SIGNIFY HOLDING B.V.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 28, 2021

2020004694 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 28, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
16/325,868 02/15/2019 PATRICK ALOUISIUS
MARTINA DE BRUYCKER
2016P80133WOUS 6257
138325 7590 09/28/2021
Signify Holding B.V.
465 Columbus Avenue
Suite 330
Valhalla, NY 10595
EXAMINER
CHAI, RAYMOND REI-YANG
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2844
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/28/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
Gigi.Miller@signify.com
jo.cangelosi@signify.com
kim.larocca@signify.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte PATRICK ALOUISIUS MARTINA DE BRUYCKER,
HAICO STORMS, and NICK WELBERS
Appeal 2020-004694
Application 16/325,868
Technology Center 2800
Before JEFFREY B. ROBERTSON, N. WHITNEY WILSON, and
DEBRA L. DENNETT, Administrative Patent Judges.
WILSON, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant appeals from the
Examiner’s October 29, 2019 decision finally rejecting claims 1–13
(hereinafter “Final Act.”).1 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We REVERSE.

1 Appellant refers to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a).
Appellant identifies Signify Holding B.V., as the real party in interest
(Appeal Br. 4).
Appeal 2020-004694
Application 16/325,868

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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Appellant’s disclosure is directed to a lighting device with lighting
terminals which can operate from a main power supply or from an auxiliary
power supply (Abstract). According to Appellant, prior art wireless
emergency lighting systems use a plug-in wall unit that senses loss of main
power and transmits a wireless signal to the lighting device of the system to
signal the power state and prompt activation of emergency lighting (Spec.
1:28–2:6). Appellant states that a problem with this kind of system is that
removal of the wireless unit or faulty operation of the unit results in either
the lighting device not turning on when main power is gone, or the lighting
device turning on in a non-emergency situation, unnecessarily draining the
secondary power source (typically batteries) (Spec. 2:6–18).
Appellant addresses this issue by providing a device that includes a
control circuit which monitors a wireless control signal indicative of the
power condition of the main power supply, and can switch to taking power
from the auxiliary power supply when it determines that there is no power at
the lighting terminals and that the wireless control signal from the main
power supply is absent (Appeal Br. 4). Claim 1, reproduced below from the
Claims Appendix, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A lighting device comprising terminals for connecting to
a main power supply, said lighting device comprising:
a light emitting module;
a control circuit for monitoring a wireless control signal
indicative of a power condition of said main power supply and
for monitoring a power condition at said terminals; and
an auxiliary power supply for powering said lighting
device,
wherein said control circuit is configured for powering
said lighting device from said auxiliary power supply in
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Application 16/325,868

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response to both: a) determining, from the monitoring of the
power condition at said terminals, that there is an absence of
power on said terminals, and b) determining, from the
monitoring of the wireless control signal, that there is an
absence of receipt of said wireless control signal.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:

Name Reference Date
Williams US 2014/0265845 A1 September 18, 2014
Recker et al. US 2015/0296599 A1 October 15, 2015

REJECTIONS
1. Claims 1–9 and 11–13 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1)
as anticipated by Williams.
2. Claim 10 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Williams in view of Recker.
OPINION
“A prior art reference anticipates a patent claim under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) if it discloses every claim limitation.” In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d
1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Cox Fibernet
Va., Inc., 602 F.3d 1325, 1336–37 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). Appellant argues that
Williams does not disclose a system in which the determination to switch to
the auxiliary power source requires “determining, from the monitoring of the
power condition at said terminals, that there is an absence of power on said
terminals,” but instead relies solely on a loss of the control signal (Appeal
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Br. 8). In particular, Appellant points to the following passage from
Williams:
As a further alternative, the circuitry in the housing 131 could
be arranged to transmit a control signal whilst the primary
supply is present at its input and to stop transmitting the
control signal if there is a power failure. In such an
embodiment, the circuitry in housing 131 would not need its
own secondary power supply 17. As long as the lighting
devices 1 receive the control signals from the circuitry in the
housing 131, they will know that primary power is available
(although perhaps switched off at a user operable switch 26). If
the lighting device 1 stops receiving the control signal, then it
can assume that primary power has been lost and it can either
directly illuminate its light source(s) from its secondary power
supply or it can first try to sense if any of the user operable
switches 26 are open circuit first, before using power from the
secondary power supply (of course in this case, the electronic
circuitry 135 in the lighting device would require the sensing
circuitry 37).

(Williams ¶ 161, emphasis added). Appellant contends that this passage
indicates that the Williams system determines power loss from loss of the
control signal (“If the lighting device 1 stops receiving the control signal,
then it can assume that primary power has been lost”), and does not
determine that there is an absence of power on the terminals by monitoring
of the power condition at the terminals. Appellant states: “The issue here is
whether Williams, in the embodiment in which it employs a wireless control
signal, determines that there is an absence of power on the terminals from
monitoring of the power condition at the terminals” (Appeal Br. 9).
We have reviewed the arguments and evidence set forth in the Appeal
Brief filed March 16, 2020 (“Appeal Br.”); the Reply Brief filed June 3,
2020 (“Reply Br.”); the Final Office Action mailed October 29, 2019 (“Final
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Application 16/325,868

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Act.”); and the Examiner’s Answer mailed April 3, 2020 (“Ans.”), and
determine that Appellant has demonstrated reversible error in the
Examiner’s finding that claim 1 is anticipated by Williams.
Thus, Williams states that, at least in some circumstances, its system
will: (1) determine that the control signal is not being received; and (2)
sense whether any user operable switches are open. Only then, according to
Williams, will its system use power from the secondary power supply
(Williams ¶ 161). However, Williams does not indicate that only if: (1) the
control signal is not being received; and (2) there is no power at the
terminals, will it switch over to the secondary power supply. Williams does
not state that the decision about whether to move to the secondary power
supply is dependent on what the system determines about the open or shut
status of the user operable switches (or whether there is power at the
terminals).
Claim 1 recites that the control circuit is configured to power the
lighting system from the auxiliary power supply only after it determines that:
(1) there is an absence of power at the terminals; and (2) the control signal is
not being received. Williams does not teach this precise system, as it does
not tie the use of the secondary (i.e. the auxiliary) power supply to a
determination that the terminals have no power.2
An anticipation rejection requires every element and limitation of the
claimed invention must be found in a single prior art reference, arranged as
in the claim. See Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. Cleveland Golf Co., 242 F.3d 1376,

2 In some embodiments, as argued Appellant, Williams does not concern
itself with the state of the user operated switches prior to moving to the
secondary power source (Williams ¶ 161).
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Application 16/325,868

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1383 (Fed. Cir. 2001). In this case, we determine that the evidence of record
does not support the Examiner’s finding of anticipation, requiring reversal of
the rejection of claim 1, and the claims which depend from it. Independent
claim 12 has similar limitations as claim 1, and has not been shown to be
anticipated by Williams for the same reasons.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejections are reversed.
DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:

Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–9, 11–13 102(a)(1) Williams 1–9, 11–13
10 103 Williams, Recker 10
Overall
Outcome
1–13

REVERSED