Salina Concrete Products, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 16, 1975

218 N.L.R.B. 496 (N.L.R.B. 1975)

496 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Salina Concrete Products , Inc. and Truck Drivers and
Helpers, Local 696, affiliated with the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware-
housemen and Helpers of America and Construc-
tion and General Laborers Local 775, affiliated
with the Laborers International Union of North
America, AFL-CIO. Case 17-CA-6121
June 16, 1975
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS, AND
PENELLO
On January 21, 1975, Administrative Law Judge
Herbert Silberman issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed excep-
tions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order.
alleging that Respondent, Salina Concrete Products, Inc.,
herein also called the Company, has engaged in and is
engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended. The complaint, as amended at the
hearing, in substance, alleges that since June 19, 1974,
Respondent unlawfully has withdrawn recognition from
and has refused to bargain collectively with the Charging
Parties, who on January 12, 1968, had been certified by the
Board as the exclusive representative of an appropriate
unit of Respondent's employees,' and that, by reason of
the foregoing and because on July 10, 1974, four employees
allegedly were unlawfully interrogated by Respondent's
counsel in connection with the preparation of the defense
in this case, the Company has interfered with, restrained,
and coerced employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. The complaint further
alleges that a strike which began on June 5, 1974, was
prolonged by Respondent's unlawful refusal to bargain,
and thereby was converted to an unfair labor practice
strike. Respondent in its answer to the complaint denied
that it has engaged in the alleged unfair labor practices. A
hearing in this proceeding was held in Salina, Kansas, on
October 22 and 23, 1974. Subsequent to the hearing, the
parties filed briefs with the Administrative Law Judge.2
Upon the entire record in the case and from my
observation of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make
the following:
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that Salina Concrete Products, Inc.,
Salina, Kansas, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall take the action set forth in said
recommended Order.
1 General Counsel and Charging Party have each filed a motion to
correct errors in the Decision of Administrative Law Judge in which they
allege that the "Remedy" portion of his Decision erroneously sets forth July
5, 1974, rather than June 5, 1974, as the commencement date of the strike,
and July 19, 1974, rather than June 19, 1974, as the date on which that strike
became an unfair labor practice strike . As the record indicates that the
strike did indeed begin on June 5, 1974, and we agree that it became an
unfair labor practice strike on June 19, we shall correct the Administrative
Law Judge's Decision to reflect the proper dates.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
HERBERT SILBERMAN, Administrative Law Judge: Upon
a charge filed by the above-named Unions on June 21,
1974, a complaint, dated August 2, 1974, was issued
1 Local 775 is the successor of Local 685 , which together with Local 696
had been certified jointly as the collective-bargaining representative.
s Respondent's request , contained in its brief, to reopen the hearing in
order to permit employees to testify as to whether on June 19, 1974, they
218 NLRB No. 94
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
Respondent, a Kansas corporation, manufactures ready-
mixed concrete and other concrete products at its plant in
Salina, Kansas. In the conduct of its business, Respondent
annually purchases goods valued in excess of $50,000
directly from sources located outside the State of Kansas,
and Respondent does an annual gross volume of business
in excess of $500,000. Respondent admits, and I find, that
it is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
11. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED
Truck Drivers and Helpers, Local 696, affiliated with the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America, herein referred to
as Local 696, and Construction and General Laborers
Local 775, affiliated with the Laborers International Union
of North America, AFL-CIO, herein referred to as Local
775, are labor organizations within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act. Local 696 and Local 775 jointly are
referred to as the Unions.
desired the Unions to represent them is denied. Among other reasons for
denying the motion is that such testimony would be speculative and would
have negligible probative weight.
SALINA CONCRETE PRODUCTS, INC. 497
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Interrogation
The complaint alleges that on July 10, 1974, Respondent
caused certain of its employees to be interrogated about
their membership in, and activities on behalf of, the
Unions. The facts are not in dispute. After the charge in
this matter was served on the Company, Earl J. Engle, who
was retained as counsel for Respondent, on July 10, 1974,
in the plant premises interviewed four employees, Richard
Wolfe, Timothy Kennedy, Harold Aldridge, and Douglas
Michaelis, concerning the facts in the case. The employees
were sent one at a time by Plant Superintendent Clarence
Rice to the office of Executive Vice President Flavel
Simcox, who then brought them to Engle. Each employee
was interviewed separately and no interview exceeded 15
minutes . No employee was asked to sign any statement and
no inquiry was made about any statement the employee
may have given to the National Labor Relations Board. At
the opening of each interview, Engle informed the
employee that he was an attorney from Kansas City
representing the Company, that he was investigating the
unfair labor practice charge that had been filed against the
Company by the Unions, and that if the employee talked
with him he wanted the employee only to tell the truth; he
assured the employee that regardless of his answers no
reprisals would be taken against him . ' Engle then asked
each employee if he was willing to talk with him and when
Engle received an affirmative reply the interview was
begun . It is not contended by General Counsel that
anything said during any interview constituted a violation
of the Act. Further, only four employees were brought to
Engle and none refused to talk to him. Each of the four
testified at the hearing that he consented to the interview.
General Counsel contends that the alleged unfair labor
practice arises from the fact that Engle did not specifically
inform each of the four employees that his;, appearance
before Engle and his discussion with Engle was
"voluntary." General Counsel argues that the standards for
such interviews, as explicated by the Board in, Johnnie's
Poultry Co., 146 NLRB 770, 775 (1964), enforcement
denied 344 F.2d 617 (C.A. 8, 1965), require that the
employee's participation should be "on a voluntary basis."
However, contrary to General Counsel, it is not necessary
for the employer or his representative in such situation
specifically to I use the word "voluntary." If the circum-
stances are such that the employee is given to understand
that he is under no compulsion whatsoever to submit to the
interview, then, in my opinion, the standards of Johnnie's
Poultry Co. are met. I find that based on the facts set forth
above, the participation of the four employees was "on a
voluntary basis" and the interviews conducted by Engle on
July 10, 1974, did not violate the Act. Accordingly, I shall
recommend 'dismissal of that allegation of the complaint.
B. The Refusal To Bargain
The Charging Parties were certified on January 12, 1968,
as the exclusive representative of a unit of the Company's
employees following an election conducted on January 4,
1968, in Case! 17-RC-5587. The tally of ballots at the
election shows that there were 23 eligible voters, and that
18 votes were cast for the petitioner and 4 votes were cast
against the petitioner. Thereafter, the Company and the
Charging Parties entered into a collective-bargaining
agreement on May 29, 1968, which expired on May 1,
1971. The agreement was renewed on July 29, 1971, by a
contract which was effective retroactively from May 1,
1971, and which expired on May 1, 1974.
The parties stipulated that the appropriate unit is
composed of:
All truck drivers, yardmen, silo builders, plant employ-
ees and mechanics of the Respondent's Salina, Kansas
plant, but excluding office-clerical employees, profes-
sional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in
the Act.
Following the expiration of the last contract on May 1,
1974, the Company and the Charging Parties began
negotiations looking to its renewal. There were three
bargaining sessions. At the last meeting, held on June 3,
the Unions submitted a proposal for a complete contract,
subject to ratification by their membership. The Company
accepted the proposed contract. However, the agreement
was rejected by the employees at the ratification meeting.
A strike began on June 5, 1974, and there has been daily
picketing of the Company's premises by the Unions since
that date. General Counsel contends that, although at its
inception the strike was an economic strike, when the
Company unlawfully withdrew recognition from the
Unions on June 19, 1974, the strike was converted to an
unfair labor practice strike.
The parties stipulated that as of June 4, 1974, 18 persons
in a unit of 29 were members of the Unions.
The Company continued its operations despite the strike.
On June 6, 7, and 9, it advertised in the Salina Journal that
it was "hiring permanent employees to replace employees
who are on strike." Between June 6 and June 10, the
Company hired 12 employees as replacements for striking
employees. In addition to these 12, its work force as of
June 19 included 7 employees who did not go on strike and
6 other employees who initially joined the strike but later
returned to work.
On June 19, the following letter was sent to the Charging
Parties on' behalf of Respondent:
As attorneys for Salina Concrete Products, Inc., we
hereby notify you that the Company has a good faith
doubt that your Unions represent for purposes of
collective bargaining an uncoerced majority of the
Company's employees in a unit of truck drivers,
mechanics, yard men and plant employees, but exclud-
ing office clerical employees, professional employees,
guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.
We have filed with the National Labor Relations
Board a petition for a representation election in the
above described unit. Until such time as' the Board
certifies your Unions as the collective bargaining
representative of the employees involved, the Company
will not recognize the Teamsters and Laborers as the
joint collective bargaining representative for any of its
498 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
employees. Consequently, the bargaining meeting
scheduled for Wednesday, June 26, will be canceled.3
Flavel Simcox, the Company's executive vice president,
testified that it was he who made the decision to withdraw
recognition - from the Unions. According to Simcox, the
bases for his decision were: (1) various employees made
statements to him directly that "they were not interested in
having the union"; (2) Plant Superintendent Clarence Rice
had informed Simcox that "he did not believe that [the
employees ] were interested in the union"; (3) approximate-
ly 30 employees were crossing the picket line and reporting
to work; and (4) a majority of the Company's employees
was composed of employees who did not participate in the
strike, who had abandoned the strike, and who were hired
as permanent replacements for strikers.
Flavel Simcox and Clarence Rice in their testimony
described statements made to them by employees which
they construed to mean that the employees who made such
statements did not wish to be represented by the Unions.
In addition, Respondent called various employees as
corroborating witnesses.
The statements made by employees to Simcox or Rice
must be interpreted in the context of a notice to employees
which was distributed on June 5, 1974, the day the strike
began. According to Simcox, copies of the notice were
mailed to all employees and, in addition, were circulated
by hand to some employees. The notice is a three-page
letter which describes the breakdown of negotiations,
advises that the Company intends to continue operations
despite the strike, informs employees that while they are on
strike they are not eligible to collect unemployment
compensation and that they may lose their jobs as the
Company has a legal right to hire permanent replacements
for them, advises employees of the legal protection to
which they are entitled in the event they decide to work,
and contains the following paragraph:
Any of you who are members of the Teamsters' or
Laborers Union should resign your Union membership
in writing before crossing any Union picket line.4
The notice clearly informs the employees that members
of the Unions may not work for the Company. This
position was restated to several employees by Simcox.
Thus, Glenn Nault testified that when he spoke to Simcox
about returning to work he was informed that "it would be
requested that I resign from the union."5 Larry Sweezer
testified that Simcox gave him a copy of the notice to read
when he asked to return to work.
Also affecting the quality of the evidence adduced by
Respondent regarding knowledge gained by Simcox and
Rice as to which employees did not wish to be represented
3 A representation petition was filed by the Company on June 19, but
was dismissed by the Regional Director.
4 General Counsel at the hearing stated that he does not contend that the
dissemination of the described notice constitutes a violation of the Act.
5 1 credit this testimony . Although Simcox at first denied making such
remark, upon further examination he acknowledged that in his conversation
with Nault he made a statement which in substance repeated the quoted
paragraph in the notice.
8 N.L.R.B. v. Ray Brooks, 204 F.2d 899, 906-907 (C.A. 9, 1953), affd. 348
U.S. 96 (1954).
by the Unions is that the information, in some instances at
least, was solicited from employees for the purpose of
developing a basis for withdrawing recognition from the
Unions. Thus, Simcox testified that he had discussions with
Rice about the employees' union sympathies because
Respondent's counsel had suggested that he "talk with
Clarence Rice concerning the feelings of other employees"
in order to determine whether a majority still favored the
Unions. And employee Douglas Michaelis testified without
contradiction that Clarence Rice "asked me if I supported
the union."
C. The Applicable Principles
As is frequently the case in the administration of the Act,
the guiding principles are more easily stated than applied.
While on one hand the Act is intended to protect the
"exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-
"organization, and designation of representatives of their
own choosing," on the other hand, to ensure the stability of
established bargaining relationships, it is necessary to
impose restrictions upon the opportunity of the employees
or rival labor organizations to depose an incumbent
representatives Similarly, while an employer may not
recognize a minority union as the exclusive representative
of a unit of his employees, to prevent recurring interference
with industrial peace, the circumstances under which an
employer may lawfully withdraw recognition from a
formally certified collective-bargaining representative are
circumscribed. In the absence of unusual circumstances,
the majority status of such union is irrebuttably presumed
to continue for 1 year following certification.7 Upon
expiration of the certification year a rebuttable presump-
tion of majority status exists which is sufficient to establish,
prima facie, a continuing obligation on the part of the
employer to bargain with the union.8 Thus, following
expiration of a collective-bargaining agreement, an em-
ployer violates Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by withdrawing
recognition from and refusing to bargain further with the
previously certified union "unless it can show (1) that the
Union in fact has lost its majority, or (2) at the least, that
reasonable grounds exist for good faith doubt as to the
continuing majority support for the representative."9
To establish a good-faith doubt defense, the employer
must show both that: (1) "the majority issue [has] not .. .
been raised ... in a context of illegal antiunion activities,
or other conduct by the employer aimed at causing
disaffection from the union or indicating that in raising the
majority issue the employer was merely seeking to gain
time in which to undermine the union";10 and (2) the
asserted doubt was grounded upon "a rational basis in
fact."" The employer's "refusal to bargain must clearly
rest on more than an allegation of subjective good faith
4 Ray Brooks v. N.LRB, 348 US. 96, 98-104 (1954); N.LRB. v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., Incorporated, 399 F.2d 409, 411 (C.A. 7, 1968).
8 Celanese Corporation of America, 95 NLRB 664,672 (1951), cited with
approval in N.LRB v. Burns International Security Services, Inc., 406 U.S.
272, 279, fn. 3 (1972), and Brooks, supra Terrell Machine Company v.
NLRB, 427 F.2d 1088, 1090 (C.A. 4), cert. denied 398 U.S. 929 (1970).
9 Zim's Foodhner, Inc. v. N.LRB., 495 F.2d 1131, 1139 (C.A.7, 1974),
cert. denied 419 U.S. 838 (1974).
10 King Radio Corporation, 208 NLRB 578 (1973).
11 NLRB. v. John S. Swift Company, Inc., 302 F.2d 342, 346 (C.A. 7,
SALINA CONCRETE PRODUCTS, INC. 499
doubt, easily made and difficult to refute. It must be
founded in reason, and represent a doubt engendered by
facts which provide some guarantee of objectivity." 12
There is no mechanical formula for evaluating the merit
of the Company's assertion that it entertained a good-faith
doubt of the Unions' continuing majority. Each such case
"turns on its own set of facts." 13 An employer must be able
to point to "objective considerations" that would lead a
reasonable man acting in good faith to conclude that the
union no longer enjoyed majority support.14
There are various deficiencies with Respondent's defense
in this case. However, the linchpin of its argument is the
unfounded assumption that employees who cross a picket
line are presumed to oppose union representation.15 It is
well established that new employees are presumed to
support the union in the same ratio as the employees in the
unit at the time of the election.16 This presumption is not
automatically rebutted by the existence of a strike and the
presence of a picket line. Although employees who cross an
authorized picket line to report for work may have
disassociated themselves from the concerted strike activity
of the other employees such "failure to join in a strike
[does] not [prove ] a lack of adherence to a union." 17 As
stated in N.L R.B. v. Frick Company: 18
"[E ]ven in the absence of unfair labor practices, there is
no presumption that an employee's return to work
during a strike demonstrates a rejection of the union as
his bargaining representative." That the employees
returned may have been nothing more than "a vote of
no confidence in the strike action, and [was] not
necessarily a repudiation of the Union in its representa-
tive capacity." West Fork Cut Glass Co., 90 NLRB 944,
956 [26 LRRM 1302] (1950), enforced in relevant part,
N.L.R.B. v. Borchert, 188 F.2d 474 [27 LRRM 2579] (4
Cir. 195I).14
14 Accord. Palmer Asbestos & Rubber Co., 160 NLRB 723, 730
(1966). The Company relies on Stoner Rubber Co., supra, 123 NLRB
1440 (1959), and Celanese Corp., 95 NLRB 644 (1951) to support its
contention that returning strikers provide a basis for doubting the
union's majority. Examination of these cases , however, reveals that the
Board merely indicated that the totality of evidence in each case was
sufficient to uphold the employer's claim of good faith doubt. The fact
that employees had abandoned a strike was only one of several factors
taken into consideration. Furthermore, in both cases the Board stressed
the fact that no unfair labor practices had been committed by either
employer. We think the Board could properly determine in the instant
proceeding that, in the totality of circumstances presented, the return of
strikers to work did not indicate an abandonment of the union.
1962); Celanese, supra, 95 NLRB at 673; Lodges 1746 and 743, International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO [United Aircraft
Corp.) v. N.L.R.B., 416 F.2d 809, 812 (CA.D.C.), cert. denied 396 U.S. 1058
(1969).
12 .Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, AFL-CIO v. N.L.RB,
466 F.2d 380, 383 (C.A.D.C., 1972).
13 Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 78 LRRM 2289, 2290, fn. 3 (CA. 7,
1971).
14 See N.L.RB. v. Frick Company, 423 F.2d 1327, 1330-32 (CA. 3, 1970),
and ruses cited therein; Bartenders, Hotel, Motel and Restaurant Employers
Bargaining Association of Pocatello, Idaho and its Employer-Members, 213
NLRB No 74 (1974), and cases cited therein.
15 "The Board has clearly stated that the mere failure of employees to
support a strike called by their bargaining representative does not give rise
to a presumption that these employees have repudiated the union as their
In this case there is specific evidence that some employees
who worked during the strike did not reject union
representation. Furthermore, "evidence of dissatisfaction
with the [Unions], to be of any significance, must come
from the employees themselves, not from the employer on
their behalf." 19 Thus, gathering such evidence, as Simcox
acknowledged was done, for the express purpose of
justifying the withdrawal of recognition attenuates the
value of the evidence. In addition, the expressions of
dissatisfaction with the Unions voiced to Simcox or Rice
by employees who sought to go to work after June 5 must
be read in the light cast upon such expressions by
Respondent's notice that they "should resign [their] Union
membership in writing before crossing any Union picket
line."
"The initial question to be considered is whether the
record as a whole supports a fmding that doubt of the
[Unions'] continued majority was the real reason for
Respondent's refusal to bargain." 20
D. The Alleged Loss of Majority
The Union received a decisive majority in the January 4,
1968, election. There were 18 votes cast for the Unions and
only 4 against. Although Kansas is a right-to-work State, as
of June 4, 1974, the day before the strike, in a unit of 29
employees, there were 18 union members, still a clear
majority. On June 19, only 2 weeks later, Respondent
withdrew recognition. Had the Unions lost their majority
in that very short period? Had there been any develop-
ments which permitted Respondent with justification to
question the Unions' continuing majority? As of that date,
crossing the picket line and working in the plant were 7
employees who never joined the strike, 6 employees who
had joined the strike but later returned to work, and 12
persons who were hired as strike replacements. I shall
discuss below the evidence relating the Respondent's
knowledge of the attitudes regarding representation of the
employees in each of these three categories. Appendix A
attached hereto sets forth in chart form the employees in
the unit as of June 4, those who were members of the
Unions, those who worked during the strike, those who
were strike replacements, and those who were still in the
Company's employ on October 21, 1974.
1. The nonstriking employees
Seven employees did not join the strike; none of the
seven were members of the Unions. Three were, long-term
bargaining representative . Employees who join the strike at the outset, but
later abandon it are also not presumed to have indicated their lack of
support for the union as their bargaining representative ." Coca Cola Bottling
Works, Inc, 186 NLRB 1050, 1053 (1970). See also Cavalier Division of
Seeburg Corporation and Cavalier Corporation, 192 NLRB 290 (1971).
is Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 184 NLRB 640 (1970), citing Laystrom
Manufacturing Co., 151 NLRB 1482, 1484 (1965), enforcement demed on
other grounds 359 F.2d 799 (CA. 7, 1966); King Radio Corporation, supra.
17 Grimaldi Buick-Opel, Inc., 202 NLRB 436, 440 (1973); see also King
Radio Corporation, 208 NLRB 578 (1973), and cases there cited.
is 423 F.2d 1327, 1333-34 (C.A. 3, 1970).
19 Montgomery Ward & Co., Incorporate4 210 NLRB 717 (1974). In his
Decision in that case the Administrative Law Judge discusses certain of the
relevant legal issues in greater depth than I have sought to do here.
zo Emerson Manufacturing Company, Inc., 200 NLRB 148, 150 (1972).
500 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
employees; two were hired on April 22 and May 20, 1974,
respectively; and the remaining two, who were full-time
students, were hired on May 22, 1974.
Simcox testified that several times over a period of years
Dale McCullick said to him that McCullick "did not
support the union and that he was not interested in joining
the union." McCullick, who has= been in the Company's
employ for 24 years, generally corroborated Simcox's
testimony. According to McCullick, on more than one
occasion he told Simcox, "I didn't want the union."
Although McCullick also testified that he had never told
any supervisor' he would vote against the Unions in any
election, I fmd that there was basis for Simcox believing
that McCullick did not wish the Unions' representation.21
Simcox testified that two or three times within the past 4
years Lloyd Pollock had told him that Pollock did not
believe in unions, did not support them, and would not join
a union . Pollock, who has been working for the Company
for 25 years, did not contradict Simcox and testified that
four or five times he told Supervisor Rice that he was
against the Unions and did not wish to become a member.
I find that Simcox had a reasonable basis for believing that
Pollock did not wish the Unions' representation.
Similarly, Clifford Spear, who has been in the Compa-
ny's employ for 11 years, corroborated Simcox's testimony
that several times Spear had said to Simcox that Spear did
not support the Unions and was not interested in them.22 I
find that Simcox may have had a reasonable basis for
believing that Spear did not want the Unions' representa-
tion,
Jeffrey Millikan was hired on May 20, 1974, and left the
Company's employ before October 21. He did not testify
and there is no evidence as to whether or not he was a
student employed for the summer only. Simcox testified
that at a social function, about 10 days after the strike
began, in a "passing conversation," Millikan's father, with
whom Jeff lives, said that Jeff Millikan did not support the
Unions. Such a casual secondhand remark did not furnish
a reasonable basis for inferring that Jeffrey Millikan was
opposed to representation by the Unions 23
John Hodge was hired on April22, 1974, and was not in
the Company's employ by October 21. Rice testified that
when he hired Hodge he was informed by Hodge that
Hodge had lost his previous job as a driver because his
employer had disposed of its trucks and equipment when a
union came into the plant and that Hodge did not think he
would ever join a union again. Simcox testified that he had
been informed by Rice that Hodge was not in favor of the
Unions because Hodge had worked for a ready-mix
21 Any inferences which Simcox drew from conversations with employ-
ees as to their desires regarding representation are subject not only to the
infirmity that employees tend to express attitudes which would be
acceptable to management and tend to conceal attitudes which would
displease management, but also to the infirmity that the attitudes of
employees are subject to change and an expression of dissatisfaction with
the Unions made one day does not mean that the employee is of the same
mind on another day. Thus, although Simcox's testimony indicates that
Simcox understood that McCullick had been steadfast in his opposition to
the Unions, in fact McCulhck was not. McCullick testified that at one time
he joined one of the Unions but later withdrew from membership.
22 Spear's testimony at the hearing contradicts his statement in a pretrial
affidavit that he never told any supervisor that he was opposed to the
Unions.
concrete plant in Ohio and after he had joined a union the
employer sold its equipment. Simcox had no reasonable
basis for inferring that Hodge did not want the Unions to
represent him on June 19. A generalized antiunion attitude
expressed by an applicant for employment is a thin
platform on which to rest an inference,that the-individual
after being accepted for employment would oppose
representation by an incumbent union, particularly when
the organization was supporting a strike which was
initiated by the membership. Hodge, in fact, signed an
authorization card for Local 775 on June 30, 1974.24
Simcox testified that he inferred that Kurt Van Tassel
and Richard Van Tassel were opposed to the Unions
because it was reported to him by Rice that Kurt had said,
"those on the picket line were stupid to be there, that they
were not accomplishing anything," and that Richard had
said that "the Unions were no good." Both Kurt and
Richard Van Tassel are full-time students who were hired
on May 22, 1974, and left the Company's employ prior to
October 21 to return to school. Kurt Van Tassel denied
having had any conversation about the Unions with any
supervisor prior to June 19. He testified that before he quit
work in August he had conversations with Rice, which
were initiated by Rice, in which he expressed the opinion
that he did not see that the strike would accomplish
anything. Richard Van Tassel denied that he expressed to
any supervisor his sentiments regarding the Unions. He
testified that he had had "academic" discussions with Rice
about unions in general but did not express an opinion
regarding the situation at the Company. I fmd that Simcox
did not have a reasonable basis for inferring as of June 19
that Kurt and Richard Van Tassel opposed representation
by the Unions.25
2. Strikers who returned to' work
Six employees who initially supported the strike returned
to work prior to June 19. Two, Dean Bethe and Bill Rose,
had been members of the Unions as of June 4. The other
four had not then joined the Unions. As' of the commence-
ment of the strike Simcox had no basis for assuming that
any of these six employees opposed the Unions' represen-
tation. Before any returned to work they, were sent or were
given copies of the Company's June 5 notice instructing
employees to resign "Union membership in writing before
crossing any Union picket line." Thus,, any action in such
direction-as revocation of union dues-checkoff authoriza-
tions-and any expressions to company supervisors of
opposition to the Unions made after the strike began were
meaningless as reflections of their sentiments because they
23 Although the parties stipulated that there were 29 employees in the
unit on June 4, the parties did not stipulate and no evidence was offered as
to whether any of them were temporary employees who would not have
been eligible to vote in a Board-conducted election.
zl The conduct of Hodge, who did not support the strike but who,
nevertheless, designated Local 775 to represent him, is a concrete
illustration of the fallacy of assunung that an employee who crosses a picket
line to go to work necessarily is opposed to union representation. It should
be noted that Hodge signed a union authorization despite the Company's
notice of June 5, which is quoted above.
25 It is doubtful that either Kurt or Richard Van Tassel would have been
deemed eligible to vote in a Board-conducted election as they appear to
have been students temporarily employed during the'summer of 1974.
SALINA CONCRETE PRODUCTS, INC. 501
were under compulsion to make the pretense that they
were renouncing the Unions if they wished to return to
work.
Larry Sweezer had been a member of the Unions, but
withdrew as of March 31, 1974, at which time he told
Clarence Rice that he didn't want to have anything to do
with the Unions. Sweezer at first observed the Unions'
picket line, but entered the plant within approximately 2
hours to inquire about returning to work. He first spoke to
Rios. Sweezer testified that he possibly told Rice he didn't
want anything to do with the Unions. Sweezer also spoke
to Simcox about returning to work. Simcox showed him
the Company's notice. Sweezer read it and informed
Simcox that he wanted to go to work. 26 Simcox testified
that, when Sweezer returned to work, Sweezer told him
that he didn't want the Unions bothering him any more.27
Simcox testified that Rice had informed him that
Richard Stuckey had told Rice that Stuckey had told a
picket with whom he had exchanged unpleasant epithets
that unions were no good and that he was not in favor of
unions . Stuckey, who was hired on May 28, 1974, returned
to work on June 7. The following week, after a name-
calling incident with a picket, Vernon Miller, Stuckey told
Rice that he didn't want anything more to do with Miller
until Miller apologized. Stuckey further testified that he
signed an authorization card, which is dated July 3, 1974,
for Local 696, at the request of Dean Bethe.
Simcox testified that Rice had informed him that when
James Pearce returned to work Pearce said to Rice that
"the union didn't appear to be accomplishing anything,
that it was not doing any good for those on the picket line."
Pearce, who was hired by the Company on March 4, 1974,
returned to work on June 7. He testified that upon his
return he told Rice that he sympathized with the Unions'
wage demands , but that he planned to remain with the
Company only for a short period of time, and that in such
circumstance he was satisfied with his wages. Pearce
further testified that he spoke with Simcox before his
conversation with Rice. With reference to the Company's
June 5 letter, he asked Simcox whether permanent
employees could be hired to replace the strikers and
whether his job was in jeopardy. Simcox said it was. Pearce
then told Simcox he was willing to cross the picket line and
go to work until he had to leave to resume a teaching
position.
Leland Green began working for the Company on
January 24, 1969 . He was on vacation when the strike
began. Green testified that before he left for his vacation he
had joined Local 696.28 He returned from his vacation on
June 7. Because of the strike he did not go to work for 3
days. On June 13 he returned to work after informing Rice
he had resigned from the Unions. Green further testified
that he also spoke with, Simcox. According to Green, "I
asked what I had to do to resign, to get it so that I could
come back to work." 29 Sinicox assisted him in the
preparation of the resignation. Simcox testified that he
spoke with Green before Green returned to work.
According to Simcox, Green said that he was concerned
about a job, he needed to come back to work, he did not
support the Unions, and he was going to resign from the
Unions.
Dean Bethe began working for the Company in 1947. He
was a member of Local 696 on June 4, 1974. He returned
to work on June 17. Simcox testified that Bethe spoke with
him on Friday, June 14, and explained that he had to have
a job to support his family, that "his needing a job was
more significant than crossing the picket line," and that he
would sign a revocation of his dues checkoff. Simcox
further testified, "I don't know that [ Bethe] said that he did
not support the union." Although Bethe gave the Company
an instrument, dated June 17, 1974, stating, "Do not
deduct union dues from my check," he thereafter, on July
3, signed an authorization card for Local 696.
Bill Rose was hired on March 6, 1974. He was a member
of one of the unions on June 4. He returned to work on
June 18, but prior to his return to work he obtained an
honorary withdrawal card from Local 696. Rose quit the
Company's employ on June 25. Chuck Bernauer, business
agent for Local 696, testified that, when Rose asked for the
withdrawal card, Rose informed Bemauer that he, Rose,
was going to West Virginia. Bernauer further `testified that
Rose did not violate the terms of his withdrawal by going
to work for the Company while the strike was in progress
"because [Rose] came to me and told me about it, and he
went back in with my blessings because he was going in to
get some traveling money. In the meantime, he was going
to try to get some cards signed." 30 Simcox testified that,
when Rose returned to work, he was told by Rose that
Rose needed an income again, that he had been lied to
about being paid for picket line duty, and that "he did not
support the union at that time."
With the exception of Sweezer, who prior to June 19 had
indicated his opposition to the Unions, Simcox had no
valid basis for believing that the strike returnees were
opposed to the Unions' representation. Neither Stuckey,
Bethe, nor Rose when they returned to work informed
Respondent that they did not wish representation by the
Unions. Stuckey and Bethe signed union authorization
cards during the strike and Rose , who had a withdrawal
card, was crossing the picket line with express sanction of
Local 696's business agent. Similarly, neither Pearce nor
Green had informed Respondent that they did not desire
the Unions' representation. Their expressions of opposition
were little more than necessary accommodations to the
conditions imposed by Respondent before they would be
permitted to return to work, namely, nonmembership in
the Unions.
26 As it is not likely that Sweezer would have received the notice in the
mail when he spoke with Srmcox , the fact that Simcox took the time to give
Sweezer the notice to read and waited while Sweezer read the notice would
indicate that Simcox wanted everyemployee who sought to return to
understand the conditions under which they could work, namely, nonmem-
bership in the Unions.
27 Sweezer corroborated Simcox in this respect.
28 Green is not included among the 18 employees who were stipulated to
have been members of the Unions on June 4, 1974.
29 This testimony emphasizes that the employees understood that they
could not work for the Company and still retain membership in either of the
Unions.
30 Harold Aldridge, who signed an authorization card for Local 775,
dated June 27, 1974, testified he was solicited to do so by Bill Rose.
502 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
3. The strike replacements
Of the 12 employees who were hired in the period
between the beginning of the strike on June 5 and June 19,
there is no evidence that 6 had in any manner communi-
cated their sentiments regarding union representation to
any member of management. The six are: James Bennett,
Regan Koch, Donald Liles, Tony Martin, James Schur,
and Richard Wolfe. Regarding the remaining six strike
replacements the evidence, in summary, is as follows:
Gary Hanks : Gary Hanks was hired as a driver on June
6, 1974. During his first week of employment, in connec-
tion with a complaint that Hanks was making to Rice that
Hanks had been followed as he was making deliveries,
Hanks said to Rice that "he would sure like to vote no so
somebody wouldn't be following him around to the
jobsites." According to Rice, at that time there were
"rumors about the right-to-work law that there eventually
would be a vote."
Timothy J. Kennedy: Timothy Kennedy, who was hired
on June 7, 1974, testified that sometime between June 12
and 14 in a conversation with three or four other
employees he made the comment that he thought that "the
strikers were crazy to be out there picketing and, if they
didn't want to work, I would be happy to come in and
work because I had been out of work and I could use the
money." According to Kennedy, Rice then was within 6 or
7 feet of the group.
Douglas Michaelis: Simcox testified to a report he
received from Rice about June 10 which, according to
Simcox, would have indicated that Michaelis was opposed
to the Unions. Michaelis, whom I credit in this respect,
testified that the conversations he had with Rice concern-
ing the Unions occurred after June 19, 1974.
Melvin Mullen : Mullen testified that about a week after
he was hired he stated to Rice, in connection with a
conversation about harassment by pickets, that he did not
believe in a union and that the Company did not need one.
Jacob Puryear: Clarence Rice testified that, when Jacob
Puryear reported for work on June 10, Puryear made a
statement to him that Puryear thought he could live forever
without a union. Simcox testified that Rice repeated the
substance of this statement to him.
Larry Richardson: Clarence Rice testified that within the
first week of his employment Larry Richardson, who was
hired on June 10, 1974, said to Rice that "if they had to
vote, they would want to vote `no' to keep somebody from
coming back and taking his truck [job] away from him."
Of the 12 strike replacements only 5 made statements to
an official of the Company which might be construed to
indicate ' that they did not wish to be represented by the
Unions.'
E. Conclusions
Flavel Simcox, who made the decision on behalf of the
Company to withdraw recognition from the Unions,
testified that his action was grounded on the following
factors: (1) Employees made statements to him or to
Clarence Rice to the effect that they did not wish
representation by the Unions and (2) a majority of the
Company's employees as of June 19, 1974, was composed
of employees who did not participate in the strike, who had
abandoned the strike, and who were hired as permanent
replacements for strikers. With respect to the first factor,
namely, statements by employees, I find that Simcox might
reasonably have concluded that only three nonstriking
employees, only one striker who returned to work, and
only five strike replacements, or a total of nine employees,
as of June 19, 1974, were opposed to representation by the
Unions. This number is considerably less than a majority
of the 41 employees then in the unit. The second factor
simply is an assumption on the part of Simcox`that any
employee who crossed the picket line to work during the
strike necessarily was opposed to representation by the
Unions. There is no basis for such assumption, either as a
presumption of law or under the' facts of this case. As
pointed out above an employee who returns to work during
a strike does not necessarily indicate by such action that he
has repudiated the union in its representative capacity.
Although it is "not unreasonable for [an employer] to infer
that the degree of union support among those employees
who had chosen to ignore a Union-sponsored picket line
might well be somewhat weaker than the support offered
by those who had vigorously engaged in concerted activity
on behalf of Union-sponsored objectives,1131 the facts
developed in this case do not suggest that the Company
had a reasonable basis for believing that the Unions ceased
to represent a majority. As of the critical date, June 19,
1974, only 2 weeks had elapsed since the strike began. On
June 4, the Unions undisputedly represented a clear
majority of the employees in the appropriate' unit.
Whatever changes in representational sentiment may have
occurred, 14 days was too short a period for Respondent to
believe in good faith that the changes would endure.
Furthermore, the evidence shows that employees who
crossed the picket line continued to support the Unions or,
as in the case of Pearce and Kurt and Richard Van Tassel,
had returned to work in circumstances which would not
have been inconsistent with a desire,for the Unions to
continue as their representative. Thus, Respondent had no
reasonable grounds for doubting the Unions' continuing
majority. Also Respondent's notice of June 5 suggests that
in raising the majority issue it was seeking to gain time to
undermine the Unions and that doubt of the Unions'
continuing majority was not the real reason for its
withdrawal of recognition.
In this case the burden is upon Respondent to rebut the
presumption that the majority the Unions enjoyed on June
4, 1974, continued through June 19, 1974, when Respon-
dent withdrew recognition. Respondent has not effectively
rebutted such presumption. Accordingly, I fmd that by
withdrawing recognition from the Unions and by refusing
to bargain with the Unions on and after June 19, 1974,
Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
The strike which began on June 5, 1974, was motivated
by the employees' desire to exert economic pressure to
obtain a more favorable collective-bargaining agreement.
Thus, at its inception, the strike was an economic strike.
However, on June 19, 1974, the Company unlawfully
31 Peoples Gas Systems Inc., 214 NLRB No 141 (1974).
SALINA CONCRETE PRODUCTS, INC. 503
withdrew recognition from the Unions, canceled the
collective-bargaining meeting scheduled for June 26, and
refused to negotiate further with the Unions. These actions
foreclosed use of the customary means for terminating a
strike where there is a statutory representative, to wit,
through negotiations between the employer and the
representative of the striking employees 32 No alternative
or equally efficacious avenue of settlement exists. This is
reflected by the fact that there is no evidence in the record
of any attempts having been made between the date of the
strike and the hearing in this proceeding to effect a
settlement. It, therefore, necessarily follows that Respon-
dent's unlawful refusal to recognize and to bargain with the
Unions has prolonged the strike.33
IV. THE EFFECr OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Company set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with its operations de-
scribed in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and
substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce
among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes
burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of
commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
"[T ]he unlawful refusal of an employer to bargain
collectively with his employees' chosen representative
disrupts the employees' morale, deters their organizational
activities, and discourages their membership in unions."
Franks Bros. Company v. N.LR.B., 321 U.S. 702, 704
(1944). Accordingly, having found that the Company has
engaged in such unfair labor practices, I recommend that it
ce! se and desist therefrom and that it take certain
affirmative action designed to effectuate the-policies of the
Act.
'Having found that the strike which began on June 5,
1974, and which was still in progress on the dates of the
hearing in this proceeding, has been prolonged since June
19, 1974, by Respondent's unlawful refusal to recognize
and to bargain with the Unions and that the strike
thereupon became an unfair labor practice strike, I shall
recommend that, upon application for reinstatement,
Respondent shall reinstate to their former jobs or, if those
jobs no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions,
without impairment of their seniority and other rights and
privileges, all those employees who participated in the
strike which began on July 5, 1974, and who have not
already been reinstated, dismissing, if necessary, any
persons hired as replacements on or after July 19, 1974. If,
after such dismissals, there are insufficient positions
remaining for all the striking employees who desire
reinstatement, the available positions shall be distributed
among, them, without discrimination because of their union
membership, activities, or participation in the strike, in
accordance with the seniority or other nondiscriminatory
practices which were theretofore applied by the Company
in the conduct of its business. Those strikers for whom no
employment is immediately available after such distribu-
tion shall be placed upon a preferential hiring list with
priority determined among them by seniority or other such
nondiscriminatory practices as theretofore applied by the
Company in the conduct of its business and, thereafter, in
accordance with such system, they shall be offered
reinstatement as positions become available and before
other persons are hired for such work. I shall also
recommend that the Respondent make the striking
employees whole for,any loss of earnings they may have
suffered, or may suffer, by reason of Respondent's refusal,
if any, to reinstate them, by payment to each of a sum of
money equal to that which he normally would have earned
during the period from 5 days after the date on which he
applied, or shall apply, for reinstatement, to the date of
Respondent's offer of reinstatement to him, absent a lawful
justification for Respondent's failure to make such offer.
Backpay shall be computed on the basis of calendar
quarters, in accordance with the method prescribed in F.
W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950). Interest at
the rate of 6 percent per annum shall be added to the net
backpay and shall be computed in the manner set forth in
Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962).
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
upon the entire record in this case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Since June 19, 1974, by failing and refusing to
bargain collectively with the Unions as the certified
collective-bargaining representative of the Company's
employees in the appropriate unit described below with
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and
other terms and conditions of employment, the Company
has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
2. By the foregoing conduct, the Company also has
interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act
and has thereby engaged in unfair labor practices within
the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
3. The strike which was in progress on June 19, 1974,
has been prolonged by Respondent's unlawful refusal to
bargain collectively with the Unions and therefore was
converted to an unfair labor practice strike.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record in this proceeding, and pursuant to
Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following
recommended:
32 See, for example, Sec. 203(a) of the Act.
33 Cantor Bros., Inc., 203 NLRB 774 (I973).
504 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ORDER34
Respondent, Salina Concrete Products, Inc., Salina,
Kansas, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with Truck Drivers
and Helpers, Local 696, affiliated with the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
and Helpers of America, and Construction and General
Laborers Local 775, affiliated with the Laborers Interna-
tional Union of North America, AFL-CIO, as the
exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the em-
ployees in the following appropriate unit:
All truck drivers, yardmen, silo builders, plant employ-
ees and mechanics of the Respondent's Salina, Kansas
plant, but excluding office-clerical employees, profes-
sional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in
the Act.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is
deemed necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively concerning rates
of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other terms and
conditions of employment with Truck Drivers and Helpers,
Local 696, affiliated with the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of
America, and Construction and General Laborers Local
775, affiliated with the Laborers International Union of
North America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative
of all the employees in the appropriate unit described
above and, if an agreement is reached, embody it in a
signed contract.
(b) Upon application, offer immediate and full reinstate-
ment to their former jobs or, if those jobs no longer exist, to
substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to
their seniority or other rights and privileges previously
enjoyed, to all those employees who participate in the
strike which began on June 5, 1974, and who have not
already been reinstated, dismissing , if necessary, any
persons hired as replacements by Respondent on or after
June 19, 1974. If sufficient jobs are not available for these
employees, they shall be placed on a preferential hiring list
in accordance with their seniority or other nondiscrimina-
tory practices theretofore utilized by the Company, and
they shall be offered employment before any other persons
are hired . Respondent shall also make whole these
employees for any loss of earnings they may suffer by
reason of Respondent 's refusal, if any, to reinstate them in
accordance with the terms of this recommended Order, in
the manner set forth in the section of this Decision entitled
"The Remedy."
34 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the ,findings,
conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes.
(c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records, timecards,
personnel records and reports, and all other records
necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the
terms of this recommended Order.
(d) Post at its plant located in Salina, Kansas, copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix B." 35 Copies of
said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director
for Region 17, after being duly signed by Respondent's
authorized representative, shall be posted by it immediate-
ly upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60
consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, includ-
ing all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to
insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered
by any other material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 17, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
Appendix A
Employees in Bargaining Unit
On June 4, 1974
James Barnett, Jr. x
Dean Bathe x 6/17 x
Gerald Bontrager
Leslie Damker
Ronald Eiler
Gary Elsey
Leland Green
x
x
x
x
/13 x
John Hodge x
Charles Jarrell
Ralph Lathan
Dale McCullick
x
x
x x
Jeffrey Milliken X
Vernon Miller
Glenn Nault
James Pearce
X'
x
6/7
Bob Phillips
Lloyd Pollock
x
x x
Manuel Ribordy
Bill Rose
x
x 6/18
Clifford Spear x x
Richard Stuckey 6/7
Larry Sweezer 6/5
James Taylor
Warren Timmons
Kurt Van Tassel
x
x
X
Richard Van Tassel X
David Wakefield
Doyle Wood
Stephen Wright
X
x
x ___
Totals 18 7 6 5
,Col. 1, name of striker; Col. 2,
member of Union; Col. 3, nonstriker;
Col. 4, striker return to work;
Col. 5, at work 10/21/74/
35 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board."
SAUNA CONCRETE PRODUCTS , INC. 505
Employees Hired as Strike Replacements and employees in the appropriate unit described below,
Employed on June 19, 1974
At work on
10/21/74
James Bennett, 6/7 x
Gary Hanks, 6/6
Regan Koch, 6/7
Tim Kennedy, 6/10 x
Donald Liles, 6/10
Tony Martin, 6/10
Douglas Michaelis, 6/6 x
Melvin Mullen, 6/7 x
Jacob Puryear, 6/7
Larry Richardson, 6/10
James Schur, 6/7
Richard Wolfe, 6/10 x
5
APPENDIX B
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE wiLL, upon request, bargain collectively con-
cerning rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and
other terms and conditions of employment with Truck
Drivers and Helpers, Local 696, affiliated with the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America, and Construc-
tion and General Laborers Local 775, affiliated with
the Laborers International Union of North America,
AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of all the
and, if an agreement is reached, we will embody it in a
signed contract. The appropriate unit is:
All truck drivers, yardmen, silo builders, plant
employees and mechanics at our Salina, Kansas
plant, but excluding office-clerical emplloyees,
professional employees, guards and supervisors as
defined in the Act.
WE WILL, upon application, offer immediate and full
reinstatement to their former jobs or, if those jobs no
longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions,
without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and
privileges, to all our employees who have engaged in
the strike which began on June 5, 1974, and who have
not already been reinstated, dismissing, if necessary,
any persons hired as replacements since June 19, 1974.
If insufficient jobs are available for these employees,
they shall be placed on a preferential hiring list and
they will be offered employment before any other
persons ate hired for such work. We will make such
applicants whole for any loss of earnings they suffer by
reason of any refusal on our part to reinstate them
beginning 5 days after their applications for reinstate-
ment until the dates of our offers of reinstatement.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the
National Labor Relations Act.
SALINA CONCRETE
PRODUCTS, INC.