South Texas Linen Service

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 5, 1980

250 N.L.R.B. 1406 (N.L.R.B. 1980)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Sun Belt Linens, Inc., d/b/a South Texas Linen
Service and Laundry, Dry Cleaning and Dye
House Workers Union, Local 281, a/w Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America. Case
23-CA-7613
August 5, 1980
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS
JENKINS AND PENEI.LO
On April 29, 1980, Administrative Law Judge
William L. Schmidt issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed ex-
ceptions and a supporting brief, and the General
Counsel filed a brief in support of the Administra-
tive Law Judge's Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, find-
ings,' and conclusions of the Administrative Law
Judge and to adopt his recommended Order, 2 as
modified herein.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge, as modi-
fied below, and hereby orders that the Respondent,
Sun Belt Linens, Inc., d/b/a/ South Texas Linen
Service, Corpus Christi, Texas, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall take the action set
forth in the said recommended Order, as so modi-
fied:
1. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(a):
"(a) Offer Sylvia Fuentes immediate and full re-
instatement to her former position or, if this posi-
tion no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent
position, without prejudice to her seniority or
other rights and privileges previously enjoyed, and
make her whole in the manner specified in section
II entitled 'The Remedy."'
I Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the
Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to
overrule an administrative law judge's resolutions with respect to credi-
bility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence con-
vinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products.
Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951) We have
carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
a In accordance with his dissent in Olympic Medical Corporation, 250
NLRB No. 11 (1980), Member Jenkins would compute the interest due
on backpay as set forth in the formula therein.
250 NLRB No. 174
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the
Administrative Law Judge.
APPENDIX
23-CA-7613
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing at which all sides had an opportu-
nity to present evidence and state their positions,
the National Labor Relations Board found that we
have violated the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, and has ordered us to post this notice.
The Act gives employees the following rights:
To engage in self-organization
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choice
To engage in activities together for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection
To refrain from the exercise of any or all
such activities.
WE WILL NOT discharge any employee be-
cause he or she chooses to exercise any of the
rights which are guaranteed by the National
Labor Relations Act.
WE WIllt NOT question you or threaten you
in an effort to make you afraid to exercise any
of the rights you have under the National
Labor Relations Act.
WE WILI. NOT in any like or related manner
interfere with, restrain, or coerce any of our
employees because they choose to exercise the
rights set forth above which are guaranteed by
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act.
WE WILL offer Sylvia Fuentes immediate
and full reinstatement to her former position
or, if this position no longer exists, to a sub-
stantially equivalent position, without preju-
dice to her'seniority or other rights and privi-
leges previously enjoyed, and WE WILL reim-
burse her for any losses resulting from her dis-
charge, plus interest.
SUN BELT LINENS, INC., D/B/A
SOUTH TEXAS LINEN SERVICE
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
WILlI AM L. SCHMIDT, Administrative Law Judge:
This matter was heard before me on December 13, 1979,
at Corpus Christi, Texas, based upon a complaint issued
1406
SOUTH TEXAS LINEN SERVICE
on behalf of the General Counsel by the Regional Direc-
tor for Region 23 on August 24, 1979, and an answer
filed by Sun Belt Linens, Inc., d/b/a South Texas Linen
Service (hereinafter called Respondent).' This proceed-
ing was commenced upon a charge filed by Laundry,
Dry Cleaning and Dye House Workers Union. Local
281, a/w International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf-
feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America (herein-
after called the Union), on July 18.
The complaint alleges that Respondent violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act by maintaining an unlawful no-so-
licitation and no-distribution rule and by three separate
incidents wherein Respondent's supervisors unlawfully
threatened employees and coercively interrogated em-
ployees. The complaint also alleges that Respondent dis-
charged Sylvia Fuentes in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act on April 27 and thereafter refused to properly
reinstate her. In general, the answer admits the prelimi-
nary allegations of the complaint and that it discharged
Fuentes but denies that it engaged in any conduct which
was in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.2
I. FINDINGS OF FACT
A. Jurisdiction
Respondent, a Texas corporation, maintains an office
and place of business in Corpus Christi, Texas, where it
is engaged in the operation of a commercial linen clean-
ing service. During the past 12 months, a representative
period, Respondent, in the course and conduct of its
business operations, purchased goods and materials
valued in excess of $50,000 from firms located within the
State of Texas, which goods and materials were shipped
to each of said firms directly from points outside of the
State of Texas. Respondent admits, and I find, that it is,
and has been at all times material herein, an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. I further find that it will ef-
fectuate the purposes of the Act to assert jurisdiction
with respect to the dispute involved herein.
B. The Labor Organization
Respondent admits, and I find, that the Union is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
C. The Evidence
1. Background
As noted above, Respondent is engaged in business as
a commercial linen cleaning service at its Corpus Christi,
Hereafter all dates in this Decision refer to calendar year 1979 unless
otherwise specified.
2 Pars. 9 and 10 of the complaint allege that supervisors of Respondent
interrogated employees in May concerning the signing of the Union's au-
thorization cards. At the conclusion of the General Counsel's case, Re-
spondent moved to dismiss all allegations of the complaint and argued,
inter alia, that no evidence was presented with respect to the allegations
contained in complaint pars, 9 and 10 The General Counsel conceded
that no evidence had been submitted in support of the allegations in pars
9 and 10, and I so find Accordingly, the Respondent's motion to dismiss
complaint pars 9 and 10 is hereby granted The remaining portions of the
same motion are disposed of belows
Texas, facility. To a certain degree, its operations begin
to increase significantly in April and business continues
at an increased pace through the summer months due to
the tourist trade in this Texas coastal city. Owen H.
Gunnels, Respondent's branch manager, is the principal
supervisor of the Corpus Christi facility. He is assisted in
the direction of the work force by Supervisor Anita
Rivera and Sales Manager Delmer J. Willingham. Re-
spondent admitted in its answer that each of the aforen-
amed individuals is a supervisor within the meaning of
Section 2(11) of the Act and I so find.3
2. The no-solicitation and no-distribution rule
With respect to the complaint allegation concerning
the maintenance of an unlawful no-solicitation and no-
distribution rule, the evidence establishes that on January
15 Respondent posted a series of plant rules on the em-
ployee bulletin board by the timeclock.4 The rule at-
tacked by the General Counsel is found on page 3 of the
posted rules and provides as follows:
X: No Solicitation or Distribution
In order to keep your plant operaton at maximum
efficiency, there will be no solicitation during work-
ing hours to influence employees to purchase any
products or services or to join any organizations.
Employees are not allowed to visit other depart-
ments without permission of their Foreman or Su-
pervisor. No employees or outsiders will be permit-
ted to distribute literature or other items at any time
on the company premises. Violation of this rule will
result in disciplinary action or discharge.
In addition to the foregoing rule, the document which
was posted near the timeclock contains several other
rules pertaining to employee conduct at the plant. The
set of rules concludes with the following:
XIII: General:
Specific rules governing special matters in certain
departments may be further necessary for the effi-
cient production and safety of that department.
If you do not understand these work rules and
Company policies, please ask your Supervisor for
an explanation.
These rules of Company Policy will remain in
effect until amended in writing.
. Although Respondent's answer admitted that Rivera and Willingham
were supervisors, it denies their agency status. In view of Respondent's
admission as to their supervisory status and all of the evidence in this
proceeding. I find that Willingham and Rivera are agents within the
meaning of Section 2(13) of the Act who act on behalf of Respondent
4 The rules appear to be the standardized rules of Sun Belt Iinens. Inc
There is evidence that Sun Belt acquired the South Texas Linen Service
operation sometime in the period between October through December
1978, and that Gunnels was transferred by Sun Belt to manage South
Texas Linen Service in January. In these circumstances, the posting of
the rules which bear Gunnels' name appears to have been occasioned by
the change in ownership and management rather than organizing activity
by the Union which occurred later
1407
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
There is no evidence that the rules posted on January
15 were ever amended in writing prior to the hearing.5
Notwithstanding the language of the disputed rule,
Sylvia Fuentes testified that, "[w]e could talk about any-
thing we wanted during our lunch hour or on lunch half-
hour...." Moreover, there is evidence that, subsequent
to the posting of the disputed rule, the Union com-
menced its organizing campaign among Respondent's
employee and, inter alia, engaged in solicitation activities
among the employees in Respondent's parking lot during
lunch periods without interference from Respondent.
This area is in full view from Gunnels' office who ob-
served strangers talking to the employees. In addition,
there is uncontradicted evidence that Gunnels applied
the rule to an employee engaged in selling Avon prod-
ucts at the plant but only insofar as it applied to working
time and he so advised all employees in a meeting. Final-
ly, as will be noted below, Respondent defended its dis-
charge of Fuentes on the basis that she was engaged in
soliciting a walkout during worktime as opposed to her
activities during the lunch hour. 6
3. Sylvia Fuentes' discharge
Sylvia Fuentes was first employed at Respondent's
laundry in March 1977. During the period of her em-
ployment she was a production worker in the linen room
end in the flatwork department. Although Fuentes was
an early and active supporter of the Union's organizing
campaign, her discharge, insofar as this record shows,
was entirely unrelated to her union activities.
Under normal circumstances, the Respondent's em-
ployees are finished with their workday at approximately
5:30 p.m. However, there are ocassions when the work-
load requires that at least some of Respondent's employ-
ees work overtime. There is evidence that the extent of
the overtime varies but it can result in employees being
required to work until 8 p.m. or even later. Other evi-
dence shows that when employees have been required to
work late Respondent has purchased, at least on some
occasions, a meal for the employees who work extended
overtime. There is considerable dispute with respect to
how late employees must work before a meal is provided
but resolution of that issue is not required to reach the
ultimate question presented by Fuentes' discharge.
On April 27, it appeared to some employees by lunch-
time that that day would be one of those days when em-
ployees would be required to work late. As a conse-
quence, during the lunch period a meeting was held in
the linen room which lasted approximately 10 minutes.
Attending this meeting were Fuentes, her sister, Dora
Marin, and several other employees. According to the
credited testimony of Fuentes, she told the employees
that they should do something about being required to
work late and not getting anything to eat. Following a
t In its brief, Respondent notes that the disputed rule has been
changed. No such evidence was presented at the hearing and no mention
is made in Respondent's brief concerning the precise manner in which the
rule has been changed.
6 The General Counsel asserted in its brief in connection with the dis-
puted rule that Fuentes was terminated for soliciting on her breaktime
There is no evidence concerning Fuentes' discharge showing that Re-
spondent relied upon the disputed rule's potential application to lunch pe-
riods as a basis for discharging Fuentes.
discussion, Fuentes prepared a brief statement on a 3 by
5 card which stated in substance that if the employees
did not get anything to eat by 6 p.m. they were going to
walk out. Those present at the meeting agreed upon this
course of action and when Fuentes completed the note
she laid it on the counter in the linen room. Subsequent-
ly, Marin picked the note up and gave it to an employee
named Martinez and requested that the note be passed
among the other employees. Although there is evidence
that the note may have been passed along from employee
to employee during worktime, there is no credible evi-
dence that Fuentes had anything to do with the note
after she laid it on the countertop during the lunch
period.
At approximately 1:30 p.m. on April 27, Willingham
approached Fuentes at her work station and inquired as
to whether she had written the note concerning the pro-
posed walkout. Fuentes acknowledged to Willingham
that she had written the note. When Willingham told
Fuentes that that was not a nice thing to do, Fuentes re-
sponded by saying that Gunnels did whatever he wanted
to do, that he made employees work late without giving
them anything to eat and that he (Willingham) should do
something about it. Willingham retorted by saying that
walking out sounded like a threat. Fuentes responded by
telling Willingham that it was a threat. At that point,
Willingham asked who was going to walk out and
Fuentes told Willingham that if the employees did not
get anything to eat by 6 p.m., he would find out who
was going to walk out. Willingham walked away with-
out saying anything further.
At approximately 5:15 p.m., Rivers approached
Fuentes at her work station and told her that this was
her last day. When Fuentes asked for an explanation of
her abrupt dismissal, Rivera told her that "[you]
shouldn't have written that note.... [you] went about
it the wrong way." There was a brief discussion as to
whether employees would, in fact, be working late that
particular day and, following that, Fuentes left. On her
way out of the plant Fuentes told Marin that she had
heen fired and the reason for her discharge. Another
group of employees and Rivera were gathered around at
the time. Marin told the group that she was walking out
because her sister had spoken up for her rights and had
been fired. Whereupon, Marin left and has not returned.
According to Gunnels, he decided to terminate
Fuentes on April 27 because he had been informed by
Willingham and Rivera that Fuentes was passing the
note around to other employees during their worktime
and that she was trying to get employees to sign the
note. Although Rivera testified at one point that she had
seen Fuentes pass the note on worktime, she later contra-
dicted that testimony.7
In addition, Rivera testified that she did not tell Gun-
nels that she had observed Fuentes pass the walkout note
to other employees during working time. Willingham
7 In view of this contradiction, the mutually corroborative testimony
of Fuentes and Marin that Fuentes did not distribute the walkout note
during working time and the lack of any contrary reliable evidence, I
have credited Fuentes' and Marin's testimony concerning the distribution
of the walkout note.
1408
SOUTH TEXAS LINEN SERVICE
was not called to testify. No inquiry was made of Rivera
concerning what she told Fuentes in the 5:15 p.m. dis-
charge conversation. No inquiry was made of any other
employee with respect to the walkout note by Respond-
ent's management nor was any other employee repri-
manded in any manner for activities in connection with
the walkout note.
4. Fuentes' notice of resignation
At the hearing Respondent sought to develop evidence
that Fuentes had given notice of her intent to terminate
her employment effective May 31 in an effort to support
its position concerning the appropriate remedy, if any, in
this case. In this respect, Rivera testified that Fuentes
had informed her prior to April 21 that she was going to
quit because she was getting married on April 21. Ac-
cording to Rivera's testimony Fuentes approached her
approximately a week later and asked if she could remain
until the last day in May and Rivera told her that that
would be okay. Rivera testified that Fuentes told her in
the later conversation that she was going to quit at the
end of May because her husband's children finished
school at that time and she was going to stay home to
take care of them. Rivera also testified that nothing fur-
ther was said concerning this subject prior to Fuentes'
discharge.
Respondent sought to corroborate the testimony of
Rivera with the testimony of Viola Hernandez, an em-
ployee of Respondent who worked with Fuentes and
who rode in the same carpool as Fuentes. In this respect,
Hernandez testified that Fuentes told her that she was
going to quit after her husband's children were out of
school and the date mentioned in this respect was May
30 or 31. Hernandez testified that Fuentes informed her
of the fact that she intended to quit on a particular occa-
sion while they were riding together in her car and that
Hernandez' sister, Mary Lopez, Dora Marin, Maria San-
chez, and Fuentes' aunt were present. No inquiry was
made of any of these individuals concerning Fuentes' al-
leged statements in the automobile.
According to Fuentes, she was married on April 21
and that about that time she told Rivera that she would
work 2 more weeks to train a replacement. Subsequently,
Fuentes said she changed her mind and told Rivera that
she would work a month or longer and that she would
give her 2-week notice if she decided to quit at a future
date. Fuentes denied ever telling Rivera that she was
quitting to take care of her husband's children or that
she ever told Rivera that she was going to quit after she
changed her mind concerning her initial notice of quit-
ting.
Rivera testified that employees left Respondent's
employ and returned to work later "all the time." Both
Marin and Hernandez had breaks in their employment
history with Respondent and there is evidence that there
is a substantial turnover in Respondent's employee com-
plement.
5. Contentions and conclusions
With respect to the no-solicitation and no-distribution
rule, the General Counsel contends that its restriction
upon employee solicitation during working hours and its
restriction upon distribution at any time at Respondent's
premises renders the rule presumptively invalid and that
Respondent failed in its effort to show by extrinsic evi-
dence that the rule was applied in such a way as to over-
come that presumption. The General Counsel also con-
tends Fuentes' discharge violated Section 8(a)(l) of the
Act and that Willingham's conversation with Fuentes on
the afternoon of her discharge involved unlawful interro-
gations and threats. In addition, the General Counsel
contends that Respondent should be ordered to reinstate
Fuentes with full backpay. On the other hand, Respond-
ent contends that it should not be held accountable for
its presumptively invalid rule because of the manner in
which it has been applied and the employees' under-
standing of the rule. Respondent contends that Fuentes
was discharged for cause resulting from her soliciting on
worktime and that, in any event, it should not be re-
quired to reinstate Fuentes or pay any backpay beyond
May 31 because of her notification to Respondent that
she intended to quit her employment on that date. Re-
spondent contends that there is no evidence to support
paragraph 8 of the complaint which alleges that Wil-
lingham made unlawful threats on April 27.
Upon a careful review of all the evidence herein, I am
satisfied that Respondent has presented sufficient extrin-
sic evidence to show that its rule on solicitation and dis-
tribution has been applied in such a manner as to convey
a clear intent to permit solicitation or distribution during
breaks and other periods when employees are not active-
ly at work. To the extent that there is evidence of what
employees understood the rule to mean, that evidence
shows that they understood that the rule did not apply to
breaktime during the work hours. The conclusion I have
reached with respect to this issue is due in no small
measure to the bold and assertive manner of Fuentes' tes-
timony that employees could talk about anything they
wanted on their lunch break. Other evidence shows that
Respondent, even in the face of the Union's organizing
campaign, did nothing to enforce the rule in an unlawful
manner. Although the rule may be presumptively invalid
there is no evidence of any kind that anyone in this es-
tablishment ever interpreted the rule in a manner that
would be possible under a literal reading of the rule. On
the contrary, at the meeting concerning the solicitation
of Avon products, Gunnels advised the employees that
they could not engage in these activities during working
time. In sum, there is no evidence at all that the policy
practiced by Respondent on this subject accorded with
its written policy. Given the circumstances presented by
the record in this case, I find that the General Counsel
has failed to show that Respondent has, in fact, main-
tained an invalid rule concerning solicitation and distri-
bution. House of Mosaics, Inc., 215 NLRB 704 (1974);
Essex International, Inc., 211 NLRB 749 (1974).
I am satisfied, however, that the General Counsel has
met his burden in establishing that Fuentes was dis-
charged on April 27 in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act. Fuentes' uncontradicted version of the discharge
conversation she had with Rivera shows that the sole
motivation for the discharge was Fuentes' leadership in
1409
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
urging employees to walk out if they were required to
work beyond 6 p.m. without being provided a meal.
There is no evidence that Fuentes was ever told of Re-
spondent's alleged belief that she was soliciting during
working time. Moreover, there is no corroboration,
whatsoever, for Gunnels' testimonial assertion that
Rivera and Willingham told him that Fuentes was solicit-
ing during worktime. Finally, there is nothing in Wil-
lingham's conversation with Fuentes which would indi-
cate that the basis of Respondent's displeasure with
Fuentes was anything other than her efforts to get em-
ployees to walk out if they could not eat. Accordingly, I
find that by encouraging employees during nonworking
time to engage in a walkout if they were required to
work beyond 6 p.m. without being allowed to eat,
Fuentes was engaged in protected concerted activity and
I further find that Respondent, by discharging Fuentes
because of that activity, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.
Contrary to Respondent's assertion that the General
Counsel failed to offer evidence to support the allega-
tions of paragraph 8 of the complaint, I find that Wil-
lingham's questioning Fuentes and his admonition to her
that her walkout efforts were not a "nice thing to do"
were designed to coerce Fuentes to abandon her deter-
mination to walk out if employee demands for a paid
meal were not successful. To the extent that there may
be some ambiguity as to whether or not the "not a nice
thing to do" remark was of a threatening nature, such
ambiguity is completely removed by Respondent's dis-
charge of Fuentes less than 4 hours later. Accordingly, I
find that Willingham's interrogation and threat to
Fuentes in the course of their 1:30 p.m. conversation on
April 27 violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
As noted above, Respondent contends that the remedi-
al order insofar as it pertains to Fuentes should be limit-
ed to backpay for the period from April 27, the date of
her discharge, through May 31, the date on which
Fuentes would have quit if evidence presented by Re-
spondent is believed. Respondent also urges that it not be
required to reinstate Fuentes. In support of its position,
the Respondent relies on Lackawanna Leather Co., 221
NLRB 355 (1975), and DeLorean Cadillac, Inc., 218
NLRB 1362 (1975). For the reasons set forth below, I
have concluded that the precedent relied upon by Re-
spondent is factually distinguishable and that its position
concerning the remedial order with respect to Fuentes'
discharge lacks merit.
Generally, in fashioning a remedial order insofar as a
discharged employee is concerned, the objective is to
vindicate the public policy which has been violated by
restoring the discharged employee as near as possible to
the status quo ante. To do less would allow the wrongdo-
er to profit from the unfair labor practice and to do
more would serve to extract an impermissible penalty
from the wrongdoer. Changed circumstances invariably
play a significant role in the actual remedy received by
an individual. Finally, it is appropriate that doubts, if
there be any, be resolved against the wrongdoer.
Assuming that the evidence presented on this subject
by Respondent is credible, I am not satisfied that the sit-
uation warrants the drastic departure from the usual
remedy in cases of this nature which Respondent seeks.
In this connection, there is evidence of a high turnover
rate among Respondent's employees. In addition, Re-
spondent's supervisor, Rivera, testified that former em-
ployees are reemployed "all the time." This is further
evident in the fact that two of the three employee wit-
nesses who testified in this proceeding were reemployed
subsequent to leaving prior employment at the facility.
Obviously, Respondent has no policy against reemploy-
ing former employees. Moreover, Respondent's evidence
in this regard warrants the inference that Fuentes' reason
for leaving was really to absent herself from the work
force temporarily while she cared for her husband's chil-
dren during their summer vacation. Although not the
sole distinguishing feature, the latter fact is significant in
distinguishing this situation from those present in the
cases cited by Respondent. In sum, the circumstance pre-
sented here is that of an employee temporarily leaving
the employment of an employer who frequently reem-
ployed its former employees. Given the fact that Fuentes
was discharged for attempting to foment an employee
walkout and subsequently sought to vindicate her right
to do so in an unfair labor practice proceeding, a clear
danger exists that Respondent would not favorably con-
sider an application by Fuentes for further employment.
In this circumstance, a remedy limited to backpay for the
period from April 27 through May 31 would not serve
to eliminate the effects of the unfair labor practice and
restore the status quo ante. To the contrary, such a
remedy as previously noted could encourage a further
unfair labor practice which Fuentes would have the
burden of establishing. In my judgment, it should be Re-
spondent, rather than Fuentes, who should suffer the
consequences of an unfair labor practice which pre-
cluded the natural course of events from taking place.
Accordingly, I shall recommend that Respondent be or-
dered to offer reinstatement to Fuentes and to make her
whole for the losses which she suffered as a result of her
discharge. To the extent that Fuentes may have absented
herself from the labor market either temporarily or per-
manently, the application of existing principles in the
Board's backpay proceedings will preclude Respondent
from being penalized in any unwarranted manner.8
D. The Effect of the Unfair Labor Practices Upon
Commerce
The activities of Respondent set forth in section C,
above, occurring in connection with the operations of
Respondent described in section A, above, have a close,
intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and
commerce among the several States and tend to lead to
labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow of commerce.
tI. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, it is recommended that Respond-
' In view of the conclusion reached herein, I find it unnecessary to
actually resolve the conflict in the testimony between Fuentes and Rivera
as to what, if anything, Fuentes told Rivera about quitting on May 31.
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SOUTH TEXAS LINEN SERVICE
ent be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and to take
certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the poli-
cies of the Act.
As discussed more fully above, I deem it appropriate
that Respondent be ordered to offer Sylvia Fuentes rein-
statement to her former position or, if that position no
longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, and I
so recommend. I also recommend that Respondent be or-
dered to make Fuentes whole for the losses she suffered
as the result of her April 27 discharge. Further in this
connection, it is recommended that backpay shall be
computed in the manner prescribed by the Board in F.
W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with in-
terest thereon as prescribed by the Board in Florida Steel
Corporation, 231 NLRB 651 (1977). (See, generally, Isis
Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962)).? Final-
ly, it is recommended that the Respondent be ordered to
post the notice to employees attached hereto as the "Ap-
pendix" for a period of 60 consecutive days in order that
employees may be apprised of their rights under the Act
and Respondent's obligations to remedy its past unfair
labor practices.
Ill. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. Respondent is an employer within the meaning of
Section 2(2) of the Act and is engaged in commerce or
an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By encouraging her fellow employees during non-
working time to engage in a walkout if they were re-
quired to work beyond 6 p.m. on April 27, 1979, without
being provided an evening meal by Respondent, Sylvia
Fuentes was engaged in activity which is protected by
Section 7 of the Act.
4. By interrogating Sylvia Fuentes concerning whether
or not she had engaged in the activity specified in para-
graph 3, above; by interrogating Sylvia Fuentes concern-
ing the names of other employees who planned to
engage in a walkout on April 27, 1979; by informing
Sylvia Fuentes that such conduct was not a nice thing to
do; and by discharging Sylvia Fuentes because she en-
gaged in the activity specified above in paragraph 3, Re-
spondent engaged in unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act and upon the
foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the
entire record herein, I hereby issue the following recom-
mended:
ORDER ' 0
The Respondent, Sun Belt Linens, Inc., d/b/a South
Texas Linen Service, Corpus Christi, Texas, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
9 The General Counsel's contention in the supplemental brief concern-
ing interest is denied
'0 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of
the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discharging any employee for exercising rights
guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
(b) Coercively interrogating or threatening any em-
ployee concerning activities which are protected by Sec-
tion 7 of the Act.
(c) In any like or related manner, interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees because they choose to
exercise the rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the
Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer to reinstate Sylvia Fuentes and make her
whole in the manner specified above in section II enti-
tled "The Remedy."
(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records, time-
cards, personnel records and reports, and all other re-
cords necessary or useful to a determination of the
amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order
and the propriety of any offer of reinstatement made to
Sylvia Fuentes in order to comply with paragraph 2(a),
of this Order.
(c) Post at its plant in Corpus Christi, Texas, copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix."T Copies of
such notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for
Region 23 of the Board, shall be duly signed by Re-
spondent and posted immediately upon receipt thereof
and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereaf-
ter in conspicuous places, including all places where no-
tices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that such
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 23, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the allegations in the
complaint that Sun Belt Linens, Inc., d/b/a South Texas
Linen Service engaged in other unfair labor practices in
addition to those allegations specifically found herein to
be true shall be, and the same herein are, dismissed.
findings. conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided
in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, he adopted by the Board and
become its findings, conclusions, and Order. and all objections thereto
shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
l In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted bh
Order of the National Labor Relation% Board" shall read "Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Ltabor Relations Board."
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