SAFE-T DATA A.R. LTD.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jun 25, 2021

2020001405 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 25, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/596,461 01/14/2015 Raviv RAZ SFET P1290 1071
122066 7590 06/25/2021
M&B IP Analysts, LLC
150 Morristown Road
Suite 205
Bernardsville, NJ 07924-2626
EXAMINER
WADE-WRIGHT, SHAQUEAL D
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2437
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/25/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
eofficeaction@appcoll.com
pair@mb-ip.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte RAVIV RAZ and AVRAHAM AMINOV
____________

Appeal 2020-001405
Application 14/596,461
Technology Center 2400
____________

Before KARL D. EASTHOM, SCOTT B. HOWARD, and
STEVEN M. AMUNDSON, Administrative Patent Judges.

AMUNDSON, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final
rejection of claims 1–20, i.e., all pending claims. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42 (2019). Appellant identifies the real party in interest
as Safe-T Data A.R. Ltd. Appeal Br. 3.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Invention
According to the Specification, the invention “relates to network
security systems generally and to real-time fraud detection in particular.”
Spec. ¶ 2.2 The Specification explains that “[t]racking fraud in the online
environment is a hard problem to solve” for several reasons. Id. ¶¶ 3–6; see
id. ¶¶ 34–35. First, “[f]raudster tactics rapidly evolve,” and “[t]oday’s
attacks expose the inadequacies of yesterday’s online fraud prevention
technologies.” Id. ¶¶ 3–4. Second, reactive strategies that “attempt to stop
fraudsters by defining new detection rules after the fact” can “never
anticipate and respond to every new fraud pattern.” Id. ¶ 5. Third,
conventional solutions “often borrow technology from other market domains
(e.g. credit card fraud, web analytics)” and “extend functionality for online
fraud detection with mixed results.” Id. ¶ 6.
Hence, the invention endeavors to overcome those deficiencies by
providing “a statistical approach to detect fraud, looking at how a general
population may utilize a website and at how a particular user may utilize the
website.” Spec. ¶ 35. In addition, the invention “may provide a hybrid
approach, using statistical models both for an entire population and for
particular users.” Id. Among other things, the invention assesses “business
action scenarios” as well as “models of session intelligence (i.e. knowledge

2 This decision uses the following abbreviations: “Spec.” for the
Specification, filed January 14, 2015; “Final Act.” for the Final Office
Action, mailed February 28, 2019; “Appeal Br.” for the Appeal Brief, filed
July 26, 2019; “Ans.” for the Examiner’s Answer, mailed October 16, 2019;
and “Reply Br.” for the Reply Brief, filed December 12, 2019.
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of how a user and/or the non-fraudulent population may operate during a
session, such as a web session).” Id. ¶ 36.
Exemplary Claims
Independent claims 1 and 10 exemplify the claims at issue and read
as follows:
1. A business action fraud detection system for a website,
the system comprising:
a business action classifier to classify a series of
operations from a single web session as a business action; and
a fraud detection processor to determine a score for each
operation based on a statistical comparison of data of each
request forming part of the operation against statistical models
generated based on previously received data, said score
combining probabilities that the transmission and navigation
activity of a session are those expected of a normal user
performing the business action.
10. A method for detecting business action fraud on a
website, the method comprising:
classifying a series of operations from a single web
session as a business action; and
determining a score for each operation based on a
statistical comparison of the data of each request forming part
of the operation against statistical models generated based on
previously received data, said score combining probabilities
that the transmission and navigation activity of a session are
those expected of a normal user performing the business action.
Appeal Br. 32–33 (Claims App.).
The Prior Art Supporting the Rejections on Appeal
As evidence of unpatentability under 35 U.S.C. § 103, the Examiner
relies on the following prior art:
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Name Reference Date
Pricer et al. (“Pricer”) US 2002/0143925 A1 Oct. 3, 2002
Zwicky US 8,682,718 B2 Mar. 25, 2014
Koutrika et al.
(“Koutrika”) US 2015/0339712 A1
Nov. 26, 2015
(filed Jan. 3, 2013)
The Rejections on Appeal
Claims 1–20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to
patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 2–5; Appeal Br. 6.
Claims 1–3, 5–12, and 14–20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Zwicky and Pricer. Final Act. 9–14; Appeal Br. 20.
Claims 4 and 13 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Zwicky, Pricer, and Koutrika. Final Act. 14–15; Appeal Br. 30.
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the rejections in light of Appellant’s arguments
that the Examiner erred. For the reasons explained below, we concur with
the Examiner’s conclusions concerning ineligibility under § 101 and
unpatentability under § 103. We adopt the Examiner’s findings and
reasoning in the Final Office Action and Answer. See Final Act. 2–15;
Ans. 3–10. We add the following to address and emphasize specific
findings and arguments.
The § 101 Rejection of Claims 1–20
INTRODUCTION
The Patent Act defines patent-eligible subject matter broadly:
“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
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requirements of this title.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. In Mayo and Alice, the
Supreme Court explained that § 101 “contains an important implicit
exception” for laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas. Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70 (2012);
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014); see also Diamond
v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981). In Mayo and Alice, the Court set forth
a two-step analytical framework for evaluating patent eligibility. Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77–80; Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18.
Under Mayo/Alice step one, we “determine whether the claims at
issue are directed to” a judicial exception, i.e., an abstract idea, a law of
nature, or a natural phenomenon. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. Step one involves
looking at the “focus” of the claims at issue and their “character as a whole.”
Simio, LLC v. FlexSim Software Prods., Inc., 983 F.3d 1353, 1359 (Fed. Cir.
2020); SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir.
2018).
In January 2019, the PTO issued revised guidance for determining
whether claims are directed to a judicial exception. See 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“2019
Guidance”).3 The 2019 Guidance applies to the Board. Id. at 50–51,
57 n.42; see 35 U.S.C. § 3(a)(2)(A) (investing the Director with
responsibility “for providing policy direction” for the PTO).

3 In response to received public comments, the PTO issued further guidance
in October 2019 with further explanations about various aspects of the 2019
Guidance. October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (Oct. 17, 2019)
(available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
peg_oct_2019_update.pdf).
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The 2019 Guidance specifies two prongs for the analysis under
Mayo/Alice step one (PTO step 2A). 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55. Prong one
requires evaluating “whether the claim recites a judicial exception, i.e., an
abstract idea, a law of nature, or a natural phenomenon.” Id. at 54. “If the
claim does not recite a judicial exception, it is not directed to a judicial
exception,” and it satisfies § 101. Id. “If the claim does recite a judicial
exception, then it requires further analysis” under prong two. Id. Prong two
requires evaluating “whether the claim as a whole integrates the recited
judicial exception into a practical application of the exception.” Id. “When
the exception is so integrated, then the claim is not directed to a judicial
exception,” and it satisfies § 101. Id. “If the additional elements do not
integrate the exception into a practical application, then the claim is directed
to the judicial exception,” and it “requires further analysis” under
Mayo/Alice step two (PTO step 2B). Id.
Under Mayo/Alice step two, we “consider the elements of each claim
both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to determine whether the
additional elements” add enough to transform the “nature of the claim” into
“significantly more” than the judicial exception. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18,
221–22 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78–79). Step two involves the search for
an “inventive concept.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18, 221; Univ. of Fla.
Research Found., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 916 F.3d 1363, 1366 (Fed.
Cir. 2019). “[A]n inventive concept must be evident in the claims.”
RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co., 855 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
MAYO/ALICE STEP ONE: PTO STEP 2A PRONG ONE
Patent-ineligible abstract ideas include fundamental economic
practices, mental processes, and mathematical formulas. See, e.g., Alice,
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573 U.S. at 219–20 (fundamental economic practice of intermediated
settlement); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 599, 611–12 (2010)
(fundamental economic practice of hedging or protecting against risk in
independent claim and mathematical formula in dependent claim); Parker v.
Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585–86, 596–98 (1978) (mathematical formula for
calculating updated alarm limit); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65–67
(1972) (mental process of converting binary-coded-decimal representation
to binary representation). The 2019 Guidance specifies three groupings
of abstract ideas: (1) certain methods of organizing human activity,
(2) mental processes, and (3) mathematical concepts. 84 Fed. Reg. at 51–52.
In Alice, the Supreme Court “did not establish any ‘precise contours’
for defining whether claims are directed to ‘abstract ideas’ or something
else.” Cellspin Soft, Inc. v. Fitbit, Inc., 927 F.3d 1306, 1315 (Fed. Cir.
2019) (citing Alice, 573 U.S. at 221). Further, for Mayo/Alice step one, the
Federal Circuit has noted that “[a]n abstract idea can generally be described
at different levels of abstraction.” Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d
1229, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Here, the Examiner determines that the claims recite mental
processes, i.e., “classifying a series of operations” and “determining a score
based on a comparison.” Final Act. 2; Ans. 3. The Examiner explains that
the claims encompass “performance of the limitation[s] in the mind.” Ans.
3–4. The Examiner also explains that nothing in the claims “precludes the
step[s] from practically being performed in the mind” except “the recitation
of generic computer components.” Id. at 3–4.
Appellant disputes that claims 1 and 10 recite mental processes. See
Appeal Br. 6–18; Reply Br. 2–6. Specifically, Appellant asserts that the
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Examiner overgeneralizes the claims and “improperly untether[s] the claims
from the language of the claims.” Appeal Br. 12–13 (emphasis omitted).
We disagree. The Examiner’s analysis properly considers the “focus”
of the claims and their “character as a whole.” See Final Act. 2; Ans. 3–4;
Simio, 983 F.3d at 1359.
Appellant asserts that “the claims are not analogous to activities
conducted mentally or on paper, because what is claimed is not what people
would do, partly because in the real world of humans, they could not so do.”
Appeal Br. 8 (emphases omitted); Reply Br. 4. Appellant also asserts that
the claimed “steps are not practically performed in the mind.” Appeal Br. 8
(emphases omitted); Reply Br. 4–5.
We disagree. As the Examiner correctly determines, each
independent claim recites mental processes, and thus an abstract idea falling
within the three groupings of abstract ideas specified in the 2019 Guidance.
See 84 Fed. Reg. at 51–52; Final Act. 2; Ans. 3–4. The 2019 Guidance
describes mental processes as “concepts performed in the human mind,”
such as “an observation, evaluation, judgment, [or] opinion.” 84 Fed. Reg.
at 52 (footnote omitted).
Here, claim 1 recites the following limitations encompassing
observations and evaluations performed by a human mentally or with
pen and paper:
● “classify a series of operations from a single web session
as a business action”; and
● “determine a score for each operation based on a
statistical comparison of data of each request forming
part of the operation against statistical models generated
based on previously received data, said score combining
probabilities that the transmission and navigation activity
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of a session are those expected of a normal user
performing the business action.”
Appeal Br. 32. Claim 10 recites similar limitations. Id. at 33.
The above-identified limitations encompass observations and
evaluations performed by a human mentally or with pen and paper because
someone could mentally classify a handful of operations from a single web
session as a business action. See Spec. ¶¶ 36–37, 45, 113–114, 128. As
examples of business actions, the Specification discusses a blog post and
a money transfer. Id. ¶¶ 36–37, 45. For a blog post, the Specification
identifies four operations corresponding to four requests that constitute the
business action, i.e., a login operation, a get operation, an add operation, and
a post operation. Id. ¶ 36. After observing those four operations, a human
could mentally classify those four operations as a business action, i.e., a blog
post. After mentally classifying those four operations, a human could
mentally or with pen and paper compare data for each operation against
previously generated statistical models to evaluate the probabilities that the
activities are those expected of a normal user. And after evaluating those
probabilities, a human could mentally or with pen and paper combine those
probabilities to determine a score for each operation, e.g., by calculating a
weighted average.
Consistent with this, the Specification discloses human observations
and evaluations for classification purposes. See Spec. ¶¶ 113–114, 128.
For example, the Specification explains that to eliminate false positives a
“system administrator may choose not to alert upon a newly-seen event.” Id.
¶ 113. The Specification similarly explains that a system administrator may
mark “an anomalous request as truly malicious.” Id. ¶ 114. The
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Specification further explains that a system administrator may “choose
a weight” for scoring purposes. Id. ¶ 128.
For these reasons, the above-identified limitations encompass
observations and evaluations performed by a human mentally or with pen
and paper. The 2019 Guidance identifies observations and evaluations
performed by a human mentally or with pen and paper as mental processes,
and thus an abstract idea. 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 & nn.14–15; see also
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Symantec”) (“[W]ith the exception of generic computer-
implemented steps, there is nothing in the claims themselves that foreclose
them from being performed by a human, mentally or with pen and paper.”).
Appellant analogizes the claims here to the claims in Application
13/287,831 where the Board determined that the abstract idea of “collecting
usage information” identified by the Examiner did not fall within any of the
three groupings of abstract ideas specified in the 2019 Guidance. See
Appeal Br. 7; Reply Br. 2–3. Here, in contrast to Application 13/287,831,
the Examiner identifies an abstract idea falling within one of the three
groupings of abstract ideas specified in the 2019 Guidance, i.e., mental
processes. Final Act. 2; Ans. 3. Thus, the record here differs from the
record in Application 13/287,831 with respect to the 2019 Guidance.
For the reasons discussed above, each independent claim recites
mental processes, and thus recites an abstract idea.
MAYO/ALICE STEP ONE: PTO STEP 2A PRONG TWO
Because we determine that each independent claim recites an abstract
idea, we consider whether each claim as a whole integrates the recited
abstract idea into a practical application. See 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55. “Only
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when a claim recites a judicial exception and fails to integrate the exception
into a practical application, is the claim ‘directed to’ a judicial exception
. . . .” Id. at 51.
As additional elements, claim 1 recites computer components, i.e.,
a “classifier” and a “processor.” Appeal Br. 32; see Final Act. 2–4; Ans.
3–4. Claim 10 recites no additional elements. Appeal Br. 33.
We determine that each independent claim as a whole does not
integrate the recited abstract idea into a practical application because the
additional elements do not impose meaningful limits on the abstract idea.
See 84 Fed. Reg. at 53–54; see also Final Act. 2–4. Instead, the claimed
computer components constitute generic computer components that perform
generic computer functions. See Spec. ¶ 132; Final Act. 2–4; Ans. 3–4. The
Specification describes the claimed computer components generically and
evidences their conventional nature. See Spec. ¶ 132; Final Act. 5.
Appellant analogizes the claims here to the claims in the following
cases: Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 880 F.3d
1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Systems, Inc., 879 F.3d
1299 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Visual Memory LLC v. NVIDIA Corp., 867 F.3d 1253
(Fed. Cir. 2017); Thales Visionix Inc. v. United States, 850 F.3d 1343
(Fed. Cir. 2017); and Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327
(Fed. Cir. 2016). See Appeal Br. 12–17; Reply Br. 5–6. But the claims here
do not resemble the claims in any of those cases.
In Core Wireless, the claims recited a “specific improvement over
prior systems,” i.e., a “particular manner of summarizing and presenting
information in electronic devices.” Core Wireless, 880 F.3d at 1362–63.
The Federal Circuit decided that the claims satisfied § 101 under Mayo/Alice
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step one because the “invention improve[d] the efficiency of using the
electronic device.” Id. at 1363.
Unlike the claims in Core Wireless, the claims here do not improve
the efficiency of using a computer or any other device. See Final Act. 2–3;
Ans. 3–4. The claimed computer components operate to manipulate data no
differently than conventional computer components. See Appeal Br. 32–33.
Hence, the Examiner properly reasons that the claimed invention “is not
[an] improvement to the computer or network.” Final Act. 3.
In Enfish, the Federal Circuit decided that the claims satisfied § 101
under Mayo/Alice step one because they recited a “specific improvement to
the way computers operate,” i.e., an improved database configuration that
permitted faster and more efficient searching. Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1330–33,
1336, 1339. Further, the Federal Circuit explained that the claims in Enfish
“did more than allow computers to perform familiar tasks with greater speed
and efficiency” and “actually permitted users to launch and construct
databases in a new way.” Finjan, 879 F.3d at 1305; see also Secured Mail
Sols. LLC v. Universal Wilde, Inc., 873 F.3d 905, 910 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(explaining that the claims in Enfish “focused on an improvement to
computer functionality”).
In Visual Memory, the claims also focused on an improvement to
computer functionality. Specifically, the Federal Circuit decided that the
claims satisfied § 101 under Mayo/Alice step one because they were
“directed to an improved computer memory system” that “enabl[ed]
interoperability with multiple different processors.” Visual Memory,
867 F.3d at 1259. That interoperability “obviate[d] the need to design
a separate memory system for each [different] type of processor.” Id.
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In Finjan, the claims recited “a system and method for providing
computer security by attaching a security profile to a downloadable,” i.e.,
“an executable application program . . . downloaded from a source computer
and run on [a] destination computer.” Finjan, 879 F.3d at 1302–03. The
claimed “security profile” included “details about the suspicious code in the
received downloadable,” such as “all potentially hostile or suspicious code
operations that may be attempted by” the received downloadable. Id.
at 1304. The claimed “security profile” produced “a new kind of file that
enable[d] a computer security system to do things it could not do before.”
Id. at 1304–05. Thus, the Federal Circuit decided that the claims satisfied
§ 101 under Mayo/Alice step one because they provided an “improvement in
computer functionality.” Id. at 1305–06.
Unlike the claims in Enfish, Visual Memory, and Finjan, the claims
here do not provide an improvement in computer functionality. See Appeal
Br. 32–33. Appellant does not describe an advance in hardware or software
that, for example, causes a computer to operate faster or more efficiently.
See, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 2–6, 34–35, 132. As the Examiner properly reasons, the
claimed invention “is not [an] improvement to the computer or network.”
Final Act. 3.
In Thales, the patent at issue disclosed “an inertial tracking system
for tracking the motion of an object relative to a moving reference frame.”
Thales, 850 F.3d at 1344. Each independent claim required two inertial
sensors, i.e., one sensor mounted on the object and another sensor mounted
on the moving reference frame. Id. at 1345–46, 1348. The claimed inertial
sensors supplied signals for determining the object’s orientation relative to
the moving reference frame. Id. at 1345–46, 1348. The Federal Circuit
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decided that the claims satisfied § 101 under Mayo/Alice step one because
they employed conventional sensors “in a non-conventional manner to
reduce errors in measuring the relative position and orientation of a moving
object on a moving reference frame.” Id. at 1348–49.
Unlike the claims in Thales, the claims here do not employ
conventional computer components in a non-conventional manner. See
Final Act. 2–3; Ans. 3–4. Instead, the claims use generic computer
components in their ordinary capacities to manipulate data. See Appeal
Br. 32–33; Ans. 3–4.
Appellant asserts that “the Federal Circuit’s post-Alice precedent
illustrates that the question to answer for patent eligibility is whether the
purported differences between the claims and the prior art reflect a
technology-specific problem and solution.” Appeal Br. 8, 11 (emphasis
omitted). But Appellant cites nothing to support the assertion that a § 101
analysis should assess “the purported differences between the claims and the
prior art.” Id. at 8, 11. Further, novelty and nonobviousness do not “resolve
the question of whether the claims” satisfy § 101. Symantec, 838 F.3d
at 1315; see SAP Am., 898 F.3d at 1163. “[A] claim for a new abstract idea
is still an abstract idea.” Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d
1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (emphasis by the court).
Appellant contends that the claims define a “concrete idea” and
“a method of operation of a concrete device acting on its own in a concrete
way.” Appeal Br. 15. But a “claim that recites concrete, tangible
components” does not “escape[] the reach of the abstract-idea inquiry.”
In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 611 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(deciding that the claims were directed to an abstract idea even though they
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recited telephone units and servers). Although the claims in Alice defined a
“concrete idea” and “a method of operation of a concrete device acting on its
own in a concrete way,” the Supreme Court decided that the claims were
directed to an abstract idea. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 213–14, 218–21.
Appellant asserts that “automation of what a human does is typically
the hallmark of an invention, rather than the sign of an unpatentable abstract
idea.” Appeal Br. 9; Reply Br. 4. But the “mere automation of manual
processes using generic computers” does not suffice for patent eligibility.
Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 1055 (Fed. Cir.
2017); see Univ. of Fla., 916 F.3d at 1367. Moreover, human inability to
accomplish each limitation “does not alone confer” patent eligibility. See
FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1098 (Fed. Cir.
2016).
Appellant asserts that “a single web session is not something that is an
abstract idea, is not something that is treatable as an abstract idea, is not an
identified method of organizing human activity, and is most certainly not a
mental process.” Reply Br. 3 (emphases omitted). But the claims do not
recite establishing a single web session. Rather, they recite steps for
manipulating data relating to a single web session. See Appeal Br. 32–33.
Unclaimed features do not support patent eligibility. See ChargePoint, Inc.
v. SemaConnect, Inc., 920 F.3d 759, 769 (Fed. Cir. 2019); Berkheimer v. HP
Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1369–70 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Appellant contends that the claims “do not preempt or substantially
preempt any abstract idea.” Appeal Br. 7 (emphases omitted); Reply Br. 2;
see Appeal Br. 17–18; Reply Br. 6. Appellant also contends that “[i]f a
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claim does not preempt an abstract idea, then it is not directed to the abstract
idea.” Appeal Br. 15 (emphases omitted).
Appellant wrongly relies on an absence of preemption to establish
eligibility. While preemption may denote ineligibility, its absence does not
establish eligibility. See FairWarning, 839 F.3d at 1098. For claims
covering a patent-ineligible concept, preemption concerns “are fully
addressed and made moot” by an analysis under the Mayo/Alice framework.
Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir.
2015).
The 2019 Guidance identifies exemplary considerations indicating
that additional elements in claims “may have integrated the [judicial]
exception into a practical application.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 & nn.25–29
(citing MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), 2106.05(e)). As the above analysis
indicates, we have evaluated Appellant’s arguments in light of those
exemplary considerations. For the reasons discussed above, however, we
determine that each independent claim as a whole does not integrate the
recited abstract idea into a practical application. Thus, each claim is directed
to a judicial exception and does not satisfy § 101 under Mayo/Alice step one.
MAYO/ALICE STEP TWO: PTO STEP 2B
Because we determine that each independent claim is directed
to a judicial exception, we “consider the elements of each claim both
individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to determine whether the
additional elements” add enough to transform the “nature of the claim” into
“significantly more” than the judicial exception. See Alice, 573 U.S.
at 217–18, 221–22 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78–79). Under Mayo/Alice
step two, we “look with more specificity at what the claim elements add, in
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order to determine ‘whether they identify an “inventive concept” in the
application of the ineligible subject matter’ to which the claim is directed.”
Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1258
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d
1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). An “inventive concept” requires more than
“well-understood, routine, conventional activity already engaged in” by the
relevant community. Rapid Litig. Mgmt. Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d
1042, 1047 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79–80). But a
“non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of known, conventional
pieces” may provide an “inventive concept” satisfying step two. BASCOM
Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1350
(Fed. Cir. 2016).
As discussed above, the independent claims recite computer
components, i.e., a “classifier” and a “processor.” Appeal Br. 32–33; see
Final Act. 2–4; Ans. 3–4. As also discussed above, the claimed computer
components constitute generic computer components that perform generic
computer functions. See Spec. ¶ 132; Final Act. 2–4; Ans. 3–4.
For example, the Specification describes the claimed computer
components generically and evidences their conventional nature. See Spec.
¶ 132; Final Act. 5. In particular, the Specification states that the invention
“may comprise a general-purpose computer selectively activated or
reconfigured by a computer program stored in the computer.” Spec. ¶ 132.
Simply implementing an abstract idea using conventional machines or
devices “add[s] nothing of substance.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 226–27; see
also Mayo, 566 U.S. at 84–85 (explaining that “simply implementing a
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mathematical principle on a physical machine” does not suffice for patent
eligibility) (citing Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 64–65, 71).
Moreover, the claimed computer components operate to manipulate
data. Appeal Br. 32–33; see Final Act. 2–4. Court decisions have
recognized that generic computer components operating to manipulate data
are well understood, routine, and conventional to a skilled artisan. See, e.g.,
Alice, 573 U.S. at 226–27; SAP Am., 898 F.3d at 1164–65 & n.1, 1170;
Apple, 842 F.3d at 1234, 1241–42; Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1316–20; Versata
Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2015);
Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715–16 (Fed. Cir. 2014);
buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
For example, the system claims in Alice recited a “data processing
system” (e.g., a “processor”) with a “communications controller” and a “data
storage unit.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 226. The Supreme Court decided that the
system claims failed to satisfy § 101 because “[n]early every computer”
includes those generic components for performing “basic calculation,
storage, and transmission functions” and the system claims simply
implemented the same abstract idea as the method claims. Id. at 226–27.
The Court reasoned that (1) “the system claims are no different from the
method claims in substance”; (2) “[t]he method claims recite the abstract
idea implemented on a generic computer”; and (3) “the system claims recite
a handful of generic computer components configured to implement the
same idea.” Id. at 226.
Here, the claimed computer components perform “basic” calculation
and storage functions that every computer performs. See Appeal Br. 32. For
instance, every computer includes a “processor” for manipulating data.
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Nothing in the claims “requires anything other than conventional computer
. . . components operating according to their ordinary functions.” See Two-
Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1339,
1341 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Hence, the claimed computer components do not satisfy the
“inventive concept” requirement. See, e.g., Customedia Techs., LLC v. Dish
Network Corp., 951 F.3d 1359, 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (describing the
claimed “processor,” “storage device,” “programmable receiver unit,” and
“remote server” as “generic computer components”); Mortg. Grader, Inc. v.
First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1324–25 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(holding that “generic computer components such as an ‘interface,’
‘network,’ and ‘database’” did not satisfy the “inventive concept”
requirement); FairWarning, 839 F.3d at 1095–96 (describing the claimed
“microprocessor” and “user interface” as “generic computer elements”);
Prism Techs. LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 696 F. App’x 1014, 1016–17
(Fed. Cir. 2017) (describing the claimed “authentication server,” “access
server,” “Internet Protocol network,” “client computer device,” and
“database” as “indisputably generic computer components”).
Appellant asserts that the claims satisfy the “inventive concept”
requirement because the “claimed elements are novel and not obvious, and
hence, they are not well-understood, routine, and conventional activities.”
Appeal Br. 19 (emphases omitted).
We disagree. Appellant relies on the purported novelty and
nonobviousness of the recited abstract idea to satisfy the “inventive concept”
requirement. See Appeal Br. 19. But a “claimed invention’s use of the
ineligible concept,” e.g., an abstract idea, “cannot supply the inventive
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concept that renders the invention ‘significantly more’ than that ineligible
concept.” BSG Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290
(Fed. Cir. 2018). Under “the Mayo/Alice framework, a claim directed to a
newly discovered” abstract idea “cannot rely on the novelty of that discovery
for the inventive concept necessary for patent eligibility.” Genetic Techs.
Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016). “The ‘novelty’
of any element[s] or steps” in a claim or even the claim itself “is of no
relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim” satisfies
§ 101. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188–89.
Appellant contends that “with computer implemented inventions, it is
the new arrangements of the computer’s instructions that cause a new device
or structure to effectively be formed that allows such novel and non-obvious
arrangements of the generic computer processes and instructions to be
patented.” Appeal Br. 9; Reply Br. 3.
We disagree. Programming a computer to perform an allegedly new
algorithm does not transform the computer into “a new device or structure.”
See Alice, 573 U.S. at 213–14, 225–27; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 599, 609–13; SAP
Am., 898 F.3d at 1163–65. The allegedly new algorithm does not alter a
processor’s structure or a memory’s structure. And “generic computer
processes” cannot “transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-
eligible invention.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 223.
Appellant analogizes the claims here to the claims in BASCOM. See
Appeal Br. 17–19 (citing BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T
Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016)); Reply Br. 6. Specifically,
Appellant asserts that “the claims are directed to an inventive concept
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because they are directed to a specific application of a technology in the
market place.” Appeal Br. 18; see id. at 20.
We disagree that the claims here resemble the claims in BASCOM.
There, the claims recited a “specific method of filtering Internet content”
requiring “the installation of a filtering tool at a specific location, remote
from the end-users, with customizable filtering features specific to each end
user.” BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1345–46, 1350. The Federal Circuit decided
that the claims satisfied § 101 under Mayo/Alice step two. Id. at 1349–51.
The court reasoned that the claims covered “a technology-based solution . . .
to filter content on the Internet that overcomes existing problems with other
Internet filtering systems” and “improve[s] an existing technological
process.” Id. at 1351 (citing Alice, 573 U.S. at 223).
Unlike the claims in BASCOM, the claims here do not cover a
technology-based solution that improves an existing technological process.
See Final Act. 2–4; Ans. 3–5. As discussed above, the Examiner properly
reasons that the claimed invention “is not [an] improvement to the computer
or network.” Final Act. 3.
Appellant asserts that the § 101 rejection fails under Berkheimer. See
Appeal Br. 19 (citing Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir.
2018)); Reply Br. 6. According to Appellant, the “Examiner has failed to
show . . . how the burden under Berkheimer has been met.” Reply Br. 6
(emphasis omitted).
We disagree that the § 101 rejection fails under Berkheimer. As
discussed above, court decisions have recognized that generic computer
components operating to manipulate data are well understood, routine, and
conventional to a skilled artisan. See, e.g., Alice, 573 U.S. at 226–27; SAP
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Am., 898 F.3d at 1164–65 & n.1, 1170; Apple, 842 F.3d at 1234, 1241–42;
Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1316–20; Versata, 793 F.3d at 1334; Ultramercial,
772 F.3d at 715–16; buySAFE, 765 F.3d at 1355.
“Whether a combination of claim limitations supplies an inventive
concept that renders a claim ‘significantly more’ than an abstract idea to
which it is directed is a question of law.” BSG Tech, 899 F.3d at 1290.
Considering the limitations as an ordered combination adds nothing to the
abstract idea that is not already present when considering the limitations
separately. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79; Final Act. 4–5; Ans. 4–5. The
ordered combination of limitations in each independent claim amounts to
nothing more than the abstract idea implemented with generic computer
components that perform generic computer functions. See Alice, 573 U.S.
at 225–26; Final Act. 2–4; Ans. 3–5. Hence, we conclude that the ordered
combination of limitations in each independent claim does not supply an
“inventive concept” that renders the claim “significantly more” than the
abstract idea. See Final Act. 4–5; Ans. 4–5. Thus, each claim does not
satisfy § 101 under Mayo/Alice step two.
SUMMARY FOR INDEPENDENT CLAIMS 1 AND 10
For the reasons discussed above, Appellant’s arguments have not
persuaded us of any error in the Examiner’s findings or conclusions under
Mayo/Alice step one or step two. Hence, we sustain the § 101 rejection of
the independent claims.
DEPENDENT 2–9 AND 11–20
We also sustain the § 101 rejection of dependent claims 2–9 and
11–20 because Appellant does not argue eligibility separately for them. See
Appeal Br. 6–20; Reply Br. 2–7; 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
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The § 103 Rejection of Claims 1–3, 5–12, and 14–20
INDEPENDENT CLAIMS 1 AND 10:
CLASSIFY A SERIES OF OPERATIONS AS A BUSINESS ACTION
As noted above, the § 103 rejection of claims 1 and 10 rests on
Zwicky and Pricer. See Final Act. 9–10, 12. Appellant argues that the
Examiner erred in rejecting the claims because the references fail to teach
or suggest the following limitation in claim 1 and a similar limitation
in claim 10: “a business action classifier to classify a series of operations
from a single web session as a business action.” See Appeal Br. 20–24;
Reply Br. 7–9.
In particular, Appellant contends that “there is no classification of
business actions in Pricer” because “all of the Web-log entries of the user for
the time period determined to be a session are extracted as the clickstream
for [a] user.” Appeal Br. 21, 23 (emphases omitted); Reply Br. 8. Further,
Appellant asserts that a user may have “accomplished nothing that amounts
to a business action” or “accomplished many business actions,” but “Pricer
is unaware of this as it does not classify the extracted Web-log entries of the
session into business actions but instead simply extracts the entries for the
user for the session without performing any classification thereon.” Appeal
Br. 21–22, 23–24 (emphasis omitted); Reply Br. 8–9.
Appellant’s arguments do not persuade us of Examiner error. Pricer
explains that companies doing business on the Internet have (1) recognized
that “they could improve sales and customer service by tracking the actions
of individual customers” visiting their websites and (2) attempted to
reconstruct the clickstreams of individual customers. Pricer ¶ 1. Pricer
discloses an improved technique for reconstructing the clickstream of
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“a particular user” during “a single user session.” See id. ¶¶ 3, 7–16,
code (57), Fig. 3; Ans. 5–6. Additionally, Pricer discusses an example
where a database system “creates a table having three columns,” i.e., “one to
store date-and-time stamps, one to store user-ID codes, and one to store the
Web-log text describing the action or information requested.” Pricer ¶ 14;
see id. ¶ 8; Ans. 6. Serially analyzing “the action or information requested”
to create a table teaches or suggests “classify[ing] a series of operations”
according to the claims.
Moreover, an obviousness analysis “need not seek out” the “precise”
disclosure of each feature in a challenged claim because the analysis “can
take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary
skill in the art would employ.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398,
418 (2007). Here, a person of ordinary skill would infer that reconstructing
the clickstream of “a particular user” during “a single user session” to
“improve sales and customer service” would serve to “classify a series of
operations” as a business action, e.g., a sales action. See Final Act. 5–6,
10, 12; Ans. 5–6. Consistent with this, the Specification identifies a money
transfer as a business action. Spec. ¶ 37. A sales action typically involves
a money transfer.
That the clickstream of “a particular user” during “a single user
session” may include operations and requests unrelated to a business action
does not matter because claims 1 and 10 use the transitional term
“comprising.” See Appeal Br. 32–33. Because the claims use the
transitional term “comprising,” they encompass “unrecited elements,” e.g.,
operations and requests unrelated to a business action. See Regeneron
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Pharm., Inc. v. Merus N.V., 864 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing
MPEP § 2111.03).
Zwicky also discloses business actions, e.g., advertising actions and
shopping actions. See, e.g., Zwicky 5:40–50, 6:34–8:10, 9:17–23, code (57),
Figs. 2, 4. More generally, Zwicky discloses a system for:
(1) collecting data concerning global website activity
to use for reference purposes;
(2) collecting data concerning local website activity
to use for fraud-assessment purposes; and
(3) comparing the local website-activity data to the global
website-activity data (reference data) to identify fraud.
Id. at 3:61–63, 4:4–11, 4:35–44, 9:49–55, 10:8–12, 10:32–51, 11:28–43,
12:7–25, code (57), Figs. 2, 4, 5A–5B.
Although Zwicky describes an embodiment that collects and analyzes
global and local search event data, Zwicky explains that “the principles and
advantages described herein are also applicable to other event data, such as
shopping event data.” Zwicky 5:47–63; see id. at 5:65–6:15. Zwicky also
explains that the system may track and record events including “whether the
user performed some action from the web page, such as adding an item to
a shopping cart.” Id. at 9:35–46. Adding “an item to a shopping cart” is a
business action. See Spec. ¶¶ 36–37.
Appellant asserts that “as admitted by the Examiner, Zwicky teaches
nothing about business actions, and hence can teach nothing about
operations that make up a business action.” Appeal Br. 24 (emphases
omitted); Reply Br. 9. That assertion mischaracterizes the Examiner’s
position. The Examiner said that “Zwicky does not explicitly teach a
business action classifier to classify a series of operations from a single
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web session as a business action.” Final Act. 10; see id. at 12. Contrary to
Appellant’s assertion, the Examiner did not admit that “Zwicky teaches
nothing about business actions.” See Final Act. 10, 12; Appeal Br. 24;
Reply Br. 9.
Appellant asserts that Zwicky looks “at a single operation, namely, a
click, and not at a series of operations from a single web session that can be
classified as a business action per the claim language.” Appeal Br. 24–25
(emphases omitted); Reply Br. 9.
We disagree that Zwicky looks “at a single operation, namely, a click,
and not at a series of operations from a single web session.” See Appeal Br.
24–25; Reply Br. 9. Zwicky discloses collecting local website-activity data
regarding the websites “visited by a user after entry of a query to a search
engine.” Zwicky 12:28–32. The websites “visited by a user after entry of a
query to a search engine” correspond to a series of clicks and “a series of
operations from a single web session” according to the claims. Thus, the
Examiner correctly finds that Zwicky teaches or suggests “a series of
operations from a single web session” according to the claims. Ans. 6–7
(citing Zwicky 4:35–44, 9:49–12:40).
INDEPENDENT CLAIMS 1 AND 10:
DETERMINE A SCORE FOR EACH OPERATION
Appellant argues that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1 and 10
because the references fail to teach or suggest the following limitation in
claim 1 and a similar limitation in claim 10: “a fraud detection processor to
determine a score for each operation . . . said score combining probabilities
that the transmission and navigation activity of a session are those expected
of a normal user performing the business action.” See Appeal Br. 24–25;
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Reply Br. 9–11. Specifically, Appellant asserts that the Examiner fails to
show that Zwicky “uses probabilities that the transmission and navigation
activity of a session are those expected of a normal user performing the
business action,” as claimed. Appeal Br. 25 (emphasis omitted); Reply Br.
10–11.
Appellant’s arguments do not persuade us of Examiner error because
Appellant attacks the references individually. Where, as here, a rejection
rests on the combined disclosures in the references, an appellant cannot
establish nonobviousness by attacking the references individually. See In re
Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Ans. 6–7.
The Examiner cites Pricer, not Zwicky, as teaching or suggesting
collecting data concerning “the transmission and navigation activity of a
session.” See Final Act. 5–6; Ans. 6–7; Pricer ¶¶ 3, 7–16, code (57), Fig. 3.
In particular, Pricer’s database system reconstructs the clickstream of
“a particular user” during “a single user session.” Pricer ¶ 3; see id. ¶¶ 7–16,
code (57), Fig. 3; Ans. 5–6. The clickstream of “a particular user” during
“a single user session” corresponds to “the transmission and navigation
activity of a session” according to the claims.
The Examiner cites Zwicky, not Pricer, as teaching or suggesting
using probabilities “expected of a normal user.” See Final Act. 9, 12;
Zwicky 3:61–63, 4:4–11, 4:35–44, 9:49–10:51, 11:28–43, 12:7–25,
code (57), Figs. 2, 4, 5A–5B. Specifically, Zwicky’s system uses
probabilities when comparing local website-activity data to global website-
activity data (reference data “expected of a normal user”) to identify fraud.
Zwicky 3:61–63, 4:4–11, 4:35–44, 9:49–10:51, 11:28–43, 12:7–25,
code (57), Figs. 2, 4, 5A–5B. As an example, Zwicky explains that
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“Descriptive Statistics System (DSS) 206 determines the values that
characterize a particular website under analysis (local activity) and/or a set
of websites (global activity).” Id. at 9:51–55. As another example, Zwicky
explains that “Inferential Statistics System (ISS) 209 evaluates whether the
local activity behavior, that is, analyzed behavior of a referred-to website,
referring website, and users, is statistically similar to that of the global
activity, which is used as a reference for comparison.” Id. at 10:8–12.
MOTIVATION TO COMBINE THE REFERENCES
Appellant argues that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1 and 10
because (1) “the Examiner’s proposed combination does not have any of”
the limitations in claims 1 and 10 and (2) “one of ordinary skill in the art
would not be motivated to make [the] invention as claimed, since one cannot
be motivated to combine what is not available in the prior art.” Appeal
Br. 25 (emphases omitted); see id. at 27–29.
We disagree. For the reasons discussed above, the combined
disclosures in Zwicky and Pricer teach or suggest all of the limitations in
claims 1 and 10. See Final Act. 5–6, 9–10, 12; Ans. 5–7; Zwicky 3:61–63,
4:4–11, 4:35–48, 5:40–63, 6:34–8:10, 9:17–23, 9:35–12:40, code (57),
Figs. 2–4, 5A–5B; Pricer ¶¶ 3, 7–16, code (57), Fig. 3.
Appellant asserts that “[t]here is no showing made by the Examiner as
to how to combine the references to construct [the] invention as claimed.”
Appeal Br. 27 (emphasis omitted). But “‘[a] person of ordinary skill is also
a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton,’ so the fact that it would
take some creativity to carry out the combination does not defeat” an
obviousness determination. Facebook, Inc. v. Windy City Innovations, LLC,
953 F.3d 1313, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (alteration by the court) (quoting KSR,
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550 U.S. at 421). “The rationale of KSR does not support [the] theory that a
person of ordinary skill can only perform combinations of a puzzle element
A with a perfectly fitting puzzle element B.” ClassCo, Inc. v. Apple, Inc.,
838 F.3d 1214, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Appellant asserts that “[t]here is also no showing that the art has
recognized the problem solved by [the inventors] or that one looking at the
cited references would recognize such a problem and combine the references
in a manner that would solve the problem.” Appeal Br. 27 (emphasis
omitted); see id. at 28. But “the law does not require that the references
be combined for the reasons contemplated by [an] inventor.” In re Beattie,
974 F.2d 1309, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see Outdry Techs. Corp. v. Geox
S.p.A., 859 F.3d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2017). “[A]ny need or problem
known in the field of endeavor at the time of invention and addressed by
the patent can provide a reason for combining” references. KSR, 550 U.S.
at 420.
Here, the Examiner explains that an ordinarily skilled artisan would
have been motivated to combine Pricer’s teachings with Zwicky’s teachings
“to recreate a user’s web log data into a clickstream to provide the advantage
of tracking the action of an internet user.” Final Act. 7, 10, 12 (citing Pricer
¶ 3); Ans. 7–8 (citing Pricer ¶ 3). Hence, the Examiner provides “articulated
reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of
obviousness.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Appellant argues that the Examiner relies on “improper hindsight”
based on the Specification’s disclosure “to simply justify collecting various
elements, or piece parts thereof, that the Examiner believes can be used to
make [the] invention as claimed appear to be obvious based on the words.”
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Appeal Br. 27 (emphases omitted); Reply Br. 12; see Appeal Br. 27–29;
Reply Br. 12–13.
We disagree that the Examiner relies on “improper hindsight” in
rejecting claims 1 and 10 for obviousness based on Zwicky and Pricer. An
explicit analysis “whether there was an apparent reason to combine” the
references reduces “the risk of . . . patent examiners falling prey to hindsight
bias.” See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418, 421. Here, the Examiner’s explicit
analysis of a reason to combine the references demonstrates that the
Examiner did not fall prey to hindsight bias. See Final Act. 7, 10, 12 (citing
Pricer ¶ 3); Ans. 7–8 (citing Pricer ¶ 3); Pricer ¶ 3.
SUMMARY FOR INDEPENDENT CLAIMS 1 AND 10
For the reasons discussed above, Appellant’s arguments have not
persuaded us that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1 and 10 for
obviousness based on Zwicky and Pricer. In our view, the claimed subject
matter exemplifies the principle that “[t]he combination of familiar elements
according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more
than yield predictable results.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 416. Hence, we sustain the
§ 103 rejection of claims 1 and 10.
DEPENDENT CLAIMS 2, 3, 5–9, 11, 12, AND 14–20
Claims 2, 3, and 5–9 depend from claim 1, and claims 11, 12, and
14–20 depend from claim 10. Appellant does not argue patentability
separately for these dependent claims. See Appeal Br. 20–30; Reply Br.
7–13. Hence, we sustain the § 103 rejection of these dependent claims for
the same reasons as claims 1 and 10. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
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The § 103 Rejection of Claims 4 and 13
Claim 4 depends from claim 1, and claim 13 depends from claim 10.
Appellant does not argue patentability separately for these dependent claims.
See Appeal Br. 20–30; Reply Br. 7–13. Hence, we sustain the § 103
rejection of these dependent claims for the same reasons as claims 1 and 10.
See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
CONCLUSION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–20.
In summary:
Claims
Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–20 101 Eligibility 1–20
1–3, 5–12,
14–20 103 Zwicky, Pricer
1–3, 5–12,
14–20
4, 13 103 Zwicky, Pricer, Koutrika 4, 13
Overall
Outcome 1–20
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED