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Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jun 11, 2021

2020006270 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 11, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/860,015 09/21/2015 Stephen F. Gass SDT 379 2808
27630 7590 06/11/2021
SawStop Holding LLC
11555 SW Myslony Street
Tualatin, OR 97062
EXAMINER
DEXTER, CLARK F
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3724
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/11/2021 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte STEPHEN F. GASS, PAUL H. STASIEWICZ, and
JAMES F.W. WRIGHT
Appeal 2020-006270
Application 14/860,015
Technology Center 3700
Before JENNIFER D. BAHR, PHILLIP J. KAUFFMAN, and
SEAN P. O’HANLON, Administrative Patent Judges.

O’HANLON, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
decision to reject claims 1, 4, and 6–8. We have jurisdiction over this appeal
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM.
In explaining our Decision, we refer to the substitute Specification
filed December 21, 2017 (“Spec.”), the Non-Final Office Action mailed

1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as SawStop Holding,
LLC. Appeal Br. 1.
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April 15, 2019 (“Non-Final Act.”), the Appeal Brief filed September 3, 2019
(“Appeal Br.”), the Examiner’s Answer mailed July 6, 2020 (“Ans.”), and
the Reply Brief filed September 4, 2020 (“Reply Br.”).
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
Appellant’s claimed invention relates to table saws. Spec. 1:8–10.
Claims 1 and 4 are independent. Claim 1, reproduced below from page 17
(Claims Appendix) of the Appeal Brief, is illustrative of the claimed subject
matter:
1. A table saw comprising:
a table defining a work surface;
a substantially planar, circular blade configured to extend
at least partially above the work surface to an elevation;
a motor operatively coupled to the blade to spin the
blade; and
an elevation system supporting the blade and operable to
change the elevation of the blade relative to the work surface;
where the elevation system includes a handwheel that a
user rotates to change the elevation of the blade, a shaft
connected to the handwheel that rotates when the user rotates
the handwheel, a spring associated with the shaft that applies a
force or torque to the shaft which varies with the elevation of
the blade, an elevation carriage supporting the blade and
configured to move up and down to change the elevation of the
blade, and a mechanism operatively connecting the elevation
carriage with the shaft so that rotation of the shaft causes the
elevation carriage to move up or down, where the mechanism
includes a cam surface connected to the shaft to rotate with the
shaft, and where the cam surface converts the force or torque
applied by the spring which varies with the elevation of the
blade to a force or torque that is substantially constant with the
variation of the elevation of the blade.
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REFERENCES
The Examiner relies on the following prior art references in rejecting
the claims on appeal:
Anderson US 97,263 Nov. 30, 1869
Cusumano US 2,420,301 May 13, 1947
Schneider US 3,499,478 Mar. 10, 1970
Cloutier ’890 US 5,103,890 Apr. 14, 1992
Hiller US 5,133,399 July 28, 1992
Cloutier ’433 US 5,259,433 Nov. 9, 1993
Mullet US 6,561,256 B2 May 13, 2003
Kicher US 8,025,090 B2 Sept. 27, 2011
Frolov US 2014/0260869 A1 Sept. 18, 2014
REJECTION
Claims 1, 4, and 6–8 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Frolov and Official Notice, as evidenced by Schneider,
Cloutier ’890, Cloutier ’433, Mullet, Kicher, Anderson, Cusumano, and
Hiller. Non-Final Act. 3–8; Ans. 3–8.
ANALYSIS
In contesting the rejection, Appellant presents arguments for
independent claim 1 and relies on these same arguments for independent
claim 4 and dependent claims 6–8. See Appeal Br. 4–16. We select claim 1
as representative, and claims 4 and 6–8 stand or fall with claim 1. See
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2019).
The Examiner finds that Frolov discloses a table saw substantially as
recited in independent claim 1, but does not disclose a spring or a cam
surface. Non-Final Act. 3–4; Ans. 3–4, 6. The Examiner
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takes Official Notice that such control mechanisms are old and
well[-]known in the art and provide various well[-]known
benefits including requiring a constant, minimal force required
by an operator to perform a function that requires varying force
thus making it easier for an operator or a limited-power motor
to perform such a task.
Non-Final Act. 6; see also Ans. 7. The Examiner cites various prior art
references “[a]s evidence in support of the taking of Official Notice.” Non-
Final Act. 6 (emphasis omitted). For example, the Examiner points to
Schneider as evidencing “a well[-]known example of such a control
mechanism that includes a force-altering connection that includes a spring
(e.g., 26) around a shaft and a cam surface (e.g., on 32), wherein this control
mechanism allows the door, which requires a nonlinear lifting force, to be
lifted with constant, reduced force.” Id.; see also Ans. 7. The Examiner
determines that,
when faced with the problem of desiring and/or requiring a
reduced, linear force for lifting an object that requires a non-
linear lifting force for benefits such as increased efficiency, it
would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art
to explore such control mechanisms in other arts that solve
substantially the same problem in the substantially the same
manner. Therefore, it would have been obvious to one having
ordinary skill in the art to apply the teachings such as those
described above and add such a control mechanism to the
elevation system of Frolov.
Id. at 6–7; see also Ans. 7–8.
Appellant first argues that the Examiner’s rejection is in error because
Schneider, Cloutier ’890, Cloutier ’433, Mullet, Kicher, Anderson,
Cusumano, and Hiller are non-analogous art. Appeal Br. 5–10; Reply
Br. 2–7. For the reasons that follow, this argument does not apprise us of
Examiner error.
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Appellant argues that the Examiner’s taking of Official Notice “is
incorrect because most of the cited references are non-analogous art and
therefore should not be used to support an obviousness rejection.” Appeal
Br. 5. However, Appellant does not identify any authority requiring that a
reference cited as evidence in support of Official Notice must be analogous
art. Moreover, Appellant does not argue or provide persuasive evidence that
the noticed fact is not considered to be common knowledge or well-known
in the art. See MPEP § 2144.03(C). Thus, Appellant does not address the
rejection as set forth by the Examiner and, therefore, fails to apprise us of
error.
Nevertheless, even considering Appellant’s arguments, we are not
persuaded that the cited supporting references are non-analogous.
Two separate tests define the scope of analogous prior art:
(1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor,
regardless of the problem addressed, and (2) if the reference is
not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor, whether the
reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem
with which the inventor is involved.
In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing In re Deminski,
796 F.2d 436, 442 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
The Supreme Court’s decision in KSR International Co. v.
Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) directs us to construe the
scope of analogous art broadly, stating that “familiar items may
have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes, and a person
of ordinary skill often will be able to fit the teachings of
multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle.” [KSR, 550
U.S.] at 402 (emphasis added).
Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 616 F.3d 1231, 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
The Examiner appears to concede that the cited supporting references
are not in the inventors’ field of endeavor. See, e.g., Non-Final Act. 9–10
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(discussing only “the problem being addressed”). Thus, our analysis focuses
on the second prong of the analogous art test.
“A reference is reasonably pertinent if . . . it is one which, because of
the matter with which it deals, logically would have commended itself to an
inventor’s attention in considering his problem.” In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656,
659 (Fed. Cir. 1992). “If a reference disclosure has the same purpose as the
claimed invention, the reference relates to the same problem, and that fact
supports use of that reference in an obviousness rejection.” Id. In other
words, “familiar items may have obvious uses beyond their primary
purposes.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 402.
Appellant argues that the inventors were concerned with “the problem
of raising and lowering a blade in a table saw.” Appeal Br. 6; see also id.
at 8 (“the problem of how to raise and lower a blade in a table saw, and more
particularly, how to do so with a handwheel while making the effort required
by a user to turn the handwheel comfortable.”). Appellant asserts that “none
of the[] references address the problem of how to raise and lower a blade in
a table saw with a handwheel.” Id. at 9. This argument is unpersuasive
because it defines the inventors’ problem too narrowly. “[T]he reasonable-
pertinence analysis must be carried out through the lens of a [person having
ordinary skill in the art] who is considering turning to art outside her field of
endeavor.” Donner Tech., LLC v. Pro Stage Gear, LLC, 979 F.3d 1353,
1360 (Fed. Cir. 2020). “Such a[n artisan]—resigned to considering art
outside her field of endeavor—would thus not identify the problems so
narrowly so as to rule out all such art.” Id. Here, Appellant’s definition of
the inventors’ problem improperly focuses on the specific components of its
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table saw (e.g., blade, handwheel), effectively precluding consideration of
references outside the claimed invention’s field of endeavor.
Appellant contends that, although “the references at issue all concern
lifting and lowering in a general sense, the fact remains that lifting and
lowering garage doors and blinds is different than lifting and lowering a saw
blade in a table saw.” Appeal Br. 10. According to Appellant, one of
ordinary skill in the art “would not have considered garage doors and
window blinds because of the differences between table saws, garage doors
and window blinds,” as “those devices have different structures, they are
used in different environments for different purposes, and they are sized and
shaped differently.” Reply Br. 4. This argument is unpersuasive because
differences alone do not preclude a reference from being reasonably
pertinent to a problem addressed by the inventors. See Donner, 979 F.3d at
1361 (“[T]here will frequently be significant differences between a patent
and a reference from a different field of endeavor. But it does not follow
that such a reference is, for that reason alone, not reasonably pertinent to one
or more problems to which the claimed invention relates.”).
As noted by Appellant, when altering the geometry of their elevation
mechanism, the inventors were concerned with the difficulty in raising the
saw blade and sought means to facilitate this lifting. See Appeal Br. 12–13
(“[I]in a table saw as disclosed in applicant’s specification, with an elevation
mechanism that allow[s] a user to fully raise or lower a blade with one or
relatively few turns of a handwheel, the geometry is different and ‘the
handwheel could be too hard to turn to raise the blade, and/or could be too
easy to turn to lower the blade’ without the spring.” (citing Spec.
95:23–24)). Appellant concedes that the cited supporting references address
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the same problem of facilitating the lifting of an object. See, e.g., id. at 8–9.
Thus, the cited supporting references are analogous art to the claimed
invention because they are reasonably pertinent.
Next, Appellant argues that none of Schneider, Cloutier ’890,
Cloutier ’433, Mullet, Kicher, Anderson, Cusumano, and Hiller “show[s] a
shaft that can be rotated by a handwheel to change the elevation of a blade
while a spring applies a force to the shaft that varies with the elevation of a
blade.” Appeal Br. 11. Appellant also asserts that “none of th[e] references
show[s] a handwheel shaft with a cam that makes the force required to turn
the handwheel substantially constant with the variation of the elevation of
the blade.” Id. According to Appellant, “in the prior art mechanisms to
raise garage doors and window blinds, the shafts are positioned above the
door or blind where a user could not reach a handwheel if one were
connected to the shaft.” Id. These arguments are unpersuasive because they
are not responsive to the rejection presented. As discussed above, the
Examiner relies on Frolov to disclose a table saw having an elevation
mechanism with a shaft and a handwheel. See Non-Final Act. 3. The
Examiner takes Official Notice that lifting mechanisms using a spring and a
cam on a shaft were old and well-known in the mechanical art, and cites
Schneider, Cloutier ’890, Cloutier ’433, Mullet, Kicher, Anderson,
Cusumano, and Hiller as evidentiary support. Id. at 6. In other words, the
Examiner’s rejection is based on the combined teachings of Frolov and
Official Notice, as evidenced by Schneider, Cloutier ’890, Cloutier ’433,
Mullet, Kicher, Anderson, Cusumano, and Hiller. Appellant’s arguments
against Schneider, Cloutier ’890, Cloutier ’433, Mullet, Kicher, Anderson,
Cusumano, and Hiller individually do not apprise us of error. See In re
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Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981) (“[O]ne cannot show non-
obviousness by attacking references individually where, as here, the
rejections are based on combinations of references.”).
Next, Appellant argues that “no prior art table saw ever used a spring
associated with a handwheel shaft and a cam on the handwheel shaft, and no
prior art reference has suggested a reason to do so.” Appeal Br. 11.
Appellant asserts that “there is no evidence that a person of ordinary skill in
the relevant art would have had that desire or would have viewed the non-
linear force required to change the elevation of a blade as a problem.” Id.
at 14. According to Appellant, “[g]iven that the [E]xaminer’s proffered
reason is not expressed in the prior art, it appears that the [E]xaminer fell
prey to hindsight bias.” Id.; see also Reply Br. 8 (“Without some evidence
in the prior art that there was a need ‘to reduce the burden of raising and
lowering the saw blade,’ as purported by the [E]xaminer, it appears that the
[E]xaminer simply created the purported motivation with hindsight.”). This
line of argument is unpersuasive because it appears to insist on an explicit
teaching, suggestion, or motivation in the prior art to establish obviousness,
where such an argument has been foreclosed by the Supreme Court. KSR,
550 U.S. at 419 (stating that a rigid insistence on teaching, suggestion, or
motivation is incompatible with its precedent concerning obviousness). The
Court noted that an obviousness analysis “need not seek out precise
teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for
[an examiner] can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a
person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” Id. at 418. Instead, the
relevant inquiry is whether the Examiner has set forth “some articulated
reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of
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obviousness.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cited with
approval in KSR, 550 U.S. at 418.
Here, the Examiner articulates adequate reasoning based on rational
underpinnings as to why it would have been obvious to modify Frolov’s
table saw elevation system having a handwheel and a shaft to include a
spring that applies force or torque to the shaft and a cam surface that
converts the force or torque to a substantially constant force or torque for
elevating the saw blade. See Final Act. 6–7 (explaining that the proposed
modification would provide a reduced linear force for lifting the saw blade);
Ans. 18–21 (explaining that the proposed modification would provide a
known mechanical advantage, making it easier to adjust the height of the
saw blade, and would eliminate friction and wear of Frolov’s threaded
members). Appellant argues that the Examiner’s reasoning is deficient
because “prior art table saws did not require such a force and have never
required such a force, as is evident from looking at prior art elevation
mechanisms, such as the elevation mechanisms disclosed in Frolov.”
Appeal Br. 12 (citing Non-Final Act. 6). Appellant asserts that, in prior art
table saws, “only a relatively small force is needed to raise and lower the
blade and a user would likely not notice any changes in that force as the
elevation changed, because those changes would be smaller still.” Id.
However, these arguments are presented in conclusory fashion without
supporting evidence or persuasive technical reasoning, and thus fail to
apprise us of error. See In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(holding that attorney arguments or conclusory statements are insufficient to
rebut a prima facie case of obviousness); In re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399,
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1405 (CCPA 1974) (citing In re Cole, 326 F.2d 769 (CCPA 1964))
(“Attorney’s argument in a brief cannot take the place of evidence.”).
To the extent Appellant argues that spring and cam elements would
not be compatible with Frolov’s elevation system (see Appeal Br. 13
(asserting that “there is no indication how the elevation mechanisms in
Frolov might be so modified to work with such an elevation system”)),
Appellant does not proffer factual evidence or persuasive rationale to
explain how combining the references’ teachings in an operable manner
would be beyond the level of ordinary skill in the art. See KSR, 550 U.S. at
421 (“A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not
an automaton.”). Moreover, we are unpersuaded by Appellant’s contention
that the Examiner relied on impermissible hindsight in reaching the
determination of obviousness of the claimed subject matter (see Appeal Br.
14; Reply Br. 8) because Appellant does not identify, nor do we discern, any
knowledge relied upon by the Examiner that was gleaned only from
Appellant’s disclosure and that was not otherwise within the level of
ordinary skill at the time of the invention. See In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d
1392, 1395 (CCPA 1971) (“Any judgment on obviousness is in a sense
necessarily a reconstruction based upon hindsight reasoning, but so long as it
takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary
skill at the time the claimed invention was made and does not include
knowledge gleaned only from [Appellant’s] disclosure, such a reconstruction
is proper.”).
Finally, Appellant argues that Frolov “teaches away from adding a
spring and cam surface to an elevation system.” Appeal Br. 13. Appellant
asserts that, “[t]he fact that Frolov discloses multiple potential elevation
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systems without ever suggesting an advantage provided by, or requirement
for, constant force or torque as the elevation of the blade varies, teaches
away from applicant’s invention.” Id. at 14. We are not persuaded by this
argument.
A reference teaches away from a claimed invention or a proposed
modification if “a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference,
would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or
would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the
applicant.” In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting In re
Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). Prior art does not teach away
from claimed subject matter merely by disclosing a different solution to a
similar problem unless the prior art also criticizes, discredits, or otherwise
discourages the solution claimed. See In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201
(Fed. Cir. 2004). Here, Appellant does not point to, nor do we find, any
disclosure in Frolov criticizing, discrediting, or otherwise discouraging the
combination of teachings proposed by the Examiner in the rejection. The
fact that Frolov is silent as to advantages or needs regarding constant force
or torque as blade elevation varies does not constitute a teaching away from
the Examiner’s proposal to modify Frolov’s blade elevation system to
include a spring that applies force or torque to the shaft and a cam surface
that converts the force or torque to a substantially constant force or torque
(see Final Act. 3–4, 6–7; Ans. 18–21).
For the above reasons, Appellant does not apprise us of error in the
Examiner’s determination that the subject matter of claim 1 would have been
obvious. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 1, and of claims 4
and 6–8 falling therewith, as being unpatentable over Frolov and Official
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Notice, as evidenced by Schneider, Cloutier ’890, Cloutier ’433, Mullet,
Kicher, Anderson, Cusumano, and Hiller.
CONCLUSION
In summary,
Claim(s)
Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 4, 6–8 103 Frolov, Official Notice
as evidenced by
Schneider, Cloutier ’890,
Cloutier ’433, Mullet,
Kicher, Anderson,
Cusumano, Hiller
1, 4, 6–8
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED