Snyder's of Hanover, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 30, 2001

334 N.L.R.B. 183 (N.L.R.B. 2001)

SNYDER’S OF HANOVER, INC. 183
Snyder’s of Hanover, Inc. and United Food & Com-
mercial Workers International Union, Local
1776, AFL–CIO, CLC. Case 5–CA–28033
May 30, 2001
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS LIEBMAN, TRUESDALE, AND
WALSH
On August 4, 2000, Administrative Law Judge Leo-
nard M. Wagman issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief. The
General Counsel filed an answering brief, and the Re-
spondent filed a reply brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions and
to adopt the recommended Order.
The judge found that the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act by: (1) prohibiting union representa-
tives from distributing prounion literature to employees
in the public right-of-way adjacent to the Respondent’s
facility;2 (2) attempting to remove the union representa-
tives from the public right-of-way; and (3) engaging in
surveillance of its employees receiving union literature
from the union organizers. For the reasons set forth be-
low, as well as those set forth by the judge, we find, in
agreement with the judge, that the Respondent unlaw-
fully interfered with the employees’ Section 7 rights to
receive literature from the Union.
The Respondent’s facility is located in Hanover, Penn-
sylvania. The public right-of-way that is adjacent to the
Respondent’s plant extends 16 feet from the centerline of
State Route 116 (also referred to as York Street) to the
Respondent’s property line.
The Respondent argues that under Pennsylvania law
“an owner whose property abuts a public street or road
owns to the center of the road . . . subject only to a public
easement of passage, or right-of-way, for transit only.”
The Respondent further contends that under State law a
property owner may “preclude activities upon a right-of-
way that exceed the intended purpose of the right-of-
way.” The Respondent maintains that the Union’s leaf-
leting was not consistent with the purpose of the right-of-
way for two reasons: (1) “the leafleting was purely for a
private benefit (to garner interest in the Union and gain
new members), not a public benefit”; (2) “the actions of
the leafleters caused substantial interference in ingress
and egress from [the Respondent’s] property.” There-
fore, the Respondent argues that as property owner it had
the right to prevent the Union’s impermissible use of the
public easement.3

1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
2 The literature encouraged employees to select the Union as their
representative for purposes of collective bargaining.
In Indio Grocery Outlet, 323 NLRB 1138, 1141
(1997), enfd. sub nom. NLRB v. Calkins, 187 F.3d 1080
(9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied 529 U.S. 1098 (2000), the
Board reaffirmed precedent holding that “in cases in
which the exercise of Section 7 rights by nonemployee
union representatives is assertedly in conflict with a re-
spondent’s private property rights, there is a threshold
burden on the respondent to establish that it had, at the
time it expelled the union representatives, an interest
which entitled it to exclude individuals from the prop-
erty.” (Emphasis in original.) The Board also stated that
in determining whether an adequate property interest has
been shown, it would look to “the law that created and
defined the Respondent’s property interest, which is
state, rather than Federal, law.” Id.
To meet its threshold burden under Indio Grocery, the
Respondent must show that it had a property interest in
the area where the handbilling occurred (in this case a
public right-of-way), and that the handbilling was outside
the scope of the public easement, such that the Respon-
dent was entitled to exercise its property interest and
expel the handbillers. To establish that the handbilling
was outside the scope of the public easement, the Re-
spondent must first establish the scope of that easement.
For the following reasons, we find that the Respondent
has not met its burden of establishing that it had the req-
uisite property interest under Pennsylvania law to ex-
clude the union handbillers from the public right-of-way
adjacent to its facility.
Even assuming, as contended by the Respondent, that
under Pennsylvania law the Respondent retained a prop-
erty interest in the public right-of-way adjacent to its
facility, the Respondent’s property right was not exclu-
sive since it was subject to a public easement as author-
ized by the municipality where the Respondent’s facility
is located.4 Although the Respondent argues that the
3 In fn. 8 of his decision, the judge characterized the Respondent’s
property argument as “belated.” We do not rely on the judge’s charac-
terization.
4 Pennsylvania courts “consider the fee of a private owner to extend
to the middle of the street abutting his building, subject only to an
easement of public use.” City of Philadelphia v. Street, 63 Pa. D. &
C.2d 709 (1974), citing Scranton v. Peoples Coal Co., 256 Pa. 332, 100
A. 818 (1917). In defining the scope of the public easement, Pennsyl-
334 NLRB No. 21
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 184
easement is limited to public transit and passage, the Re-
spondent failed to produce any evidence that so circum-
scribed the scope of the public right-of-way. Nor did the
Respondent produce evidence that peaceful handbilling
activity was outside the scope of the public right-of-way.
To the contrary, under Pennsylvania law, handbilling on
a public right-of-way is permissible if it is not coercive,
intimidating or violent.5 Furthermore, Police Officer
Hettinger, who was fully credited by the judge, testified
that York County Assistant District Attorney Tom Kelly
informed him that the handbilling activity engaged in by
the union representatives was not prohibited as long as it
did not pose a threat or danger to the union representa-
tives or others, and did not impede the flow of traffic.
Here, the credited testimony established, contrary to the
Respondent’s contention, that the Union’s handbilling
did not pose a threat or danger to anyone and did not
impede traffic near the Respondent’s facility. Further,
the Respondent has not shown by credible testimony that
the handbilling was in any way coercive, intimidating, or
violent.
Nor do we agree with the Respondent that the Union’s
handbilling was a “private use of the right-of-way with
no reasonable benefit to the public.” Rather, we agree
with the General Counsel that “there is a substantial pub-
lic benefit involved in the leafleting activity in question.”
Section 1 of the National Labor Relations Act states that
it is the policy of the United States to safeguard com-
merce from injury by “protecting the exercise by workers
of full freedom of association, self-organization, and
designation of representatives of their own choosing, for
the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of
their employment . . . .” Section 7 implements the public
policy objectives of the Act by guaranteeing employees
the “right to self-organization,” and the Supreme Court
has squarely held that that right “depends in some meas-
ure on the ability of employees to learn the advantages of
self-organization from others.” NLRB v. Babcock & Wil-
cox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 113 (1956). Therefore, we con-
clude that the Union was asserting a public right, and
acting in accordance with public policy, when it distrib-
uted organizational handbills to employees from the pub-
lic right-of-way.

vania courts have held that the rights of the public are regarded as being
in the exclusive possession of the municipality, which may authorize
the use of a public sidewalk for any “public service,” but such a use
must be specifically authorized by the municipality “by legislative
grant in clear words or by unavoidable implication.” Philadelphia v.
Street, supra, citing 46 S. 52d St. Corp. v. Manlin, 398 Pa. 304, 312,
317, 157 A.2d 381 (1960). See also RKO-Stanley Warner Theatres,
Inc. v. Mellon National Bank & Trust Co., 436 F.2d 1297, 1303 (3d Cir.
1970).
5 The Respondent states in its brief that “Pennsylvania courts have
found that the private use of the right-of-way with no reasonable bene-
fit to the public is an unauthorized use and is not permissible.” How-
ever, Pennsylvania courts have also recognized that peaceful protests
on a public right-of-way are permissible when free from coercion,
intimidation, and violence. See Indiana Cobra, Inc. v. Food & Com-
mercial Workers Local 23, 406 Pa. SupCt.. 342, 594 A.2d 368 (Pa.
Sup.Ct. 1991), end mem. appeal denied 608 A.2d 30 (Pa. 1992);
Frankel-Warwick Limited Partnership v. Hotel, Bartenders & Restau-
rant Employees Union, 334 Pa. Super. 47, 482 A.2d 1073, 1075 (Pa.
Sup.Ct. 1984).
In sum, because the Respondent produced no evidence
as to the scope of the public easement, it was unable to
establish that the Union’s handbilling was outside the
scope of that easement and that therefore the Respondent
was entitled to exclude the union representatives from
the public right-of-way. Accordingly, we find that the
Respondent has not met its threshold burden under Indio
Grocery of establishing that it had, at the time it at-
tempted to expel the union representatives, an interest in
the property which entitled it to exclude the handbillers
from the property. For these reasons, we agree with the
judge that the Respondent’s actions violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, Snyder’s of Hanover, Inc.,
Hanover, Pennsylvania, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Order.

Gabriel A. Terrasa, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Paul M. Lusky, Esq. (Kruchko & Fries), of Baltimore, Mary-
land, for the Employer.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
LEONARD M. WAGMAN, Administrative Law Judge. This
case was tried in Hanover, Pennsylvania, on October 26, 1999.
The charge was filed on November 4, 1998, and the complaint
was issued March 31, 1999.1 The complaint alleges that the
Company, Snyder’s of Hanover, Inc., violated Section 8(a)(1)
of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) by:
1. Instructing representatives of the Union, United Food &
Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1776, AFL–
CIO, CLC, to cease distribution of union literature and leave
the public property adjacent to the Company’s facility.
2. Calling the Hanover, Pennsylvania police to the facility in
an effort to remove union organizers from public property; and
3. Engaging in surveillance of employees’ receipt of union
literature from the union organizers.
The Company, by its timely answer, denied committing the
alleged unfair labor practices.
1 All dates are in 1998, unless otherwise indicated.

SNYDER’S OF HANOVER, INC. 185
On the entire record, including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed
by the Company and the General Counsel, I make the following
FINDINGS Of FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The Company, a Pennsylvania corporation, manufactures
and distributes snack foods at its facility in Hanover, Pennsyl-
vania, where, during the past 12 months, a representative pe-
riod, it sold and shipped products and goods valued in excess of
$50,000 directly to point located outside the State of Pennsyl-
vania. During the same period, the Company purchased and
received at its Hanover, Pennsylvania facility products, goods,
and materials valued in excess of $5000 directly from points
located outside the State of Pennsylvania. The Company ad-
mits, and I find, that it is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. The
Company and the General Counsel have stipulated that, for this
proceeding, the Union is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Facts
At 2:30 p.m. on the afternoon of October 1, five union repre-
sentatives arrived at the entrance to the Company’s facilities,
on State Route 116 (York Street or SR 116) to distribute union
handbills to employees, as they entered or exited during a shift
change. The five were Patricia Berger, Nicole Mitten, Ken
Sudo, Dave Hurlbert, and Pierre Joanis. The Company’s plant
lies a little more than 225 feet off of SR 116. A paved two-lane
tree-lined driveway, 34.5 feet wide, connects the plant to the
highway. The Company’s employees use this driveway going
to and from their work at its plant. There is no traffic light at
the intersection of the driveway and SR 116.
Before arriving at the Company’s driveway, the five union
representatives learned from PennDOT and the local township
that a public right-of-way extended 16 feet from the centerline
of SR 116 to the Company’s property line. The same authori-
ties advised the union representatives that they could conduct
their activity so long as they remained on the road side of the
utility poles bordering the Company’s property. I find from the
parties’ stipulation and testimony of the Company’s plant engi-
neer, Dennis Tavares, that on October 1, there was a right-of-
way, running from the middle of SR 116 to a line running tan-
gent to one utility pole near the driveway and a short distance
behind the other utility poles located near the edge of the road.
The five union representatives arrived in the vicinity of the
Company’s driveway in an automobile, which they parked on
the shoulder of SR 116, adjacent to the neighboring property of
Hanover Foods. They prepared to distribute handbills to com-
pany employees as they entered or exited the driveway at 3
p.m. The handbill encouraged company employees to select
the Union as their representative for purposes of collective
bargaining. Berger and Joanis took up positions on the south-
west side of the driveway entrance, also referred to as the left
side of the driveway. Their three colleagues stationed them-
selves on the opposite side of the entrance, the right side, as one
enters the driveway.2
According to Berger’s testimony, the five union representa-
tives did not venture inside the utility poles, but remained in the
right-of-way. I find from her uncontradicted and credible testi-
mony that the five began handing out union leaflets to incom-
ing and exiting autos, at the top of the driveway.
At about 2:45 p.m. Company Vice Presidents John Bartman
and Pat McInerney received word, while at a meeting at the
plant, that there were people trespassing on company property
and handing out leaflets. The receptionist, who reported the
trespass, showed the Union leaflet to Bartman and McInerney.
The two company officials left the meeting to observe the as-
serted trespassing. They walked up the left side of the drive-
way, toward Union Representatives Berger and Joanis.3
Bartman testified that, as he and McInerney walked toward
SR 116, he saw five union representatives in the driveway.
Bartman further testified that four were between a factory store
sign and the road, inside the Company’s property line and a
fifth was standing about one-third of the way down the drive-
way toward the plant. According to Bartman, as he and McIn-
erney approached them, the union representatives moved to-
ward SR 116. They all stood in the driveway between the road
and the factory store sign, on company property. Bartman testi-
fied that the union representatives remained in these positions
for the remainder of their stay.
McInerney testified that as he and Bartman approached the
front driveway entrance, he saw five people near the entrance.
Further, according to McInerney, he saw one of the five very
close to the road, three people 25 to 30 feet from SR 116 and
one person approximately 70 feet down the drive. McInerney
also testified that as he and Bartman moved toward them, the
union representatives all moved to within 25 feet of SR 116,
and remained there until a police officer arrived and pulled
them aside.
According to his testimony, the Company’s plant engineer,
Dennis Tavares, came out of the factory store at between 2:45
and 3 p.m. and saw about a half dozen union agents in the plant
driveway. Tavares also testified that he saw two union agents
standing just below the factory store sign, one holding literature
and the other handing literature to the driver of a passing vehi-
cle. He also testified that when he first surveyed the scene,
traffic was “backed up” at the edge of the driveway and on
York Street
Bartman and McInerney approached Berger and Pierre
Joanis and came within at most 25 feet of them.4 McInerney

2 My findings regarding the union representatives’ deployment and
arrival at the Company’s driveway are based on Berger’s testimony
which she gave in a candid manner.
3 My findings regarding how Bartman and McInerney learned of the
handbilling are based on their uncontradicted and credible testimony.
4 According to Berger, McInerney came within 1 foot of her and
Bartman stood only 2 feet from her. Bartman testified that he and
McInerney were 25 feet from Berger. McInerney denied that he was
ever 1 or 2 feet away from any of the female union representatives.
Joanis testified that the taller of the two company officials stood 1 or 2
feet from Berger and Joanis. The taller of the two was McInerney. I
find it unnecessary to resolve this conflict in testimony.

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 186
asked the union representatives if there were any company
employees with them. The union representatives said no.
McInerney said that the union representatives were trespassing
and directed them to leave. During this exchange, the remain-
ing three union representatives were handbilling on the other
side of the driveway entrance. The company vice presidents
insisted that the union handbillers were trespassing on company
property and should leave. The union representatives remained
adamant in their refusal to leave and insisted that they were not
trespassing. Joanis warned McInerney that he and Bartman
were engaging in surveillance.5
Bartman announced that he would call the police. Berger
said she would wait until the police told her to leave. Bartman
walked back to the company building to call the police. McIn-
erney remained in the vicinity of Berger and Joanis arguing
with them. The union representatives claimed that they were
standing in the right-of-way and accused McInerney of surveil-
lance. At this time, cars were leaving the plant. I find from
Berger’s testimony that she warned that the Union would file
an unfair labor practice charge and that McInerney replied that
she might as well be talking to herself.
McInerney retreated down the driveway as Berger was hand-
ing union literature to departing cars during the shift change.
He stood, looking into car windows and greeting people in the
cars by name. In a few minutes, Bartman joined McInerney
along the side of the driveway. The two moved a bit further
down the driveway and continued to wave at the passing cars as
the shifts changed. They also called out to the people in the
cars by name.6 At the same time, Berger was handing to the
passing employees the Union’s handbills. Tavares also stood
along the side of the driveway, waiving at passing cars and
addressing their occupants by name.7
The Penn Township Police Department dispatched Patrol-
man Guy Hettinger in quick response to Bartman’s call. Het-
tinger’s patrol report asserts that he arrived at the entrance to
the Company’s driveway at 2:57 p.m. The patrol report also
stated that the complainant, identified as John “Bartrum,” but
properly identified as “Bartman” in Hettinger’s testimony,
“felt” that the five people handing out union literature, referred
to in the report as subjects, “were trespassing.” Hettinger’s
report also contains the following account of his action when he
arrived at the Company’s driveway:

5 I have based my findings regarding the confrontation between
McInerney and the union representatives on the testimony of the par-
ticipants, to the extent their accounts do not disagree. Where there is
disagreement as to McInerney’s exact language, I find it unnecessary to
resolve it.
6 I based my findings regarding Bartman’s and McInerney’s waving
and calling to employees on Berger’s testimony and admissions which
the Company made in its statement of position addressed to a field
attorney on the Regional Director’s staff, dated December 21.
7 Tavares testified that he returned to the plant when Bartman re-
turned to the driveway. However, Berger testified that Tavares re-
mained along the driveway and joined Bartman and McInerney in
waiving and calling out to the passing cars. One of Berger’s col-
leagues, Pierre Joannis, placed Tavares at the bottom of the driveway
after Bartman had returned to the driveway, and also testified that Ta-
vares was waiving and calling out names as cars passed on the drive-
way toward the union representatives. Berger and Joannis testified
about Tavares’s presence at the driveway in a full and forthright man-
ner. In contrast, Tavares, seemed uncertain about what was going on
along the driveway after the police arrived. On considering the de-
meanor of the three witnesses, I have credited Berger and Joannis re-
garding Tavares’ conduct as he stood along the Company’s driveway.

Upon arrival I spoke to [complainant] and Patrick
McInerney who advised that they asked the subjects to
leave but they refused.
The five subjects were from the United Food and
Commercial Workers Local 1776 in Norristown PA. The
subjects were standing in front of the entrance to Snyders
on the SR 116 right-of-way. They were not blocking traf-
fic or stopping vehicles.
I called Tom Kelly of the DA’s office regarding the
situation. He advised me that the subjects are legally al-
lowed to be there and are not trespassing.
I advised [complainant] of the information and sug-
gested he contact his attorney for further assistance.

Officer Hettinger’s testimony added to, and was consistent
with, his official report. He testified that when he arrived at
Snyders, he observed the five union representatives standing at
the entrance to Snyder’s driveway, where the pavement of SR
116 and the driveway meet. He also testified that Bartman and
McInerney were standing halfway down the length of the
driveway and that there was no traffic in the driveway.
According to Hettinger’s testimony, the two company officials
complained that the five union people were trespassing on the
Company’s property and Bartman and McInerney also re-
quested that the officer ask the five to leave. Officer Hettinger
testified that on hearing this complaint, he went to a corner of
the driveway to talk to the five union people.
The police officer testified that he told Patricia Berger and
her colleagues of the Company’s complaint that they were tres-
passing and also asked the nature of their activity. Hettinger
testified that the union representatives told him that that they
were handing out union literature. He also testified that one of
them asserted that they had a right to be in the right-of-way of
SR 116, which extended 16 feet from the yellow line in the
middle of the road. Hettinger testified that he took their names,
birthdates, social security numbers, and cards from two of the
five. He also testified that he told the union representatives that
he did not know what a full right-of-way was in that area and
that he would have to check on it.
Officer Hettinger testified that he went to his police cruiser
and contacted York County’s assistant district attorney, Tom
Kelley, on a cell phone. According to Hettinger’s testimony, he
told Kelly about the Company’s complaint and reported his
observations of the five union representatives’ conduct and
where they were located with regard to SR 116. Hettinger testi-
fied that Kelley advised him that:

[I]f the union representatives were out along side the roadway
in what was considered the right-of-way, they were allowed to
be there as long as they didn’t—did not pose a threat to any-
one or not a danger to themselves or anybody else and did not
impede the flow of traffic.

SNYDER’S OF HANOVER, INC. 187
According to Hettinger’s testimony, he returned to Bartman
and McInerney and told them of Kelley’s remarks. In his tes-
timony, on direct examination by company counsel, Bartman
admitted that Hettinger returned from speaking to “a local dis-
trict attorney” and asserted that the five union representatives
had “a 16-foot right-of-way.” On direct examination by com-
pany counsel, Vice President McInerney made essentially the
same admission. Having offered as evidence, Bartman’s and
McInerney’s testimony containing Hettinger’s assertion of his
conversation with Kelley, I conclude that the Company has
waived its earlier hearsay objection to Hettinger’s testimony
and his official report regarding the same conversation. Trouser
Corp. of America, 153 F.2d 284, 287–288 (3d Cir. 1946). Ac-
cordingly, I have credited Officer Hettinger’s testimony and his
report regarding his conversation with Attorney Kelley.
According to Hettinger, he reported his conversation to the
five union representatives. His report shows that he departed
from the site of their handbilling at 3:16 p.m. I find from
Patricia Berger’s and Pierre Joannis’s testimony that the union
representatives left the site at about 3:30 p.m.
In assessing credibility in this case, I have noted that Officer
Hettinger was a neutral observer and that his attitude while
testifying before me was consistent with that role. He testified
in an open and candid manner. I also noted that the testimony
of McInerney, Bartman, and Tavares varied regarding where
the union representatives stood. I also observed that the three
seemed anxious to show that the handbilling caused a traffic
backup. Thus, the three did not impress me as reliable wit-
nesses, when compared to Hettinger. Accordingly, I have cred-
ited the police officer and have based my findings of fact on his
testimony, where it differed from that of Bartman, McInerney,
or Tavares. Further, as Hettinger’s credited testimony shows
that he observed that the five union representatives did not go
beyond the the top of the Company’s driveway, where it meets
SR 116, I have credited Patricia Berger’s testimony that she and
her colleagues did not trespass on the Company’s property.
B. Analysis and Conclusions
The Board has recognized that an employer’s unlawful at-
tempt to interfere with its employees’ right under Section 7 of
the Act to receive union literature violates Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act. Romar Refuse Removal, Inc., 314 NLRB 658 (1994);
Pioneer Press, 297 NLRB 972 (1990). The Board has also held
that an employer violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by attempt-
ing to thwart nonemployee union representatives in their efforts
to communicate with employees from public property adjacent
to the workplace. Lechmere, Inc., 308 NLRB 1074 (1992).8
Here, the Company attempted to remove the Union’s five non-
employee representatives from the public right-of-way as they
were distributing a handbill designed to encourage the Com-
pany’s employees to select the Union as their collective-
bargaining representative. The Company sought to remove the
union representatives by insisting that they were trespassing
and ordering them to leave the public right-of-way, where they
were engaging in distribution of the Union’s literature to com-
pany employees. When the union representatives refused to
leave, the Company called on the Penn Township police to
interfere with the Union’s handbilling. The Company asked the
police to remove the Union’s representatives, who were at-
tempting to communicate with employees from public property
adjacent to the workplace. I find that by these efforts the Com-
pany violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Lechmere, Inc., supra.

8 In its posthearing brief, the Company, for the first time in this pro-
ceeding contends that its property rights extend to the middle of SR 116
and that under State law it could properly prohibit the union representa-
tives from handbilling on October 1. In an effort to support its position,
the Company cites State court decisions regarding such property inter-
ests. However, none of those decisions discuss peaceful handbilling.
Indeed, holdings of Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court do not support the
Company’s position. Instead, the court has recognized that the public
retains the right of peaceful protest on the public right-of-way. E.g.,
Pennsylvania Labor Board v. Chester & Delaware Counties Bartend-
ers, Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union, 64 A.2d 834, 837–839 (Pa.
1949). Accord: Frankel-Warwick Limited Partnership v. Hotel, Bar-
tenders & Restaurant Employees Union, 482 A.2d 1073 (Pa. Sup.Ct.
1984). Accordingly, I find no merit in this belated contention.
I also find that the Company engaged in unlawful surveil-
lance of the Union and of the employees’ protected activities,
when Bartman, McInerney, and Tavares remained along the
Company’s driveway waving at passing cars and calling out the
names of employees in those cars, as the union representatives
attempted to hand out literature. I find that the Company’s
conduct in this regard was likely to discourage its employees
from taking the Union’s literature. I find, therefore, that by this
conduct, the Company violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Hospital Episcopal San Lucas, 317 NLRB 54, 59 (1995);
Carter Hawley Hale Stores, 267 NLRB 385, 402 (1983).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. By instructing union representatiives to cease distribution
of Union literature and leave the public right-of-way adjacent to
the Company’s facility, and by calling the Penn Township po-
lice in an effort to remove the union representatives from the
public right-of-way, the Company has engaged in unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
8(a)(1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. By engaging in surveillance of employees to whom the
Union was offering union literature, the Company violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and
desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act.9
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended10

9 Contrary to the General Counsel’s position, I find that the character
and scope of the violations in this case do not warrant a requirement
that Respondent’s management read the attached notice to employees.
Compare Loray Corp., 184 NLRB 557 (1970).
10 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 188
ORDER
The Respondent, Snyder’s of Hanover, Inc., Hanover, Penn-
sylvania, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Prohibiting representatives of United Food & Commer-
cial Workers International Union, Local 1776, AFL–CIO, CLC,
or any other labor organization, from distributing union litera-
ture to employees in the public right-of-way adjacent to its
facility.
(b) Attempting to remove representatives of United Food &
Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1776, AFL–
CIO, CLC, or of any other labor organization, distributing un-
ion literature, from the public right-of-way adjacent to its facil-
ity.
(c) Engaging in surveillance of its employees receiving un-
ion literature from United Food & Commercial Workers Inter-
national Union, Local 1776, AFL–CIO, CLC, or any other la-
bor organization or participating in any other concerted activity
protected by Section 7 of the Act
(d) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its fa-
cility in Hanover, Pennsylvania, copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.”11 Copies of the notice, on forms provided
by the Regional Director for Region 5, after being signed by the
Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60
consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices
are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In
the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the
Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility in-
volved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and
mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current em-
ployees and former employees employed by the Respondent at
any time since October 1, 1998.

11 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of the United States court
of appeals, the words in the notice “Posted by Order of the National
Labor Relations Board’’ shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of
the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National
Labor Relations Board.’’
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.

APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and
abide by this notice.

Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights:

To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected con-
certed activities.

WE WILL NOT prohibit representatives of United Food &
Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1776, AFL–
CIO, CLC, or any other labor organization, from distributing
union literature to our employees in the public right-of-way
adjacent to our facility.
WE WILL NOT attempt to remove representatives of United
Food & Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1776,
AFL–CIO, CLC, or of any other labor organization, distributing
union literature to our employees in the public right-of-way
adjacent to our facility.
WE WILL NOT engage in surveillance of our employees re-
ceiving union literature from United Food & Commercial
Workers International Union, Local 1776, AFL–CIO, CLC, or
any other labor organization or participating, in any other con-
certed activity protected by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
you by Section 7 of the Act.

SNYDER’S OF HANOVER, INC.