Service Employees Local 87 (Able Building Maintenance Co.)

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 23, 2007

349 N.L.R.B. 408 (N.L.R.B. 2007)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
349 NLRB No. 40
408
Service Employees International Union, Local 87
(Able Building Maintenance Company) and
Carlos Serrano. Case 20–CB–12510
February 23, 2007
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS SCHAUMBER, KIRSANOW, AND WALSH
On November 16, 2006, Administrative Law Judge
Mary Miller Cracraft issued the attached decision. The
General Counsel filed exceptions and a supporting brief,
the Respondent filed an answering brief, and the General
Counsel filed a reply brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions,
and to adopt the recommended Order dismissing the
complaint.
ORDER
The recommended Order of the administrative law
judge is adopted and the complaint is dismissed.
Shelley Brenner, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Jane Brunner, Esq., of Oakland, California, for the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MARY MILLER CRACRAFT, Administrative Law Judge. The
complaint1 alleges that Service Employees International Union,
Local 87 (Respondent or the Union) violated Section
8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act2 by
requesting that Able Building Maintenance Company (ABMC)
discharge its employee Carlos Serrano for a reason other than
Serrano’s failure to tender uniformly required initiation fees
and periodic dues. More specifically, the complaint alleges that
Respondent caused the discharge of Serrano pursuant to an

1 The General Counsel has implicitly excepted to some of the
judge’s credibility findings. The Board’s established policy is not to
overrule an administrative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the
clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they
are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950),
enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the
record and find no basis for reversing the findings.
The General Counsel has excepted, inter alia, to the judge’s failure
to find that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by
breaching its duty of fair representation to Charging Party Serrano. We
find this exception without merit because this theory of the violation
was neither alleged in the complaint nor litigated at the hearing.
1 This case was tried in San Francisco, California, on June 14 and
July 20, 2006. The charge was filed by Carlos Serrano, an individual,
on November 7, 2005, and amended on November 18, 2005, and Janu-
ary 31, 2006. The complaint issued on January 31, 2006, and was
amended on May 31, 2006. All dates are in 2005, unless otherwise
referenced.
2 29 U.S.C. Sec. 158(b)(1)(A) and (b)(2).
internal union bylaw which prohibits members from working
for more than one company covered by the collective-
bargaining agreement between San Francisco Maintenance
Contractors Association (SFMCA) and Respondent and/or from
working simultaneously at two jobs in the same industry cov-
ered by the SFMCA contract.
All parties were afforded full opportunity to appear, to intro-
duce relevant evidence, to examine and cross-examine wit-
nesses, and to argue the merits of their respective positions. On
the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of
the witnesses,3 and after considering the briefs filed by counsel
for the General Counsel and counsel for Respondent, I make
the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.
I. FINDINGS OF FACT
During 2005, union member Carlos Serrano worked as a
regular full-time employee at 425 Market Street.
Since 1984, Carlos Serrano (Serrano) has worked as a janitor
in San Francisco, California, at 425 Market Street. Addition-
ally, Serrano has been a member of the Union since 1984.
Currently, his hours at 425 Market Street are from 6 p.m. to
1:45 a.m., Monday through Friday, for a total of 37.5 hours per
week. This is considered full-time employment. Throughout
Serrano’s employment at 425 Market Street, various janitorial
contractors have been awarded the janitorial contract for that
building.
During 2005, the Union’s multiemployer contract with
SFMCA applied to employees working at 425 Market Street.
Prior to July 1, 2005, OneSource Building Services, Inc. pro-
vided janitorial services at 425 Market Street. OneSource was
a party to the Union’s multiemployer contract with SFMCA.
This multiemployer contract applied to OneSource employees
working at 425 Market Street. On July 1, ABMC took over the
contract at 425 Market Street. ABMC was a party to the multi-
employer contract and employees of OneSource continued to
work for ABMC under the same contract.
During 2005, union member Carlos Serrano worked regular
part-time hours at University of San Francisco (USF).
In September 2003, Serrano began working a second janitor-
ial job, this one located at USF. He routinely worked regular
hours on Saturday and Sunday and was on call from 4 to 8 a.m.
during the week. At all relevant times, the janitorial contractor
at USF was ABMC. Regarding his weekend hours, Serrano
was a regular part-time employee of ABMC at USF.
During 2005, a single-employer contract between the Union
and ABMC applied to ABMC employees at USF.
Although ABMC is a member of the multiemployer bargain-
ing group SFMCA, it nevertheless has a single employer con-
tract (the USF contract) with the Union covering its USF em-
ployees. The USF contract was effective from 2001–2005.
In October 2005, the Union approved a bylaw precluding un-
ion members from working for more than one company cov-

3 Credibility resolutions have been made based upon a review of the
entire record and all exhibits in this proceeding. Witness demeanor and
inherent probability of the testimony have been utilized to assess credi-
bility. Testimony contrary to my findings has been discredited on some
occasions because it was in conflict with credited testimony or docu-
ments or because it was inherently incredible and unworthy of belief.
SERVICE EMPLOYEES LOCAL 87 (ABLE BUILDING MAINTENANCE CO.) 409
ered by the SFMCA contract and/or from working “simultane-
ously at two jobs in the same industry that are covered by the
[multiemployer contract].” The purpose of this bylaw was to
prevent inequities in employment opportunities.
On August 13, 2005, at a regular membership meeting of the
Union, a proposed constitutional bylaw amendment to article
XIV, section 10, received its first reading. The amendment
stated,
A member may on[ly] work for one Company covered by the
Collective Bargaining Agreement between [SFMCA] and [the
Union]. Members are prohibited from working simultane-
ously at two jobs in the same industry that are covered by the
above-mentioned Agreement.
The proposed bylaw amendment was read at a subsequent
meeting on September 10. On October 8, the bylaw amend-
ment passed.
On this record, it is undisputed that Serrano was paid no
overtime pay by ABMC even though he routinely worked in
excess of 40 hours per week when the hours at 425 Market
Street and at USF were combined.
It is probable that Rojas discovered that Serrano was work-
ing two jobs for ABMC, resulting in his working in excess of
40 hours per week.
In early November 2005, ABMC Project Manager Ricardo
Rojas called the Union and spoke with union executive board
member and union employee Carmen Cortez about the new
bylaw.
Cortez confirmed that the bylaw had been approved.
Rojas told Cortez that he recently learned that Carlos Serrano
was working two jobs for ABMC.
Cortez told Rojas that it was up to him.
It is uncontradicted that Ricardo Rojas (Rojas), ABMC pro-
ject manager at USF, and union executive board member and
employee Carmen Cortez (Cortez)4 spoke by telephone in early
November 2005 about the new bylaw. Neither Rojas nor Cor-
tez asserts that Cortez explicitly told Rojas to terminate or re-
move Serrano from his position with ABMC at USF. All other
aspects of their conversation are disputed.
My findings, above, are based on numerous credibility reso-
lutions. For instance, Cortez testified that in early November
Rojas called her to ask if it was true that the Union had a new
bylaw that prohibited members from having two jobs.5 Cortez
responded that it was true. On the other hand, Rojas testified
that in early November 2005, he received a telephone call from

4 In its answer, the Union admits that Cortez, executive board mem-
ber, is an agent of the Union within the meaning of Sec. 2(13) of the
Act. In addition to being on the executive board, Cortez also worked as
an employee of the Union from September through December 2005.
She described her duties as answering the phone and helping members.
Miranda explained that Cortez was hired by the Union’s vice president
after Miranda began her maternity leave on September 6, 2005.
Miranda noted that Cortez was a “member organizer” and assisted
union staff who could not speak Spanish. She also visited buildings
with officers of the Union.
5 Although the parties assumed that the bylaw prohibited Serrano
from holding his two jobs, the literal language of the bylaw may not
have impacted Serrano’s situation.
Cortez.6 According to Rojas, Cortez told him that Serrano was
working two different jobs and this was contrary to union rules.
To resolve the conflict of who called whom, I turn to the tes-
timony of Union President Olga Miranda (Miranda). I credit
her uncontradicted testimony that the bylaw had not been im-
plemented by the Union. No decision had been made regarding
fines or other methods of enforcement of the bylaw. In con-
trast, another bylaw amendment explicitly set forth the fines to
be levied. Thus it would appear implausible that Cortez would
call Rojas about the impact of the new bylaw. Moreover, even
if a method of implementation had been determined, it is highly
improbable that of the 2800 members of the Union, Cortez
would single-handedly decide that Serrano should be the first
member impacted by the bylaw and unilaterally make a call to
ABMC to alert them to the bylaw implications for Serrano.7
It is more probable that Rojas discovered that Serrano was
working for ABMC in excess of 40 hours per week and, upon
learning that the Union had passed a bylaw on the subject of
members holding two jobs, he called the Union to inquire about
the bylaw. Thus I find that Rojas called the Union.
Although Cortez adamantly testified that Serrano’s name
was not mentioned during the conversation with Rojas, I find to
the contrary. After consulting her sworn affidavit, Union Presi-
dent Miranda testified that Cortez told her that Serrano’s name
was mentioned during the conversation. After her recollection
was refreshed, Miranda testified that Cortez reported that Rojas
told her that Serrano was working at USF during the day. I
credit Miranda’s refreshed recollection, as set forth in her affi-
davit, that Serrano’s name was mentioned during the Cor-
tez/Rojas conversation, as reported to Miranda by Cortez.
Moreover, Rojas testified that Serrano’s name was men-
tioned during the conversation with Cortez. His testimony
corroborates Miranda’s refreshed recollection of Cortez’ de-
scription of the conversation. Thus, I find, based upon the tes-
timony of Miranda and Rojas, that Serrano’s name was men-
tioned during the conversation.
Based upon my credibility resolutions set forth below, I find
that Rojas asked if it was true that the Union had a new bylaw
that prohibited members from having two jobs. Cortez said it
was true. Rojas stated that Serrano was working two different
jobs for his company and this was contrary to union rules.
Cortez responded, “It’s up to you.”
According to Cortez, Rojas told her that it had come to his
attention that he had “a person that is working two jobs for the
company he worked for.” Although Cortez denied responding,

6 Although Rojas did not know Carmen’s last name, there is no
doubt that the person Rojas spoke to was Carmen Cortez.
7 In this regard, I have taken into consideration Serrano’s testimony
(denied by Cortez) that he visited the union hall in October to pay his
monthly fees. At that time, according to Serrano, Cortez asked him to
speak to a group of people. He declined and Cortez became angry and
threatened to call the police. Serrano further testified that he left the
union hall, took his 5-year old son to his mothers, and returned to the
hall to await the arrest threat. After waiting 20 minutes, Serrano went
home. Cortez denied that she threatened to call the police regarding
any member of the Union. Serrano’s scenario makes no sense to me
and it is, therefore, discredited.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD410
“It’s up to you,”8 I credit the statement in her sworn affidavit to
this effect. As explained in her sworn affidavit, Cortez told
Rojas that it was up to him because she thought he was calling
the Union to make sure he was not breaking any rule by having
an employee work two jobs. As enhanced by her sworn affida-
vit, I credit Cortez’ testimony that she told Rojas it was up to
him.
Rojas testified that after Cortez told him that Serrano was in
violation of the new bylaw, Rojas asked for something in writ-
ing to confirm the bylaw. Rojas identified a document faxed to
him by the Union on November 18, as identical to the docu-
ment faxed to him in early November. Rojas explained that he
had either lost the early November faxed document or given it
to Serrano. Cortez denied that she faxed the bylaw to Rojas.
I have not credited Rojas’ assertion that Cortez told him to
fire Serrano or Rojas’ testimony that he received a faxed docu-
ment from Cortez for several reasons including relative de-
meanor, lack of corroboration, improbability, and internal in-
consistency. I found Rojas’ attempt to finesse the November
18 document for an earlier document untrustworthy. In this
respect, I note that no telephone records, which might have
corroborated his testimony, were offered. Finally, on cross-
examination, Rojas testified that if the Union told him to fire an
employee, he would do so no matter what reason was given.
However, he inconsistently admitted that he was aware only
that the Union could request the discharge of an employee for
failure to pay dues and fees.
On November 4, ABMC told Serrano that, according to the
Union, Serrano no longer had a job at USF.
On November 4, Serrano worked his last day for ABMC at
USF. According to Serrano, as he was standing in line to
punch his card before leaving work on November 4, ABMC
Project Manager Rojas told him that Cortez of the Union told
Rojas that Serrano did not have a job with ABMC at USF any
more.
In basic agreement, Rojas recalled telling Serrano that Car-
men from the Union called and told him that according to the
union rules, Serrano could not work two different jobs because
that would take away opportunities for other members.
Further testimony regarding meetings on November 7 and 9
does not assist in resolving credibility or providing insight into
the November 4 events.
According to Serrano, on the following Monday, November
7, he spoke with Cortez at the union hall. Serrano testified that
Cortez said that he could not hold two jobs in the same business
due to the union rule prohibiting a member from holding two
jobs. Serrano made an appointment for Wednesday, November
9, to speak with Miranda, president of the Union.
Cortez testified that when Serrano came to the union hall, he
was very upset and said, “I’m here because you told my super-
visor to fire me.” Cortez told Serrano no. She explained to

8 I discredit Cortez’ awkward attempt to distance herself from her
sworn affidavit which clearly states that she told Rojas, “It’s up to you”
after affirming that the bylaw had been passed. Her affidavit states,
“The reason I told [Rojas] that it was up to him was because I thought
he was calling the union to make sure he’s not breaking any rules by
having the employee work two jobs.”
Serrano that she only told Rojas that the new bylaw had been
passed.
Not only does the testimony of Serrano and Cortez conform
to their prior testimony regarding the events of November 4, it
is also consistent with my finding of fact that Cortez told Rojas
that it was up to him.
At the November 9 meeting, according to Serrano, he de-
manded a layoff letter or a termination letter as well as holiday
and birthday pay. Miranda asked who gave Serrano the layoff
and he responded that Cortez had done so. At that point, Cor-
tez was asked to join the meeting.
Miranda testified basically in agreement. She recalled that
Serrano came to her office and demanded to know why she had
removed him. Miranda told Serrano that she did not know he
had been removed from 425 Market Street. Serrano explained
that he had not been removed from 425 Market Street but,
rather, from USF. Miranda said she did not know that he
worked there. Serrano told Miranda that Cortez had given an
order to have him removed. Miranda countered that Cortez did
not have any authority to remove employees from their jobs.
Miranda then called Cortez to the meeting.
According to Miranda, she asked Cortez if she had given an
order to Rojas to have Serrano removed from his job. Cortez
denied that she had done so. Cortez stated that Rojas had called
her about a constitutional amendment and she had answered his
questions, acknowledging that a change had been made. Cortez
told Serrano that she never gave an order to have Serrano re-
moved.
According to Serrano, Miranda told Cortez, “You have been
fired. You have been fired.” Serrano then observed a power
struggle between Miranda and Cortez, Miranda asserting that
she was the president and could do what she pleased and Cortez
countering that Miranda was not the owner of the Union. In
any event, according to Serrano, Miranda explained that it had
been a mistake to lay off Serrano. Shouting and crying ensued
and Miranda and Cortez began speaking only in English, which
Serrano could not understand. Miranda asked Serrano to leave.
According to another version of Serrano’s testimony, this
one on cross-examination, Miranda told Serrano that he should
be fired because he could not have two jobs. Serrano agreed
that one of his affidavits stated that Miranda told ABMC to
discharge him. When asked whether it was Miranda or Cortez
that told ABMC to fire him, Serrano stated that he did not
know. Then on redirect examination, Serrano stated that he
was confused and nervous on cross-examination but, actually,
Cortez was the one who told ABMC to fire him.
Miranda testified that during the meeting with Serrano, Cor-
tez joined them and explained that she received a call from
Rojas asking if there was a constitutional change that members
were not allowed to work two jobs. Cortez told him that there
was such a change. Although Miranda did not independently
recall the remainder of the conversation, after consulting her
sworn affidavit, she agreed that she told Cortez that she should
not always believe that management supervisors were con-
cerned about violating the contract when they called for infor-
mation, and that as a union representative, she should question
supervisors about asking for information about in-house
amendments. Further, Miranda agreed that she told Cortez that
SERVICE EMPLOYEES LOCAL 87 (ABLE BUILDING MAINTENANCE CO.) 411
she could fire her as a union employee even though she could
not remove her from the executive board of the Union.
Miranda agreed that Cortez became upset and began crying and
that she and Cortez were speaking in raised voices. Although
Cortez was later discharged on December 5, Miranda testified
that this had nothing to do with the way Cortez handled the
telephone call from Rojas.
Cortez testified that when she arrived in Miranda’s office,
Miranda confronted her with Serrano’s assertion that Cortez
told Rojas to fire Serrano. Cortez told Miranda that she had
already explained to Serrano that she did not tell Rojas to fire
Serrano. She only told him that a bylaw had been passed.
Cortez agreed that an argument ensued between Miranda and
her. Before Cortez could explain to Miranda that she had not
ordered the discharge of Serrano, Miranda ordered Cortez to
apologize to Serrano. Cortez refused and the argument ensued.
During the argument, Miranda accused Cortez of using the
wrong work ethic. Miranda told Cortez that she was the one
who gave orders at the Union and she told Cortez that she was
fired. None of this testimony assists me in making a determina-
tion in this case.
There is no credible evidence of union animus toward
Serrano.
In addition to the evidence regarding Cortez’ alleged threat
to call the police, which I have discredited, after Serrano testi-
fied that he could not recall further conversation with Miranda
on November 9, he was asked, “When you spoke to her ini-
tially, did you complain about what had happened to you being
discharged?” He responded that during his meeting with Union
President Miranda on November 9, when he explained to her
that he had been laid off at USF, she responded in a mocking
tone, “because [you] are a shop steward, [you have] the right to
hold two jobs.” Miranda denied this comment. She testified
that she did not know that Serrano held two jobs. She also
testified that Serrano was not retained as a shop steward at 425
Market Street when the Union emerged from control by a sister
local.
Serrano also testified that approximately 2 months after
Miranda’s June 2005 election as president, she held a meeting
with about 10 employees outside 425 Market Street at the Fre-
mont entrance. Miranda told the assembled employees that she
wanted to switch insurance and also convert employees to a
401(k). Serrano testified that he asked her who had requested a
change in insurance because the employees were happy with
their current insurance. According to Serrano, Miranda re-
sponded that Serrano was going to get into trouble. Miranda
said she would wait for Serrano in her office. Serrano re-
sponded that he never had any problems but his coworkers had
problems. Miranda responded in a mocking manner, “He who
laughs last, laughs best.”
Serrano testified that at a second meeting a few days later
with 10 employees held outside at 50 Fremont, the same collo-
quy between Miranda and Serrano occurred in that she stated
she wanted to switch insurance, he stated that no employees
had requested a change in insurance, and Miranda responded
that Serrano was going to have problems and she would expect
him in her office and he who laughs last, laughs best.
Miranda testified that once she was elected president, she did
not hold meetings outside the buildings. Prior to her election,
she held meetings on the street. She could not recall a date
when she held meetings to discuss insurance changes but
thought such meetings were probably in 2003, because that was
about the time of a decertification election. Later, Miranda
stated that the meetings were in June 2005. In any event,
Miranda denied that Serrano asked any questions at these meet-
ings and denied that she said Serrano was going to get into
trouble. Miranda recalled using the phrase, “he who laughs
last, laughs best” in Spanish in addressing all employees, mean-
ing that those who joined the process of collective action would
triumph eventually.
Based upon their relative demeanors, the internal consistency
of the testimony, and the inherent probability of the accounts, I
credit the testimony of Miranda over that of Serrano. Initially, I
find it highly improbable that identical exchanges would occur
in two consecutive meetings. Secondly, none of the other 10
employees was called to corroborate Serrano’s testimony re-
garding the alleged threats made to him by Miranda. Finally,
Miranda impressed me as credible in her denial of making such
threats to Serrano.
II. ANALYSIS
Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of Act provide as follows:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or
its agents (1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exer-
cise of the rights guaranteed in section 7 . . . or (2) to cause or
attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an em-
ployee in violation of [section 8(a)(3)] or to discriminate
against an employee with respect to whom membership in
such organization has been denied or terminated on some
ground other than his failure to tender the periodic dues and
the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquir-
ing or retaining membership.
An essential element of any violation of Section 8(b)(1) is
restraint or coercion in the exercise of a Section 7 right; i.e., the
right to form, join, or assist a labor organization, or to refrain
from such activity. Opposition to officers or policies of a labor
organization constitutes protected Section 7 activity.9 The
credited evidence, however, fails to reflect that Serrano en-
gaged in Section 7 activity.
An essential element of a violation of Section 8(b)(2) is that
the union must cause or attempt to cause discrimination. There
is no credible evidence of an express demand from the Union
causing Serrano’s discharge and thus there is no evidence that
the Union directly caused his discharge.
In order to establish an attempt to cause an employer to dis-
criminate against an employee, there must be some evidence of
union conduct. “It is not sufficient that an employer’s conduct
might please the union.” Wenner Ford Tractor Rentals, 315
NLRB 964, 965 (1994), quoting Toledo World Terminals, 289
NLRB 670, 673 (1988). However, where a reasonable infer-
ence of a request is supported, direct evidence of an express

9 See, e.g., Sheet Metal Workers Local 16 (Parker Sheet Metal), 275
NLRB 867 (1985), citing Operating Engineers Local 17 (Combustion
Engineering), 231 NLRB 1287 (1977).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD412
demand is not necessary. Avon Roofing & Sheet Metal Co.,
312 NLRB 499 (1993) (direct evidence of an express demand
by the union is not necessary where evidence supports reason-
able inference of union request).
The credited evidence reflects that in the context of discuss-
ing the Union’s bylaw with Rojas, Cortez said only, “It’s up to
you.” There is no reasonable basis upon which to find an infer-
ence of an attempt to cause discharge from this statement.
Standing alone, the statement “[I]t’s up to you” would most
reasonably be understood literally; that is, the Union wants no
involvement in ABMC’s decision.
Moreover, discharge was not a foreseeable consequence of
the labor organization’s communication, “[I]t’s up to you.”10
Serrano’s discharge was not a foreseeable consequence of tell-
ing Rojas that it is up to him whether to allow Serrano to work
at two jobs for ABMC.11 Taken in context, I conclude that a
preponderance of the credible evidence does not establish that
the Union attempted to cause the discharge of Serrano.

10 If a foreseeable consequence of the communication is discharge,
an explicit demand to discharge is not required. See, e.g., Town &
Country Supermarkets, 340 NLRB 1410, 1411 (2004) (union seized
upon union dissident’s statement, “[N]ext time I see you I’m going to
kick your ass. I’m not afraid of you” by reporting this to employer as a
threat in violation of employer’s handbook knowing that dissident
employee would be discharged for making the statement); Paperwork-
ers Local 1048 (Jefferson Smurfit Corp.), 323 NLRB 1042, 1044
(1997), enfd. 865 F.2d 251 (3d Cir. 1998) (union’s report of racial
harassment to employer with full knowledge of employer’s rules con-
cerning such conduct, when coupled with union’s unsupported state-
ment that African-American employees were upset by remark, supports
inference of an implied request that dissident employee be disciplined).
11 See, e.g., Laborers Local 158 (Contractors of Pennsylvania), 280
NLRB 1100 (1986) (knowledge of political dissension within union
may have been known to employer but is insufficient to support an
inference that union requested discharge of dissident employee).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The National Labor Relations Board has jurisdiction of this
case by virtue of ABMC’s indirect effect on interstate com-
merce.
ABMC, a corporation with an office and place of business in
San Francisco, California, provides services as a janitorial con-
tractor. During calendar year 2005, ABMC provided janitorial
services in excess of $50,000 within the State of California, to
firms that meet one of the NLRB’s jurisdictional standards on a
direct basis. Thus, I find that ABMC is engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
Respondent is a labor organization within the meaning of the
NLRA.
Respondent admits and I find that it is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
A preponderance of the evidence does not support a finding
that Respondent restrained or coerced Serrano because of his
protected activity.
A preponderance of the evidence does not support a finding
that Respondent caused or attempted to cause the Employer to
terminate Serrano.
Respondent has not violated the Act.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended12
ORDER
The complaint is dismissed.

12 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.