Signal Delivery Service

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 23, 1977

229 N.L.R.B. 881 (N.L.R.B. 1977)

SIGNAL DELIVERY SERVICE
Signal Delivery Service, Inc. and Joseph J. Matera.
Case 6-CA-9067
May 23, 1977
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS
PENELLO AND MURPHY
On February 22, 1977, Administrative Law Judge
David S. Davidson issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel
filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the
Respondent filed cross-exceptions and a reply brief
to the General Counsel's exceptions.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, find-
ings,1 and conclusions of the Administrative Law
Judge and to adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that the complaint be, and it hereby is,
dismissed in its entirety.
I The General Counsel and the Respondent have excepted to certain
credibility findings made by the Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's
established policy not to overrule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions
with respect to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the
relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard
Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3,
1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for
reversing his findings.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
DAVID S. DAVIDSON, Administrative Law Judge: The
charge in this case was filed on March 8, 1976, by Joseph J.
Matera, an individual. The complaint issued on July 29,
1976, alleging that Respondent discharged Matera on
March 4, 1976, because he gave testimony in another
proceeding before the Board. The complaint alleges that
Matera's discharge violated Section 8(a)(4) and (1) of the
Act. In its answer Respondent denies the commission of
any unfair labor practices.
A hearing was held before me in Pittsburgh, Pennsylva-
nia, on October 13 and 15, 1976. At the conclusion of the
hearing the parties waived oral argument and were given
leave to file posthearing briefs which have been received
from the General Counsel and Respondent.
229 NLRB No. 141
Upon the entire record in this case including my
observation of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make
the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
Respondent, an Illinois corporation, has a place of
business in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, from which it
engages in transporting merchandise on behalf of Sears,
Roebuck and Company, to customers of Sears. During the
12-month period immediately preceding issuance of the
complaint, Respondent performed services valued in excess
of $50,000, for Sears which in turn received merchandise
valued in excess of $50,000 from points outside Pennsylva-
nia. I find that Respondent is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of the Act and that it will
effectuate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdictidn
herein.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Facts
Respondent employs approximately 72 drivers and
helpers in its Pittsburgh division. They operate out of two
terminals, one at Pittsburgh and one at Cannonsburg,
Pennsylvania. The employees are represented by Teamsters
Local 294, referred to herein as the Union. The Pittsburgh
division is under the overall supervision of Norman
McGowan. In addition, Gino Gizzi manages the Pittsburgh
terminal, and Richard Watson manages the Cannonsburg
terminal.
In the spring of 1975 representatives of Sears, Respon-
dent's only customer in the Pittsburgh area, spoke to
Respondent's officials about the high cost of operations in
the Pittsburgh division. Sears was concerned because
within Respondent's eastern territory Pittsburgh had the
highest cost per stop and the lowest production. Sears'
officials informed Respondent that if it did not reduce the
cost and improve productivity Sears would cancel the
contract and give it to another carrier.
As a consequence, in May 1975, Respondent's officials
decided to initiate a road surveillance program entailing
following trucks, observing employees, and determining
what they were or were not doing to contribute to the high
cost and low production. Respondent's vice president in
charge of retail delivery, Richard Gensler, and local
managers, McGowan, Gizzi, and Watson, were made
responsible for carrying out the surveillance program.
Respondent informed Union Business Agent Peluso that it
was going to start the road surveillance program and
explained the reasons for it. The road surveillance program
continued from then through the time of the events at issue
in this case.
At the outset of the surveillance program Respondent
gave warnings to those employees whom it found loafing or
taking excessive breaks or lunchtime on the job. In July
1975, on 2 consecutive days, incidents occurred as a result
of which Respondent gave warnings to Charging Party
Joseph Matera for theft of time. On July 15, 1975,
according to Gensler and McGowan, as a result of a report
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DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
relayed through Sears, they and Gizzi were alerted to check
on a truck parked at a shopping center to which they went.
They testified that they kept the truck under observation
for nearly 2 hours while seeking to find the employees
assigned to it. According to them, the employees did not
return until after 5 p.m. when they had been on overtime
for a little more than half an hour.' According to Matera,
the three employees had just returned from their afternoon
break at or about 5:20 p.m. and were just starting back to
the terminal 4 or 5 miles away when McGowan and
Gensler appeared next to the truck and accused them of
having been at that site for 3 hours. Matera testified that he
asked how they could have been there for 3 hours, and
Gensler and McGowan said they had a report that they
had been there that long. According to Matera, he told
them that they had delivered their whole load and asked
how they could have been loafing for 3 hours if they had
finished and were on their way back to the warehouse. The
three employees continued to deny that they had been
away from the truck for more than 15 minutes when given
warning notices on the following day.
On July 16, McGowan and Gensler were returning to the
terminal from a meeting when they saw a truck parked
near a funeral home. They stopped and waited to observe
the truck and, about 15 minutes later at 5:20, the same
three employees came out of the funeral home. According
to Matera, he and the other two employees were only in the
funeral home for 15 minutes on breaktime which was due
them. Apparently rejecting this explanation, on the next
day McGowan and Gensler gave the three men a second
warning notice based on this incident.
From May through early August 1975, Respondent
issued 16 warning notices and one 5-day suspension to
employees for theft of time. On July 24 Union Business
Agent Peluso wrote McGowan complaining that the
Company had embarked upon a "ridiculous" labor
relations procedure by issuing warning notices to employ-
ees for what were alleged to be flagrant violations of
working practices without taking substantial disciplinary
action. The Union asserted that the presumed reason was
that the Company could not substantiate the basis for the
warnings, and it protested that arbitrating each of the
warning notices would bankrupt the Union. The Union
advised the Company that it objected to all assertions of
facts in the warning notices, mentioning specifically the
notices based on the July 16 incident described above. The
Union reserved the right to contest the facts relied on by
the Company in the event any future disciplinary action
was taken based on the warning notices that had been
given.
On August 4 McGowan wrote Peluso reminding him of
the institution of the road study program and the reasons
for it, stating why Respondent believed the conduct
involved was a violation of the collective-bargaining
agreement, and advising the Union that "Any employee, in
the future, who is involved in hanging out, loafing on
delivery routes, collecting pay for work not performed, will
not be given a second opportunity but will be terminated
IMMEDIATELY." McGowan stated that he was posting a
I Normal quitting time was 4:30. Time worked after 4:30 was overtime.
Truck crews were required to be back at the terminal no later than 6 p.m.
whether or not they had delivered their full load.
copy of the letter on the bulletin board for the advice of
employees, and the letter was posted.
In a second letter dated August 8, McGowan stated that
the warning letters were not required by the contract but
had been given in order to give employees a second chance.
McGowan objected to any inference that the warning
letters were issued to overburden the union finances or
interfere with the arbitration process, but stated that
Respondent had no objection to the Union reserving the
right to challenge the facts in the warning letters in any
subsequent disciplinary arbitration instead of arbitrating
the justification for the letters at that time.
On August 22 Respondent discharged three employees
for theft of time. In arbitration the penalties were reduced
from discharge to suspension. After receiving the arbitra-
tor's decision around January 1, 1976, Respondent adopted
a policy of suspending employees for a first theft-of-time
offense and discharging them for a second.
On February 12, 1976, Gizzi and Watson made a road
study of one of the trucks from the Pittsburgh terminal.
They chose to follow a truck driven by John McGowan
with Matera and Henderson Woodward, Jr., as helpers.
According to Watson, they chose to study that truck
because it had a "short" load requiring fewer stops than
average. According to Watson and Gizzi, they observed the
truck that day parked at a drive-in restaurant from about
noon until 1:13 p.m. According to Matera and Woodward
the truck was there for about half an hour from about
12:45 to 1:15. They testified, as did Sears' customer,
Bernetta Porter, that from about noon until 12:30 or later
they were at Porter's house delivering a washing machine.
On the next day Gizzi called the three employees into his
office and notified them that they had been seen at the
restaurant on the previous day for approximately I hour
and 15 minutes in violation of the contract which provided
a half-hour lunch period and that each was suspended for
10 days. Matera protested and told Gizzi that he was
"crazy," and Gizzi said he did not want to hear anything
further. Matera served his suspension beginning on
February 16 and returned to work on March 1.
During his suspension Matera was subpenaed to testify
as a witness for the General Counsel in Case 6-CA-8530.
Matera, who had been a union committeeman at the time
of events at issue in that case, appeared at the hearing on
February 23 and 24 and testified to statements made by
Respondent's officials at several meetings with the Union
in support of the allegations of the complaint that
Respondent refused to employ Raphael Rizza because of
his participation in a grievance meeting and because
Respondent considered Rizza a troublemaker who filed
grievances. 2
Matera returned to work on March 1, but did not work
on March 2. On March 3 he worked as a helper with Joe
Lawson on a truck driven by Jack Waldschmidt. On that
day Gizzi and Watson again made a road study and chose
that truck to follow. According to Gizzi and Watson, on
that occasion they observed the truck parked at a drive-in
from noon until 1:23. According to Matera and Wald-
2 The Board's decision in that case is reported at 226 NLRB 843 (1976).
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SIGNAL DELIVERY SERVICE
schmidt the truck was at the drive-in for about half an hour
starting at 12:30.
On the next day, Gizzi and McGowan told the three
employees that they had been observed taking a lunch hour
of 1 hour and 23 minutes, notified Matera and Lawson that
they were discharged because they had been previously
warned and suspended, and notified Waldschmidt that he
was suspended. Matera again told them that they were
"crazy" and that the employees had only taken half an
hour because he had made certain that they only took half
an hour for lunch in view of his just ended suspension.
McGowan rejected his plea and repeated that he was fired.
B. Concluding Findings
Counsel for the General Counsel contends that Matera
and Waldschmidt should be believed as to the length of
their lunch hour on March 3, that the grounds asserted by
Respondent for Matera's discharge were a pretext, and that
the cause of Respondent's road study of Matera on March
3 and subsequent discharge was the testimony given by
Matera while suspended in support of the complaint
against Respondent concerning Rizza. Respondent con-
tends that Gizzi and Watson had no knowledge of Matera's
testimony in the Rizza proceeding, that Matera was guilty
of the offenses for which he was charged, and that the
timing of Matera's road study and discharge in relation to
his testimony was mere coincidence.
I find that there is evidence to support the inference that
on March 3 Gizzi chose to follow the truck on which
Matera was riding because Matera had recently given
testimony against Respondent and did so in the hope of
establishing a basis for disciplining him. However, I further
find that Gizzi and Watson are to be credited as to what
they found during the March 3 road study and that Matera
and the others on the truck were guilty of what Respondent
calls "theft of time" in taking approximately an hour and
20 minutes instead of half an hour for lunch.
Pittsburgh Terminal Manager Gizzi testified that he
attended the Rizza hearing and saw Matera there, but that
Matera did not testify for the General Counsel while Gizzi
was present. According to Gizzi, before that hearing he had
no knowledge that Matera might testify and after the
hearing no one told him that Matera had testified.
McGowan testified that he also did not see Matera
testify, but that he knew that Matera had testified.
However, according to McGowan he did not mention it to
Gizzi unless possibly they discussed it 2 or 3 months later
when Respondent received either the briefs or a transcript
of the testimony. McGowan testified that he did not
remember discussing the hearing with Gizzi during that
time.
Watson testified that he learned only shortly before
testifying in this proceeding that Matera had testified at the
Rizza hearing.
McGowan testified that in deciding whom to study on
any particular day he and Gizzi considered a number of
factors such as the number of curfews, 3 those whose
performance they believed was substandard, and those
I A "curfew" is a return to the terminal without completing all delivenes
because of the 6 p.m. deadline.
about whom they had received reports. When asked if they
ever chose employees to study upon their return from
suspension, McGowan testified, "I really could not answer
that," that he probably did, and that he would have to
check the records. When asked if it was a policy to follow
employees who had just returned from a suspension,
McGowan testified that he thought it could be a determin-
ing factor but would not say that it happened often.
Although pressed to identify anyone other than Matera
who was studied a day or two after returning from
suspension McGowan was unable to name any other
employee, continued to repeat that it possibly happened,
and testified that if given time he could probably come up
with some names. When McGowan resumed the stand
after a I-day recess and was further cross-examined, he was
still not able to answer with any more specificity, and
ultimately testified that he did not recall conducting a road
study of any employee other than Matera so soon after his
return from suspension.
McGowan was also questioned at some length about the
records of road studies kept by Respondent. Initially
McGowan testified that Respondent kept a record of road
studies showing violations but did not keep any record if
there were no violations. He testified that the managers
worked from load sheets, making notations on them if they
encountered something wrong and making no notations
otherwise.
After the recess McGowan testified that he did not recall
if he kept a record when he followed employees and added
that he did not do so all the time but sometimes did and
sometimes made tape recordings. McGowan then testified
further that on a road study he took notes on most
occasions and that Gizzi made written records of most of
his road studies. He testified further that it was normal
practice to conduct lengthy road studies and to keep a
written record of them whether or not a violation was
found. Finally, he testified that there were occasions when
no records were kept if no violations were found.
Watson testified that there were a number of reasons for
choosing a particular truck to study, including past
production of the crew, the areas to which the truck was
going, the type of load, and whether there were a number
of large items on the load. Watson testified that he had
personally never engaged in a road study of any employee
other than Matera upon his return from suspension.
According to Watson, on February 12 Gizzi informed him
that they would study the truck on which Matera was
riding because it was "short" and they ought to be able to
make a short day out of it. However, Watson testified that
on March 3 Gizzi simply told him which truck they were
going to follow and he did not know how the decision to
study that truck was made. Gizzi was not questioned about
the basis of the selection of the truck to be studied on that
date, March 3.
McGowan was evasive in his testimony as to Respon-
dent's practice in following employees who had recently
returned from suspension. Initially he conveyed that
Respondent only kept records when violations were found
from which it could have been argued that Respondent had
883
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
no way of determining whether it had studied others after
their return from suspension since no violations were found
other than in Matera's case. However, he changed that
testimony apparently after realizing that Respondent
would introduce records itself which would contradict him
both as to the form in which records were kept and the fact
that records were kept when no violations were found. He
remained unable however to testify as to any other case in
which an employee was followed immediately after
returning from suspension. While Watson testified to the
reason given for following the truck on February 12, he
testified that he did not know the reason why Gizzi decided
to follow the truck with Matera on March 3, and Gizzi and
McGowan gave no explanation for that decision. In view
of McGowan's unsubstantiated and suspect testimony as
to Respondent's practice and the lack of any testimony as
to the reason Matera was studied on March 3, the inference
is warranted that a candid explanation would not have
helped Respondent.
Turning to the denial of Gizzi that he knew of Matera's
participation in the Rizza hearing, Gizzi denied ever
becoming aware of it while McGowan testified that he
possibly told Gizzi about it 2 or 3 months later. Matera's
testimony was of a nature that would ordinarily interest
management officials attending a hearing in which either
their own conduct or conduct which occurred in their
presence was at issue. Having read Matera's testimony, I
find it impossible to believe the denial of knowledge by
Gizzi.
In light of McGowan's evasive and contradictory
testimony described above, the absence of any explanation
for following Matera's truck on March 3, the nature of
Matera's testimony in the Rizza proceeding, and the
animus established in the prior proceeding, I find the
inference warranted that McGowan and Gizzi were aware
of Matera's testimony at the Rizza hearing 4 and that Gizzi
decided to follow Matera on March 3 because he gave that
testimony in the hope that the road study would produce a
basis for discharging Matera.
I am not persuaded however that Gizzi and Watson
fabricated or distorted their findings that Matera and the
others on the truck took an excessively long lunch hour.
Here the testimony of Matera and Waldschmidt as to the
March 3 incident, as well as the testimony presented by the
General Counsel's witnesses as to two of the other
incidents involving Matera, is less persuasive than that of
Gizzi and particularly Watson, and is corroborated by the
records kept of the road studies.
In his testimony Matera disputed not only the accuracy
of the March 3 road study but also the accuracy of the
observations that he had taken excessive time on prior
occasions. According to Matera on July 15, 1975, he and
the others on his truck had just finished a 15-minute break
at 5:20 p.m. and were starting to return to the terminal
when McGowan and Gensler appeared at the truck and
asked what they had been doing there for 3 hours. I find it
impossible to credit Matera that he and the others had only
taken a 15-minute break and that with no indication of any
ulterior motive whatsoever Gensler and McGowan accused
4 In General Iron Corp., 218 NLRB 770, 782 (1975), where the Board
declined to infer knowledge. the hearing attended by the dischargee was an
them of taking a 3-hour break. I credit Gensler and
McGowan as to what they observed at that time. With
respect to the second of the two incidents except for the
late timing of the break there is no evidence to contradict
Matera that they only took the 15 minutes which was due
them. In the absence of any testimony to indicate whether
or not employees were permitted to delay taking their
break until after 4:30 and any evidence that they took more
than 15 minutes, I credit Matera and find that on this
occasion McGowan and Gensler acted on the basis of
assumption rather than observation. However, there is no
showing that there was illicit motivation for the warning
given Matera at that time.
With respect to the February 12 suspension, Mrs. Porter,
the only seemingly impartial witness who testified in the
proceeding, supported Matera and Woodward in their
claim that they were not parked at lunch at 12 o'clock but
arrived at her home and made a delivery between 12 and
12:30. According to Mrs. Porter, she and her husband,
both unemployed, awakened at noon to an alarm which
she regularly set for that hour, and her husband left the
home briefly to buy doughnuts returning within about 5
minutes. She testified that Matera and Woodward arrived
shortly after her husband's return, delivered the washing
machine, and left approximately a half hour later. She
testified that around I o'clock, after they left, she
attempted to call her mother to tell her that the washer had
arrived but there was no answer. According to Mrs. Porter,
a couple of days later Woodward and McCowan, the driver
of the truck returned to her home and sought a statement
from her husband as to the time that they had been at her
house to support a protest of their suspension. She testified
that she and her husband spoke briefly at that time and
agreed that they had arrived sometime between 12 and
12:30 and had left sometime between 12:30 and 1.
Although she placed the return of Woodward and
McCowan to her house to obtain a statement a couple of
days after the delivery, Woodward testified that it was
about a week later that they returned to her house and
related the timing of the visit to the day on which Matera
testified at the Rizza hearing, which was II days after the
delivery was made.
The reliability of Mrs. Porter's testimony depends
entirely upon the accuracy of her recollection that she was
awakened by her alarm on that day and that the alarm was
set for noon. Her attempt to call her mother adds nothing
to corroborate her version of the time the deliverymen left
as her mother was not at work that day and there was no
answer. Her telescoping of the interval which passed before
Woodward and McCowan returned to obtain her hus-
band's statement itself demonstrates an inaccurate recol-
lection of time, and the fact that she and her husband were
not questioned about it for 11 days rather than 2 days
makes it less likely that what they remembered at that time
was accurate. Bearing in mind that Gizzi and Watson were
regularly engaging in road studies at that time and had no
apparent motive as of February 12 before the Rizza
hearing to falsely accuse Matera, Woodward, and McCow-
an or any other employee of the theft of time, I am not
ex parte representation hearing at which no employer representative was
present.
884
SIGNAL DELIVERY SERVICE
satisfied that Mrs. Porter's testimony is sufficiently reliable
to warrant discrediting Gizzi and Watson and the record of
the road study which they made that day. As for Matera
and Henderson, both displayed selective memories of the
events of February 12 appearing to remember in great
detail the delivery to the Porter home and the circumstanc-
es under which they had lunch but very little other detail
from that day. Both had clear interest in the outcome of
this proceeding. In Matera's case I am struck by the fact
that he uniformly disputed the charges of theft of time
despite the fact that no motive has been shown for
Respondent to have accused him consistently before
February 22.
With respect to March 3 the only corroboration offered
for Matera's testimony was that of Waldschmidt who
testified that on that occasion he, Matera, and the other
helper on the truck stopped for lunch between 12:30 and I.
Apart from that testimony Waldschmidt displayed practi-
cally no memory of the events of that day or the days close
to it.
I have considered the General Counsel's contention that
it is Gizzi and Watson who should be discredited rather
than Matera and Waldschmidt as to the events of this day.
It is true as I have noted above that on this occasion, unlike
the occasion of the previous observations of Matera,
Respondent apparently had a motive to seek to find cause
to discharge or discipline Matera and I have not credited
Gizzi as to his lack of knowledge of Matera's testimony. As
counsel for the General Counsel points out also the
findings of Watson and Gizzi as to the amount of time
spent by Waldschmidt, Matera, and Lawson at their first
stop after lunch seems incredibly short for the delivery of
two pieces of furniture, and there are some conflicts
between Watson's testimony and what he and Gizzi
recorded on the road study or stated in the tape recording
they made simultaneously with the road study. However, I
have listened carefully to the tape recording made by
Watson and Gizzi and I am persuaded that the tape is
genuine, that it was made at various times during the
course of the road study, that it sometimes describes
concurrent observations and that it sometimes summarizes
what had been observed over a short period just preceding
the time of recording of passages. It has the roughness and
spontaneity that one would expect of a recording made
over a period of time in a car sometimes on the move. I
credit Watson and Gizzi that they observed the truck
driven by Waldschmidt with Matera and Lawson parked at
lunch for approximately an hour and 23 minutes on March
3.
s Enterprise Products Company, Enterprise Fractionation Company, 196%
NLRB 549, 559-560(1972), enfd. 471 F.2d 651 (C.A. 5, 1973).
' In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
The question remains whether Matera was discharged
because of what Watson and Gizzi observed or because he
testified in the Rizza proceeding. The evidence shows that
from August 1975 on Respondent followed a policy of first
suspending and then discharging employees found to have
engaged in what Respondent refers to as theft of time.
While the evidence shows that those discharges which were
taken to arbitration were ultimately reduced by arbitrators
to lesser discipline, there is nothing to contradict the
testimony that at the time of Matera's discharge Respon-
dent regularly followed the policy of discharging employ-
ees found guilty of theft of time after one suspension, and
Respondent discharged other employees both before and
after Matera under similar circumstances. The question is
not whether the discharge was just but whether it was
caused by Matera's testimony or by what Watson and
Gizzi observed. Under the policy being followed by
Respondent at the time of Matera's discharge, any other
employee found to have engaged in similar conduct after
having been previously suspended would also have been
discharged. Thus, under Respondent's interpretation and
application of its rules, the cause Gizzi and Watson
discovered which Respondent relied on in discharging
Matera was cause for discharge. Under these circumstanc-
es, the fact that Respondent looked for grounds to
discharge Matera because he testified in the Rizza
proceeding is not sufficient to make his discharge unlaw-
ful. 5
Accordingly, I find that the General Counsel has failed
to establish that Respondent discharged Matera in viola-
tion of the Act and will recommend the complaint be
dismissed.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. Signal Delivery Service, Inc., is an employer engaged
in commerce within the meaning of the Act.
2. The General Counsel has failed to establish that
Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices as
alleged in the complaint.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and
conclusions of law and the entire record in this case, and
pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended, I hereby issue the following recommend-
ed:
ORDER 6
The complaint is dismissed in its entirety.
conclusions, and the recommended Order herein, shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes.
885