Si Barghelamev.Sunlight Saunas, Inc.

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Jul 1, 2009

No. 91169318 (T.T.A.B. Jul. 1, 2009)

Mailed: July 1, 2009

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
______

Si Barghelame
v.
Sunlight Saunas, Inc.
_____

Opposition No. 91169306
to Application No. 78507597

Opposition No. 91169318
to Application No. 78507510
_____

David L. Garrison of David L. Garrison PS for Si Barghelame.

Amy C. Kelly of Shook, Hardy & Bacon LLP for Sunlight
Suanas, Inc.
______

Before Kuhlke, Mermelstein and Wellington, Administrative
Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Wellington, Administrative Trademark Judge:

Sunlight Saunas, Inc. (applicant) has filed
applications to register the marks SUNLIGHT SAUNAS (in
standard characters) and:

THIS OPINION
IS NOT A PRECEDENT OF
THE TTAB
Opposition Nos. 91169306 and 91169318
2
for “saunas” in International Class 11 and “Retail store and
online retail store services, featuring bath and beauty
products, aromatherapy products, saunas, and heat and far
infrared treatment pads” in International Class 35.1 Both
applications contain a disclaimer of the word SAUNAS.
Si Barghelame (opposer), an individual, opposed
registration of applicant’s marks under Section 2(d) of the
Trademark Act on the ground of priority and likelihood of
confusion. Specifically, opposer pleaded that he is the
owner of Registration no. 2579741 for the mark SUNSAUNA for
“Full spectrum infrared sauna”;2 that he “has used this mark
since at least as early as August 1, 1999 for the goods
listed in [the pleaded registration] and for the services of
retail store sales of saunas and associated products”; and
that there is a likelihood of confusion because the marks
“are similar, and [the] companies are in direct competition
with one another because they sell similar products.”
Applicant, in its answers, denied the allegations in
the notices of opposition.

1 Application Serial no. 78507597 (filed on October 28, 2004) is
for the stylized mark with the design and contains an allegation
of first use in commerce in connection with the recited services
on July 5, 2003. Application Serial no. 78507510 (also filed on
October 28, 2004) is for the mark in standard characters and
contains an allegation of first use in commerce in connection
with the recited services on July 1, 2001.

2 Issued on June 11, 2002, Section 8 affidavit accepted and
Section 15 affidavit acknowledged.
Opposition Nos. 91169306 and 91169318
3
The proceedings were consolidated prior to trial and
have been presented on the same record. The record
automatically consists of the pleadings and the files of the
involved applications. Opposer submitted his own trial
testimony, with related exhibits. Applicant submitted,
under a notice of reliance, status and title copies of two
registrations it owns for the marks SUNLIGHT SPA and
SUNBURST; printouts from the Patent and Trademark Office’s
TARR electronic database for application Serial no. 77251293
(SUNLIGHT SPA and design) that is owned by applicant; and
copies of fifteen third-party registrations, all for marks
“us[ing] the term SUN (or a variation).”
Both parties filed briefs.
Evidentiary Objections
At the deposition of opposer and as restated in its
brief, applicant has objected to the introduction of
Exhibits 4 and 5. Specifically, applicant objected “to the
form” of the documents in the exhibits because names of
individuals were redacted. Exhibit 4 consists of copies of
email communications and phone log records purportedly
indicating instances of actual confusion involving the
parties’ marks and goods. Exhibit 5 consists of what
opposer testified are “communications of our clients and our
company through email and when people respond to our
website.” Barghelame test., 8:11-13. In its brief,
Opposition Nos. 91169306 and 91169318
4
applicant argues that, without the identity of the third
parties, it was unable to corroborate the instances of
actual confusion. Applicant also asserts that the documents
constitute or contain impermissible hearsay and should not
be considered by the Board.
In response, opposer argues that the documents were
redacted to “omit the identity of the confused customers and
buyers because disclosure of the identity of those
individual would provide an unnecessary advantage to the
applicant, his direct competitor.” Reply brief, p. 2.
Opposer also states that the documents were “produced during
discovery, and no objection or inquiry was made during the
time that discovery was open” and that opposer “would have
provided the information if a suitable protective order had
been offered by applicant to preclude unfair use of the
information on those customers.” Id. at p. 3.
Applicant’s objections are not well-taken. Inasmuch as
copies of the redacted documents were provided during
discovery, applicant was put on notice that opposer intended
to keep the names of certain individuals confidential.
Opposer is correct that had applicant truly sought to
investigate these matters further, it could have moved to
compel unredacted copies under a protective order.
Moreover, applicant’s contention that these documents
constitute hearsay is misplaced because opposer is not
Opposition Nos. 91169306 and 91169318
5
seeking to rely on the truth of the statements contained in
the communications. The case law clearly establishes that
statements by opposer's testimony witness regarding third-
party communications to them, in the form of e-mail or
telephone calls, are evidence that the communications were
made to them. The statements are not offered for the truth
thereof. See, Corporate Fitness Programs, Inc. v. Weider
Health and Fitness, Inc., 2 USPQ2d 1682 (TTAB 1987).
Rather, such statements in the trademark context fall under
the ‘state of mind’ exception to the hearsay rule. See Fed.
R. Evid. 803(3); see also, CCBN.com Inc. v. c-call.com Inc.,
53 USPQ2d 1132, 1137 (D. Mass. 1999) (“[S]tatements of
customer confusion in the trademark context fall under the
‘state of mind exception’ to the hearsay rule. Letters (or
their electronic equivalent, i.e., email) from customers are
also recognized as an exception to the hearsay rule.
International Kennel Club of Chicago v. Mighty Star Inc.,
846 F.2d 1079, 6 USPQ2d 1977, 1985 (7th Cir. 1988) (The
“weight of authority allows the admission of letters
directed to the plaintiff where the evidence contains
factual data (beyond a mere legal conclusion) that is
material to the issue of the likelihood of confusion”). See
also, Freddie Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Ridgeline, Inc., 589 F.
Supp. 72, 223 USPQ 1139, 1141 (N.D. Tex. 1984) (“Hearsay
letters and statements of customers are admissible in
Opposition Nos. 91169306 and 91169318
6
evidence under Fed. R. Evid. Rule 803(3) where they reveal
the then existing state of mind of the writers and speakers
and their state of mind is relevant to the case”), aff'd
mem., 783 F.2d 1062 (5th Cir. 1986).
Accordingly, we overrule applicant's objections to
these exhibits. We hasten to add that our decision in this
case is not dependent on these exhibits. As explained,
infra, the evidence purportedly indicating instances of
actual confusion has little, if any, probative value.
Standing
Opposer has established his standing to oppose
registration of the involved applications. In particular,
opposer has established that he is the owner of the pleaded
registration and that said registration is valid and
subsisting (see footnote 3) and, furthermore, he has shown
that he has a personal interest in this proceeding. See
Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 55 USPQ2d 1842
(Fed. Cir. 2000); Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092, 50
USPQ2d 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1999); and Lipton Industries, Inc. v.
Ralston Purina Co., 670 F.2d 1024, 213 USPQ 185 (CCPA 1982).
Priority
Initially, we note that applicant has not contested
priority of use. Indeed, applicant did not present any
evidence for purposes of establishing priority.
Nevertheless, it may rely on the subject applications’
Opposition Nos. 91169306 and 91169318
7
filing date for priority purposes and it is opposer’s burden
to establish that he has priority. See Levi Strauss & Co.
v. R. Josephs Sportswear Inc. 36 USPQ2d 1328, 1332 (TTAB
1998), quoting Alliance Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. ABH
Diversified Products, Inc., 226 UPSQ 348, 351 (TTAB
1985)(“an applicant is entitled to rely upon the filing date
of its application as a presumption of use of the mark
subject of the application as of that date”).
Based on opposer’s testimony in conjunction with the
exhibits submitted with his declaration, we find that he is
the owner of the pleaded registration and that the
registration is valid and subsisting.3 Thus, there is no
issue regarding opposer’s priority in regard to the goods
covered by his registration vis-à-vis the recited goods and
services in the subject applications. King Candy, Inc. v.

3 Opposer submitted with his testimony a copy of his pleaded
registration (Exhibit 1) along with printouts from the Patent and
Trademark Office’s TESS electronic database (Exhibit 2)
indicating that the “Section 8 (6-year) accepted & Section 15
acknowledged” by the Office on November 30, 2007. Opposer
identified the registration as his and, in regard to the TESS
database printouts, he gave the following testimony:
Q. I am handing you Exhibit No. 2, can you identify this
document for us, please.
A. Yes, I do. This is, again, a Trademark Office’s –
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s record.
Q. Is there a date on this document?
A. Yes, 8-1-2008.
Q. On the...fourth page of this document there is a list
of prosecution history, do you see that?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Does it indicate to you the status of this
registration?
A. Yes. It shows the list of actions we have taken by
documents provided and the actions were taken on this
process.
Opposition Nos. 91169306 and 91169318
8
Eunice King’s Kitchen, Inc., 496 F.2d 1400, 182 USPQ 108
(CCPA 1974).
As noted, opposer also alleged use of his mark in
connection with “retail store sales of saunas and associated
products.” Because opposer has not registered his mark for
these services, in order to establish priority, he must show
that he made common-law use of his SUNSAUNA mark in
connection with said services before the October 28, 2004
filing date of the involved applications. And, in a case
involving common-law rights, “the decision as to priority is
made in accordance with the preponderance of the evidence.”
Hydro-Dynamics Inc. v. George Putnam & Company Inc., 811
F.2d 1470, 1 USPQ2d 1772, 1773 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
Based on the record, we cannot conclude that opposer
has established priority with respect to his alleged common
law rights in his mark SUNSAUNA for retail store sales of
saunas and associated products. In his deposition, opposer
testified that “our company name is SUNSAUNA, LLC and we
sell and manufacture sauna products.” Barghelame test.,
4:3-4. He further states that his infrared sauna is sold
“locally and also on the web.” Id., 4:7-8. However,
opposer does not testify to any retail store services.
Moreover, the exhibits submitted with opposer’s testimony do
not corroborate any retail store services, but instead

Opposition Nos. 91169306 and 91169318
9
indicate that applicant’s saunas may be purchased from
third-party retail outlets. See, e.g., Exhibit 3 (Batch no.
0133) advertising applicant’s goods as “Available
Exclusively at COLEMAN SPAS,” giving two street addresses;
Exhibit 3 (Batch no. 0134) again advertising applicant’s
products as “Exclusively at Bath & Spas.” Even if we were
to construe, and we do not, that opposer’s testimony and
exhibits show that Sunsauna LLC renders retail store
services, there is no further evidence as to when opposer
initiated any such retail store services. Ultimately,
opposer has failed to establish that he rendered retail
store services featuring saunas and associated products
under the mark SUNSAUNA prior to applicant’s filing date.
In view thereof, we find that opposer only has priority
via its trademark registration as to the goods identified
therein, namely, full spectrum infrared saunas, and that
opposer has not established priority for any common-law
rights he may have in connection with retail store services.
We now turn to likelihood of confusion and, based on
our findings on priority, we note that our analysis is
limited to opposer’s pleaded registered mark, SUNSAUNA, for
the goods identified therein vis-à-vis the applied-for marks
and the goods and services identified in the subject
applications.
Likelihood of Confusion
Opposition Nos. 91169306 and 91169318
10
Our determination under Section 2(d) is based on an
analysis of all of the facts in evidence that are relevant
to the factors bearing on the likelihood of confusion issue.
In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177
USPQ 563 (CCPA 1973). In any likelihood of confusion
analysis, however, two key considerations are the
similarities between the marks and the similarities between
the goods and/or services. See Federated Foods, Inc. v.
Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 192 USPQ 24 (CCPA
1976). Opposer must establish that there is a likelihood of
confusion by a preponderance of the evidence. The relevant
du Pont factors in the proceeding now before us are
discussed below.
We first consider the similarity between opposer's
goods as identified in his registration for SUNSAUNA and
applicant's identified goods and services. It is settled
that the issue of likelihood of confusion must be determined
in light of the goods or services as identified in the
involved application(s) and registration(s) and, in the
absence of any specific limitations therein, on the
presumption that all normal and usual channels of trade and
methods of distribution are or may be utilized for such
goods or services. See Octocom Systems Inc. v. Houston
Computers Services Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 16 USPQ2d 1783 (Fed.
Cir. 1990); Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, N. A. v.
Opposition Nos. 91169306 and 91169318
11
Wells Fargo Bank, 811 F.2d 490, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1815 (Fed.
Cir. 1987); and CBS Inc. v. Morrow, 708 F.2d 1579, 218 USPQ
198 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
In this case, the goods themselves are legally
identical inasmuch as applicant’s “saunas” is broad enough
to include opposer’s “full spectrum infrared saunas.” In
addition, applicant's retail store and online retail store
services feature, inter alia, “saunas” which, again, is
broad enough and would reasonably include opposer’s full
spectrum infrared saunas. As a result, we find applicants'
services to be closely related to opposer’s goods. See In re
U.S. Shoe Corp., 229 USPQ 707 (TTAB 1985) (mark for retail
women's clothing store services and clothing held likely to
be confused with mark for uniforms); In re United Service
Distributors, Inc., 229 USPQ 237 (TTAB 1986) (mark for
distributorship services in the field of health and beauty
aids held likely to be confused with mark for skin cream).
With respect to the goods being legally identical, in
part, and in the absence of any limitations in the
identifications of goods, we must presume that the parties’
saunas would be sold in the same channels of trade (e.g.,
retail and online retail outlets for such goods) to the same
classes of consumers. This further highlights the
relatedness of opposer’s full spectrum infrared saunas to
applicant’s retail and online retail store services in that
Opposition Nos. 91169306 and 91169318
12
one prospective outlet or trade channel for opposer’s goods
would presumably include applicant’s stores or online retail
website featuring such goods. For example, it is
foreseeable that consumers seeking to purchase registrant’s
sauna will visit applicant’s store or applicant’s website
for such goods and, in doing so, they will obviously
encounter applicant’s marks for the retail services as well
as for the same goods.
In view thereof, the du Pont factors of the similarity
of the goods and services, channels of trade and classes of
purchasers all favor opposer in finding a likelihood of
confusion.
Before we determine the level of similarity or
dissimilarity of the parties’ marks, we first address
applicant’s argument regarding the “number and nature of
similar marks in use on similar goods.” Brief, p. 10.
Applicant argues that “[i]n selecting an appropriate mark to
use for goods and services related to saunas, there is
little wonder why many third parties also selected the word
SUN for similar goods to suggest warmth and illumination.”
Id. at 10. We construe these statements as relating to the
du Pont factor involving the number and nature of similar
marks in use on similar goods and services and the overall
strength of opposer’s mark, SUNSAUNA, and that it perhaps
should be accorded a narrower scope of protection. In
Opposition Nos. 91169306 and 91169318
13
support, applicant introduced its own registrations for the
marks SUNLIGHT SPA for “retail store and online retail store
services, featuring bath and beauty products, aromatherapy
products, saunas, and heat and far infrared treatment pads”4
and SUNBURST for “electric far infrared heater.”5 Applicant
also introduced fifteen third-party registrations for marks
containing the term SUN for a variety of goods and services.
A review of these registrations reveal that at least eight
cover services and/or goods that are not related to saunas
or retail services involving saunas; rather, they involve a
variety of goods and services that include space heaters,
pool lights, mail order catalog services for bath and body
products, pool chemicals, greenhouses, etc. The remaining
seven third-party registrations cover either identical goods
or, arguably, related goods and services, e.g., SUN LIFE
SAUNAS for, inter alia, “on-line retail store services
featuring infrared saunas...”6; RISING SUN for, inter alia,
“wholesale and retail store services and internet retail
store services featuring...saunas, ...sauna equipment”7;
SUNRAY for, inter alia, “light therapy lamp
fixtures,...electric lights used for medical purposes,

4 Registration No. 3065353 issued on March 7, 2006, SPA
disclaimed.
5 Registration No. 3436994 issued on May 27, 2008.
6 Registration No. 3469179.
7 Registration No. 2966591.
Opposition Nos. 91169306 and 91169318
14
namely, in treating seasonal affective disorder”8; and
ULTRASUN and GARDA SUN for, inter alia, “lamps, skypanels,
and suncouches for artificial sun bathing”.9
However, as applicant itself acknowledges in its brief
and as is often stated, third-party registrations are not
evidence of use of the marks shown therein, or that
consumers have been exposed to them. AMF Inc. v. American
Leisure Products, Inc., 474 F.2d 1403, 177 USPQ 268 (CCPA
1973). Thus, while we have considered the third-party
registrations to the extent that they act like a dictionary
definition showing that a term may have a normally
understood meaning (as shown by the dictionary definition
itself), they are of limited probative value in deciding
this case. Red Carpet Corp. v. Johnstown American
Enterprises Inc., 7 USPQ2d 1404, 1406 (TTAB 1988). Thus,
while we may conclude that the term “Sun” may have some
suggestive value in relation to the goods and services, this
evidence has no effect on the level of distinctiveness of
opposer’s mark and we cannot conclude that opposer’s mark is
otherwise entitled to a narrower scope of protection.
In view thereof, this factor is neutral.
We next turn to the du Pont factor of the similarity or
dissimilarity of the marks. We begin our comparison bearing

8 Registration No. 2310348.
9 Registrations Nos. 2590728 and 2555245, respectively, owned by
the same entity.
Opposition Nos. 91169306 and 91169318
15
in mind that the respective goods are, in part, legally
identical and that “[w]hen marks would appear on virtually
identical goods or services, the degree of similarity
necessary to support a conclusion of likely confusion
declines.” Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of
America, 970 F.2d 874, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed. Cir.
1992). Nonetheless, we are required to determine the
similarity or dissimilarity of the marks when viewed in
their entireties in terms of appearance, sound, connotation
and commercial impression. Palm Bay Imports, Inc. v. Veuve
Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1722, 396 F.3d 1369, 73
USPQ2d 1689, 1694 (Fed. Cir. 2005). As applicant correctly
noted in its brief, the test is not whether the marks can be
distinguished when subjected to a side-by-side comparison,
but rather whether the marks are sufficiently similar that
confusion as to the source of the goods or services offered
under the respective marks is likely to result. The focus
is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who
normally retains a general rather than a specific impression
of trademarks. See Sealed Air Corp. v. Scott Paper Co., 190
USPQ 106 (TTAB 1975).
In this case, the marks are applicant’s SUNLIGHT SAUNAS
(with and without the design) and opposer’s SUNSAUNA. With
respect to applicant's mark with design, it is well settled
that one feature of a mark may be more significant than
Opposition Nos. 91169306 and 91169318
16
another, and it is not improper to give more weight to this
dominant feature in determining the commercial impression
created by the mark. In re National Data Corp., 753 F.2d
1056, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Specifically,
where both words and a design comprise the mark (as in
applicant's mark), then the words are normally accorded
greater weight because the words are likely to make an
impression upon purchasers, would be remembered by them, and
would be used by them to request the goods. In re Appetito
Provisions Co., 3 USPQ2d 1553, 1554 (TTAB 1987). Thus,
although we do not ignore the design element in applicant’s
one mark, we do place greater emphasis on the literal
portions of the respective marks.
In terms of sound or how the marks will be spoken, we
find them to be very similar. Both begin with the same
first syllable “Sun” and end with a nearly identical
syllable “Sauna(s).” Applicant’s plural use of the latter
term does very little to distinguish the marks as consumers
will likely use the plural or singular or possessive in
referencing either party’s goods or services. See Wilson v.
Delauney, 245 F.2d 877, 114 USPQ 339, 341 (CCPA 1957)(“It is
evident that there is no material difference, in a trademark
sense, between the singular and plural forms of the word
“Zombie” and they will therefore be regarded here as the
Opposition Nos. 91169306 and 91169318
17
same mark”); see also, In re Pix of America, Inc., 225 USPQ
691, 692 (TTAB 1985).
Applicant argues that “there are obvious differences in
the appearances of these marks” and further contends that
opposer’s mark, SUNSAUNA, “appears visually to be an exotic,
non-English word.” Brief, p. 8. We disagree. First, we
see no ‘exotic’ quality in registrant’s mark but find it
merely to be the combination of the English words SUN and
SAUNA, albeit put together as a compound term. Moreover,
although the marks differ by applicant’s addition of the
design in one mark and its use the term SUNLIGHT versus SUN
in combination with SAUNA(S), we see no significant
difference in the connotations created by the marks. Both
marks, when viewed in connection with their identical goods,
i.e., saunas, suggest a relation with the Sun which, of
course, provides heat and light.
Again, we consider the marks as a whole and do not
ignore the elements in applicant’s marks that do not appear
in opposer’s mark. Yet, we find the differences to not be
so significant for purposes of distinguishing the marks and,
overall, we find the marks are more similar than not.
Accordingly, we find this du Pont factor weighs in favor of
finding a likelihood of confusion.
Opposition Nos. 91169306 and 91169318
18
Opposer has presented evidence purportedly showing that
actual confusion has occurred between the parties’ marks.
Specifically, opposer testified in his deposition that
Exhibit 4 contains email correspondence printouts which he
states are from “customers who were confused about our
product with Sunlight Saunas [applicant], which we get them
from time to time and we normally direct them back to their
customer or we just tell them it’s not our product that they
are inquiring about.” Barghelame test., 10:12-16 Exhibit 4
also consists of copies of opposer’s telephone message log
with the following two messages, “are you same as Sunlight
Saunas” and “wants to know if we sell Sunlight Saunas”
written in the message box.
There are several problems with the aforementioned
evidence. First, in two of the email communications, it is
not clear at all that the prospective consumers were
actually confused between the source of the applicant’s and
registrant’s saunas. Rather, it appears that opposer
gratuitously concludes in one email communication that the
consumer was confused and responds with a message “Please
note that we are different than the Sun Light saunas.”
Exhibit 4 (at Batch no. 0123). In another email printout,
there is a handwritten note “They are refering [sic] to
Sunlight Saunas web site,” but it is not possible to discern
that the consumer was confused in the first place. Exhibit
Opposition Nos. 91169306 and 91169318
19
4 (at Batch no. 0126). The message was apparently
handwritten onto the copy of the email printout by opposer
or someone acting on his behalf. Thus, in at least two of
the four email correspondence episodes the evidence really
only shows that opposer, or someone acting on his behalf,
concluded that there was confusion. Likewise, the telephone
message log printouts only show that opposer, or someone
taking messages for opposer, believed the callers were
confused and recorded a message to that effect. There is no
indication or further information as to what were the
circumstances of the callers’ confusion. Accordingly, we
find that, in part, the evidence of record lacks sufficient
detail for us to conclude that there were any instances of
actual confusion. That leaves us with a couple episodes of
email correspondence in which one could infer that the
consumer was actually confused between SUNLIGHT SAUNA and
SUNSAUNA. At best, however, opposer’s evidence of actual
confusion indicates that there have been a handful of
instances of actual confusion as a result of the parties’
marks being used on or in connection with saunas.
On the other hand, we are not persuaded by applicant's
argument that the parties marks “have coexisted in the
marketplace for nearly eight years” without “evidence of
confusion.” Brief, p. 15. As often stated, proof of actual
confusion is not necessary to establish likelihood of
Opposition Nos. 91169306 and 91169318
20
confusion. Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation's Foodservice, Inc.,
710 F.2d 1565, 218 USPQ 390, 396 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
Furthermore, we have no evidence as to the nature and extent
of applicant’s use of its marks. Such information is
necessary in order to determine if there was even an
opportunity for actual confusion to occur. The mere filing
of the applications and applicant’s allegations therein
regarding dates of use of the marks in commerce are not
evidence that the mark has actually been used in commerce.
Accordingly, we conclude that the actual confusion
factor is neutral or slightly favors opposer in this case.
Upon balancing the relevant du Pont factors, we
conclude that consumers familiar with opposer’s full
spectrum infrared saunas sold under its SUNSAUNA mark would
be likely to believe, upon encountering applicant’s marks
SUNLIGHT SAUNAS (typed or stylized with a design) for
legally identical goods as well as related services, that
the goods and services originate with or are somehow
associated with or sponsored by the same entity.
Lastly, to the extent that there may be any doubt on
our finding of likelihood of confusion, we resolve that
doubt, as we must, in favor of opposer as the prior user and
registrant. See Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice,
Inc., id.
Opposition Nos. 91169306 and 91169318
21
Decision: The oppositions are sustained and
registration of the involved applications is refused.