with my colleagues' decision in all re-
spects except that pertaining to the remedy. I
would not order backpay for Shoemaker, nor
would I expunge the records of her suspension, for
it seems clear to me that the Respondent's conten-
tion that, in suspending Shoemaker, it relied on in-
formation gathered independently of, and before,
the unlawful interview is supported by the record.
Accordingly, the majority's remedy in this respect
is improper under Section 10(c) of the Act which
precludes reinstatement and backpay for individ-
uals suspended or discharged for cause. Cf. Illinois
Bell Telephone Company, 251 NLRB 498 (1980), in
which I participated in an order directing the re-
spondent there to reinstate an employee with back-
pay and to delete all references to disciplinary
action based on an unlawful interview where the
decision to discharge was based on information ob-
tained during that interview.4 I do, of course,
concur in all other respects with the cease-and-
desist and affirmative portions of the order pro-
vided by the majority.
4 Since my colleagues appear uncertain as to the facts upon which I
rely, I merely refer them to the factual findings of the Administrative
Law Judge which I joined them in adopting. I am not persuaded, as they
are, by his final conclusion that the suspension was the "result" of the
unlawful interview, because his factual findings do not establish the nec-
essary causal link between the interview and the suspension.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
GEORGE NORMAN, Administrative Law Judge: This
case was heard at Atlanta, Georgia, on April 19, 1978.
The charge was filed on December 8, 1977, by Lafaye
K. Shoemaker, an employee of Southern Bell Telephone
and Telegraph, herein called Respondent or the Compa-
ny. Based on that charge, Region 10 of the National
Labor Relations Board, by its Regional Director, issued
a complaint dated January 11, 1978, alleging that Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(l) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, herein called the Act, by
denying employee Shoemaker's request to have a union
SOUTHERN BELL TELEPHONE 1195
representative present at an investigatory meeting for the
purpose of imposing disciplinary action that Respondent
directed employee Shoemaker to attend.
Issues
The primary issues are:
1. Whether employee Shoemaker requested the pres-
ence of a union representative during an investigatory
meeting conducted on November 17, 1977.
2. Whether employee Shoemaker was entitled to union
representation during the investigatory meeting conduct-
ed on November 17, 1977.
3. Whether the subsequent suspension of employee
Shoemaker should be expunged from her record if union
representation was wrongfully denied.
All parties were given full opportunity to participate,
to introduce relevant evidence, to examine and cross-ex-
amine the witnesses, to argue orally, and to file briefs. A
brief was filed on behalf of Respondent. No brief was
filed by the General Counsel.' All have been carefully
considered.
Upon the entire record in the case and from my obser-
vation of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY
The Company, a New York corporation, with an
office and place of business located at Atlanta, Georgia,
is engaged in the business of providing local and long-
distance telephone services. During the past calendar
year, it has received gross revenues in excess of
$250,000, and during the same period has purchased and
received goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly from
suppliers located outside the State of Georgia. The Com-
pany is an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
It. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO,
herein called the Union, is a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
Ill. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
At the time of the alleged violation, employee Shoe-
maker was employed by Respondent and held the title of
service evaluator. The service evaluator's duties involve
monitoring certain equipment and completing records
which reflect the degree of efficiency with which the
Company's communication system is operating. The
equipment monitored by the service evaluator dispenses
a tape showing telephone numbers dialed and the se-
quence in which they were dialed. For each number the
service evaluator completes a ticket by inserting certain
information such as the time dialed and the time com-
pleted. These times are not on the tape. A quota of calls
Although counsel for the General Counsel argued orally at the hear-
ing, the nature of the remedy sought was not discussed nor does the com-
plaint contain a prayer for relief indicating the nature of the remed
sought by the General Counsel in this case
from each exchange is set for each service evaluator.
The tickets completed by the service evaluator are re-
viewed by management and the Federal Communications
Commission and are used to evaluate the quality of serv-
ice being provided to the telephone subscriber by the
Company.
As a result of numerous discrepancies between tapes
and tickets completed by certain service evaluators, an
investigation was initiated in August 1977. Tapes pro-
duced by the equipment were compared with corre-
sponding tickets completed by the service evaluators. It
became apparent that times written on tickets by em-
ployee Shoemaker did not correspond with the sequence
of numbers on the tapes and reflected inaccurate infor-
mation. It is undisputed that inaccurate information
indeed was placed on the tickets by employee Shoemak-
er.
After it had become apparent that employee Shoemak-
er was involved in numerous cases of placing inaccurate
information on tickers, Timmie Garrett, the service eval-
uation manager and Shoemaker's second-level supervisor,
on November 17, 1977, went from the third floor to the
second floor where Shoemaker was working and asked
Shoemaker to go with her up to the third floor where
they proceeded to Chris Whitworth's office. Whitworth
at the time was Garrett's boss. Upon arriving, Garrett in-
troduced Shoemaker to Johnny Strickland, Southern
Bell's security representative who was already there
waiting. This was the first time that Shoemaker was
aware that an investigation was taking place. 2 Garrett
and Strickland being aware of company policy concern-
ing such investigative meetings, prior to the meeting,
Garrett called Network Supervisor Jerry Roberts to see
if he had a union representative who would be available
during the time of the meeting. She did this because of
the lack of union representatives in her own crews at
that time. In this regard, Garrett testified that she
wanted to be prepared in case the Charging Party asked
for a union representative. Roberts assured Garrett that
he did have a union representative under his jurisdiction
who would be available at the time of the meeting.
Shoemaker testified that when Strickland said he
wanted to talk to her about some discrepancies, she told
him she would like to have "my representative here."
She said Strickland did not reply. He offered her a chair
and she sat down. Strickland had a piece of paper at the
desk on which he wrote as he asked her her name, ad-
dress, phone number, social security number, and senior-
ity date, and then he showed her some tickets which re-
flected discrepancies in her work and asked her if she
could explain them. She asked him what he was writing
down, and Strickland said it was for his personnel re-
cords. When he finished writing, he asked her to read it
and sign it. Shoemaker told Strickland that she would
not sign it unless "I had a union representative there or
legal advice." Strickland replied, "Legal advice?" twice,
and then said to Shoemaker, "You only have two
2 Respondent has a written policy stating that "Whenever an investiga-
tory interview is to be conducted from which discipline could reasonably
result and an employee requests the presence of a union representative,
this request should he granted."
SOUTHERN BELL TELEPHONE
1196 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
choices, either you sign it or verbally agree that what
this statement says is true." Shoemaker replied, "My
name, address, telephone number, that is true . . . I am
not signing anything else." And she did not. Garrett then
took Shoemaker back to the second floor where she
went back to work.
Shoemaker further testified that, when she was asked
to go upstairs to the third floor by Garrett, she had no
idea what the purpose of going to Whitworth's office
was. She had not met Strickland prior to that time, nor
did she know that he was from the security department
until that meeting. Shoemaker said that at the meeting
she did not have a feeling that she had done anything
wrong, but she was scared to death at the mention of se-
curity, and that she knew what security was at the tele-
phone company, but had never had any dealings with se-
curity. She said that she was never told at the meeting
that she had done anything wrong, but Strickland did
say that the tickets were out of timing sequence and that
the timing was not correctly indicated on the tickets.
Shoemaker did not deny that the tickets contained dis-
crepancies.
Strickland and Garrett testified that Shoemaker did
not request or even mention union representation or rep-
resentation of any kind prior to or during the meeting.
After taking Shoemaker back down to the second
floor, Garrett took another service evaluator upstairs
with her. She later brought that service evaluator back
down and told her to go home. Garrett then told Shoe-
maker, about 8 p.m., "I want you to go home and I'll get
back in touch with you about what we decide to do
about the disciplinary action."
On November 29, Shoemaker was again summoned
upstairs to Whitworth's office. Garrett, who was sitting
behind the desk, told Shoemaker that she had talked
with the security department and the "higher-ups" and
they had requested that Shoemaker be terminated but she
(Garrett) was not going to do that; she was going to sus-
pend her for 10 working days.3 Shoemaker later filed a
grievance concerning her suspension. Terry Nicholson,
the union steward who with David Prather were Shoe-
maker's grievance representatives, testified that at the
grievance session Garrett was asked if Shoemaker re-
quested representation at the November 17 meeting and
that her response was that after the meeting started and
Shoemaker realized what was going on, she did ask for
representation.4 Garrett denied that she made any such
statement at the grievance meeting.
Discussion and Conclusions
Respondent argues that the General Counsel did not
prove that the Charging Party requested union represen-
tation in the investigatory meeting occurring on Novem-
ber 17, 1977. Respondent argues further that the weight
of the evidence presented in the hearing proves that the
3 After the meeting of November 17, no more discrepancies were
found in Shoemaker's tickets.
4 Nicholson said he did not remember whether Garrett said she made a
response to Shoemaker's request for representation. Present at the griev-
ance meeting were David Prather and Terry Nicholson for the grievant
and Betty Ramble and Timmie Garrett for management.
Charging Party never requested representation of any
kind in this meeting.
In that connection, the General Counsel produced two
witnesses to prove that Shoemaker did request represen-
tation at the November 17 meeting; namely, Shoemaker
and Nicholson. Respondent offered the testimony of
Garrett and Strickland to prove that Shoemaker did not
request representation.
Shoemaker was unaware of an investigation concern-
ing her job performance prior to being asked by Garrett
to go upstairs to the meeting and she had no idea at that
time what the meeting was about. When she arrived at
the meeting place, she was introduced to Strickland and
told that he was a security officer of the Company.
Strickland then confronted her with tickets which she
admitted she had prepared and which she did not deny
contained discrepancies. She testified that she was scared
because security was involved. When Strickland asked
her to sign a statement (it is undisputed that she refused
to sign), she requested representation or legal advice. In
such circumstances of surprise and fear it is reasonable to
conclude that a refusal to sign a statement would normal-
ly be accompanied by a remark such as "I want legal
advice," or "I want a representative." That, in substance,
is what Shoemaker testified was her stated reaction.
That, coupled with the testimony of Nicholson that, at
the grievance meeting involving the discipline of Shoe-
maker for the discrepancies on her tickets, Garrett said
that Shoemaker had asked for representation as the meet-
ing got underway, convinces me that Shoemaker had
indeed asked for representation at the November 17
meeting. Moreover, Shoemaker's demeanor while testify-
ing, as compared with that of Garrett and Strickland,
tips the credibility scales in her favor. She was candid,
forthright, and not in the least evasive or hesitant. Gar-
rett and Strickland did not so impress me.
Respondent also argues that Shoemaker's testimony
demonstrated that, during the meeting in question, she
did not reasonably believe that the meeting would result
in disciplinary action and that under N.L.R.B. v. J. Wein-
garten. Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975), not only must the em-
ployee request representation in order to enjoy the right
to union representation, but the right to union represen-
tation attaches only at meetings which "the employee
reasonably believes may result in disciplinary action
against him." Although Respondent states the law cor-
rectly, I do not agree with his statement of the facts.
Inasmuch as Shoemaker was not apprised of the fact
that she was being investigated nor was she told what
the November 17 meeting was about until she actually
arrived, she had no forewarning and, therefore, did not
and indeed, could not have been expected to request rep-
resentation prior to attending the meeting. Consequently,
until after the meeting began she could not possibly have
anticipated either that the meeting would result in disci-
plinary action against her. Upon being confronted by the
security officer with tickets containing discrepancies in
her work and being asked to read a statement containing
an admission by her, Shoemaker, being surprised and
scared, asked for representation. Thus, I am convinced
that not only did she request representation at the meet-
SOUTHERN BELL TELEPHONE 1197
ing, but also that she did so because she reasonably be-
lieved that the meeting "may result in disciplinary
action" against her. Thus, both conditions set forth in
N.L.R.B. v. J. Weingarten, Inc., supra, have been met.
Respondent cites article 17.05 of the working agree-
ment between the Communications Workers of America,
AFL-CIO, and Respondent as not applying to the No-
vember 17 meeting in that no discipline was to be
announced.Respondent also stated that it has a policy of
providing union representation at investigatory meetings
where discipline could reasonably follow. Both Garrett
and Strickland were aware of that policy. Indeed, Gar-
rett testified that she went to the trouble of arranging for
a union representative to be available should one be re-
quested. That persuades me that Respondent considered
the meeting not just merely an investigatory meeting, but
a meeting that an employee (Shoemaker) could reason-
ably believe "may result in disciplinary action" against
her, as was the case in Weingarten.
Respondent argues further that even if the testimony
of Shoemaker, "I would not sign it [the statement] unless
I had a union representative there or legal advice," were
believed there was no wrongful denial of union represen-
tation, inasmuch as she did not sign the statement and
she admitted that she was told she did not have to sign
it; that her request for union representation was condi-
tioned upon having to sign a statement and, thus, the
condition she attached to her alleged request never oc-
curred; that she allegedly asked for union representation
only for the purpose of signing the statement and not for
the meeting in general; and that since she was told she
did not have to sign a statement there was no wrongful
denial of union representation. That argument ignores
the fact that the statement she was asked to sign not only
concerned the subject matter of the meeting but was,
indeed, a summary of what had taken place at the meet-
ing. It contained her "admission of wrongdoing" that
was the very basis for assessing the discipline which in
fact followed.
Respondent also questions the Charging Party's mo-
tives in her claim that she asked for union representation
in that she did not come to the National Labor Relations
Board for 3 weeks after the meeting; that she waited
until she was disciplined before coming forth with her
complaint; and that the Charging Party has much to gain
by now alleging a denial of union representation; i.e., the
hope that her 2 weeks' suspension will be removed from
her record. Respondent appears to lose sight of the fact
that, in life, redresses are sought only after wrongs have
been committed, not before. Why would she have gone
to the National Labor Relations Board and charged that
she was denied representation at a meeting which she
reasonably expected might result in disciplinary action,
unless discipline actually resulted therefrom. The wrong
of denying her representation without the resulting pun-
ishment is a denial of rights without real substance. Cer-
tainly it was the 2-week suspension that followed the
denial of her right to representation that motivated her
to file a charge and seek redress. Such a motive should
not in such circumstances be considered suspect.
Respondent also argues that Garrett and Strickland
knew the company policy concerning the providing of
union representation and even took steps to insure that a
union representative would be available in the event that
the Charging Party requested one, and that they had no
reason to violate this policy. Respondent comes full
circle in its argument that Garrett and Strickland could
have denied her representation for the reason previously
cited by Respondent that Shoemaker conditioned her re-
quest for representation on the signing of a statement
that Respondent told her she did not have to sign. Ergo,
being of the opinion that the denial of the request would
not in those circumstances be a violation of Respondent's
policy, they did just that. Therefore, I do not agree with
Respondent that the only reasonable conclusion which
can be reached on the testimony of Garrett and Strick-
land concerning the arrangements for the availability of
the union representatives is that the Charging Party did
not request union representation. I believe the Charging
Party requested union representation and that her request
was denied, and thus, her rights were violated. N.L.R.B.
v. J. Weingarten, Inc.. supra; International Ladies' Gar-
ment Workers' Union, Upper South Department, AFL-CIO
v. Quality Manufacturing Co., 420 U.S. 276 (1975).
IV. THE EFFECTS OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with Respondent's oper-
ations described in section I, above, have a close, inti-
mate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and
commerce among the several States and tend to lead to
labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in, and is
engaging in, certain unfair labor practices, I shall recom-
mend that it cease and desist therefrom, and take certain
affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of
the Act.
Having found that Respondent unlawfully required
that employee Lafaye K. Shoemaker participate in an in-
vestigatory meeting for the purpose of imposing disci-
plinary action, while denying the request of said employ-
ee for a union representative, and as a result of such
meeting issued a 2-week disciplinary layoff to her, I shall
recommend that Respondent be ordered to revoke and
expunge from its records the disciplinary layoff given to
said employee and to make her whole for any loss of pay
suffered by her as a result of her 2-week disciplinary
layoff, with interest thereon, to be computed in the
manner prescribed in F W. Woolworth Company, 90
NLRB 289 (1950), and Florida Steel Corporation, 231
NLRB 651 (1977). 5
On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and con-
clusions, and upon the entire record in this case, I hereby
make the following:
s See, generally, Isis Plumbing Heating Co.. 138 NLRB 716 (1962)
SOTHERN BELL TELEPHONE 197
1198 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing an em-
ployee in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section
7 of the Act, Respondent has engaged in, and is engag-
ing in, unfair labor practices proscribed by Section
8(a)(l) of the Act.
4. By requiring that an employee participate in an in-
vestigatory interview for the purpose of imposing disci-
plinary action without union representation, where such
union representation had been requested because the em-
ployee had reasonable grounds to believe that the mat-
ters to be discussed may result in her being disciplined,
and discipline was actually imposed, Respondent has vio-
lated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practice is an unfair labor
practice affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, I
hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER 6
The Respondent, Southern Bell Telephone and Tele-
graph, Atlanta, Georgia, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall:
i. Cease and desist from:
(a) Issuing disciplinary layoffs and requiring that em-
ployees participate in employee investigatory meetings
without union representation, although requested by em-
ployees who have reasonable grounds to believe that the
matters to be discussed may result in their being the sub-
ject of disciplinary action, and actually imposing such
disciplinary action on the employee.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Strike and physically remove from its records and
files any reference to the layoff that was imposed against
Lafaye K. Shoemaker on November 29, 1977, and make
her whole for any loss of pay she may have suffered as a
result of her 2-week disciplinary suspension beginning on
November 29, 1977, with interest thereon, in the manner
set forth in the section of this Decision entitled "The
Remedy."
a In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the find-
ings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in
Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and
become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto
shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records, time-
cards, personnel records and reports, and all other re-
cords necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due
under the terms of this Order.
(c)Post at Respondent's place of business in Atlanta,
Georgia, copies of the attached notice marked "Appen-
dix." 7 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 10, after being duly signed
by Respondent's authorized representative, shall be
posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof,
and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereaf-
ter, in conspicuous places, including all places where no-
tices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said no-
tices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 10, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
7 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursu-
ant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an
Order of the National Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILtL NOT issue any disciplinary layoffs or
suspensions or require any employee to take part in
any investigatory interview or meeting in which the
employee has reasonable grounds to believe that the
matters to be discussed may result in his or her
being the subject of disciplinary action and concern-
ing which we have refused that employee's request
to be represented by a labor organization.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner in-
terfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, as amended.
WE WILL revoke and expunge from our files and
records all papers and other references to the'No-
vember 29 disciplinary suspension given to employ-
ee Lafaye K. Shoemaker, and WE Wl. make
Lafaye K. Shoemaker whole for any loss of pay she
may have suffered as a result of her 2-week disci-
plinary suspension beginning on November 29,
1977, with interest thereon.
SOUTHERN BELL TELEPHONE AND TELE-
GRAM