South Atlantic & Gulf Coast Dist.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 9, 1970

181 N.L.R.B. 590 (N.L.R.B. 1970)

590 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
South Atlantic and Gulf Coast District , International
Longshoremen 's Association , AFL-CIO, Clerks
and Checkers Local No. 1924 and Lykes Bros.
Steamship Co., P. C. Pfeiffer Co., Inc . and-James
J. Flanagan Shipping Corporation
South Atlantic and Gulf Coast District , International
Longshoremen 's Association , AFL-CIO, and its
Local Unions, Local 325, Local 1306 , Local 1610,
Local 341 and Local 814 and West Gulf Maritime
Association
South Atlantic and Gulf Coast District , International
Longshoremen 's Association , AFL-CIO, and its
Locals, Local 1029 , Local 1175 , and Local 440
and West Gulf Maritime Association. Cases
23-CB-954, 23-CB-955, 23-CB-956, 23-CB-957,
and 23-CB-959
March 9, 1970
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS
FANNING AND JENKINS
On September 29, 1969, Trial Examiner Thomas
A. Ricci issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that the Respondents in Cases
23-CB-957 and 23-CB-959 had engaged in certain
unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and
recommending that they cease and desist therefrom
and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in
the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. He further
found that the Respondents in Cases 23-CB-954,
23-CB-955, and 23-CB-956 had not engaged in
certain other unfair labor practices alleged in the
complaint and recommended dismissal as to them.
Thereafter, Lykes Bros. Steamship Company, P. C.
Pfeiffer Co., Inc., James J. Flanagan Shipping
Corporation and the General Counsel filed
exceptions to the Decision and supporting briefs.
Respondent Unions (with the exception of Local
1924) filed exceptions to the Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a
three-member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and
the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the
findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the
Trial Examiner.
Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, and
hereby orders that the Respondent Unions, South
Atlantic and Gulf Coast District, International
Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO, and its
local unions, Local 325, Local 1306, Local 1610,
Local 341, Local 814, Local 1029, Local 1175, and
Local 440, their officers, agents, and representatives,
shall take the action set forth in the Trial
Examiner's Recommended Order.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
THOMAS A. Ricci, Trial Examiner: This is a
consolidated proceeding, in which three separate
complaints were issued by the General Counsel. A hearing
on all the complaints was held before the duly designated
Trial Examiner on July 8 and 9, 1969, at Beaumont,
Texas. On April 3, 1969, separate charges were filed by
Lykes Bros. Steamship Co. (Case 23-CB-954), P. C
Pfeiffer Co. (Case 23-CB-955), and James J. Flanagan
Shipping Corporation (Case 23-CB-956) against South
Atlantic and Gulf Coast District, International
Longshoremen's Association, Clerks and Checkers Local
No. 1924, herein called Local 1924 A complaint based on
these three charges issued on April 10, 1969, alleging that
Local 1924 had violated Section 8(b)(3) of the Act by
striking against the charging companies without giving the
60-day notice required by Section 8(d), and by insisting
upon bargaining with respect to employees outside the
certified bargaining unit . On April 4, 1969, a charge was
filed by West Gulf Maritime Association, herein called the
Maritime Association (Case 23-CB-957), against South
Atlantic and Gulf Coast District, International
Longshoremen's Association, herein called the ILA
District, and five of its constituent locals, Local 325,
Local 1306, Local 1610, Local 341 and Local 814. A
complaint based on this charge was also issued on April
10, 1969, alleging that the ILA District and each of these
five locals had violated Section 8(b)(3) by conditioning
execution of a finally negotiated collective-bargaining
agreement upon consummation of contracts involving
employees in other bargaining units and represented by
other ILA Local unions And on April 10, 1969, the
Maritime Association, in Case 23-CB-959, filed a charge
against the ILA District and three others of its locals,
Local 1029, Local 1175 and Local 440; a complaint based
on this charge issued on April 29, 1969, also alleging
violations of Section 8(b)(3) by insistence upon unlawful
conditions precedent to execution of a duly agreed upon
collective-bargaining contract
Briefs were filed after the close of the hearing by all
parties.
Upon the entire record, and from my observation of the
witnesses , I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. INTERSTATE COMMERCE
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the
Interstate commerce and the Board's jurisdiction is
conceded in the answers. The three individual charging
party employers, Lykes, Pfeiffer, and Flanagan, are
shipping and stevedoring companies operating in several
ports in the State of Texas; during the past 12 months
each of them received revenues in excess of $50,000 for
181 NLRB No. 89
SOUTH ATLANTIC & GULF COAST DIST. 591
transporting goods in interstate and foreign commerce,
and for stevedoring work in connection with such
interstate and foreign commerce The nominal charging
party in the other two complaints is West Gulf Maritime
Association , but the individual employers in interest,
members of the Association , are engaged in the business
of cargo loading and unloading of deep sea vessels at
various ports in the State of Texas. These contracting
stevedore members of the Maritime Association in a
12-month period furnished stevedoring services valued in
excess of $500,000 to steamship companies operating
vessels in interstate and foreign commerce I find that the
shipping and stevedoring employer-members of the
Maritime Association , and the individual employers who
filed charges here, are engaging in commerce within the
meaning of the Act and that it will effectuate the policies
of the Act to exercise jurisdiction herein
II THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED
South Atlantic and Gulf Coast District , International
Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO, and its
constituent and affiliated locals are labor organizations
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act
III THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The Issues
Basic Facts
All these cases , charges and complaints , arose from a
strike that paralyzed all the ports of Texas - from St
Charles to Brownsville - for over 100 days On October
1, 1968, the ILA District and all of its affiliated locals
ceased work , the major group of strikers were
longshoremen , members of what are called deep sea
locals, the smaller groups were clerks and checkers, who
join and are represented by clerks' locals, and
warehousemen , who also have their own Local ILA
unions. A court injunct ion forced all employees back to
work on October 2; 80 days later, on December 20, the
total work stoppage resumed and continued into early
April 1969 . The only cargo that moved in or out of any
ports was military material and Biafra relief supplies,
called mercy cargo . This was done by humane agreement
of the parties , in all other respects the economic struggle
was without quarter.
Almost all port employees have long been represented
under ILA contracts ; in all instances the last agreements
executed before the strike by their terms expired on
September 30, 1968. There was bargaining with increasing
momentum during the strike, and it centered primarily
upon the longshoremen , and their deep sea locals. For this
group it was multiemployer bargaining , the shipping and
the stevedoring companies being members of and
represented by the West Gulf Maritime Association;
across the table, for the ILA District and the deep sea
locals, sat many local delegates and officers, and
representatives of the District . The leader for these unions
was Ralph Massey , president of the ILA District The
Maritime Association committee was led by William
Arnett, executive officer of its office of labor relations.
The terminal stages of these negotiations took place in
Galveston , where they reached a climax in late March; on
March 30, final agreement was reached for all
longshoremen and their locals.
Many of the shipping companies, if not stevedoring
companies, employ clerks and checkers, but while most of
these employers are members of the Maritime
Association, not all of them bargain for their clerks and
checkers through that Association Among the ILA
Clerks Locals, there are Locals 1351 and 1665, and the
employers who use members of these locals do bargain
with them through the Association. During the period of
the strike , while negotiations were going on for
longshoremen, there were also sporadic meetings between
the Association and the ILA District, as well as Locals
1351 and 1665, looking towards settlement of the clerks'
and checkers ' dispute in those ports where these two locals
function. What bargaining took place, and where and
when it occurred, for warehousemen and with their
distinctive warehousemen locals, the record does not show
But this aspect of the total picture bears no significant
relationship to the issues of this case, and therefore need
not be explored.
In three of the ports - Beaumont , Port Arthur, and
Orange - there is a Local 1924, representing checkers
and clerks There are also three shipping companies,
Lykes, Pfeiffer, and Flanagan, who operate in these ports
as well as others Although these three companies deal
with the deep sea locals through the Maritime
Association, and sign the single multiemployer
longshoremen agreement together with all other members
of the Association, with respect to those clerks and
checkers which they employ in Beaumont , Port Arthur
and Orange they bargain directly with Local 1924 and
sign separate contracts. They had no negotiations with
Local 1924 before the overall longshoreman settlement of
March 30, 1969 They did bargain with Local 1924
between April 1 and April 12, and came to terms on the
12th The ILA District representatives, of course,
participated in this bargaining between Lykes, Pfeiffer,
and Flanagan and the affiliated Local 1924
The Major Question
It is a policy of the ILA, its District and all its locals,
that no employee works in any port until contracts have
been agreed upon for all employees involved there.
Massey, the highest official of the ILA in the West Gulf
Coast ports, did not appear at the hearing, but testimony
of what he announced before the end of the strike stands
uncontradicted. Speaking to the Maritime Association at
the moment all issues were being resolved concerning
longshoremen, he said- "We want it understood before we
leave this room that nobody is going back to work at any
port until all crafts have got a contract." According to
Ashley Lott, a vice president of Lykes, Massey said:
"After all pending ILA negotiations are complete, we can
quickly get back to work." From the testimony of J. E.
Williams, secretary-treasurer of the ILA district, who was
present on March 30 "Mr Homburg [a Maritime
Association negotiator] asked the question in the last
meeting. He said, `Now, that we are settling the Deep Sea
contract, when can I go back to work9' He was told by
President Massey at that time that all the crafts in all the
ports had to be settled before the ratification would be
taken and everybody go back to work at the same time in
each particular port Each port would go back whenever
all the questions in that particular port were settled. And
this was never disputed by Mr Homburg or his
Committee."
At most of the ports work resumed within a day or two
after March 30 With the sole exception of Beaumont,
592 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Port Arthur, and Orange Ports, every port which had
been struck was back to normal operations, with all
categories at work by April 4. And, by the time the
longshoremen resumed work the bargaining for clerks,
checkers, and warehousemen had been successfully
concluded at all those ports. At the three ports in
question, however, - Beaumont , Port Arthur, and
Orange - the total strike continued through April 13, the
longshoremen , in keeping with the ILA policy, refusing to
work because the dispute between Clerks Local 1924 and
Lykes, Pfeiffer, and Flanagan was still alive It was settled
on April 12, and the next day the longshoremen returned.
The major allegation of the complaint is that it was
unlawful of the ILA District, and of all the deep sea locals
involved in these three ports, to refuse to abide by their
agreement fully consummated with respect to
longshoremen, to condition ratification or acceptance of
the settlement upon successful completion of the
bargaining for the clerks and checkers. However the
question be phrased - either as refusal to abide by the
deep sea local agreement, or as strike action by
longshoremen to compel these three companies to come to
terms with Local 1924 - representing checkers and clerks
- the post-March 30 conduct of these Respondents is
said to constitute violations of Section 8(b)(3) of the Act
The Respondents - ILA District and deep sea locals
- do not dispute the fundamental factual assertion that
they did not ratify the settlement agreement , and did
continue the strike, for the reason that the clerks and
checkers negotiations were still uncompleted If nothing
more were shown, it is clear that the post-March 30 strike
action would suffice to prove the unfair labor practice
alleged.
The defense is an affirmative one, that on the 30th,
when agreement on all issues affecting the longshoremen
was reached, the employers - all of them - agreed that
the longshoremen would not work until and unless the
clerks and the checkers dispute was also settled The
Unions call this an integral part of the settlement; in
words they speak of the shippers themselves having
conditioned the deep sea local contract upon satisfaction
of the union demands of the clerks. The Maritime
Association filed its first charge - against ILA District
and five deep sea locals - on April 4 How the employer
group could on March 30 have "agreed" to a continuation
of the strike until an uncertain future date, and
simultaneously have filed its charge, the Respondents
made no effort to explain.
The Minor Questions
In July of 1968, more than 2 months before expiration
of all its contracts with -perhaps 60 or 70 separate
-employers throughout the many ports, Williams, also
called Red, secretary-treasurer of ILA District, prepared a
form letter for Massey's signature, and, as he testified at
the hearing, had a copy mailed to each and every
employer involved. It is explicit notice of intent to
forestall automatic renewal of agreement and to alter the
terms of contract. One of the complaints alleges that with
respect to the Clerks Local 1924 contracts with Lykes,
Pfeiffer, and Flanagan, that Union served no notice of
intent to modify or renegotiate the agreement 60 days
before September 30, indeed that it never served such a
notice upon these three companies. The parties did
bargain nevertheless from April 2 to 13, but it is said the
Local committed an unfair labor practice in its failure to
serve those three notices The defense to this is that the
requisite notices were in fact mailed out and received. -
In its initial contract. proposals, served on these three .
Companies on April 2, Local 1924 included the word"
"timekeeper" in the unit description for the employees to
be covered by a new agreement. Against the employers'
objection, it persisted in its demand that this word remains
in the contract through Friday, April Il,'when it agreed)
to forget about it The complaint against Local 1924P
alleges that by this demand the local unlawfully refused td
bargain because "said classification of timekeeper being'
[was] specifically excluded from the appropriate unit in"
which Respondent was certified as exclusive bargaining'
representative," and because the unit so` described in the;
demand "is inappropriate for purposes of collective-
bargaining under Section 9(a) of the Act." Not one of
these 3 Companies employs, or has employed persons,
classified "timekeeper," in these 3 ports, and the fact is
the Board-issued certificates upon which Local 1924's
status as bargaining agents rests, do not exclude the
employee classification of timekeeper. It is also a fact that
a unit of "clerks, checkers and timekeepers" in the
shipping industry is not inappropriate under Board law.'
Pertinent Evidence, Analysis, and Conclusions
A Section 8(b)(3) Violations by ILA District and its
Deep Sea Locals
The one clear fact shown on this record is that on the
Gulf coast, longshoremen represented by the ILA will not,
work, or sign any contract with their employer, so long as ;
any other category of employee in -the ports is engaged in
a labor dispute with its employers, no matter that all
bargaining issues pertaining to longshoremen have been
completely settled, no matter whether their own employers
do or do not employ other categories, and no matter who
may be the employer of the other categories or crafts.
And it is no less clear that when all longshoremen
contract provisions were finally agreed upon on March 30,
1969, regardless of anything the Maritime Association
spokesmen might have said, regardless of any opposition
they might have voiced, regardless of any request for
immediate unloading of ships they might have made, none`
of the deep sea locals were going to sign contracts, and no
longshoreman was going to abandon the strike until the
"single ball of wax" concept of the ILA was satisfied by
the necessary concessions to the clerks and checkers
unions. This is the reality of the situation in the gulf coast
ports. On its face, this ILA policy bespeaks a violation of
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act A union enjoying statutory
status as exclusive representative of all employees' within a
bargaining unit may not unilaterally extend the scope of
its agency authority and insist to impasse upon the
employer's capitulation to the demands of other
employees and other unions.'
In such a context can it be said' that the"shipping
companies' docility, even seeming acquiescence in the'
inevitable, proves rational acceptance of the principle of
collateral, or secondary strike spelled out in Ralph'
Massey's fiat announcement at the longshoremen's
bargaining table, or "agreement," as the ILA would have
it, with the longshoremen's resolution to continue striking
notwithstanding full settlement of their own dispute? Does
silence from a contestant in the face of an opponent's
'Hampton Roads Maritime Association, 178 NLRB No 44
'Douds v International Longshoremen's Association , 241 F 2d 278
(CA 2).
SOUTH ATLANTIC & GULF COAST DIST. 593
absolute insistence upon an illegal condition amount to
contractual accord? I think not. When the employer has
no choice but to tolerate the continuing economic hurt of
what is otherwise illegal strike action, does his sufferance
excuse the clear unfair labor practice? No more could an
employer plead confession and avoidance of an illegal
discharge on the ground that the employee went home
quietly. A persuasive analogy is seen in the cases where
unions sign a contract containing clearly illegal provisions
because the employer will not otherwise agree to any
settlement Both the unprotesting employee and the union
with its back to the wall go from the employer's premises
to file charges with the Board.' And this is what the West
Coast Maritime Association did; it filed its charge on
April 4
The principal defense argument is that the failure of the
Maritime Association to protest, during the negotiations,
against Massey's dictum that the strike must continue,
and the failure of its members to attempt to work the
longshoremen for the next 10 days, suffices to show the
employers also desired that the ports remain totally
immobilized until the ball of wax was complete. It is true
there was little objection articulated when Massey
repeatedly made his position clear, it is not quite true all
the employers accepted the fiat docilely - some did try to
unload ships, but failed. It does not follow from this,
however, that the shipping companies wished to keep all
ports closed until the much minor category of clerks and
warehousemen was made happy Mr. Brock, counsel for
the ILA, took pains to make Arnett, the Association
spokesman, admit that at the last longshoremen session
he, Arnett, "knew" that in Galveston and Houston, at
least, the longshoremen were not going to work until the
clerks and checkers had settled Asked by Brock, who was
also at the negotiations, had he understood "we were
going to wrap up all the negotiations in one ball of wax
before anybody went back to work," Arnett answered,
"You may have stated it, but there was no understanding
or agreement with the employers."
The record shows Massey cautioned the shippers
repeatedly, during the month or so of negotiations before
March 30, that they had better hurry and settle with all
other locals if they wanted the longshoremen back quickly
when the deep sea contracts were settled And no one
disputed the testimony of Red Williams, Massey's
assistant, that whenever Massey said this "they [the
association committeemen] never disagreed " Lott, the
Lykes Company official who was also present at the
negotiations, was asked on cross-examination whether,
when Massey announced no one would work until the
clerks and checkers negotiations had been completed,
anyone on behalf of the employers said "You've got to go
ahead and send deep sea people in Beaumont even though
the clerks and the checkers don't have a contract " He
answered he heard nobody say that
There are substantive realities in the field of industrial
relations and of collective bargaining that cannot be
ignored. Warned again and again by Massey, and no
doubt by past experience as well, that this was the way
things had to be, Arnett and his committeemen knew any
expression of disagreement would have been futile It is
not an unreasonable assumption that he also knew any
real objection from him might have upped Massey's
economic demands for the longshoremen so as to exert a
superficially more respectable pressure for enforcement of
the basic ILA policy. The strike was more than 3 months
'Siegel v . N L R B , 340 F 2d 309 (C A 2).
old, and the force of the economic squeeze was no doubt
fully appreciated by everybody
One company did call for longshoremen gangs to
unload a ship. Agents for the Flanagan Company, one of
the Charging Parties, called for men out of Locals 1029
and 1175, two of the Respondent Unions. Longshoremen
did arrive on schedule on April 3, but turned away when
they saw the picket line of Clerks Local 1924 at the dock
Joseph Harper, of Atlantic and Gulf Grain Stevedoring
Associates, also a member of the Maritime Association,
called for men on April 2 from Respondent Locals 1610
and 325, but none was sent. Bill Young, of Local 1610,
told Harper the reason was because the deep sea contract
was not ratified. It was not ratified because in the opinion
of the ILA District and its deep sea locals, settlement as
to longshoremen meant nothing until the clerks and the
checkers, as well as the warehousemen, were satisfied.
But this testimony was not really necessary to the case.
The record transcript in its entirety, including the
pleadings,' the statements of witnesses, and the words of
the parties' representatives at the hearing,s amounted to
admission by the Respondent Unions that they intended
to, and did continue to strike at the ports of Beaumont,
Port Arthur and Orange, because the Lykes, Pfeiffer and
Flanagan companies had not yet completed their
bargaining with ILA Local 1924 for clerks and checkers I
find the evidence does not support the affirmative defense
assertion that as spokesman for these three companies the
Maritime Association consented to such continuation of
the strike as to exculpate the Respondents now for
conduct that clearly violated the Act. I conclude that from
March 30, 1969 to April 13, when the longshoremen
returned to work, ILA District and its Locals 325, 1306,
1610, 341, 814, 1029, 1175, and 440, violated Section
8(b)(3) of the Act.
Red Williams said at the hearing it is a traditional
practice of ILA Unions to have the local membership
ratify contract terms when finally settled. There is no real
'Paragraph 12 of the complaint in Case 23-CB-957 reads
(a) On or about March 30, 1969 , the bargaining committees
representing West Gulf and District , on behalf of Local 325, Local 1306,
Local 1610, Local 341, and Local 814, and other Locals of the ILA,
reached full agreement on all substantial and material aspects of a
collective-bargaining agreement , subject to ratification by the
memberships of Local 325, Local 1306, Local 1610, Local 341, Local
814 and other constituent ILA locals
(b) Since reaching agreement as described in subparagraph (a) above,
and at all times material herein , Local 325, Local 1306, Local 1610,
Local 341, and Local 814 have failed and refused to submit their
respective agreement to their respective memberships for a ratification
vote
To these allegations , the Respondents answer
Respondents deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 12(a) of the
Complaint
Respondents deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 12(b) of the
Complaint because Respondents did not fail and refuse to submit the
agreement to their respective memberships for a ratification vote
Respondents would show that at the bargaining table, as a part of the
final agreement, it was understood and agreed that the agreement would
not be ratified , and need not be ratified , until an agreement had been
reached with the Clerks and the Checkers and Warehouse Locals in each
respective port.
'Asked to state a clear position of the ILA on the record , its counsel at
one point said
That all of the parties agreed and understood that we have reached a
tentative agreement here today on the deep sea contract. Now, we have
the Clerks and Checkers that have to reach an agreement We have the
warehouse people When we get this all wrapped up, then we are going
to ratify these contracts and everybody wants to ratify them , then we
will go back
594 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
evidence that any of the deep sea locals formally ratified,
even to this day, the longshoremen agreement reached on
March 30. The Respondents made an oblique attempt to
-show that the reason for this, as well as for continuation
of the strike beyond March 30, was because there still
remained unresolved issues directly affecting the
longshoremen when the final meeting with the Maritime
Association closed. The implied contention, an apparently
alternative defense to the whole case, is unpersuasive. The
parties shook hands and congratulated one another when
they left that room. Nothing was said about any
impediment to immediate resumption except Massey's
announcement that the clerks and the checkers problem,
and only that problem, remained.6 There was no formal
document signed then, there was none drafted by April 13
when everybody had returned to work, and the lawyers
have not yet agreed to the precise contract language
among themselves. The substantive terms of the
agreement have all been put into effect, including wage
raises retroactive to October 2, 1968, when the employees
returned to work for 80 days under compulsion of a court
injunction. The most significant fact serving to remove all
meaning from this special defense that the longshoremen
had not settled their own differences by March 30, is the
admission by Red Williams at the hearing that between
March 30 and April 13, when the deep sea locals did quit
the strike, nothing had changed in the relationship
between these locals and the employers of longshoremen
A final defense, arising implicitly from the
Respondents' answers, is that all the people who work in
any single port or, I suppose, all the people who work in
all the West Gulf ports, are joined in a single bargaining
unit, with the ILA-District and/or District plus locals -
the bargaining agent. From this it is argued that a union
has a right to insist that the conditions of employment
affecting all the employees it bargains for in one single
bargaining unit must first be agreed upon before it can be
compelled to sign any contract, or before it can be
required in law to send back only part of the strikers,
these whose wages, etc., have been settled. Of the many
evidentiary facts which under Board precedent are deemed
indictive of single-employer bargaining units as
distinguished from multi-employer units, the following
three are the most determinative: (1) separate Board
certification, (2) separate single-employer contracts, and
(3) separate bargaining in fact leading to the contracts.
Nothing could be plainer than that all three of these facts
are true with respect to the bargaining relationship
between Local 1924 respecting clerks and checkers
vis-a-vis the Lykes Company, the Pfeiffer Company, and
the Flanagan Company. It is not possible on this record
to determine the scope of clerks and checkers units in
ports other than Beaumont , Port Arthur, or Orange, but
that matter is irrelevant to the issue of this case. It is
simply not true that the ILA District and the Deep Sea
Local Respondents bargained in these three ports for
longshoremen and clerks and checkers in a single
bargaining unit.
The unspoken purport of this defense is that by
agreeing with Massey that the Local 1924 negotiations
must be settled before the longshoremen would accept
'Arnett testified the only matter to be disposed of was clarification of
the exact language to be used for fixing the occasions when a special
hou>Ay rate was to be applied for handling damaged cargo . Each side
designated a committee of two to reduce this item to agreeable language,
but it seems nothing had been done about this by the time of the hearing 3
months later.
their contract and return to work, the Maritime
Association, including its members Lykes, Pfeiffer and
Flanagan, brought the single, port-wide, and
multi-employer unit into being But this is a play on
words, no more than an indirect attempt to assert once
again that the employers "agreed" to the unilateral
insistence by Massey that the strike would end only when
he thought proper, without regard to the binding effect
upon all unions of Section 8(b)(3) of the Act. Red
Williams said generally that it has been a practice in the
past in the West Gulf Coast ports to pursue this. "ball of
wax" method of bargaining. Union certifications for the
clerks and the checkers of these three companies issued in
1965 in the name of the ILA District itself, and the
contracts made later that year were in the name of Local
1924, apparently formed after the certifications. There is
no clear proof as to what happened when the 1965
contracts were negotiated, nor indeed of past strikes
continued in these ports only because categories outside
the bargaining units were still in dispute with their own
employers. In any event, failure to complain of past unfair
labor practices, if in fact any were committed, does not
preclude the filing of proper charges with the Board.
As in all refusal to bargain complaint proceedings,
whether against employers or against unions, there are the
subsidiary questions of appropriate unit and bargaining
agency status. The two complaints covering this aspect of
the total case set out three separate units, each applicable
to employees engaged in general longshoremen and
general stevedoring work. One is limited to such
employees in the port of Beaumont, and is said to be
represented by "Local 325, Local 1306, and Local 1610,"
one is limited to the port of Orange, allegedly represented
by "Local 3211 and Local 610," and the third refers to
Port Arthur, said to be represented by "Local 1029 and
Local 1575, and Local 440." The answers deny that these
are in fact appropriate bargaining units. At the hearing
the Respondents - including ILA District and all the
named Locals - stated no position as to what is or are
the existing bargaining units, although there is no question
these unions have in the past acted, and now act, as
exclusive bargaining agents for the employees involved.
The reason for this evasive position of the ILA is clear; it
is to support the oblique assertion that longshoremen in
these three ports are joined both with longshoremen
elsewhere and with clerks and checkers in ports all over
the West Gulf coast. It was stated more than once on the
record that the deep sea locals, including those named
Respondents, were once certified by the Board.
All this throws a fog over the case, but there is no
reason why the questions to be decided should remain
obscured. The longshoremen contract in effect before 1968
was received in evidence; it was executed by Galveston
Maritime Association, Inc., and Houston Maritime
Association, Inc , on behalf of the employers, two groups
which later, before 1968, merged into the present West
Gulf Maritime Association. The Unions identified in the
contract as representing the employees are the ILA
District and all the deep sea Locals, although separately
numbered. The contract also shows clearly that its
coverage was intended to be over all longshoremen and
stevedoring work in all the ports of Texas and St. Charles,
Louisiana, and this record shows clearly that both in 1964
and again in 1969 the collective bargaining which led to
the old contract and to the agreement reached on March
30 of this year, was multi-employer in scope, applicable to
the same ports, and with the West Gulf Maritime
Association speaking for all its members and the ILA
SOUTH ATLANTIC & GULF COAST DIST. 595
district and its deep sea Locals representing all the
employees.' Accordingly, I find that all employees
engaged in general longshoring and general stevedoring
work, employed by members of the West Gulf Maritime
.Association, in all the deep sea ports of Texas and St.
Charles, Louisiana, but excluding supervisors as defined in
the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of
collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of
the Act.
I also find that on March 30, 1969, ILA District and
its deep sea Locals jointly were, and have since been the
exclusive representative of the employees in the
appropriate unit for the purposes of collective bargaining
within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act.
B. Local 1924 and the Sixty-Day Notice
The 1965 Board certifications, upon which the contracts
in the name of Local 1924 rested in 1968, describe
bargaining units of clerks and checkers, but in
single-employer units for the Lykes, Pfeiffer, and
Flanagan companies. The certifications are limited to the
ports of Beaumont, Port Arthur and Orange, although not
all three companies operate in all of these ports. The
bargaining that ensued was carried on jointly that year, in
that identical but separate contracts, effective November
1, 1965, to September 30, 1968, were then signed by each
of the companies. September 30 was also the date when
all other ILA local contracts throughout the West Gulf
Coast area by their terms expired.
As detailed above, the first bargaining session looking
towards renewal of these contracts came on April 2, and it
was then that Local 1924 first served upon the three
companies a statement of its demands The parties
bargained for 10 days and reached full agreement. Local
1924 picketed the ports during this period, and at the
meetings representatives of the three companies accused
the Union of not having served the 60-day notice called
for by Section 8(d) of the Act The Union spokesmen
denied the charge and insisted they had mailed the
appropriate notices The complaint alleges Local 1924
refused to bargain, in violation of Section 8(b)(3), by such
asserted failure to give adequate notice of intention to
change the conditions of employment
The affirmative burden of proving that Local 1924 did
not send the requisite notices rests upon the General
Counsel, and I find on the total record that the evidence
does not suffice to establish that necessary fact. Williams,
the assistant to the ILA District president, testified it is
the usual practice to issue notices of intent to modify all
ILA local agreements from his office, where complete
records of all contracts in effect are maintained. He said
he prepared a form letter to that effect for Massey's
signature , and then had copies printed. He verified, from
' 'The contract itself contains no recognition - appropriate unit clauses
as such The pertinent provision , however , reads as follows.
It is hereby agreed between First Parties and Second Parties that the
following shall be the scale of wages and, working arrangements for
labor to be performed as set forth below in the loading and unloading of
deep sea vessels , arriving at or departing from the Texas ports, and the
port of Lake Charles, La , with any kind of cargo , including cotton and
tobacco , effective the Ist day of October 1964, and terminating the 30th
day of September , 1968 Any negotiation that may happen regarding
this Contract shall be taken up collective by the members of the
Maritime Association at Galveston , Houston, Corpus Christi and the
Sabine District who are Owners or Operators or Agents of deep sea
vessels loading or unloading at the Texas ports, including the port of
Lake Charles, La
the contracts in his files, the names and office addresses of
all employers involved, had his secretary add the
appropriate name and address to each form, reverified the
letters and envelopes a second time, and then instructed
the girl to mail them. He said he had no reason to believe
she had not done so. He offered into evidence from his
file, copies of 7 such notices, all dated July 3, 1968, and
addressed as follows:
Lykes Brothers Steamship Company
6821 Avenue P. 0 Box 1243
Houston, Texas
Lykes Bros. Steamship Company, Inc.
Carton Exchange Building
Houston, Texas
P.C. Pfeiffer Company, Inc.
P. O. Box 579
Port Arthur, Texas
P. C. Pfeiffer Company, Inc.
P. O. Box 3248
Beaumont, Texas
James J. Flanagan Stevedores
P. O. Box 1367
Port Arthur, Texas
Port Arthur Stevedores
P. O. Box 1367
Port Arthur, Texas
James J. Flanagan Stevedores
P. O. Box 271
Beaumont, Texas
The body of each letter read:
In line with a clause in our existing agreement, which
states that sixty (60) days prior to the expiration date,
that either party desiring to negotiate a new agreement
shall notify the other party.
We are hereby notifying you of the desire of the
South Atlantic and Gulf Coast District of the
International Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO,
to negotiate new conditions, wages and fringe benefits,
and we are now in process of drawing up our proposals.
We will notify you when our proposals are ready and
arrange for a meeting at a convenient date.
There are a number of significant related facts lending
support to Williams' conclusionary testimony that his
secretary mailed originals of the letter copies he brought
to the hearing. It is true she is the person who is said to
have placed the letters in a letter box, but I doubt she
could have been more precise in her recollection as to
these particular six or seven. It stands uncontradicted that
the ILA District, through its many locals, had between 60
and 70 contracts in effect in July of 1968, all applying to
the West Coast ports and all expiring on the same day -
September 30 Copies were sent to all of the employers. It
was not unreasonable, therefore, to serve a form letter
upon all the companies.
To prove the negative proposition that the Respondent
did not mail notices to these three particular companies,
each of them presented an individual agent at the hearing
to say he had not received any and he could not find one
596 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
in his company's files But each of these witnesses
admitted that the addresses appearing on the purported
copies received in evidence to addresses with proper
name for each of the three companies - are in fact
offices of the three companies. Lott, of the Lykes
Company, quarreled with Red Williams at a bargaining
meeting, insisting a notice to his Houston Office could not
be appropriate because he, Lott, had not personally
participated in the 1965 negotiations. In the
circumstances, this was not a good argument. Bush,
president of the Pfeiffer Company, said he did receive a
notice pertaining to the warehousemen contract he had
with an ILA local, but not with respect to his agreement
with Local 1924. He did not produce that particular letter,
if any of the many notices served by the ILA in July read
any differently than the forms received in evidence, surely
some member of the West Coast Maritime Association
would have produced it at the hearing. From this it
follows Bush was not really denying receipt of the letter
Williams said he sent, but only allocating, in his mind, the
form letter to one of his contracts instead of to another.
James Flanagan, of the Flanagan Company, appeared to
support the complaint; he said he had received no notice.
He added: "It came as a complete surprise to me that
they resorted to the tactic of putting up picket lines before
there was one breath of notification." This statement did
not enhance his credibility.
The complaint says Local 1924 committed the unfair
labor practice on April 3, because that is when it first
advised the Companies of its particular demands, and
struck to enforce them But this local had been picketing
the docks, on and off with the deep sea locals, from as far
back as January. And its clerks and checkers certainly
had been on strike from the first day. The witness Bush,
with assistance of counsel, suggested the reason' why the
clerks did not work during the 100 days was because there
was no work for them to do, and because nobody called
them, what with the longshoremen refusing to load or
unload. This attempt to separate the clerks and the
checkers from the rest of the ILA must fail. Everybody
knew everybody was on strike. For months before March
30 the Maritime Association was bargaining with clerks
and checkers Local 1351 and 1665 in the ports of Houston
and Galveston, where Lykes and Pfeiffer also operate and
employ clerks and checkers. And when negotiations were
held with Local 1924 in April, there was no argument
about wages, for it was understood that the money pattern
already settled for Houston and Galveston would be
followed in Beaumont , Port Arthur and Orange In such a
situation, for Flanagan to say he was surprised his clerks
and checkers in Beaumont wanted to change the old
contract, weakens rather than strengthens the complaint.
Of all the 60 or 70 ILA contracts reopened during the
month of July up and down the gulf coast, no other single
employer complained of inadequate 60-day notice. It
would appear that all the other form letters mailed out by
the secretary were received and understood. The General
Counsel argues a very technical rule of evidence, that the
individual who placed these notices in the United States
mailbox was not produced as a direct witness. But no
reason appears to explain why Red Williams should want
to skip over these particular three Companies when he
distributed such a large number of notices. These
Companies may not have agreed to a ball of wax which
would permit the deep sea locals to strike-pressure them
into coming to terms with employees in other bargaining
units, but on this record it must be held no one doubted
the strike - throughout the ports - was a single ball of
ILA wax.
Lykes, Pfeiffer and Flanagan knew their clerks and
checkers working in the three ports of Beaumont, Port
Arthur and Orange were striking with all other port
employees and that bargaining towards a new contract
with Local 1924 was intended Massey told them that
much clearly enough during the longshoremen
negotiations long before March 30. In the light of this
entire record, there is no substantial reason for deeming
Red Williams' testimony about the mailing of form
notices to all employers in all the ports for all the
contracts, insufficient. In the context of the related facts,
proof of mailing need not be absolutely direct. I conclude
the evidence as a whole does not prove Local 1924 did not
serve the requisite 60-day notices of intent to modify the
contracts with these three companies, and I shall therefore
recommend dismissal of this allegation.
C The Dispute Over Timekeeper Work
The second and last allegation of wrongdoing charged
to Local 1924 is that it insisted upon including
timekeepers in the unit description of the contract which it
requested these companies to sign. In precise words the
complaint alleges this was illegal because each of the
separate certifications underlying the bargaining
"specifically excluded" timekeepers and because a unit
including them was inappropriate. It can be assumed the
intent of this last complaint phrase is that the unit was
inappropriate because timekeepers had been specifically
excluded Both the General Counsel and counsel for the
three companies restated unequivocally at the hearing that
the basis of their argument on this point is that
timekeepers had been excluded in the Board's certificates.
As strongly indicated by several of the witnesses, who
personally participated inby,. the bargaining involved, the
precise nature of what the Union wanted, what the parties
talked about, and what the employers refused to yield,
was something substantially different. For reasons that do
not appear, none of the representatives at the hearing saw
fit to elicit the details of discussion on this point; there
was talk of many substantive items, such as the number of
men that would be hired on the job, the guarantee to a
man who is called out on a job, and the scope of work
other than timekeeper occupations. If the indirect
testimony of the witnesses touching on the timekeeper
issue, and a Regional Director's decision received in
evidence, be carefully examined, however, the real issue
becomes clear enough.
It must first be noted that the outstanding certificates
do not exclude timekeepers as a job classification or
category. The Board selections resulting in the
certifications rested on three separate representation
petitions, which in turn were consolidated with four
others, also filed by the ILA, but each for still other
employers. Lykes, Pfeiffer, and Flanagan hire no persons
to do only timekeeping work, at least not in the ports of
Beaumont, Port Arthur, and Orange, but some of the
other employers involved in the consolidated
representation proceeding, did do so in 1965. In the cases
of Pfeiffer and Flanagan there were stipulations for
consent elections, and the unit definition in their election
agreements was described l as including "timekeepers."
This was an oversight by the two companies. In the case
of Lykes there was a direction of election, in which the
unit appeared as stipulated to by the parties, and made no
reference to timekeepers. Apart from repeated
conclusionary statements (voiced at the hearing that
SOUTH ATLANTIC & GULF COAST DIST. 597
"timekeepers had been excluded," all that appears on the
record so far as Lykes is concerned is that the certificate
to Local 1924 says nothing about timekeepers, in or out
After the certification of Local 1924 to Pfeiffer and
Flanagan, those companies filed Board petitions seeking
to have the previously agreed upon unit description
clarified by deletion of the word timekeeper from among
the inclusions, for the reason that there were no
timekeepers employed. (Cases 23-UC-9, 10) After a
hearing, the Regional Director did this, and the
certificates were modified in this language.
Inasmuch as the testimony further shows that neither of
the Employers hereto have any employees who are
classified as "timekeepers ," . the respective units as
to each employer herein is hereby clarified to delete
from the description of the unit the job classification of
timekeepers.
Correction of these two certificates brought them in line
with that of Lykes and eliminated all reference to
timekeepers. And this was consistent with the most basic
Board law and procedure, for the Board cannot, and does
not include or exclude any job classification or job
category that does not exist If the complaint be appraised
strictly on its face value, therefore, this point must be
dismissed
There seems to be a further argument that it was
timekeeper work that was excluded, or perhaps whatever
category of employees these companies chose to do the
timekeeping work, either at the time of the elections or
thereafter. This is, of course, not what the certificates say.
In any event, there is timekeeping work performed by
employees of these companies in these ports; it is part of
the work duties of their gang foremen , whose exclusion on
the ground they also exercise supervisory authority never
was, and is not now questioned by anyone. There is no
evidence, or claim, that in April of 1968 Local 1924
suggested inclusion of gang foremen because they also do
the timekeeping. In other ports of the West Gulf Coast
some of these companies do hire a timekeeper
classification which does that work, and in those locations
the timekeepers are included in the units of clerks and
checkers.
What the Union was really saying in April is that
timekeeper work is not a supervisory function , that the
employers ought not assign it to the foremen but to rank
and filers instead, employees covered by the contract, so
that the Union could bargain about the conditions of
employment that should govern timekeeper work, and that
this should be done regardless of whether in the end the
employers might be required to hire additional persons -
perhaps to be called timekeepers - to do this
nonsupervisory work While the issue then in dispute does
not appear on the record quite as clearly as stated here,
indirectly the evidence does establish it. The true issue of
the case therefore is: May a union demand that an
employer cease assigning nonsupervisory work to
supervisors and give it to the production workers instead?
In his testimony on this point, Lott, of the Lykes
Company, simply said, "they wanted timekeepers included
in the contract." He then added, "we had a ruling from
the National Labor Relations Board that timekeepers
were not a part of the bargaining force. Custom had set
the practice of a foreman keeping the time and the
employers did not have to bargain with timekeepers
because foremen were supervisory employees." When, at
one of the conferences , James Flanagan told the union
people that "historically" it had been the practice for
foremen to do the timekeeping, Red Williams answered
him: "The past is one thing; the future is another."
Flanagan then added that from all the discussion he
formed the impression that had he agreed with Local
1924, "we would be contractually obligated to hire
timekeepers." And the decision of the Regional Director
in the two UC cases, read in its totality, shows the
evidence then before him proved the same question as the
issue separating the parties back in 1965
This is not a case where the Union sought to include in
its contract employees properly and in fact excluded from
its certificate authorization. Compare, Central Soya. 142
NLRB 105. It wanted to have more of the ordinary work
assigned to the employees it represented , it wanted the
agreement to require "allocating fairly claimable unit
work to unit employees ,"' it wanted the contract to
"restrict the performance of unit work, or at least fairly
claimable unit work , to unit members . . "' This was
not an unlawful demand by a bargaining agent speaking
for what is essentially a production unit. It is a question
whether, even were it assumed Local 1924 sought to
achieve something beyond its prerogative under the
existing certificates , it insisted upon the demand to that
impasse where the unfair labor practice can be said to
have been committed. It did drop the matter entirely
before the bargaining was over and the issue never became
an impediment to a final contract. In any event, as I find
that the issue it raised relating to timekeeping work
involved a proper subject of collective bargaining, I shall
recommend dismissal of the complaint with respect to
Local 1924.
THE REMEDY
The form of misconduct found to have been illegal
consisted of refusal to sign , or abide by the final
agreement reached after collective bargaining on March
30, 1969, and continuance of the strike for the next 12
days at the three ports in Beaumont , Port Arthur, and
Orange. And the labor organizations which engaged in
this illegal conduct are those unions named Respondents
- ILA District and eight separate of its deep sea Locals
They must therefore be ordered to cease and desist from
the prohibited conduct and to sign and execute the agreed
upon agreement.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent Unions are labor organizations
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act
2. All employees engaged in general longshoring and
general stevedoring work employed by employer members
of the Gulf Coast Maritime Association, Galveston,
Texas, in all the deep sea ports of Texas and St. Charles,
Louisiana, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes
of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b)
of the Act.
3. ILA District, and its deep sea Locals are, and at all
times material herein have been the exclusive
representative of the employees in the appropriate unit for
the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning
of Section 9(a) of the Act.
4. By refusing to bargain for the appropriate unit, the
Respondents have engaged in and are engaging in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(3) of
'Retail Clerks Union, Local 1428, 155 NLRB 656
'Retail Clerks . Local 1288, 163 NLRB 816
598 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the Act.
5: The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
conclusions of law, it is hereby recommended that South
Atlantic and Gulf Coast District, International
Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO, and its Local
Unions No. 325, No 1306, No. 1610, No. 341, No. 814,
No. 1029, No. 1175, and No. 440, their officers,
representatives, agents, successors and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from insisting, as a condition
preceded to executing a collective-bargaining agreement
with West Coast Gulf Maritime Association covering
employees in the unit found appropriate above, that
employer members of the Association bargain with ILA
Local 1924 and agree upon a contract with that Local
with respect to employees outside the bargaining unit
described above.
2 Take the 'following affirmative action which I find
will effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request, execute the contract with West Coast
Maritime Association pursuant to the agreement reached
on March 30, 1969.
(b) Upon request bargain collectively with the
Association on the basis of the aforesaid appropriate unit
and subject to the provisions of Section 9(a) of the Act,
with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment,
or other terms and conditions of employment, and if an
understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a
signed statement
(c) Post in conspicuous places in their business offices
and meetings halls copies of the attached notice marked
"Appendix."" Each of the notices shall bear the numerical
designation of the particular Local Union Respondent.
Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional
Director for Region 23, shall, after being duly signed by
the Respondents' representatives, be posted by the
Respondents immediately upon receipt thereof, and be
maintained by them for 60 consecutive days thereafter in
conspicuous places, including all places where notices to
members of the Respondents are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondents to
insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
(d) Additional copies of said notices, to be furnished by
the Regional Director for Region 23, shall, after being
duly signed by the Respondents' representatives, be
returned to the Regional Director for posting, at the port
premises of each of the employers found herein to have
been members of the Association operating in the ports of
Beaumont, Port Arthur, and Orange, Texas, if those
employers are willing, for 60 consecutive days, in places
where notices to employees are customarily posted.
1'In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102 46 of
the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the
findings, conclusions , recommendations , and Recommended Order herein
shall, as provided in Section 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be
adopted by the Board and become its findings , conclusions , and order, and
all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. In the event
that the Board's Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States Court
of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board " shall be changed to read "Posted
pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing
an Order of the National Labor Relations Board "
(e) Notify the Regional Director , in writing , within 20
days from the date of receipt of this Decision , what steps
the Respondents have taken to comply herewith."
IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the complaint herein
in Cases 23-CB-954, 955, and 956, against South Atlantic
and Gulf Coast District , International Longshoremen's
Association , AFL-CIO, Clerks and Checkers Local No.
1924, be dismissed.
In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board
this provision shall be modified to read "Notify said Regional Director, in
writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order what steps the
Respondents have taken to comply herewith "
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO MEMBERS
Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations
Board an agency of the United States Government
WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively with
Gulf Coast Maritime Association in the following unit
of employees with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours
of work, and other conditions of employment and, if an
understanding is reached, embody such understanding
in a signed agreement:
All employees engaged in general longshoring and
general stevedoring work employed by
employer-members of the Gulf Coast Maritime
Association, Galveston, Texas, in all the deep sea
ports of Texas and St. Charles, Louisiana.
WE WILL NOT refuse to sign a fully negotiated
agreement covering employees in the above-described
unit for the reason that any of the employer-members
of this association have not bargained to completion on
behalf of others of their employees represented by other
local unions, or because other employers, not members
of the association, have not bargained to completion on
behalf of their employees represented by other local
unions.
WE WILL NOT engage in any strike after completion
of collective-bargaining negotiations on behalf of the
employees in this appropriate unit for the purpose of
coercing any of the employer-members of this
association to bargain on behalf of others of their
employees represented by other local unions, or for the
purpose of compelling other employers, not members of
this association, to bargain on behalf of their employees
represented by other local unions.
Dated By
SOUTH ATLANTIC AND
GULF COAST DISTRICT
INTERNATIONAL
LONGSHOREMEN S
ASSOCIATION AFL-CIO,
AND ITS LOCAL UNION
No.
(Labor Organization)
(Employer)
(Representative) (Title)
SOUTH ATLANTIC & GULF COAST DIST. 599
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by or covered by any other material.
anyone Any questions concerning this notice or compliance
with its provisions, may be directed to the Board's Office,
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days 6617 Federal Office Building, 515 Rusk Avenue, Houston,
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, Texas 77002, Telephone 713-226-4722