Seattle Automobile Dealers Association

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 26, 1959

122 N.L.R.B. 1616 (N.L.R.B. 1959)

1616 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Sucesores de Abarca , Inc., is engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. Respondent Union de Soldadores, Mecanicos, Montadores de Acero, Auxiliares
y Ramas Anexas, Local 1839, ILA-Ind., and Respondent International Longshore-
men's Association, District Council of the Ports of Puerto Rico, ILA-Ind., are
labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By maintaining in effect, applying , and enforcing an arrangement or under-
standing with Abarca between March 19, 1956, and March 25, 1957, whereby its
members were given preference in the performance of ship repair and maintenance
work, and whereby nonmembers were required to obtain clearance and approval
from it as a condition for the performance of ship repair and maintenance work,
and by executing and maintaining in effect a collective-bargaining contract with
Abarca dated November 16, 1956, to expire on June 30, 1958, which contract
contains a union-security clause requiring intermittent ship repair and maintenance
employees of Abarca to become members of Local 1839, notwithstanding that said
Local was not either at the time of the execution of said contract or within the
preceding 12-month period prior thereto in compliance with the provisions of
Section 9(f), (g), and (h) of the Act, Respondents have engaged in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(2) of the Act.
4. By causing Abarca to discriminate against Luis Rodriguez Arroyo in violation
of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, Respondent ILA District Council has engaged in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(2) of the Act.
5. By coercing and restraining employees of Abarca in the exercise of rights
guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, Respondents have engaged in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]
Seattle Automobile Dealers Association and Gladys Cocks, Peti-
tioner and Clerical Workers Division A of Automobile Drivers
and Demonstrators Union , Local No. 882, Chartered by the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauffeurs, Ware-
housemen and Helpers of America , Independent . Case No.
19-RD-126. February 26, 1959
DECISION AND DIRECTION OF ELECTION
Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9(c) of the National
Labor Relations Act, a hearing was held before William Gilbert
Nowell, hearing officer. The hearing officer's rulings made at the
hearing are free from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed.
Pursuant to Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act,
the Board has delegated its powers herein to a three-member panel
[Chairman Leedom and Members Rodgers and Jenkins].
The Union moves that the petition should be dismissed because
(1) Gladys Cocks, the Petitioner, is a confidential employee; (2) the
petition was employer sponsored; (3) there was supervisory assist-
ance in securing signatures in support of the petition; and (4) there
is a contract bar to an election at this time.
As to, (1), the record shows that Cocks is an office secretary in the
employ of'bne of the Association's members. Although she did some,
122 NLRB No. 191.
SEATTLE AUTOMOBILE DEALERS ASSOCIATION 1617
confidential work during a salesmen's strike, which ended 2 months
prior to the filing of the petition, she did not at the time the peti-
tion was filed act in a confidential capacity to any official who
handles or effectuates labor relations policies. Nor does she do so
now. Accordingly, we find that Petitioner is not a confidential
employee.,
As to (2), it appears that the Association consists of approxi-
mately 33 automobile dealers in the Seattle area who employ the
approximately 129 clericals in the unit. The alleged conduct upon
which sponsorship is predicated involves only 2 of the Association
members who employ 12 of the office clericals included in the unit.
The record shows that Cocks informed her employer of dissatis-
faction among the "girls" and of their intention with respect to the
Union. Cocks asked her employer to recommend an attorney.
Cocks testified that she was going through with the "girls" plans
whether or not her employer approved, and that she told him of
their intentions only because he was her employer. The Employer
recommended an attorney who is not connected with his business.
The attorney, who is being paid by the Petitioner, supplied the
forms and drew up the necessary papers. Although Cocks' employer
knew that Cocks secured signatures in support of the petition from
employees of his company, as well as from employees of other Asso-
ciation members, on company time, the fact that the Petitioner had
been paid for the 2 or 3 hours used in soliciting does not establish
employer sponsorship? Furthermore, Cocks testified that she had
performed uncompensated overtime in the past and that she felt the
time she used in soliciting was her own.
The Union also contends that Phyllis Bowman, an employee of
another Association member, assisted the Petitioner in securing sig-
natures in support of the petition, and that, because she is a super-
visor, her assistance is relevant to the issue of employer sponsorship.
The record shows that Bowman has been excluded from the contract
unit as a "head bookkeeper." It also shows that, along with six other
clericals, Bowman is under the immediate supervision of a business
manager who is in charge of the office. Although Bowman inter-
views applicants for employment, she does so merely as a screening
process to eliminate inexperienced applicants. She makes no recom-
mendation on these applicants to the business manager, who alone
does the hiring. Bowman has no authority to discharge or grant
time off; she has never recommended wage increases nor been
1 B. F. Goodrich Company, 115 NLRB 722, 724; American Litho told Corporation,
107 NLRB 1061, 1064.
2 Robert F. Dwyer et al ., d/b/a Clackama8 Logging Company, 113 NLRB 229, 230.
1618 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
consulted thereon; and she does not discipline, make work assign-
ments, or make reports on employees. She substitutes only spor-
adically for the business manager, when he is ill or on vacation, and
even then her exercise of authority is limited to routine decisions.
Accordingly, we find that Bowmaii is not a supervisor. Concerning
the knowledge of her employer about her activities, Bowman testi-
fied that she told her employer about "the feeling by all the girls,
that they would prefer not having a union," and that she "was going
to give them a petition to sign if they chose." She was told by her
employer that it was not company business, and that he could not
tell her what to do or what not to do. Bowman was paid for the
time she spent soliciting signatures, but she testified that she was
entitled to it as uncompensated overtime.
Under all the circumstances, we are satisfied that the petition
herein was not initiated or sponsored by the Employer.
As to (3), the allegation of supervisory assistance was based on
Bowman's status as a supervisor. In view of our finding that Bow-
man is not a supervisor, there is no merit in this contention.
As to (4), the record shows that the contract between the parties
expired in April 1958 and that, as of the date of the petition,
October 1, 1958, no new contract had been signed. We therefore
find that there is no contract bar.3 Accordingly, we deny the Union's
motion to dismiss.
Upon the entire record in this case, the Board finds :
1. The Employer is engaged in commerce within the meaning of
the Act.
2. The Petitioner, an employee of one of the Association members,
asserts that the Union is no longer the bargaining representative of
the employees as defined in Section 9(a) of the Act.
3. A question affecting commerce exists concerning the repre-
sentation of employees of the Employer within the meaning of
Section 9(c) (1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
4. The following employees of the Employer constitute a unit ap-
propriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the mean-
ing of Section 9(b) of the Act: All. office and clerical employees of
the members of the Seattle Automobile Dealers Association, Seattle,
Washington, excluding office managers, confidential secretaries, head
bookkeepers, all other employees, and all supervisors as defined in
the Act. This unit conforms to the stipulation of the parties, and
apparently to the contract unit.
[Text of Direction of Election omitted from publication.]
a Appalachian Shale Products Co., 121 NLRB 1160.