ServiceNow, Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 31, 2021

2020005834 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 31, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/722,976 10/02/2017 Sanjay Gupta SERV:0497 4034
145139 7590 03/31/2021
ServiceNow c/o Fletcher Yoder PC
P.O. Box 692289
Houston, TX 77269
EXAMINER
LABOGIN, DORETHEA L
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3624
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/31/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docket@fyiplaw.com
hill@fyiplaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte SANJAY GUPTA, DEVINDER NARANG,
ABHISHEK RAKSHE, RYAN CURRIER,
PUJA SUBRAMANYAM, CAMERON WHEELER and
JESSICA QUITTNER
___________

Appeal 2020-005834
Application 15/722,976
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before CARL W. WHITEHEAD JR., JAMES B. ARPIN and
ADAM J. PYONIN, Administrative Patent Judges.

WHITEHEAD JR., Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1
Appellant2 is appealing the final rejection of claims 1, 5–17 and 20
under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a). Appeal Brief 2. Claims 1, 9 and 17 are

1 Rather than reiterate Appellant’s arguments and the Examiner’s
determinations, we refer to the Appeal Brief (filed February 24, 2020), the
Reply Brief (filed August 11, 2020), the Final Action (mailed September 4,
2019) and the Answer (mailed June 11, 2020), for the respective details.
2 “Appellant” refers to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a).
Appellant identifies ServiceNow Inc. as the real party in interest. Appeal
Brief 2.
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independent. Claims 2–4, 18 and 19 are cancelled. See Claims Appendix.
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
Introduction
According to Appellant, the claimed invention “relate[s] to dynamic
scheduling of service appointments based on service agent skill, schedule,
and location. Service agent profiles may be maintained on one or more
databases.” Specification ¶ 4.
Representative Claim3
Claim 1 is representative (bracketed step lettering added):
1. A system, comprising:
a non–transitory memory; and
one or more hardware processors configured to read
instructions from the non–transitory memory to perform
operations comprising:
[a] receiving a service appointment request,
wherein the service
appointment request comprises one or more strings of text;
[b] identifying, via a machine learning process,
one or more
skills associated with the service appointment request,
comprising:
[b1] parsing the one or more strings of text
of the service
appointment request; and
[b2] referencing a first database to identify
the one or

3 Appellant argues independent claims 1, 9 and 17 as a group for both the
35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection (Appeal Brief 7) and the 35 U.S.C. § 103 rejection
(Appeal Brief 13). We select independent claim 1 as the representative
claim for the rejections. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
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more skills associated with the service appointment request
based on the one or more strings of text;
[c] referencing service agent profile data stored in
a second
database, wherein the service agent profile data comprises one
or more skills possessed by each of a plurality of service agents;
[d] referencing service agent schedule data stored
in a third
database, including a location of each of the plurality of service
agents during one or more previously scheduled appointments
wherein a service agent of the plurality of service agents is
considered available if the respective service agent does not
have an appointment scheduled during a specific time slot and
is scheduled to be within a threshold distance of a geographical
location identified in the service appointment
request;
[e] dynamically populating a calendar graphical
user interface
(GUI) of available appointment times, comprising identifying
one or more time slots, occurring during a period of time,
during which at least one service agent of the plurality of
service agents possesses the identified skills is available, and
scheduled to be located within the threshold distance of the
geographical location immediately before, during, or
immediately after the period of time;
[f] receiving an input selecting a first time slot of
the one or
more time slots; and
[g] updating a schedule of a first service agent of
the plurality
of service agents to reflect that the first service agent has a
service appointment scheduled during the first time slot.
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References
Name4 References Date
Karabetsos US 2006/0195365 A1 August 31, 2006
Fletcher US 2014/0122143 A1 May 1, 2014
Rejections on Appeal
Claims 1, 5–17 and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as
directed to a judicial exception without significantly more. Final Action 7–
10.
Claims 1, 5–17 and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Karabetsos and Fletcher. Final Action 10–35.
USPTO Section 101 Guidance
In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
published revised guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (January 7, 2019)
(“2019 Revised Guidance”).5 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of
internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51;
see also October 2019 Update at 1.
Under the 2019 Revised Guidance and the October 2019 Update, we
first look to whether the claim recites:

4 All reference citations are to the first named inventor only.
5 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further
guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance.
USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October
2019 Update”) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf).
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(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see Manual Patent Examining Procedure
“MPEP” § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed. Rev. 10.2019,
June 2020)) (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).6
2019 Revised Guidance at 52–55.
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under
Step 2B, to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well–understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
2019 Revised Guidance at 52–56.

ANALYSIS
35 U.S.C. § 101 Rejection
The Examiner determines claims 1, 5–17 and 20 are patent ineligible
under 35 U.S.C. § 101. See Final Action 7–10; see also Alice, 573 U.S. at
217 (describing the two-step framework “for distinguishing patents that

6 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a
practical application. See 2019 Revised Guidance at 54–55.
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claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that
claim patent–eligible applications of those concepts”).
We are not persuaded the Examiner’s rejection is in error. Unless
otherwise indicated, we adopt the Examiner’s findings and conclusions as
our own. We add the following primarily for emphasis and clarification
with respect to the Revised Guidance.
Step 2A—Prongs 1 and 2 identified in the 2019 Revised Guidance
Prong One
The Examiner determines, because of the scheduling service aspect of
the claims’ limitations, that those limitations
could all be reasonably interpreted as a human making
observations of data regarding scheduling an appointment and
matching skills needed for the service appointment; therefore,
the claims are directed to a mental processes. Further, each of
these limitations are directed to sales activities, and interactions
between people and thus, the claims are directed to a certain
method of organizing human activity. Accordingly, the claims
are directed to mental processes and a certain method of
organizing human activity, and thus, the claims are directed to
an abstract idea under the first prong of Step 2A.
Final Action 8 (emphasis added).
The Specification discloses:
FIG. 11 is a flow chart of a process 800 for dynamic scheduling
of service appointments. At block 802, the process 800 receives
a service appointment request 804. The service request may be
generated by a user, a network administrator for the customer, a
technician, an account manager, a customer service agent, a
customer service manager, or some other party. In embodiments
in which the work order or service appointment request is
generated by a third party and a service appointment has not yet
been scheduled, a request or reminder to schedule a service
appointment may be sent to the user. In block 806, the process
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800 identifies one or more skills associated with the service
appointment request 804. In some embodiments, the service
appointment request 804 may include or be accompanied by
information indicating the field associated with the service
appointment request 804 (e.g., network architecture, network
security, programming, component compatibility, etc.). In other
embodiments, the process 800 may utilize text recognition and/or
machine learning to identify skills associated with the service
appointment request 804.
Specification ¶ 53.
Claim 1 recites a system for receiving appointment service
requests and identifying skills associated with the service requests in
limitations [a], [b]. Claim 1 also recites parsing the service request
text and identifying the skills associated with the request based upon
the text in limitations [b1], [b2]. Claim 1 further recites referencing
the skills of the service agents in limitation [c]. Claim 1 recites
referencing service agents’ information including locations of
previously scheduled appointments and determining availability of
service agents based upon the reference information in limitation [d].
Claim 1 also recites populating a calendar with available appointment
times based upon the referenced information in limitation [e].
Claim 1 further recite receiving appointments and updating the
schedule based upon received reference information in limitations [f],
[g].
These steps recite commercial or legal interactions (including
agreements in the form of contracts; legal obligations; advertising,
marketing or sales activities or behaviors; business relations) and, thus, the
claim recites the judicial exception of “[c]ertain methods of organizing
human activity”; the claim recites as well, “concepts performed in the
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human mind[7] (including an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion),”
thus, the claim recites the abstract idea of “mental processes.” 2019 Revised
Guidance at 52.
Further, our reviewing court has found claims to recite abstract ideas
when they recite similar subject matter in regard to certain methods of
organizing human activity. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d
709, 715 (Fed Cir. 2014) (holding that claim “describ[ing] only the abstract
idea of showing an advertisement before delivering free content” is patent
ineligible); see also buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d. 1350, 1355
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding that concept of “creating a contractual
relationship—a ‘transaction performance guaranty’” is an abstract idea
(citation omitted)).
Furthermore, our reviewing court has found claims to recite judicial
exceptions when they recite similar subject matter in regard to mental
processes. See Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d
1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[W]ith the exception of generic computer-
implemented steps, there is nothing in the claims themselves that foreclose
them from being performed by a human, mentally or with pen and paper.”);
Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1324
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that computer-implemented method for
“anonymous loan shopping” was an abstract idea because it could be
“performed by humans without a computer”); Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP

7 “If a claim, under its broadest reasonable interpretation, covers
performance in the mind but for the recitation of generic computer
components, then it is still in the mental processes category unless the claim
cannot practically be performed in the mind.” 2019 Revised Guidance at 52
n. 14.
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Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Courts have examined
claims that required the use of a computer and still found that the
underlying, patent-ineligible invention could be performed via pen and paper
or in a person’s mind.”); CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654
F.3d 1366, 1375, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that the incidental use of
“computer” or “computer readable medium” does not make a claim
otherwise directed to process that “can be performed in the human mind, or
by a human using a pen and paper” patent eligible); id. at 1376
(distinguishing Research Corp. Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d
859 (Fed. Cir. 2010) and SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 601 F.3d
1319 (Fed. Cir. 2010), as directed to inventions that “could not, as a practical
matter, be performed entirely in a human’s mind”).
Therefore, we conclude the claims recite a judicial exception pursuant
to Step 2A, Prong One, of the 2019 Revised Guidance.
Prong Two
Under Prong Two of the 2019 Revised Guidance, we must determine
“whether the claim as a whole integrates the recited judicial exception into a
practical application of the exception.” 2019 Revised Guidance at 53. We
note that a “claim that integrates a judicial exception into a practical
application will apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that
imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is
more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.”
2019 Revised Guidance at 53, Section III(A)(2).
Appellant argues that the claims recite specific features of performed
techniques, such that the claims incorporate the alleged abstract ideas into a
practical application and are not merely a drafting effort to monopolize the
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judicial exception. Appeal Brief 11–12 (citing 2019 Revised Guidance at
53). We do not find Appellant’s argument persuasive. As the U.S. Supreme
Court has described “the concern that drives this exclusionary principle [i.e.,
the exclusion of abstract ideas from patent eligible subject matter] as one of
pre-emption.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 216 (citation omitted). However,
characterizing preemption as a driving concern for patent eligibility is not
the same as characterizing preemption as the sole test for patent eligibility.
As our reviewing court has explained, “[t]he Supreme Court has made clear
that the principle of preemption is the basis for the judicial exceptions to
patentability,” and “[f]or this reason, questions on preemption are inherent in
and resolved by the § 101 analysis.” Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom,
Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Alice, 573 U.S. at 216).
Although “preemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter, the
absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.” Id.
Moreover, “[w]here a patent’s claims are deemed only to disclose patent
ineligible subject matter under the [Alice/Mayo] framework . . . preemption
concerns are fully addressed and made moot.” Id.; see also OIP Techs., Inc.
v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[T]hat the
claims do not preempt all price optimization or may be limited to price
optimization in the e-commerce setting do not make them any less
abstract.”).
Appellant further argues, that similar to Example 378 where the
example claim is said to “integrate[ ] an abstract idea into a practical

8 Example 37 – Relocation of Icons on a Graphical User Interface, Subject
Matter Eligibility Examples: Abstract Ideas, 1–5, available at
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application because the claim recites receiving an input from a user and then
automatically moving icons on a GUI based on the input and collected data;”
claim 1 of the instant application recites “dynamically populating a calendar
graphical user interface (GUI) of available appointment times.” Appeal
Brief 12. Appellant contends,
that if receiving an input, referencing data stored in memory, and
then updating the locations of items on a GUI based on the
received input and the stored data integrate an abstract idea into
a practical application, then the instant independent claims also
integrate the allegedly abstract idea into a practical application.
Appeal Brief 12.
We do not find Appellant’s argument persuasive because the claimed
subject matter is distinguishable from the subject matter recited in
Example 37. In Example 37, the claimed subject matter was determined to
be patent eligible because, “the additional elements recite a specific manner
of automatically displaying icons to the user based on usage which provides
a specific improvement over prior systems, resulting in an improved
interface for electronic devices.” In contrast, claim 1 of the instant
application recites, “dynamically populating a calendar graphical user
interface (GUI) of available appointment times.” Appellant does not
persuasively show this limitation provides a similar specific technical
improvement over prior systems. Accordingly, we find Appellant’s
proposed condition does not integrate claim 1’s recited abstract idea into a
practical application because claim 1 does not recite additional elements that
reflects “an improvement in the functioning of a computer, or an

https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/101_examples_37to42_
20190107.pdf
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improvement to other technology or technical field.” See 2019 Revised
Guidance at 55.
Accordingly, we determine that claim 1 does not recite additional
elements that integrate the recited judicial exception into a practical
application pursuant to Step 2A, Prong Two, of the 2019 Revised Guidance.
Thus, claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea.
Step 2B identified in the 2019 Revised Guidance
In Step 2B, we consider whether an additional or combination of
elements, “[a]dds a specific limitation or combination of limitations that are
not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the field, which is
indicative that an inventive concept may be present” or “simply appends
well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the
industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception,
which is indicative that an inventive concept may not be present.”
2019 Revised Guidance at 56.
Appellant contends that, “independent claims 1, 9, and 17 include
limitations, or combinations of limitations, that are missing from the cited
references and are not otherwise well-understood, routine, conventional
activity in the field, thus making independent claims 1, 9, and 17 novel and
non-obvious in view of the cited references.” Appeal Brief 13. We find
Appellant’s contentions are not persuasive because any alleged improvement
to the efficiency, speed, and accuracy, arise out of the conventional
advantages of using the claimed computing device as a tool, and not a
particular improvement to the computing device itself. Intellectual Ventures
I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(“[M]erely adding computer functionality to increase the speed or efficiency
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of the process does not confer patent eligibility on an otherwise abstract
idea”); see 2019 Revised Guidance at 55; see also Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc.
v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1084, 1090 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“This invention makes
the trader faster and more efficient, not the computer. This is not a technical
solution to a technical problem.”). Further, as our reviewing court explains,
a “claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea.” Synopsis, Inc. v.
Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Even
assuming the technique claimed was “[g]roundbreaking, innovative, or even
brilliant,” that would not be enough for the claimed abstract idea to be patent
eligible. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569
U.S. 576, 591 (2013).
We also note that in BASCOM, our reviewing court found that
although the claims of the patent were directed to a judicial exception, the
patentee alleged an “inventive concept can be found in the ordered
combination of claim limitations that transform the abstract idea of filtering
content into a particular, practical application of that abstract idea.”
BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc., v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341,
1352 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In particular, the patent at issue in BASCOM recited
“a technology-based solution (not an abstract–idea–based solution
implemented with generic technical components in a conventional way) to
filter content on the Internet that overcomes existing problems with other
Internet filtering systems.” BASCOM at 1351.
We find independent claim 1 is distinguishable, as it recites an
abstract-idea-based solution, that is, a method for scheduling service agents,
in a conventional way. See generally Specification. Therefore, we are not
persuaded that ordered combination of limitations in claims 1 provides an
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inventive concept, and we find the claims simply append a well-understood,
routine, and conventional activity to the judicial exception. See 2019
Revised Guidance at 56.
Accordingly, we conclude claims 1, 5–17 and 20 are directed to
“commercial or legal interactions (including agreements in the form of
contracts; legal obligations; advertising, marketing or sales activities or
behaviors; business relations)” and, thus, the claims are directed to the
judicial exception of “[c]ertain methods of organizing human activity,” as
well as, “concepts performed in the human mind (including an observation,
evaluation, judgment, opinion)”; thus, the claims are directed to the judicial
exception of “mental processes.” See 2019 Revised Guidance at 52, 54–56.
We further conclude the claims do not recite significantly more than a
judicial exception. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s § 101 rejection of
claims 1, 5–17 and 20.
35 U.S.C. § 103 Rejection
The Examiner finds, “Karabetsos [070] teaches the central processing
means directs the user to input product-identifying means (e.g.[,] a Stock
Keeping Unit (SKU) number or similar other identifier) (string of text).”
Final Action 13. Appellant asserts:
Karabetsos does not appear to disclose “receiving a
service appointment request, wherein the service appointment
request comprises one or more strings of text . . . parsing the one
or more strings of text of the service appointment request, and
referencing a first database to identify the one or more skills
associated with the service appointment request based on the one
or more strings of text”, as recited by independent claims 1, 9,
and 17.
Appeal Brief 14 (emphasis omitted).
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Appellant argues, “In stark contrast, Karabetsos discloses that a user
selects a desired service from a menu of available services and provides a
location at which the user would like the service performed. See Karabetsos,
paragraph 67.” Appeal Brief 14. We do not find Appellant’s argument
persuasive of Examiner error because Appellant’s argument is not
commensurate with the scope of the claims. The Specification discloses in
paragraph 45 (see Figure 5) (emphasis added):
As illustrated from the path 302, the user, in this example,
George Warren, navigated from a home screen through a service
catalog, and a list of available services to select a point of sale
installation. Based on the customer’s selection, a work order
name 304 (e.g., “point of sale installation”), short description
306, and detailed description 308 are displayed.
First, the claims do not prohibit the string of text from originating
from a menu of available services, and, second, the Specification discloses
that the string of text actually originates from a list of available services. See
Specification ¶ 45. Consequently, we discern no meaningful difference
between the claimed text string, read in light of the Specification, and
Karabetsos’s “step of inputting a desired handyman service or other desired
service type into the central processing means via the user–based data input
means” where the “desired handyman service or other desired service type []
may be selected from select service category.” Karabetsos ¶ 67; see Final
Action 13.
Appellant further argues that Fletcher does not appear to remedy
Karabetsos’s noted deficiency. Appeal Brief 15. We do not find
Appellant’s argument persuasive of Examiner error because we do not find
Karabetsos deficient. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness
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rejection of independent claims 1, 9 and 17, argued together, as well as, the
dependent claims not argued separately. See Appeal Brief 15, 16.
CONCLUSION
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 5–17, 20 101 Eligibility 1, 5–17,
20

1, 5–17, 20 103 Karabetsos, Fletcher 1, 5–17,
20

Overall
Outcome
1, 5–17,
20

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(v).

AFFIRMED