SAP SE

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 2, 2022

2021000803 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 2, 2022)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 15/616,567 06/07/2017 Jaeyoung Choi 8880-98666-01 4781 106592 7590 03/02/2022 Klarquist Sparkman, LLP (SAP) 121 SW Salmon Street, Suite 1600 Portland, OR 97204 EXAMINER PEREZ-ARROYO, RAQUEL ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2169 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/02/2022 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): docketing@klarquist.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte JAEYOUNG CHOI, CHUL WON LEE, JEONG HEE WON, and NORMAN MAY ___________ Appeal 2021-000803 Application 15/616,567 Technology Center 2100 _________________ Before ERIC B. CHEN, JAMES B. ARPIN, and DAVID J. CUTITTA II, Administrative Patent Judges. ARPIN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-20, all of the pending claims. Final Act. 1.2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. 1 “Appellant” refers to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42 (2012). Appellant identifies the real party-in-interest as SAP SE. Appeal Br. 2. 2 In this Decision, we refer to Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed June 22, 2020) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed November 12, 2020); the Final Office Action (“Final Act.,” mailed January 29, 2020) and the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed September 16, 2020); and the Specification (“Spec.,” filed June 7, 2017). Rather than repeat the Examiner’s findings and Appellant’s contentions in their entirety, we refer to these documents. Appeal 2021-000803 Application 15/616,567 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant’s claimed media, servers, and methods “generally relate[] to processing workload elements, such as requests for database operations, in a database environment. Particular implementations relate to queuing requests for database operations when database resources are at a specified level.” Spec. ¶ 1. As noted above, claims 1-20 are pending. Claims 1, 16, and 18 are independent. Appeal Br. 10 (claim 1), 14 (claim 16), 15 (claim 18) (Claims App.). Claims 2-15 depend directly or indirectly from claim 1, claim 17 depends directly from claim 16, and claims 19 and 20 depend directly from claim 18. Id. at 10-16. Claims 1 and 18, reproduced below with disputed elements emphasized, are illustrative. 1. One or more computer-readable storage media storing computer-executable instructions for causing a database system, the database system comprising one or more processing units and a memory, having such instructions in memory and executed on the one or more processing units, to perform operations for providing dynamic admission control for database operation requests, the operations comprising: determining a first use level for at least one system computing resource; receiving a first data definition language statement or data manipulation statement from a database client; comparing the first use level with a first threshold value; and enqueuing the first data definition language statement or data manipulation statement in a request queue, the request queue comprising a data structure physically embodied in the memory. Appeal Br. 10 (Claims App.) (emphases added). Appeal 2021-000803 Application 15/616,567 3 18. A method, implemented in a computing system that implements a database environment, the computing system comprising one or more processors and a memory, the method comprising: periodically determining a resource use level for one or more computing resources of the computing system; receiving a request for a database operation from a database client; determining that the request is eligible for deferred execution; determining the computing system does not have sufficient resources to execute the request; and enqueuing the request in a request queue for deferred execution. Id. at 15 (emphases added). Independent claim 16 recites elements corresponding to the disputed elements of claim 1. Id. at 14. REFERENCES AND REJECTIONS The Examiner relies upon the following references: Name3 Number Publ’d/Issued Filed Bulkowski US 2012/0278293 A1 Nov. 1, 2012 Apr. 20, 2012 Lee US 2013/0339636 A1 Dec. 19, 2013 Aug. 20, 2013 Devarakonda US 10,324,758 B2 June 18, 2019 Mar. 31, 2017 The Examiner rejects claim 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as indefinite. Final Act. 2. The Examiner also rejects claims 1-6, 9,4 12, 18, and 20 under 3 All reference citations are to the first named inventor only. 4 Although the Examiner does not list claim 9 in the statement of this rejection in the Final Office Action, the Examiner addresses claim 9 in the explanation of the rejection. Accordingly, we understand claims 1-6, 9, 12, Appeal 2021-000803 Application 15/616,567 4 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) as anticipated by Lee. Id. at 3-11. Further, the Examiner rejects (1) claims 7, 8, 10, and 13-15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Lee and Devarakonda (id. at 11-18) and (2) claims 11, 16, 17, and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Lee and Bulkowski (id. at 18-25). Appellant and the Examiner focus their contentions and findings, respectively, on claims 1 and 18; so we do as well. See Appeal Br. 5, 7; Ans. 3. We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues identified by Appellant and in light of the arguments and evidence produced thereon. See Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential). Arguments not made are forfeited.5 Unless otherwise indicated, we adopt the Examiner’s findings in the Final Office Action and the Answer as our own and add any additional findings of fact for emphasis. We address the rejections below. ANALYSIS A. Indefiniteness As noted above, the Examiner rejects claim 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as indefinite. Final Act. 2. In particular, claim 16 recites, in part: comparing the first computing resource level with a queuing range; 18, and 20 are rejected as anticipated by Lee. The omission of claim 9 from the statement of the rejection is harmless error. 5 See In re Google Tech. Holdings LLC, 980 F.3d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“Because Google failed to present these claim construction arguments to the Board, Google forfeited both arguments.”); 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2019) (“Except as provided for in §§ 41.41, 41.47 and 41.52, any arguments or authorities not included in the appeal brief will be refused consideration by the Board for purposes of the present appeal.”). Appeal 2021-000803 Application 15/616,567 5 determining that the first computing resource level is within a queuing range; enqueuing the request for a database operation in the request queue. Appeal Br. 14 (Claims App.) (emphases added). The Examiner finds claim 166 is indefinite for two reasons. First, the Examiner finds it is unclear whether the two recitations of “a queuing range” refer to the same or different “queuing” ranges. Final Act. 2. Second, the Examiner finds “the request queue” lacks proper antecedent basis. Id. Appellant does not challenge this indefiniteness rejection, and the Examiner does not withdraw the rejection. Ans. 3; see supra note 5. Therefore, we summarily affirm this rejection.7 B. Anticipation by Lee As noted above, the Examiner rejects claims 1-6, 9, 12, 18, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) as anticipated by Lee. Final Act. 3-11, 25-27. “A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.” Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). The elements must be arranged as required by the claim, but this is not an ipsissimis verbis test. See In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 832 (Fed. Cir. 6 The Examiner does not reject claim 17 as indefinite. See Final Act. 2. Nevertheless, because claim 17 depends from claim 16, claim 17 suffers from the same deficiencies as claim 16. 7 See MPEP § 1205.02, 9th ed., Rev. 10.2019 (last revised June 2020) (“If a ground of rejection stated by the examiner is not addressed in the appellant’s brief, appellant has waived any challenge to that ground of rejection and the Board may summarily sustain it, unless the examiner subsequently withdrew the rejection in the examiner’s answer.”). Appeal 2021-000803 Application 15/616,567 6 1990). Moreover, “it is proper to take into account not only specific teachings of the reference but also the inferences which one skilled in the art would reasonably be expected to draw therefrom.” In re Preda, 401 F.2d 825, 826 (CCPA 1968). We address the anticipation rejection of independent claims 1 and 18 below. 1. Independent Claim 1 Appellant contends the Examiner errs in rejecting claim 1 for two reasons. Appeal Br. 6. Specifically, Appellant contends the Examiner errs in relying on Lee’s queuing elements (1) “that are not [data definition language (DDL)] or data manipulation statements” and (2) “that are not the elements that are received from a client.” Id. For the reasons given below, we are not persuaded of Examiner error by Appellant’s contentions. First, Appellant contends, at the beginning of the discussion of the “queueing” limitation[, the Examiner] cites paragraph 27 of Lee as teaching “applications . . . send database commands to store, retrieve, and manipulate data stored on the databases.” Paragraphs 30, 40, 47, and 104 of Lee all describe queuing I/O requests, not DDL statements or data manipulation statements as recited in claim 1, or client requests as recited in claims 16 and 18. Paragraph 30 of Lee states “I/Os would only be queued once this limit is hit.” Appeal Br. 6. Further, Appellant contends, “[r]egarding queuing of DDL or data manipulation statements, assuming for the sake of argument that the applications in Lee send DDL or data manipulation statements to the I/O requestors, Lee is clear that it is not those commands that are queued, but I/O requests generated by processing such commands.” Id. at 7. Thus, Appellant contends that Lee does not disclose, “receiving a first data definition language statement or data manipulation statement from a Appeal 2021-000803 Application 15/616,567 7 database client” [or] “enqueuing the first data definition language statement or data manipulation statement in a request queue.” Id.; see id. at 10 (recitations of claim 1). We disagree with Appellant. The Specification discloses: When a request for a database operation (e.g., a query, a data manipulation language (DML) statement, a transaction control command, etc.) is received, based on the current resource usage data for the system, and optionally the nature of the request, it can be determined whether the system has enough available resources to process the request. Spec. ¶ 30 (emphasis added); see id. ¶¶ 36 (“Through various subcomponents, the database server 108 can process requests for database operations, such as requests to . . . manipulate data.” (emphasis added)), 38 (“At least certain types of requests for database operations, such as statements in a query language to . . . manipulate data, can be associated with a transaction context.” (emphasis added)). Further, the Examiner finds the Specification discloses, “the query language processor 315 may determine whether the request includes data manipulation statements, a query, or other types of operations, such as transaction control operations.” Spec. ¶ 54 (emphasis added); see Ans. 3; see also Spec. ¶ 58 (“When the request is received by the query language processor 408, in process 426, the query language processor 408 decodes the request. If the request includes data manipulation statements, they may be executed by the query language processor 408.” (emphasis added)). Thus, the Specification discloses that a request for data operations may include data manipulation statements. Further, the Examiner finds the Specification discloses: [Online transaction processing (OLTP)] requests 1114 can be, for example, requests to create or modify data in the database Appeal 2021-000803 Application 15/616,567 8 system 1110 (e.g., DML statements that update, insert, or delete records), transaction control commands (e.g., to commit or roll back a transaction), and commands that modify the format of data records (e.g., data definition language, or DDL, statements that create, modify, or remove tables and other database objects), and typically, relatively simple queries. Spec. ¶ 110 (emphasis added); see id. ¶ 2 (discussing load processing of OLTP requests). Consequently, the Examiner finds, “the terms ‘data manipulation language statement’, and ‘data definition language statement’, are defined according to the customary meaning: [as] statements or operations that perform modifications to database records or database objects.” Ans. 3. This interpretation is consistent with the Specification’s disclosure, as noted above. See In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[T]he PTO applies to the verbiage of the proposed claims the broadest reasonable meaning of the words in their ordinary usage as they would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, taking into account whatever enlightenment by way of definitions or otherwise that may be afforded by the written description contained in the applicant’s specification.”). Appellant cites to Wikipedia definitions for data description language (DDL) and data manipulation language (DML) to show that the cited queuing elements are not data definition statements or data manipulation statements.8 Appeal Br. 5-6. Nevertheless, Wikipedia is not a reliable source for such definitions. See Ex parte Coward, Appeal No. 2017-000644, 8 Appellant introduces additional dictionary definitions for the first time in the Reply Brief. Reply Br. 2-3. We do not consider such newly submitted evidence. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(1) (“A reply brief shall not include . . . any new or non-admitted affidavit or other Evidence.”). Appeal 2021-000803 Application 15/616,567 9 2018 WL 799021, at *4 (PTAB 2018) (“Due to the constantly changing nature of Wikipedia, a citation to Wikipedia is of limited value. Moreover, Wikipedia is not considered to be a reliable source.”); Ex parte Three- Dimensional Media Group, Ltd., Appeal No. 2009-004087, 2010 WL 3017280, at *17 (BPAI 2010) (non-precedential) (“Wikipedia is generally not to be considered as trustworthy as traditional sources for several reasons, for example, because (1) it is not peer reviewed; (2) the authors are unknown; and (3) apparently anyone can contribute to the source definition”); see also Bing Shun Li v. Holder, 2010 WL 4368469, at *2 (5th Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (noting Wikipedia’s unreliability and citing Badasa v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 909, 910-11 (8th Cir. 2008)). Moreover, to the extent we consider such definitions, they may not contradict the meaning of terms expressed in the Specification. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1322-23 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“[J]udges are free to consult dictionaries and technical treatises at any time in order to better understand the underlying technology and may also rely on dictionary definitions when construing claim terms, so long as the dictionary definition does not contradict any definition found in or ascertained by a reading of the patent documents.” (emphasis added, citation omitted)). Here, the Examiner’s interpretation of these terms is supported by the Specification’s disclosure and is persuasive. Turning to Lee, the Examiner finds, “[Lee’s] I/O requests contain the operations to be performed in a database.” Ans. 4 (citing Lee ¶ 17). Further, Lee discloses: FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a system on which the I/O request management techniques described herein may be implemented. Referring to FIG. 1, a storage system 100 provides storage for data used by several different applications 130, 132, Appeal 2021-000803 Application 15/616,567 10 134, 136 and 138. Those applications make use of storage system 100 indirectly, by sending commands to I/O requestors 120, 122 and 124. For example, applications 130, 132, 134, 136 and 138 may be various database applications, and I/O requestors 120, 122 and 124 may be database servers that respond to the database commands by storing, retrieving, and manipulating data stored on databases spread over storage devices 104 and 106. Lee ¶ 27; see id. ¶ 43 (discussing I/O requests received from OLTP applications). Thus, the Examiner finds the I/O requests may include commands for manipulating data stored in databases and may originate from OLTP applications. See id. ¶ 44 (“[D]uring periods in which the same storage system is used primarily for OLTP operations, the load setting will automatically be optimized for reduced latency.”). Therefore, the Examiner finds Lee discloses “receiving a first . . . data manipulation statement,” as recited in claim 1, that may be included in a request, e.g., an I/O request, to perform database operations. We agree with the Examiner. Second, Appellant contends: Lee makes it clear that I/O requests are not sent by applications, but are rather generated in response to processing requests sent by the applications. Paragraph 30 of Lee recognizes this indirect relationship between applications and I/O requests, stating, with added emphasis, “Those application make use of storage system 100 indirectly, by sending commands to 1/0 requestors 120, 122, and 124.” Paragraph of 18 of Lee states that, with added emphasis, “I/O requestors may be, for example, database servers that issue the I/O requests in response to database commands received from database applications.” Appeal Br. 6 (italics added). Thus, Appellant contends, “Lee fails to teach . . . queueing of commands sent by the client, but rather describes queuing of other operations generated and sent by the I/O requestors after those Appeal 2021-000803 Application 15/616,567 11 commands have already been processed.” Id. at 6-7 (italics added). Again, we disagree with Appellant. The Examiner finds that I/O requests are generated by users and received by database servers. Final Act. 4 (citing Lee ¶¶ 17, 18); see Ans. 3-4. In particular, Lee discloses: Techniques are described herein for managing, within a storage system, the sequence in which I/O requests are processed by the storage system based, at least in part, on one or more logical characteristics of the I/O requests. The logical characteristics may include, for example, the identity of the user for whom the I/O request was submitted . . .. Lee ¶ 17 (emphasis added). Moreover, Lee discloses: The in-storage I/O management techniques described herein may be employed instead of or in addition to any management performed within I/O requestors that are issuing the I/O requests to the storage system. As used herein, “I/O requestor” refers to any entity that issues an I/O request to a storage system. I/O requestors may be, for example, database servers that issue the I/O requests in response to database commands received from database applications. However, the techniques described herein are not limited to any particular type of I/O requestor. Id. ¶ 18 (emphases added). Thus, the Examiner finds Lee discloses that the I/O requests may be received from a database client. Again, we agree with the Examiner. Finally, Appellant contends, “Lee clearly only queues I/O requests created from at least initial processing of queries,” and not “the first data definition language statement or data manipulation statement in a request queue,” as recited in claim 1. Appeal Br. 7; see Reply Br. 3-4. Appellant contends, “the Office action acknowledges the difference between commands issued by applications and I/O requests generated by Appeal 2021-000803 Application 15/616,567 12 I/O requestors in processing those commands, but then conflates commands and I/O requests for purposes of the ‘queuing’ limitation.” Appeal Br. 7. Nevertheless, as noted above, the Examiner finds Lee discloses, “receiving a first . . . data manipulation statement,” as recited in claim 1, that may be included in an I/O request to perform database operations. Ans. 3-4; see Lee ¶ 27 (“For example, applications 130, 132, 134, 136 and 138 may be various database applications, and I/O requestors 120, 122 and 124 may be database servers that respond to the database commands by storing, retrieving, and manipulating data stored on databases . . ..” (emphasis added)). Further, Lee discloses, “[t]he I/O requests may be processed, for example, by placing the I/O requests into an output I/O queue.” Lee ¶ 46. Therefore, we are persuaded the Examiner shows Lee discloses, “enqueuing the first data definition language statement or data manipulation statement in a request queue,” as recited in claim 1. 2. Independent Claim 18 Unlike independent claim 1, claim 18 does not recite “a data definition language statement or data manipulation statement.” Appeal Br. 15 (Claims App.). Nevertheless, Appellant contends, claim 18 also recites that a request for a database operation is received, and that same request is enqueued. As discussed [with respect to claim 1], Lee does not enqueue a request for a database operation received from a database client, but rather enqueues I/O requests generated in response to processing the request for a database operation. Id. at 7. For the same reasons discussed above with respect to claim 1, we are persuaded that Lee discloses receiving a request and queuing the received request. Lee ¶¶ 43 (“However, if 90% of the I/O requests that are actually Appeal 2021-000803 Application 15/616,567 13 received by the storage server are from the two OLTP applications, then the storage system may select [a] load setting that is optimized for OLTP applications.”), 46 (“The I/O requests may be processed, for example, by placing the I/O requests into an output I/O queue.”). Thus, the Examiner demonstrates Lee discloses the disputed limitations of claim 18. Ans. 3-4 (discussing Lee ¶¶ 17, 43, 44, 46, 47). For the above reasons, we are not persuaded the Examiner errs in finding that Lee anticipates the media and methods recited in claims 1 and 18, respectively. Further, Appellant does not argue dependent claims 2-6, 9, 12, and 20 separately from their base claims; and, on this record, Appellant does not persuade us the Examiner errs in determining claims 2-6, 9, 12, and 20 are anticipated by Lee. See Final Act. 5-9, 10-11; Appeal Br. 8. Consequently, we are not persuaded that the Examiner errs in rejecting claims 1-6, 9, 12, 18, and 20; and we sustain the anticipation rejection thereof. C. Obviousness Over Lee and Devarakonda or Bulkowski The Examiner rejects (1) claims 7, 8, 10, and 13-15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Lee and Devarakonda (Final Act. 11-18) and (2) claims 11, 16, 17, and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Lee and Bulkowski (id. at 18- 25). Appellant does not challenge the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of independent claim 16 separately from its challenge to the anticipation rejection of claim 1 (Appeal Br. 8 (“Regarding the rejection of independent claim 16, Lee is applied in a similar manner as for claim 1.”)) or the obviousness rejections of dependent claims 7, 8, 10, 11, 13-15, 17, and 19 separately from its challenge to the anticipation rejection of claims 1 and 18 Appeal 2021-000803 Application 15/616,567 14 (id.). Given our affirmance of the anticipation rejection of independent claims 1 and 18, we are not persuaded that the Examiner errs in rejecting claims 7, 8, 10, 11, 13-17, and 19; and we sustain the obviousness rejections thereof. DECISION 1. The Examiner does not err in rejecting: a. claim 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as indefinite; b. claims 1-6, 9, 12, 18, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) as anticipated by Lee; c. claims 7, 8, 10, 13, and 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Lee and Devarakonda; and d. claims 11, 16, 17, and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Lee and Bulkowski. 2. Thus, on this record, claims 1-20 are unpatentable. CONCLUSION For the above reasons, we affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1-20. In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Basis /Reference(s) Affirmed Reversed 16 112(b) Indefiniteness 16 1-6, 9, 12, 18, 20 102(a)(2) Lee 1-6, 9, 12, 18, 20 7, 8, 10, 13-15 103 Lee, Devarakonda 7, 8, 10, 13-15 11, 16, 17, 19 103 Lee, Bulkowski 11, 16, 17, 19 Overall Outcome 1-20 Appeal 2021-000803 Application 15/616,567 15 TIME FOR RESPONSE No time for taking any action connected with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2013). AFFIRMED