Snively Groves, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 17, 1954

109 N.L.R.B. 1394 (N.L.R.B. 1954)

1394 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
SNIVELY GROVES , INC. and INTERNATIONAL WOODWORKERS OF AMERICA,
CIO. Case No . 10-CA-1486. September 17, 1954
Decision and Order
On November 5, 1953, Trial Examiner John I-I. Eadie issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the
Respondent had not violated the Act and recommending that the
complaint be dismissed in its entirety, as set forth in the copy of the
Intermediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter the General Counsel
filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and a supporting brief ;
the Respondent filed a brief in support of the Intermediate Report.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate Report, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in
the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda-
tions of the Trial Examiner with the following modification.
The Charging Union and the Respondent were parties to a collec-
tive-bargaining agreement which, with respect to duration, provided :
This Agreement shall continue in full force and effect for the
period of one year from the 21st day of April, 1951, provided
however, that the Company and the Union shall within a period
of sixty (60) days prior to the expiration date of the Agreement
meet in a conference at a place to be mutually agreed upon, for
the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of a new
Agreement.
On January 21, 1952, some 90 days before the expiration date, the
Union requested negotiations, which began about a month thereafter
and continued to March 31, 1952, when they ended, as the Trial Ex-
aminer found, in a good-faith impasse on the subject of wages. The
Union struck that day, about 70 days after its notice, but within the
contract term.
The next day, April 1, 1952, the Respondent sent the strikers a
letter stating that they had been misled in going out on strike and
informing them that unless they reported back to work on or before
7 a. m., April 5, 1952, their places would be filled and they could there-
after return to work only as new employees. On or about May 21,
1952, the strike was abandoned and the strikers applied uncondition-
ally for reinstatement. Thereafter the Respondent did reinstate some
of these applicants.
The complaint alleged a discriminatory discharge of the strikers
on April 5, 1952, and a refusal to reinstate, on May 22, 1952, as to
those not reinstated. The Trial Examiner found that as the provi-
109 NLRB No. 199.
SNIVELY GROVES, INC. 1395
sions of Section 8 (d) had not been complied with 1 the strikers had
lost their employee status, and he therefore found it unnecessary to
decide whether the alleged discharges and refusals to reinstate were
discriminatory. To this conclusion the General Counsel excepts.
We agree with the Trial Examiner's conclusion, but find his rationale
incomplete.
The Trial Examiner stated that Section 8 (d) provides a no-strike
period of 60 days before the expiration of a contract. This is not
precisely so. As we have recently set forth in the Lion Oil case,' Sec-
tion 8 (d) requires that when notice is given, there be a waiting period
of 60 days or until the expiration date 3 of the contract, whichever is
later, before a strike to obtain contract modifications or terminations.
Applying that principle here, we find that although the Union waited
more than 60 days after its notice of January 21, it struck within the
contract term, before the expiration date. The strikers therefore lost
the protection accorded to economic strikers under the Act. Accord-
ingly, we shall, as did the Trial Examiner, dismiss the complaint 4
[The Board dismissed the complaint.]
MEMBER MURDOCK took no part in the consideration of the above
Decision and Order.
1 The Union also failed to give the notices to the Mediation Service required by Section
8 (d) (3). In view of our disposition of the case , we do not pass upon the effect of this
failure, or on the General Counsel's contention as to it. See , however, California Associa-
tion of Employers for and to behalf of J. C . Penney, 109 NLRB 754.
2 Lion Oil Company, 109 NLRB 680.
As defined in that decision.
Member Peterson , who concurred in the result in Lion Oil, supra, deems himself bound
thereby.
Intermediate Report
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon an amended charge filed by International Woodworkers of America, CIO,
herein called the Union , the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board,
respectively called herein the General Counsel and the Board , by the Regional Direc-
tor for the Tenth Region (Atlanta, Georgia ), issued a complaint dated April 30, 1953,
against Snively Groves , Inc., herein called the Respondent , alleging that the Respond-
ent had engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 8 (a) (1), (3 ), and (5 ) and Section 2 (6) and ( 7) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, herein called the Act.
With respect to the unfair labor practices , the complaint , as amended , alleges that:
(1) Beginning on or about February 26, 1952, and thereafter, the Respondent
refused to bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of its
employees in an appropriate unit; ( 2) on about March 31, 1952 , the Respondent's
employees listed in Appendix A, attached hereto, ceased work concertedly and went
on strike ; ( 3) said strike was caused and prolonged by unfair labor practices of the
Respondent ; (4) on about April 5, 1952, the Respondent discharged the emp'cvees
named in said Appendix A, because of their membership in and activities on beh -If of
the Union and because they engaged in the strike ; (5) on or about May 21 , 1952, the
employees named in Appendix A abandoned the strike and unconditionally applied
for reinstatement ; ( 6) on about May 22, 1952, and thereafter , the Respondent
failed and refused to reinstate the employees named in Appendix A, except those who
334811-55-vol. 109-89
1396 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
have a reinstatement date listed opposite their names, because of their membership in
and activities on behalf of the Union and because they engaged in the strike; and (7)
the Respondent engaged in certain acts which constituted interference, restraint, and
coercion.
The Respondent's answer admits the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint,
but denies the commission of any unfair labor practices.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held at Waycross, Georgia, on July 7, 8, and 9,
1953, before the undersigned Trial Examiner. Motions of the General Counsel to
amend the complaint were granted without objection. The General Counsel also
moved to conform the pleadings to the proof, as to names, dates, and other minor
variances. The motion was granted without objection. The Respondent moved to
dismiss the case of Lottie Giles and the complaint as a whole. Ruling was reserved
on the motions. The motions to dismiss are disposed of as hereinafter indicated.
The General Counsel and the Respondent have filed briefs with the Trial Examiner,
which have received due consideration.
Upon the entire record in the case, and from my observation of the witnesses, I
make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The Respondent is a Florida corporation, having its principal office at Winter
Haven, Florida. It has a plant at Waycross, Georgia, where it is engaged in the
manufacture, sale, and distribution of wooden packing boxes which are used in the
shipment of citrus fruits. The Waycross plant is the only operation of Respondent
which is involved in the instant proceeding.
In the course and conduct of its business operations, the Respondent annually
sells and ships from the Waycross plant finished products, valued at more than
$500,000, to customers located outside the State of Georgia.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
International Woodworkers of America, CIO, is a labor organization which admits
to membership employees of the Respondent.
III THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
On April 21, 1951, the Respondent and the Union entered into a collective-bargain-
ing contract for a period of 1 year. Mr. E. H. Bennett, Respondent's attorney, and
Mr. I. C. Connor, manager of the Waycross plant, represented the Respondent in the
negotiations for the contract. However, it was not signed until it received the final
approval of John A. Snively, Sr., president of Respondent.
By letter dated January 21, 1952, the Union requested the Respondent for a meet-
ing in order to negotiate a new agreement. Thereafter, meetings between representa-
tives of the Respondent and the Union were held on February 26 and March 5 and
31, 1952. The parties were unable to reach agreement on a new contract.
Immediately following the meeting of March 31, the Union struck the plant. By
letter dated May 21, 1952, the Union notified the Respondent that the employees had
voted to end the strike and that they would report for work the following morning.
The Respondent failed to reinstate the strikers, except on the dates shown on
Appendix A.'
The Respondent operated the plant during the strike, with employees who did not
go on strike and hiring new employees to replace the strikers.
B. Alleged interference, restraint, and coercion
Employee LeRoy Turner went on strike with other employees on March 31, 1952.
Turner testified, in substance, that about 2 weeks after the start of the strike Foreman
1 The complaint alleges that employees William E. Macklin, Dawson S McDaniel, James
O Thornton, and Isabella Holmes were strikers who were not reinstated until the dates
shown opposite their names on Appendix A. However, at the hearing the parties stipu-
lated to the effect that these employees were first hired on the dates in question, and not
reinstated. The stipulation also was to the effect that employee Reppard Thornton had
quit his job on May 14, 1952, and was rehired on June 9, 1952. None of these employees
appeared as witnesses at the hearing.
SNIVELY GROVES, INC. 1397
C. L. Thomas came to his house and offered him his job back if he would "swear
on the Bible" that he would quit the Union, that he (Turner) refused; that he returned
to work about 1 month after the start of the strike, that when he reported for work
he had a conversation with Thomas and Samuel Cutrer, plant superintendent; that
in Cutrer's presence Thomas asked him if he would "swear" that he would not have
"anything else to do with union"; that "they just asked me weren't I through with
the union"; that he (Turner) refused to reject the Union, stating that he believed
in it ; and that Cutrer then told Thomas to put him (Turner) to work. Both Thomas
and Cutrer denied the statements concerning the Union attributed to them by Turner.
Turner's testimony is the only evidence adduced by the General Counsel in support
of the allegations of the complaint to the effect that the Respondent interrogated its
employees concerning their union sympathies and that it conditioned further employ-
ment on the abandonment of union membership and activities. There is nothing in
the record which tends to discredit Thomas and Cutrer, and they impressed me as
reliable and credible witnesses. Accordingly, it is found that the General Counsel
failed to sustain the burden of proving the above allegations of the complaint.
C. The alleged refusal to bargain
By letter dated January 21, 1952, the Union requested the Respondent for a meet-
ing in order to negotiate a new collective-bargaining contract. The first meeting was
held on February 26. Bennett and Connor represented the Respondent at that meet-
ing. James Craven, International representative of the Union, and a bargaining com-
mittee of employees represented the Union. The Union submitted a proposed agree-
ment; and certain counterproposals were made by the Respondent. It appears that
the Union's wage proposal also was discussed. The meeting lasted for about 2 hours.
On March 1, 1952, Craven sent the following telegram to President Snively:
Entire membership of Local S-113 at your plant in Waycross, Ga., has requested
that I ask you to attend our negotiations on Wed., March 5, at 2:00 P. M. since
it is our understanding that any agreements made with your plant manager and
attorney are dependent on you as to their finality.
On March 3, Snively sent a telegram in reply to Craven as follows:
Retel it is impossible for me to come to Waycross Wednesday March Fifth.
We are at the heighth of our season and it would be necessary for me to have
more notice before attending any meeting in Waycross. I think our attorney
and Mr. Connor are capable of negotiating a new contract which I shall be glad
to come to Waycross and discuss with you and your group when it is in final
form. I shall be glad to talk with you in Winter Haven at any time you care
to come down.
A bargaining conference was held on March 5, as scheduled, with the same repre-
sentatives of the parties attending as were present at the first meeting. It appears
that the parties tentatively agreed to a number of contract provisions at this meeting.
Subject to the final approval of Snively, the Respondent agreed to paid holidays,
grievance procedure, and safety and health provisions. It is not clear from the
record if agreement on vacations was reached, but it is undisputed that the Respondent
did offer paid vacations of 1 week. The Respondent also indicated that it might
agree to a modification of the Union's proposal for checkoff of union dues.
At Bennett's request, Craven agreed to redraft the Union's proposals; while it is
not clear from the evidence, it appears that the revised proposals were to include the
tentative agreements reached at the first two bargaining conferences.2 At the second
meeting, Craven requested that the Respondent submit or make available to the Union
"a list of job classifications and the rates that applied to each particular job classifi-
cation." Concerning the conversation in this connection, Craven was questioned and
testified as follows:
Q. You say the company refused to submit it to you. What did they say?
A. They said if I wanted that information I could get it from the individual
employees myself. Mr. Connor stated that he did not know all of the classifica-
tions in the plant; and that he did not know what jobs all of the various people
were on . The card file at the clock did not specify the particular job that the
people were doing.
Q. Was there any discussion of a wage or ways and means of making this
information available?
8 Craven testified that he submitted the revised proposals to Bennett at his office on
March 10.
1398 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
A. I asked that they call the foremen in and get the information from the
foremen, but they refused to go along with that request as well; and after con-
siderable discussion along these lines there was a rather heated argument for
a few minutes between Mr. Bennett and I; . . .
After Mr. Bennett and I could not reach an agreement on them furnishing
us the necessary information for the purposes of classifying jobs, he turned to
Mr. Lee and said , "Mr. Lee, if you will formally request it of the company,
I think that we could be able to submit the information that we can collect
to you...."
By registered letter dated March 7, 1952, addressed to Manager Connor, the
Union requested the Respondent to furnish it with "a list of all production and
maintenance employees and the current rate of pay they receive ." The letter stated
that the request was made "for the purpose of establishing job classifications."
Within a few days Connor furnished the Union with a list of job classifications.
The list contained a statement providing for rate differentials between common
labor and the three job classes set forth therein. It is undisputed that the list fur-
nished by the Respondent was a copy of one that had been submitted by the Union
during negotiations for the 1951 contract ; and that the job classifications were not
in effect in the plant at the time in question and were not set forth in the 1951 con-
tract.3
On March 19 , 1952 , Craven sent a night letter to Snively in which he stated,
"Entire membership tells committee and I that we must have something to offer
by March 30, 1952," and that he was willing to meet with Snively at Winter Haven.
Snively replied by telegram dated March 20, 1952, stating , in substance , that due
to a fire he could not meet with Craven before March 25 and that he would attend
a conference either at Winter Haven or at Waycross , according to Craven 's wishes
in the matter.
The final bargaining conference was held at Waycross on March 31. In addi-
tion to the persons who had attended the two prior meetings , John Snively, Tom
Snively, brother and business associate of John Snively, and E. L. Jones, treasurer
of Respondent , were present . The meeting lasted for about 15 or 20 minutes.
There was a brief discussion of the points at issue at the start of the meeting.
Craven asked Bennett if the Respondent was willing to classify jobs in accordance
with the list that had been submitted to Lee. Bennett replied that the Respondent
would agree to the list. Craven then submitted the Union 's wage proposal . Presi-
dent John Snively refused to give any wage increase , and stated the reasons for
his refusal . The Union 's representatives then walked out of the meeting .4 Craven
went to the plant immediately after leaving the meeting. Within a matter of minutes
the employees ceased work and went on strike.
About April 8, 1952, Craven made a telephone call to Bennett . Concerning the
conversation, Craven testified without contradiction that he told Bennett that "our
mind [is] never closed, and we [are] ready and willing to meet at any time for
3 Connor testified , in substance , that either the same day or the day after he received
the Union's request he called to his office employee Jim Lee, president of the local of the
Union, and gave him the list, and that the list was the only information on job classifica-
tions that the Respondent had available.
* Witnesses for the General Counsel testified to the effect that after Snively refused to
grant a wage increase , he refused to discuss other contract proposals by stating that his
"mind was closed" and that "there wasn't anything else to talk about." Craven testified
that Snively made these remarks after he had stated that he not only would not give any
wage increase but also would not grant "any paid holidays or any paid vacations." Em-
ployees Herrin , Roberts, and Walker were on the Union 's bargaining committee and were
present at the third meeting . Herrin, contrary to Craven , testified that neither holidays
nor vacations were discussed at the meeting. Walker and Roberts did not testify that
Snively made any remarks about paid holidays or paid vacations . Walker testified that
at the start of the meeting when Bennett asked what the Union wanted to discuss first,
Craven chose the wage increase proposal by stating it was "the main thing." However,
Craven's testimony was to the effect that Bennett initiated the discussion on wages Both
Herrin and Roberts testified , in substance , that the employees struck because they did not
get a wage increase . John Snively denied the statements attributed to him wherein be
purportedly refused to discuss other contract proposals after he rejected the Union's wage
demands. Jones and Connor supported Snively's testimony in this respect . The Trial
Examiner believes that the Respondent 's witnesses were the more reliable and credible in
this connection.
SNIVELY GROVES, INC. 1359
further negotiations"; and that Bennett replied, "I will give the Company your mes-
sage." The record is silent as to any further communications between the parties in
this connection.
Conclusions
The Respondent's answer admits the appropriateness of the unit alleged in the
complaint. In substance, the answer also admits that the Union represented a
majority of the employees in the appropriate unit until March 31, 1952, or until
the start of the strike, but denies that the Union represented a majority after that
date.
The General Counsel contends that the Respondent did not bargain in good faith.
This contention is rejected.
The evidence shows that until and through March 31, 1952, the Respondent met
with the Union and tentatively agreed to a number of contract proposals. It is
true that Bennett and Connor did not have authority to bind the Respondent, and
that any agreement made by them had to receive the final approval of Snively.
However, the Union did not raise any objection to this procedure until after the
first meeting. When the Union wired Snively on March 1, requesting him to attend
the meeting scheduled for March 5, he promptly replied that he was unable to come
to Waycross because of business, and that, "I shall be glad to talk with you in
Winter Haven at any time you care to come down." The Union then met with
Bennett and Connor on March 5 without protest. As related above, Snively was
present at the third meeting.
The General Counsel contends that the Respondent's failure to submit the infor-
mation requested in the Union's letter of March 7, 1952, shows that it did not bar-
gain in good faith and constitutes an independent violation of Section 8 (a) (5)
of the Act. This contention also is rejected. At the meeting on March 5, Craven
requested a list of job classifications and "the rates that applied to each particular
job classification." Connor replied to the effect that there were no job classifica-
tions in the plant. It appears that an argument then ensued between Craven and
Bennett concerning the method of obtaining the requested information, with Ben-
nett agreeing to supply "the information that we can collect" if Lee, president of
the local union, would "formally request it." However, Lee's letter to Connor
requested, "A list of all production and maintenance employees and the current
rate of pay they receive." Within a few days Connor submitted to Lee a list of
job classifications. It is undisputed that this list had been submitted to the Respond-
ent by the Union during negotiations for the 1951 contract, and that the classi-
fications were not in effect at the plant.
Clearly, the Respondent failed to submit the information requested by the Union's
letter of March 7. However, I do not believe that these facts are sufficient to estab-
lish that the Respondent was not bargaining in good faith. In view of the Union's
inconsistent requests, it is quite possible, if not probable, that the Respondent's
failure to submit the requested information is attributable to a misunderstanding.
There is no evidence that the Respondent at any time refused to submit the infor-
mation. Connor testified that he gave Lee the only information on job classifica-
tions that he had in the office. The evidence does not show that the Union pro-
tested when it received the list of job classifications on about March 8. On the
contrary, the Union indicated that it was satisfied with the information supplied
when at the final meeting on March 31, Craven asked if the Respondent would
agree to the job classifications shown on the list. Bennett's reply that the Respond-
ent would do so shows its good faith in the matter.
From the whole record I am satisfied and find that the rupture in the bargaining
negotiations on March 31 was caused by a genuine impasse on wages, and not by a
failure or refusal to bargain on the Respondent 's part . Since the General Counsel
failed to prove that the Union represented a majority of the nonstriking employees,
and since the undisputed evidence indicates otherwise , it is not necessary to discuss
the alleged refusals to bargain after March 31. Accordingly, it is found that the
Respondent did not engage in conduct violative of Section 8 (a) (5) of the Act.
D. The strike
The complaint alleges that the Respondent discriminatorily discharged the em-
ployees shown on Appendix A on or about April 5, 1952; that on or about May 21,
1952, said employees abandoned the strike and unconditionally applied for reinstate-
ment ; and that on or about May 22, 1952, the Respondent discriminatorily failed
and refused to reinstate said employees , except those who have reinstatement dates
listed opposite their names on Appendix A.
1400 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The General Counsel contends that the employees were discharged by reason of
the following letter dated April 1, 1952, which the Respondent sent to the strikers:
It is regretted that you have been misled by your leaders in going out on strike.
This of course is your right, but it is also your right under the law of the State
of Georgia to return to work and you will be protected if you care to continue
work.
It is necessary to notify you that unless you report for work on or before
Saturday morning, April 5, 1952, at 7:00 A. M., regardless of any other hour
you have reported for work in the past, your place will be filled and will not
thereafter be open to you except on the basis of a new application, the same
as any other new employee.
As related above, the Union and the Respondent entered into a collective-bargain-
ing agreement on April 21, 1951. This contract did not expire until April 21, 1952.
At the hearing the parties stipulated that no notice was given to the Respondent by
the Union, as required by Section 8 (d) (1) of the Act, except the following letter
dated January 21, 1952:
This is to advise you that the International Woodworkers of America, CIO, at
its Local S-113, desires to meet with you at the earliest date convenient to both
parties for the purpose of negotiating a new agreement to replace the one entered
into with your company on April 21, 1951.
The parties also stipulated that no notice was given by the Union to the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service "30 days atter notice of the existence of the
dispute," as required by Section 8 (d) (3) of the Act. It is undisputed that the strike
started on March 31, 1952, or within the 60-day period before the expiration date of
the contract, specified in Section 8 (d) (4) of the Act.
It is found that the strike was not caused or prolonged by any unfair labor prac-
tices on the part of the Respondent. Since the strike was economic, there can be
no question but that the provisions of Section 8 (d) of the Act apply, and that by
going on strike within the 60-day period before the expiration date of the 1951 con-
tract the strikers lost their status as employees. Therefore, it is unnecessary to decide
whether or not the Respondent discharged the strikers on or about April 5, 1952, or
failed and refused to reinstate them on about May 22, 1952.
Considerable evidence was adduced concerning an alleged act of violence which
occurred on April 8, 1952, and involved some of the strikers. The Respondent
contends that it should not be ordered to reinstate these strikers. In view of the
findings made above, it would serve no purpose to set forth the facts herein or to
resolve the issues.
Accordingly, it is found that the Respondent did not engage in conduct violative
of Section 8 (a) (3) and (1) of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]
Appendix A
Betty R. Goble, 6/17/52
Therodoric Manley, 6/17/52
James O. Daughtry, 6/26/52
Will Durden, 6/26/52
Joshua Solomon, 6/5/52
Leon Cobb, Jr., 6/18/52
Henry J. Russell, Jr., 6/3/52
D. C. Herd, Jr., 6/23/52
Betty Sue Gunter, 5/26/52
Annie E. Lord, 6/9/52
John Henry Brown, 8/11/52
Clara Mae Cato, 12/22/52
Ethel Mae Corbett, 10/3/52
Lucille Cox, 10/6/52
Charlie David, 11/25/52
Edward Driggers, 7/3/52
Claude Goble, 10/6/52
Louise Goble, 10/28/52
Doris Archer
Gladys Barnes
Fosteen Banks
Emma O. Griffin, 10/6/52
Ray Hurst, 12/29/52
Joy I. Jackson, 3/5/53
Henry Kennedy, 12/12/52
Viola McMillan, 10/6/52
Linnett E. Pitts, 10/6/52
Robert Alfred Schulz, 11/24/52
Robert L. Smith, 4/2/53
Leavy Swain, 3/19/53
Reba Thompson, 12/3/52
Ruth I. Simpson, 1/1/53
E. L. Herrin, 12/1/52
Linwood D. Boyett, 6/10/52
Isabella Holmes, 6/5/52
William E. Macklin, 6/4/52
Dawson S. McDaniel, 6/18/52
James O. Thornton, 6/2/52
Reppard Thornton, 6/9/52
Troy Lee
Ella M. (Mrs. J. L.) Manning
John L. Manning
BANNER DIE FIXTURE COMPANY
Lizzie B. Barnes
Dorothy Barnett
Paul E. Best
Inez Beverly
Mary E. Beverly
Johnnie B. Bishop
Harris Boyd
Viola Boyd
Frances P. Brown
James W. Carver
Zella Cason
Mary Jane Clark
Harley Conner
Harvey Conner
Robert L. Corbett
Viola (Mrs. Robert ) Corbett
Nezzie Crosby
Nellie Dowling
James F. Duggan
Elizabeth Ferguson
Lonnie Freeman
Marvin Gibson
Sam Golden
Early Gordon
Sara Higgs
Vienna Holmes
Pearlie Mae Houston
Rayfield Jones
Viola Jones
George R. Kennedy
Willie L. Kennedy
Nettie Kirkland
Fronnie Lee
Jim 0. Lee
Sara P. May
William M . Merritt
James Norris
James Pittman
Fannie F. Roberts
Leavy G. Roberts
Lola L. Roberts
Etta Mae Rounds
John Roundtree
Bertha C. Russell
Johnny C. Sanders
Lewis Sheffield
Granville Simmons
Laverne Smith
Dicie Spells
William A. Sweat
Mamie ( Marie) Taylor
Eugene Todd
James L. Tucker
Roosevelt Tucker
W. E. Tuten
Effie Tyson
Lillie Mae Walker
Marcus E. Walker
Myrtis Walker
Tom William Watkins
Maggie Tuten
W. E. Wilder
Fay Carver
R. E. Kirkland
Jesse J. Rowe
Elvin Tanner
Lucille Joyce
Lottie Giles
1401
BANNER DIE FIXTURE COMPANY and LOCAL 155, UAW, CIO. Case
No. 7-CA-693. September 17,1954
Decision and Order Remanding Case to Regional Director
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held in this proceeding at De-
troit, Michigan, from September 15 to 24, 1953, inclusive, before
Bertram G. Eadie, the duly designated Trial Examiner. On Febru-
ary 9, 1954, the Trial Examiner issued his Intermediate Report dis-
missing the complaint in its entirety. Thereafter, the General Coun-
sel and the Charging Party (Local 155, UAW-CIO) filed exceptions
and briefs, requesting a hearing de novo, in the event that the evidence
in the record failed to sustain the allegations in the complaint, be-
cause of the Trial Examiner's alleged prejudicial errors in excluding
relevant and material evidence which the General Counsel sought to
introduce and for other reasons.
We have carefully examined the portions of the record cited by
the General Counsel and the Charging Party, and have independently
considered the entire record, including the Trial Examiner 's Inter-
mediate Report. On the basis of all the Trial Examiner 's rulings at
109 NLRB No. 200.