Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Aug 26, 2020

2019001250 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 26, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/151,265 01/09/2014 Kwangil KONG 0203-1200 9549
68103 7590 08/26/2020
Jefferson IP Law, LLP
1130 Connecticut Ave., NW, Suite 420
Washington, DC 20036
EXAMINER
HARRELL, ROBERT B
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2442
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/26/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
usdocketing@jeffersonip.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte KWANGIL KONG
____________________

Appeal 2019-001250
Application 14/151,265
Technology Center 2400
____________________

Before CARL L. SILVERMAN, SCOTT E. BAIN, and
JULIET MITCHELL DIRBA, Administrative Patent Judges.

SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Appellant1 seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–9, 12–17, and 19–21. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant’s invention relates to application-based content sharing.
Abstract. Specifically, the invention relates to sharing content generated in

1 Throughout this Decision, we use the word “Appellant” to refer to
“applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a) (2017). Appellant identifies
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 2.
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2
an environment fulfilling conditions of a schedule registered with a schedule
organizer application. Id.; Spec., ¶¶ 2–5, 13–15; Figs. 1, 3.
Claims 1, 13, and 19 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 1,
reproduced below, is representative2 of the subject matter on appeal:
1. A method for sharing content in an apparatus, the method
comprising:
registering a schedule with a schedule organization
application;
configuring, by at least one processor, a condition of the
schedule, information identifying sharers for sharing content
associated with the schedule, and an interoperation application to
be automatically executed when an environment of the apparatus
corresponds to the condition of the schedule;
generating content by executing the interoperation
application when the environment of the apparatus corresponds
to the condition of the schedule, the generating of the content
comprising one of capturing a picture or recording an audio;
storing the content generated by the interoperation
application; and
transmitting, by a radio communication unit, the stored
content to the sharers,
wherein the configuring of the information identifying
sharers comprises selecting address information corresponding
to at least one address registered with a phonebook of the
apparatus, and
wherein the sharing is performed using a social
networking service.

Appeal Br. 15 (Claims App.).

2 Claims 1–9, 12–17, and 19–21 are argued as a group. Appeal Br.
4–14. We select independent claim 1 as representative. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
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REFERENCE
Name Reference Date
Azizi et al. US 2014/0025799 Al Jan. 23, 2014

REJECTIONS
Claims 1–9, 12–17, and 19–21 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 4–8.
Claims 1–9, 12–17, and 19–21 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(e) as being unpatentable over Azizi. Final Act. 8–13.
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed Appellant’s arguments in the Appeal Brief, the
Examiner’s rejections, and the Examiner’s responses to Appellant’s
arguments. For at least the reasons discussed below, we agree with and
adopt the Examiner’s factual findings and legal conclusions, as set forth in
the Final Action and Examiner’s Answer. In our analysis below, we
highlight and address specific findings and arguments for emphasis.
PRINCIPLES OF LAW
Patent-eligible subject matter is defined in 35 U.S.C. § 101 of the
Patent Act, which recites:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject
to the conditions and requirements of this title.
There are, however, three judicially created exceptions to the broad
categories of patent-eligible subject matter in 35 U.S.C. § 101: “[l]aws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.” Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank
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Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted); Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70 (2012).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 75–77).
In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the
claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims
before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use
of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561
U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the
basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We
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view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting
to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.”
Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace
that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known
structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a
patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S.
at 72). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional
features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) has
published revised guidance on the application of § 101. USPTO, 2019
Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7,
2019) (“Guidance”). “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal
agency management, expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51; see also
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October 2019 Update at 1 (October 2019 Update: Subject Matter
Eligibility).3
Under that guidance, we first determine whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes) (Step 2A, Prong 1); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)
(Step 2A, Prong 2)).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that
exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception (Step 2B).
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–56.
A claim that integrates a judicial exception into a practical application
applies, relies on, or uses the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a
meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception. See Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. at 54. When the judicial exception is so integrated, then the

3 USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October
2019 Update”) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf).

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claim is not directed to a judicial exception and is patent eligible under
§ 101. Id.
The § 101 Rejection
The Examiner determines the claims are directed to the abstract idea
of content sharing without adding significantly more. Final Act. 4, 6–8. In
particular, the Examiner determines the claims are directed “towards a
schedule organizer application based content sharing method and apparatus
for sharing content generated in an environment fulfilling conditions of a
schedule registered with the schedule organizer application among a group
of sharers” and “[t]he method includes configuring sharers for sharing a
schedule and information on the schedule, detecting content generated in an
environment fulfilling conditions of the schedule, and transmitting the
content to the sharers.” Id. at 6.
The Examiner determines the claims deliver collected content to other
devices and are similar to the patent-ineligible claims in Affinity Labs of Tex.
LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 838 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Id. at 7. The
Examiner determines the additional elements in the claims are generic well
known elements being used in their conventional manner, and do not add
significantly more. Id. In particular, the Examiner notes:
Claims 1–9, 12–17, and 19–21 further recites additional
claim elements of schedules, processors, sharers, applications,
pictures, audios, storages, transmissions, radios, Social
Networking services, GPSs, MMSs, and URLs. These elements
are described in the specification as well-known elements within
the computer technology and are being used in their conventional
manner. The collected content and delivery of content is
operating on generic hardware which is operating according to
conventional functionality. The elements considered
individually and in combination are directed toward
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conventional data collection and delivery which is being used as
a generic tool for operating the abstract idea. The claimed
invention fails to show an inventive concept and does not
transform the claimed invention into something significantly
more than the abstract idea itself.
Id.
Appellant argues the Examiner errs in determining that the claimed
features are “well-understood, routine, conventional activity.” Appeal Br. 6–
7 (citing Berkheimer, Berkheimer Memo4). Appellant argues the Examiner
errs, “at least for the reason there are no prior art references being cited against
the instant claims.” Id. at 7.
Appellant argues the claim produces content to be shared and sharing
the content. Id. According to Appellant, the claim is more than an idea and
provides a more convenient interaction between the user and the device and
this is a “technical effect.” Id. Appellant recites limitations and argues the
claims address the user inconvenience through automatic operation. Id. at
8–9. Appellant argues patent-eligibility is supported by DDR Holdings, LLC
v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014), Enfish, LLC v.
Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016) and McRo, Inc. v. Bandai
Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Id. at 9–10.
In the Answer, the Examiner notes that, consistent with Berkheimer,
the Examiner cited prior art (Azizi5) and a court case (Affinity Labs of Tex.
LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 838 F.3d 1266). Ans. 10. The Examiner finds

4 Changes in Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter Eligibility,
Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v. HP Inc.), USPTO
Memorandum, Robert W. Bahr, Deputy Commissioner for Patent
Examination Policy, April 19, 2018 (the “Berkheimer Memo”).
5 Azizi is also the prior art cited in the § 102 rejection discussed infra.
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“[s]ince the Appellant's invention defined in the claims implemented,
individually, generic well-known elements to perform, as a combinational
whole, the same generic problem as Azizi, the invention as defined in the
Appellant’s claims are directed to an Abstract Idea performed by a generic
system and is thus patent ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101.” Id. at 10–11
(citing Azizi, Abstract, Fig. 1A ¶¶ 2–4, 109, 19, 21, 23, 26, 32–34, 37, 52–
54; Spec. ¶¶ 93, 109).
Pursuant to the Guidance, we first determine, under Step 2A, Prong 1,
whether the claim recites a judicial exception. For the reasons set forth
below, we determine claim 1 recites a mental process and certain methods of
organizing human activity. The claim 1 limitations may be parsed as set
forth below wherein elements that reflect recitation of these abstract ideas
are italicized:
1. A method for sharing content in an apparatus, the method
comprising:
registering a schedule with a schedule organization
application;
configuring, by at least one processor, a condition of the
schedule, information identifying sharers for sharing content
associated with the schedule, and an interoperation application
to be automatically executed when an environment of the
apparatus corresponds to the condition of the schedule;
generating content by executing the interoperation
application when the environment of the apparatus corresponds
to the condition of the schedule, the generating of the content
comprising one of capturing a picture or recording an audio;
storing the content generated by the interoperation
application; and
transmitting, by a radio communication unit, the stored
content to the sharers,
wherein the configuring of the information identifying
sharers comprises selecting address information corresponding
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to at least one address registered with a phonebook of the
apparatus, and
wherein the sharing is performed using a social
networking service.

In addition to the Examiner’s finding that much of the claim
limitations are directed to the abstract idea of “content sharing” (Ans. 4;
citing Affinity Labs of Tex. LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 838 F.3d 1266 (Fed.
Cir. 2016)), most of the italicized limitations can be performed as mental
processes. If a method can be performed by human thought alone, or by a
human using pen and paper, it is merely an abstract idea and is not patent
eligible under § 101. CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d
1366, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 2011). “That purely mental processes can be
unpatentable, even when performed by a computer, was precisely the
holding of the Supreme Court in Gottschalk v. Benson.” Id. at 1375. See
also Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1146–47
(Fed. Cir. 2016).
Here, the claim is broadly written and recites sharing content in an
apparatus. In particular, “configuring . . . a condition of the schedule,
information identifying sharers for sharing content associated with the
schedule, and an interoperation . . . executed when an environment of the
apparatus corresponds to the condition of the schedule” can be done by an
observer or sharer of the content and can be accomplished mentally and by
pen and paper. “[G]enerating content by executing the interoperation . . .
when the environment . . . corresponds to the condition of the schedule, the
generating of the content comprising one of . . .” can be done similarly.
Likewise, “storing the content generated by the interoperation . . . ;
transmitting . . . the stored content to the sharers, wherein the configuring of
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the information identifying sharers comprises selecting address information
corresponding to at least one address registered with a . . .” is a mental
process that can be done mentally and by pen and paper. . Thus, claim 1
recites concepts that can be performed in the human mind (observation,
evaluation, judgment) and with pen and paper, an example of a mental
process. See, e.g., Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d
1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[W]e have treated analyzing information by
steps people go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms,
without more, as essentially mental processes within the abstract-idea
category.”). The Guidance lists mental processes as another example of an
abstract idea. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
In view of the above, we determine that claim 1 recites the abstract
idea of a mental process. Additionally, we note that the italicized limitations
also recite the abstract idea of organizing human activity, including
“managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between
people,” such as “social activities, teaching, and following rules or
instructions.” See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
The Federal Circuit explains the “directed to” inquiry is not simply
asking whether the claims involve a patent-ineligible concept:
The “directed to” inquiry . . . cannot simply ask whether the
claims involve a patent-ineligible concept, because essentially
every routinely patent-eligible claim involving physical products
and actions involves a law of nature and/or natural
phenomenon—after all, they take place in the physical world.
See Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1293 (“For all inventions at some level
embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural
phenomena, or abstract ideas.”). Rather, the “directed to”
inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light of
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the specification, based on whether “their character as a whole is
directed to excluded subject matter.”
Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir.
2016)(citations omitted); see also Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188 (“In determining
the eligibility of respondents’ claimed process for patent protection under
§ 101, their claims must be considered as a whole.”); McRO, Inc. v. Bandai
Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citations
omitted) (the question is whether the claims as a whole “focus on a specific
means or method that improves the relevant technology or are instead
directed to a result or effect that itself is the abstract idea and merely invoke
generic processes and machinery”).
Therefore, we proceed to Step 2A, Prong 2, of the Guidance to
determine whether additional elements recited in the claims beyond the
judicial exception of claim 1 integrate the abstract idea into a practical
application. Such additional elements may reflect an improvement to a
technology or technical field. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55.
As discussed below, there are no additional limitations recited beyond
the judicial exception itself that integrate the exception into a practical
application. More particularly, the claims do not recite: (i) an improvement
to the functionality of a computer or other technology or technical field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(a)); (ii) a “particular machine” to apply or use the judicial
exception (see MPEP § 2106.05(b)); (iii) a particular transformation of an
article to a different thing or state (see MPEP § 2106.05(c)); or (iv) any other
meaningful limitation (see MPEP § 2106.05(e)). See also 84 Fed. Reg.
at 55.
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We determine the additional elements of claim 1 do not integrate the
abstract idea into a practical application. Claim 1 is reproduced below with
the additional elements (“apparatus,” “application,” “processor,”
“automatically,” “capturing a picture or recording an audio,” “phonebook,”
and “social networking service”) shown in italics:
1. A method for sharing content in an apparatus, the method
comprising:
registering a schedule with a schedule organization
application;
configuring, by at least one processor, a condition of the
schedule, information identifying sharers for sharing content
associated with the schedule, and an interoperation application
to be automatically executed when an environment of the
apparatus corresponds to the condition of the schedule;
generating content by executing the interoperation
application when the environment of the apparatus corresponds
to the condition of the schedule, the generating of the content
comprising one of capturing a picture or recording an audio;
storing the content generated by the interoperation
application; and
transmitting, by a radio communication unit, the stored
content to the sharers,
wherein the configuring of the information identifying
sharers comprises selecting address information corresponding
to at least one address registered with a phonebook of the
apparatus, and
wherein the sharing is performed using a social
networking service.

The claim is broadly written, and the improvement, if any, of the
claim is in the abstract idea itself, not in the functionality of a computer or
other technology or technical field. No particular machine, no
transformation, no other meaningful limitation is persuasively argued by
Appellant. Additionally, the additional elements do not use the alleged
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abstract idea in a meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of
the judicial exception to a particular technological environment, such
that the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the exception. See MPEP § 2106.05(e).
Rather, the additional elements merely implement an abstract idea
using broadly claimed elements (“apparatus,” “application,” “processor,”
”automatically,” “capturing a picture or recording an audio,” “radio
communication unit,” and “social networking service”) to perform the
abstract idea. See MPEP § 2106.05(f). The limitations merely use the
abstract idea by linking it to a particular technological environment. See
MPEP § 2106.05(e).
Because the additional elements of claim 1 do not integrate the
abstract idea into a practical application, we determine representative claim
1, and claims 2–9, 12–17, and 19–21 are directed to an abstract idea. See
Guidance, Step 2A, Prong 2.
Because we determine the claims are directed to an abstract idea, we
next analyze the claims under step two of Alice to determine whether there
are additional limitations that individually, or as an ordered combination,
ensure the claims amount to “significantly more” than the abstract idea.
Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73, 77–79). As
stated in the Guidance, many of the considerations to determine whether the
claims amount to “significantly more” under step two of the Alice
framework are already considered as part of determining whether the
judicial exception has been integrated into a practical application. 84 Fed.
Reg. at 56. Thus, at this point of our analysis, we determine, under Step 2B
of the Guidance, if the claims add a specific limitation, or combination of
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limitations, that is not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the
field, or simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities at
a high level of generality. Id.
As with the integration into a practical application analysis discussed
above, an inventive concept “cannot be furnished by the unpatentable law of
nature (or natural phenomenon or abstract idea) itself.” Genetic Techs. Ltd.
v. Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also 84 Fed.
Reg. at 56; Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (explaining that, after determining a claim
is directed to a judicial exception, “we then ask, ‘[w]hat else is there in the
claims before us?’” (emphasis added, brackets in original)
(quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78)). Instead, an “inventive concept” is
furnished by an element or combination of elements that is recited in the
claim in addition to the judicial exception and sufficient to ensure the claim
as a whole amounts to significantly more than the judicial exception
itself. Alice, 573 U.S. at 218–19 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73); see BSG
Tech LLC v. Buyseasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(explaining that the Supreme Court in Alice “only assessed whether the
claim limitations other than the invention’s use of the ineligible concept to
which it was directed were well-understood, routine and conventional,”
(emphasis added)).
On the record before us, the claims fail to recite specific limitations
(or a combination of limitations) that are not well-understood, routine, and
conventional. Rather, the additional elements, discussed supra, are generic
computer components recited at a high level of generality or basic computer
functions. Appellant does not persuasively argue, or point to any description
in the Specification, that these components are anything other than what was
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well-understood, routine, and conventional in the art. See Mortg. Grader,
Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1324–25 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (generic computer components such as an “interface,” “network,” and
“database” fail to satisfy the inventive concept requirement); see also Spec.
¶¶ 29, 82–105,143. Additionally, the Examiner determines that, consistent
with Berkheimer, prior art Azizi is cited for teachings of the additional
elements, and the Examiner also refers to the Specification. See Ans. 10–11.
To the extent Appellant argues the claims recite a solution to a
problem in computer technology that adds significantly more, we note that
these steps are part of the ineligible abstract idea. “If a claim’s only
‘inventive concept’ is the application of an abstract idea using conventional
and well-understood techniques, the claim has not been transformed into a
patent-eligible application of an abstract idea.” BSG Tech, 899 F.3d at
1290–91 (citing Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1370 (Fed. Cir.
2018)). “[I]t is irrelevant whether [the claimed abstract idea] may have been
non-routine or unconventional as a factual matter . . . narrowing or
reformulating an abstract idea does not add ‘significantly more’ to it.” BSG
Tech, 899 F.3d at 1291.
Regarding case law cited by Appellant, we are not persuaded by
Appellant’s arguments. The claims here are unlike Enfish and DDR as the
claims before us are broadly written and do not recite an improvement to a
computer. As discussed supra, if the claims recite any improvement, this
improvement is to an abstract idea. See claim 1; Abstract; Spec. ¶¶ 2–5, 27–
30. Because the claim does not solve a problem in the software arts, claim
1 is unlike the technology-based integrations cited by Appellant. For
example in Enfish, the patent-eligible claim was directed to a self-referential
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table to improve computer databases. 822 F.3d at 1337. Likewise, in
McRO, the patent-eligible claim focused on a specific asserted improvement
in computer animation. Thus, we conclude under Step 2B of the Guidance
that the claim limitations, considered individually and as an ordered
combination, simply append well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry.
For the above reasons, Appellant has not persuaded us of Examiner
error, and we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–9, 12–17, and
19–21 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
The § 102 Rejection
Appellant argues the Examiner errs in finding Azizi teaches the claim
1 limitations:
configuring, by at least one processor, a condition of the
schedule, information identifying sharers for sharing content
associated with the schedule, and an interoperation application
to be automatically executed when an environment of the
apparatus corresponds to the condition of the schedule;
generating content by executing the interoperation
application when the environment of the apparatus corresponds
to the condition of the schedule, the generating of the content
comprising one of capturing a picture or recording an audio;
storing the content generated by the interoperation
application.

Appeal Br. 11 (also referred to as “disputed limitations”; emphasis added).
Appellant argues Azizi teaches establishing a communication link to a
website for uploading/downloading designated media contents but fails to
teach the disputed limitations. Id. Appellant argues it is clear to a person
having ordinary skill in the art that establishing a communication link does
not correspond to the features of automatic execution and “capturing a
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picture or recording an audio.” Id. at 12. Appellant argues establishing a
communication does not in and of itself generate content— it allows transfer
to take place. Id. at 13. Appellant argues the Examiner errs in finding Azizi
(Abstract, paragraphs 19, 30) discloses “storing a content generated by the
interoperation application.” Id. at 12–13.
In the Answer, the Examiner reiterates and points to specific Azizi
teachings that address Appellant’s arguments. The Examiner finds Azizi
teaches sharing content in an apparatus, including registering a schedule
with a schedule organization application. Ans. 12–13 (citing Azizi,
Abstract; Figs. 1A, 2; ¶¶ 23, 2, 9, 31 35). The Examiner finds Azizi teaches
configuring by at least one processor a condition of the schedule (“rules”)
identifying sharers for sharing content associated with the schedule. Id. at
13 (citing Azizi, Figs. 2, 7 (processor 710); ¶¶ 22, 23, 4, 19–23, 28, 30, 53).
The Examiner finds Azizi teaches automatic operation wherein the client
server session can be automatically initiated to capture pictures and upload
the pictures. Id. at 13 (citing Azizi, Abstract; ¶¶ 4, 19–23, 28, 30, 53). The
Examiner finds Azizi teaches generating content when the environment of
the apparatus corresponds to the conditions of the schedule. Id. (citing Azizi
¶¶ 28, 30). The Examiner finds Azizi teaches storing images that are
captured by the applications processor 710 and/or temporarily stored in
NAND flash 716. Id. (citing Azizi ¶¶ 53–57; Fig. 7).
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments and agree, instead,
with the findings of the Examiner. Appellant’s argument that Azizi
teachings are limited to establishing a communication link ignores the
extensive teachings of Azizi identified by the Examiner that describe the use
of a communication link in generating and automatically sharing content, as
Appeal 2019-001250
Application 14/151,265

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in the disputed limitations. For example, the extensive teachings are
identified in the Azizi Abstract, and in discussion of automatic sharing of
photos and video for shared calendared soccer match. Azizi ¶¶ 23, 28, 30.
Additionally, Appellant does not rebut the Examiner’s findings in the
Answer.
We note much of Appellant’s arguments are unsupported by factual
evidence. Mere attorney arguments and conclusory statements that are
unsupported by factual evidence are entitled to little probative value. See In
re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d
699, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Ex parte Belinne, Appeal 2009-004693, 2009 WL
2477843, at *3–4 (BPAI Aug. 10, 2009) (informative).
In view of the above, we sustain the rejection of claims 1–9, 12–17,
and 19–21 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e).
CONCLUSION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–9, 12–17, and
19–21 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–9, 12–17, and
19–21 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e).

DECISION

Claims
Rejected
35
U.S.C. §
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–9, 12–17,
19–21
101 Eligibility 1–9, 12–17,
19–21

1–9, 12–17,
19–21
102(e) Azizi 1–9, 12–17,
19–21

Overall
Outcome
1–9, 12–17,
19–21

Appeal 2019-001250
Application 14/151,265

20

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED