SIGNIFY HOLDING B.V.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardSep 28, 20212020004694 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 28, 2021) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 16/325,868 02/15/2019 PATRICK ALOUISIUS MARTINA DE BRUYCKER 2016P80133WOUS 6257 138325 7590 09/28/2021 Signify Holding B.V. 465 Columbus Avenue Suite 330 Valhalla, NY 10595 EXAMINER CHAI, RAYMOND REI-YANG ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2844 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 09/28/2021 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): Gigi.Miller@signify.com jo.cangelosi@signify.com kim.larocca@signify.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte PATRICK ALOUISIUS MARTINA DE BRUYCKER, HAICO STORMS, and NICK WELBERS Appeal 2020-004694 Application 16/325,868 Technology Center 2800 Before JEFFREY B. ROBERTSON, N. WHITNEY WILSON, and DEBRA L. DENNETT, Administrative Patent Judges. WILSON, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant appeals from the Examiner’s October 29, 2019 decision finally rejecting claims 1–13 (hereinafter “Final Act.”).1 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We REVERSE. 1 Appellant refers to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies Signify Holding B.V., as the real party in interest (Appeal Br. 4). Appeal 2020-004694 Application 16/325,868 2 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER Appellant’s disclosure is directed to a lighting device with lighting terminals which can operate from a main power supply or from an auxiliary power supply (Abstract). According to Appellant, prior art wireless emergency lighting systems use a plug-in wall unit that senses loss of main power and transmits a wireless signal to the lighting device of the system to signal the power state and prompt activation of emergency lighting (Spec. 1:28–2:6). Appellant states that a problem with this kind of system is that removal of the wireless unit or faulty operation of the unit results in either the lighting device not turning on when main power is gone, or the lighting device turning on in a non-emergency situation, unnecessarily draining the secondary power source (typically batteries) (Spec. 2:6–18). Appellant addresses this issue by providing a device that includes a control circuit which monitors a wireless control signal indicative of the power condition of the main power supply, and can switch to taking power from the auxiliary power supply when it determines that there is no power at the lighting terminals and that the wireless control signal from the main power supply is absent (Appeal Br. 4). Claim 1, reproduced below from the Claims Appendix, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A lighting device comprising terminals for connecting to a main power supply, said lighting device comprising: a light emitting module; a control circuit for monitoring a wireless control signal indicative of a power condition of said main power supply and for monitoring a power condition at said terminals; and an auxiliary power supply for powering said lighting device, wherein said control circuit is configured for powering said lighting device from said auxiliary power supply in Appeal 2020-004694 Application 16/325,868 3 response to both: a) determining, from the monitoring of the power condition at said terminals, that there is an absence of power on said terminals, and b) determining, from the monitoring of the wireless control signal, that there is an absence of receipt of said wireless control signal. REFERENCES The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is: Name Reference Date Williams US 2014/0265845 A1 September 18, 2014 Recker et al. US 2015/0296599 A1 October 15, 2015 REJECTIONS 1. Claims 1–9 and 11–13 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) as anticipated by Williams. 2. Claim 10 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Williams in view of Recker. OPINION “A prior art reference anticipates a patent claim under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) if it discloses every claim limitation.” In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Cox Fibernet Va., Inc., 602 F.3d 1325, 1336–37 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). Appellant argues that Williams does not disclose a system in which the determination to switch to the auxiliary power source requires “determining, from the monitoring of the power condition at said terminals, that there is an absence of power on said terminals,” but instead relies solely on a loss of the control signal (Appeal Appeal 2020-004694 Application 16/325,868 4 Br. 8). In particular, Appellant points to the following passage from Williams: As a further alternative, the circuitry in the housing 131 could be arranged to transmit a control signal whilst the primary supply is present at its input and to stop transmitting the control signal if there is a power failure. In such an embodiment, the circuitry in housing 131 would not need its own secondary power supply 17. As long as the lighting devices 1 receive the control signals from the circuitry in the housing 131, they will know that primary power is available (although perhaps switched off at a user operable switch 26). If the lighting device 1 stops receiving the control signal, then it can assume that primary power has been lost and it can either directly illuminate its light source(s) from its secondary power supply or it can first try to sense if any of the user operable switches 26 are open circuit first, before using power from the secondary power supply (of course in this case, the electronic circuitry 135 in the lighting device would require the sensing circuitry 37). (Williams ¶ 161, emphasis added). Appellant contends that this passage indicates that the Williams system determines power loss from loss of the control signal (“If the lighting device 1 stops receiving the control signal, then it can assume that primary power has been lost”), and does not determine that there is an absence of power on the terminals by monitoring of the power condition at the terminals. Appellant states: “The issue here is whether Williams, in the embodiment in which it employs a wireless control signal, determines that there is an absence of power on the terminals from monitoring of the power condition at the terminals” (Appeal Br. 9). We have reviewed the arguments and evidence set forth in the Appeal Brief filed March 16, 2020 (“Appeal Br.”); the Reply Brief filed June 3, 2020 (“Reply Br.”); the Final Office Action mailed October 29, 2019 (“Final Appeal 2020-004694 Application 16/325,868 5 Act.”); and the Examiner’s Answer mailed April 3, 2020 (“Ans.”), and determine that Appellant has demonstrated reversible error in the Examiner’s finding that claim 1 is anticipated by Williams. Thus, Williams states that, at least in some circumstances, its system will: (1) determine that the control signal is not being received; and (2) sense whether any user operable switches are open. Only then, according to Williams, will its system use power from the secondary power supply (Williams ¶ 161). However, Williams does not indicate that only if: (1) the control signal is not being received; and (2) there is no power at the terminals, will it switch over to the secondary power supply. Williams does not state that the decision about whether to move to the secondary power supply is dependent on what the system determines about the open or shut status of the user operable switches (or whether there is power at the terminals). Claim 1 recites that the control circuit is configured to power the lighting system from the auxiliary power supply only after it determines that: (1) there is an absence of power at the terminals; and (2) the control signal is not being received. Williams does not teach this precise system, as it does not tie the use of the secondary (i.e. the auxiliary) power supply to a determination that the terminals have no power.2 An anticipation rejection requires every element and limitation of the claimed invention must be found in a single prior art reference, arranged as in the claim. See Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. Cleveland Golf Co., 242 F.3d 1376, 2 In some embodiments, as argued Appellant, Williams does not concern itself with the state of the user operated switches prior to moving to the secondary power source (Williams ¶ 161). Appeal 2020-004694 Application 16/325,868 6 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2001). In this case, we determine that the evidence of record does not support the Examiner’s finding of anticipation, requiring reversal of the rejection of claim 1, and the claims which depend from it. Independent claim 12 has similar limitations as claim 1, and has not been shown to be anticipated by Williams for the same reasons. CONCLUSION The Examiner’s rejections are reversed. DECISION SUMMARY In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1–9, 11–13 102(a)(1) Williams 1–9, 11–13 10 103 Williams, Recker 10 Overall Outcome 1–13 REVERSED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation