Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 12, 1999

329 N.L.R.B. 1493 (N.L.R.B. 1999)

RYDER INTEGRATED LOGISTICS, INC. 1493
Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc. and International
Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agri-
cultural Implement Workers of America
(UAW), AFL–CIO and District 2A, Transporta-
tion, Technical, Warehouse, Industrial and Ser-
vice Employees Union, affiliated with American
Maritime Officers, Party in Interest. Case 7–
CA–39781
November 12, 1999
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN TRUESDALE AND MEMBERS LIEBMAN
AND BRAME
On May 6, 1998, Administrative Law Judge Thomas
R. Wilks issued the attached decision. The Respondent
and the Party in Interest filed exceptions and supporting
briefs, the General Counsel and the Charging Party filed
answering briefs, and the Respondent and the Party in
Interest filed reply briefs. In addition, the General Coun-
sel filed cross-exceptions and a supporting brief, and the
Respondent filed an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions2
and to adopt the recommended Order as modified.3

1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
We agree with the judge’s findings that the disputed warehouse em-
ployees employed at the Respondent’s Redford, and then Canton,
Michigan Logistics Optimization Center were not accreted into the
existing unit of the Respondent’s drivers servicing the GM De-
troit/Hamtramck, Michigan plant, and that the Respondent violated Sec.
8(a)(2) and (1) by its February 28, 1997 recognition of the Party in
Interest as the representative of these nonaccreted employees. We also
agree with the General Counsel, as stated in his cross-exceptions, that
this violation taints any subsequent showing of majority status by the
Party in Interest. Garment Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 736
(1961); J.E. Leasing Corp., 262 NLRB 373, 380 (1982). “Indeed, such
acquisition of majority status itself might indicate that the recognition
. . . afforded [the Party in Interest] a deceptive cloak of authority with
which to persuasively elicit additional employee support.” Garment
Workers, 366 U.S. at 736. Therefore, we find it unnecessary to pass on
whether the Party in Interest’s purported subsequent majority status
was the result of misrepresentations made during its solicitation of
employee membership applications.
The judge also found that employee Pat Swift was an agent of Re-
spondent, but not a supervisor. We adopt the judge’s finding as to
Swift’s agency status, and therefore find it unnecessary to pass on his
status as a supervisor.
2 The first sentence of the second paragraph of the judge’s conclu-
sions of law mistakenly refers to Human Relations Manager Betty
Burdette. The statements included in this sentence were only made by
Pat Swift. We amend the conclusions of law accordingly.
3 In his recommended Order, the judge inadvertently omitted a pro-
vision, referred to in his remedy, requiring the Respondent to withdraw
and withhold recognition from the Party in Interest as the collective-
bargaining representative of the warehouse employees. We shall mod-
ify the recommended Order accordingly.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified below and orders that the Respondent, Ryder
Integrated Logistics, Inc., Canton, Michigan, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set
forth in the Order as modified.
1. Insert the following as a new paragraph 2(b) and
reletter the subsequent paragraphs.
“(b) Withdraw and withhold recognition from District
2A, Transportation, Technical, Warehouse, Industrial
and Service Employees Union, affiliated with American
Maritime Officers, its successors or assigns, as the col-
lective-bargaining representative of loaders, dockmen,
and warehousemen employed at its Canton, Michigan
LOC facility, and cease giving effect to any collective-
bargaining agreement, modification, extension, renewal,
or supplemental agreement between it and District 2A as
to those employees, until such time as District 2A shall
have been certified by the Board as the exclusive bar-
gaining representative of such employees in an appropri-
ate bargaining unit.”
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the admin-
istrative law judge.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to
post and abide by this notice.

WE WILL NOT threaten employees with the closure of
our warehouse operations if they refuse to sign member-
ship applications for District 2A, Transportation, Techni-
cal, Warehouse, Industrial and Service Employees Un-
ion, affiliated with American Maritime Officers.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees with the closure of
our warehouse operations if they designate the Interna-
tional Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agri-
cultural Implement Workers of America (UAW), AFL–
CIO as their collective-bargaining representative.
WE WILL NOT recognize and bargain with District 2A,
Transportation, Technical, Warehouse, Industrial and
Service Employees Union, affiliated with American
Maritime Officers, its successors, or assigns, as the col-
lective-bargaining representative of loaders, dockmen,
and warehousemen employed at our Canton, Michigan
LOC facility unless and until that Union has been certi-
fied by the National Labor Relations Board as the exclu-

329 NLRB No. 89
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1494
sive bargaining representative of any such employees in
an appropriate unit.
WE WILL NOT give effect to our collective-bargaining
agreement with District 2A, Transportation, Technical,
Warehouse, Industrial and Service Employees Union,
affiliated with American Maritime Officers, its succes-
sors, or assigns, with respect to the warehouse employees
referred to above, and any modifications, extensions,
renewals, or supplements that may have been applied to
those employees, provided that nothing in the Order shall
require our withdrawal or enhancement of any wage in-
crease or other benefits, terms, and conditions of em-
ployment that may have been established pursuant to any
such agreement.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed to you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL reimburse all former and present loaders,
dockmen, and warehousemen employed at the Redford,
Michigan or Canton, Michigan LOC for all initiation
fees, dues, and other moneys, if any, paid by or withheld
from them.
WE WILL withdraw and withhold recognition from Dis-
trict 2A, Transportation, Technical, Warehouse, Indus-
trial and Service Employees Union, affiliated with
American Maritime Officers, its successors or assigns, as
the collective-bargaining representative of loaders,
dockmen, and warehousemen employed at our Canton,
Michigan LOC facility, and cease giving effect to any
collective-bargaining agreement, modification, exten-
sion, renewal, or supplemental agreement between us
and District 2A as to those employees, until such time as
District 2A shall have been certified by the National La-
bor Relations Board as the exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative of such employees in an appropriate bargaining
unit.
RYDER INTEGRATED LOGISTICS, INC.
Ellen Rosenthal, Esq. and Dara Diomande, Esq., for the Gen-
eral Counsel.
Kevin J. Kinney, Esq. (Krukowski & Costello), of Milwaukee,
Wisconsin, for the Respondent.
Betsey Engel, Esq., of Detroit, Michigan, for the Charging
Party.
Joel Glanstein, Esq. (O’Donnell, Schwartz, Glanstein &
Rosen), of New York, New York, for the Party in Interest.1
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
THOMAS R. WILKS, Administrative Law Judge. The original
charge in this proceeding was filed on May 6, 1997, by Interna-
tional Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural
Implement Workers of America (UAW), AFL–CIO (the Charg-
ing Party or UAW), against Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc.
(the Respondent or Ryder). It is alleged that the Respondent’s

1 The name of the Party in Interest appears here and in the caption as
stipulated at the trial.
agents threatened plant closure to its employees if they sup-
ported the Charging Party and also that the Respondent unlaw-
fully extended special privileges to District 2A, Transportation,
Technical, Warehouse, Industrial and Service Employees Un-
ion, affiliated with American Maritime Officers (Party in Inter-
est or District 2A) in violation of Section 8(a)(2) of the Act.
The first amended charge in this proceeding was filed by the
Charging Party against the Respondent on July 29, 1997. That
charge additionally alleged that the Respondent unlawfully
recognized District 2A as the exclusive bargaining representa-
tive of its warehouse employees at its Canton, Michigan facility
on April 25, 1997, in violation of Section 8(a)(2) of the Act.
On July 31, 1997, the Regional Director partially dismissed
the charge in this case. The partial dismissal covered the
8(a)(2) allegations of the unlawful recognition by the Respon-
dent of District 2A. On August 8, 1997, the Charging Party
timely appealed the Region’s partial dismissal and presented
new evidence for consideration. The second amended charge
was filed by the Charging Party against the Respondent on
September 24, 1997. That charge additionally alleged that in
mid-April 1977, the Respondent threatened its Canton ware-
house employees with job loss if they did not sign representa-
tion authorizations on behalf of District 2A. It also alleged that
on or about August 27, the Respondent unlawfully entered into
a collective-bargaining agreement with District 2A (i.e., cover-
ing the Canton warehouse employees).
A further investigation was conducted. As a result of the in-
vestigation, on September 25, 1997, while an appeal of the
dismissal was pending before the Office of Appeals of the Gen-
eral Counsel, the Regional Director revoked his July 31, 1997
partial dismissal regarding the 8(a)(2) allegations of unlawful
recognition.
The complaint was issued by the Acting Regional Director
against the Respondent on October 3, 1997.
The complaint alleged that the Respondent in early to mid-
April 1997, coercively threatened its employees with ware-
house closure and job loss if they selected the Charging Party
as their collective-bargaining representative and if they did not
sign applications for membership in District 2A, in violation of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The complaint as amended at trial
further alleged that on February 28, 1997, the Respondent un-
lawfully recognized District 2A as the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of all loaders, dockmen, and ware-
housemen employed by it at its Canton warehouse at a time
when District 2A did not represent an uncoerced majority of
that unit of employees, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and 2 of
the Act. Finally, the complaint alleged that the Respondent
unlawfully entered into and subsequently maintained and en-
forced a collective-bargaining agreement with District 2A cov-
ering that employee unit when District 2A did not represent an
uncoerced majority of these employees in violation of Section
8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act.
The Respondent filed a timely answer dated October 16,
1997, which denied the 8(a)(1) allegations and also contended
that one of the three alleged threatening agents, Pat Swift, was
not a supervisor within the meaning of the Act. With respect to
the original 8(a)(1) allegations, it contended that the matter had
been settled on August 6, 1997. However, although the Re-
spondent may have executed the partial settlement agreement,
the Regional Director had never approved it. The Respondent
further denied the 8(a)(2) allegations contending that it had
entered into a preexisting collective-bargaining agreement with
RYDER INTEGRATED LOGISTICS, INC. 1495
District 2A covering its drivers and warehouse employees since
May 8, 1995, for which District 2A was its representative.
Thereafter, the Respondent argued that the Canton warehouse
unit was an accretion to a preexisting unit of drivers repre-
sented by District 2A. Finally, the answer contended that the
complaint was barred by Section 10(b) of the Act, by laches,
and that its conduct was a result of its reliance on the Regional
Director’s dismissal of the original charge. The answer further
argued that the dismissal revocation was based on the subse-
quent bilateral negotiations between the Respondent and Dis-
trict 2A which resulted in a separate warehouse unit contract
and was the result of a misinterpretation of “settled Board law.
see e.g. UPIU, Local 1027 (Mead), 216 NLRB 486 (1975).”
District 2A moved to intervene as a potentially adversely af-
fected interested party by motion dated October 20, 1977. The
Regional Director granted that motion by his order dated No-
vember 6, 1997. In the meantime, the Regional Director issued
an amendment to complaint on October 23, 1997, which ran
only to the requested remedial order therein.
The trial in this matter was held before me in Detroit, Michi-
gan, on December 3, 4, and 5, 1997, at which time all parties
were afforded opportunity to adduce into evidence relevant
testimony and documentary evidence. Briefs from all four
parties were received at the Division of Judges, following an
extension of time to do so, no later than January 28, 1998.2
Respondent requested by motion received at the Division of
Judges on March 2, 1998, to reopen the record for the receipt of
the Regional Director’s letter to the parties dated February 10,
1998. In that proffered letter, the Regional Director announced
deferral of the Charging Party’s petition for certification of
representation for a unit of 535 of the Respondent’s employees
at various locations, including the Canton warehouse, pending
resolution of the instant case. The General Counsel by motion
received at the Division of Judges on March 10, 1998, opposed
that motion on grounds that positions taken by the Charging
Party in the representation case are irrelevant to the instant
case, that no determination has been made by the Regional
Director or the Board as to the issue of appropriate unit in that
case (Case 7–RC–21253), and that such action occurred after
the events of the complaint in the instant case. I agree. The
Respondent’s motion is denied. In any event, the Board can
clearly take administrative notice of the actions of its Regional
Directors and pending petitions for representation for clearly
stated relevant reasons.
The briefs submitted by the parties fully delineate the facts
and issues and, in form, approximate proposed findings of facts
and conclusions. Portions of those briefs have been incorpo-
rated herein, sometimes modified, particularly as to undisputed
factual narration. However, all factual findings herein are
based on my independent evaluation of the record. Based on
the entire record, the briefs and my observation and evaluation
of witnesses’ demeanor, I make the following findings
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
At all material times, the Respondent, with a place of busi-
ness in Canton, Michigan (the Respondent’s Canton facility),
has been engaged in the interstate shipping, sorting, and dock-
ing of automobile parts. During the calendar year ending De-

2 The General Counsel’s unopposed motion to correct transcript, at-
tached to the brief, is granted, and on p. 234, LL. 12–13 of the tran-
script is corrected to read “they asked him was this binding us to be up
under district 2A.”
cember 31, 1996, the Respondent, in conducting its Canton
business operations, derived gross revenues in excess of $1
million. During the same period of time, the Respondent, in
conducting its business operations, purchased goods and mate-
rials valued in excess of $50,000 from points located outside
the State of Michigan and had them shipped directly to its
Michigan facilities.
It is admitted, and I find, that at all material times, the Re-
spondent has been engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION
It is admitted, and I find, that at all material times, District
2A has been a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Facts
1. Business background
The city of Detroit is situated in southeast Michigan. On its
southern limit is the Detroit River, which forms part of the
United States-Canadian border. Woodward Avenue runs about
perpendicularly north from the river and divides the city in
about half. Located about 6 miles north of the river is the mu-
nicipality of Hamtramck, which is located to the immediate east
of Woodward Avenue.
The municipality of Highland Park lies about 8 miles north
of the River. It is adjacent to the northwest corner of Ham-
tramck and is intersected by Woodward Avenue. Both Ham-
tramck and Highland Park form enclaves, which are completely
surrounded by the city of Detroit. In relatively recent times, the
General Motors Corporation (GM) constructed an automobile
assembly plant in Hamtramck, which partially protruded into
Detroit. That facility is referred to by the parties as Deham. It
primarily had assembled Cadillac motor vehicles and relied on
various suppliers situated, inter alia, in southern Michigan,
Ohio, and Indiana. In 1992, GM decided to revise its assembly
methods pursuant to its experience in a coventure with the
Toyota motor car company. Its objective was to eliminate
waste, improve plant ergonomics and plant safety, and change
work stations in order to perform more functions in the same
space. Deham served as a pilot plant in this program, which
was effectuated there between 1992 to 1994. GM then next
proceeded to change its external supply chair.
The Respondent is a successor to Ryder Dedicated Logistics,
Inc. It maintains a regional headquarters and facility in High-
land Park. Among its customers are eight GM assembly plants.
There are about 450–500 Ryder drivers involved in parts deliv-
ery services to GM operations from suppliers in the Highland
Park facility service area of Michigan, Ohio, and Indiana.
These parts are containerized and delivered by a tractor-trailer
vehicle which, in turn, must retrieve the empty containers from
the assembly plants and return them to the appropriate supplier.
GM had elected to move into a level production system (i.e.,
where the same events occur in the same sequence in the same
fashion every day, at the same rate of work). This allowed the
Respondent to schedule in a fixed manner the parts flowing
from the supplier community into the assembly plant. In con-
trast to past operations where suppliers would send as much as
1 month’s worth of material at one time into the plant, and then
these parts would have to be stored and maneuvered out of the
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1496
way with general chaos prevailing, Ryder was able to put to-
gether a fixed system that would support the level of production
while minimizing the amount of inventory required to be on
hand at the assembly plant at any given time. In 1994, GM
decided to bid the business (i.e., the external part of the supply
chain) and this business was awarded to Ryder with a start date
set for September 1994.
Richard Jennings, vice president and general manager for
Ryder, testified that because of the Respondent’s previous
knowledge and experience with automotive manufacturers, its
original proposal to GM called for some type of offsite facility,
perhaps a cross dock, to accommodate the movement of mate-
rial into the assembly plant.3 GM did not, however, immedi-
ately accept the external warehouse idea, and the business
agreement did not incorporate it.
As Ryder began to evaluate the actual date for the Deham as-
sembly plant, they were able to come up with a solution that did
not immediately require the LOC. According to Jennings’
testimony, the reason that no LOC was required at that time
was that the Respondent was able to shorten the pipeline and
bring in more frequent delivery of materials so that less space
was required in the assembly plant for storage of parts.
Jennings testified that although the original business solution
had called for a LOC, because of data from GM that was not as
accurate as it could have been or due to underestimation of the
amount of material that GM had actually been storing in the
Deham assembly plant, the shortening of the supply pipeline
worked initially.
Shortly after having been awarded the Deham business, Ry-
der placed a team inside the assembly plant to begin studying
alternate solutions. Jennings testified that even prior to the
team study, Ryder had recommended to GM a three-plant syn-
ergy involving the LOC. This plan, which was presented to
GM in November 1994, combined the supply chain activity of
three assembly plants into one facility, which would have been
known as the LOC. That plan ultimately became a viable busi-
ness strategy for GM and was put out to bid by GM in April
1995. Ryder received a letter of intent to proceed with that
business in October 1995.
The Ryder team initially focused on cost initiatives.
Jennings testified that each time the Respondent could elimi-
nate a day’s worth of inventory or even a few hours’ worth of
inventory, they were able to eliminate the need for extensive
storage space at the Deham assembly plant. The elimination of
inventory resulted in significant economics. The second part of
the initiative involved the ability of GM to be able to put vehi-
cles into the marketplace in a much more rapid fashion based
on demand. The biggest constraint that GM had in this regard
was the inability to change body die molds quickly. By chang-
ing body molds, the Deham plant could assembly other model
vehicles, such as the Buick Park Lane, as the customer dictated.
The body shop needed to grow in order to shorten the change
over time. As the body shop grew inside the Deham assembly
plant, space available for storing parts was reduced. Ulti-
mately, the actual productive activity space inside the Deham
assembly plant became more important to GM than the need to
store parts. The LOC project then became a reality and the
Respondent was awarded the business in February 1997. This
project had been potentially viable since the winter of 1994 and

3 The offsite facility or cross dock is actually what will later be re-
ferred to as the “Logistics Optimization Center” or “LOC.”
Ryder had actually received a competitive bid in April 1995.
Jennings testified that the Deham project had remained viable
because a small change in the production system would eventu-
ally need to go offsite to support the assembly plant.
Prior to February 1997, the operation typically functioned in
the following manner. Ryder truckdrivers would pick up their
trucks and a list of scheduled suppliers from a Ryder facility
located in Highland Park, Michigan. The drivers would then
pick up parts (which come in containers of various sizes) from
the suppliers’ plants and bring them to Deham. After being
unloaded, the drivers would retrieve empty containers and
transport them to the suppliers’ plants.
Ryder was ultimately instructed to begin immediate opera-
tions on February 14, 1997. Jennings testified that because of
the phased-in approach to the business plan, Ryder had been
able to secure a lease on a 230,000-square-foot LOC facility in
Canton, Michigan, that was being built by a developer, but that
lease would not be available until mid-June 1997. Because of
the immediate need to relieve pressure on the Deham assembly
plant, Ryder had been able to prevail on the same builder-
developer to temporarily lease some space in Redford Town-
ship at the Redford Industrial Trade Center 15 miles from the
Highland Park facility. This was a 45,000- or 50,000-square-
foot facility with no parking and a shared entryway with the
Postal Service. Jennings testified that this was a temporary
measure until the Respondent would be able to occupy the Can-
ton LOC facility.
The Respondent began operations at Redford which at that
time essentially consisted of processing empty containers from
the Deham plant on March 1, 1997, with the use of temporary
employees.
On June 15, 1997, the Canton facility was delivered to Ryder
and after the setup phase and the 2-week summer shutdown at
the Deham assembly plant, this facility became fully opera-
tional on July 15, 1997. All LOC operations have run through
and from Canton since that date. The Canton LOC is 35 miles
from the Highland Park facility and 32 miles from Deham.
Respondent’s drivers transported new containerized parts from
suppliers to the Canton warehouse for temporary sorting and
storage and thereafter to Deham on an as-needed basis. The
drivers transported empty containers from Deham to the Canton
LOC for sorting and transport from Canton to the original sup-
plier plant. The Redford warehouse only processed empty
containers.
2. Labor relations background
In May 1995, the Respondent entered into a collective-
bargaining agreement with the Party in Interest, District 2A,
Transportation, Technical, Warehouse, Industrial and Service
Employees Union, affiliated with American Maritime Officers.
The contract included an ongoing obligation to meet and bar-
gain over “all matters pertaining to rates of pay, hours, and
other conditions of employment.” The recognition clause of
the collective-bargaining agreement covered:

All drivers/loaders/dockmen/warehousemen/switchers in the
employ of Ryder at specific locations and any future remote
domicile site created to service this account.

During the term of this collective-bargaining agreement
which expires in May 1998, all the employees in the bargaining
unit covered by this agreement were drivers, also known as
route managers and switchers, with the exception of the ware-
house employees and shipping clerks whose status is in dispute
RYDER INTEGRATED LOGISTICS, INC. 1497
in this proceeding and who were not permanently hired until
after the LOC operation became operational on about March 1,
1997. They were initially hired as temporary employees at
Redford LOC through a temporary employment agency but
obtained status as permanent employees of the Respondent on
March 29, 1997. Upon hiring, they were told that the Redford
facility was only temporary. Fifteen drivers were initially as-
signed to service the Redford LOC. Jennings testified that in
negotiations with District 2A, he explained the intent of the
business arrangement with GM to eventually institute an offsite
LOC warehouse operation. Jennings testified that it was his
intent to negotiate an addendum to the District 2A collective-
bargaining agreement to cover warehouse employees. The
collective-bargaining agreement provided no warehouse em-
ployee wage rates.
On February 25, 1997, Jerry Madrzykowski, District 2A un-
ion representative, discovered that Ryder had opened a ware-
house in Redford and planned to hire warehouse personnel to
service the Deham account. On February 26, 1997,
Madrzykowski sent a certified letter to Jennings, seeking rec-
ognition and representation for the future warehouse employ-
ees. On February 28, 1997, Jennings sent a reply letter to
Madrzykowski acknowledging that District 2A represents these
warehouse employees and agreed to meet and bargain on all
matters with District 2A with respect to these warehouse em-
ployees. On or about April 5, 1997, Madrzykowski instructed
his union steward, Hal Lindke, to solicit membership applica-
tions from the warehouse employees. Those employees con-
sisted of sorters, who placed empty containers in staging areas
for movement by forklift (hi-lo) operators onto the truck; fork-
lift operators who removed containers from the trucks; and
clerical employees known as “shipping clerks,” who tracked the
flow of shipments and who processed related documentation.
There were about 25 to 28 employees engaged in those posi-
tions in a 24-hour-a-day, three-shift operation.
District 2A proceeded to secure membership applications
from the warehouse employees. Eleven applications were so-
licited by Steward Hal Lindke on April 7, 1997, and another 5
or 6 on April 24, 1997. There is a dispute as to whether Lindke
misrepresented the purpose of the document and whether the
Respondent’s agents coerced employees to support District 2A.
On April 13, 1997, Madrzykowski held a drivers’ member-
ship meeting in a hall located in Hamtramck, Michigan. Ten to
fifteen warehouse employees attended the meeting as guests.
At this meeting, the warehouse employees voiced concerns
about Ryder drivers potentially bumping warehouse employees
from their jobs. In response to their concerns, Madrzykowski
told the warehouse employees that they would have their own
collective-bargaining agreement. Madrzykowski also told the
warehouse employees that they should be able to control their
own identity and negotiate their own terms and conditions of
employment. An overwhelming majority of drivers expressed
agreement.
The first unfair labor practice charge was filed on May 5,
1997, which alleged threats to employees and favoritism to
District 2A.
On July 28, 1997, the UAW amended its charge to add an al-
legation of unlawful recognition by Ryder of District 2A in
February 1997. On July 31, 1997, the parties were notified of
the Regional Director’s decision “that further proceedings are
not warranted at this time with respect to the allegations involv-
ing favoring and unlawfully recognizing District 2A.”
On August 7, 1997, after the partial dismissal of the charge,
District 2A met with warehouse employees at the Canton
breakroom. Madrzykowski, during a morning and a separate
afternoon session, told the employees that the Board’s Regional
Director had cleared the way for District 2A to represent them
in collective bargaining with Ryder. He stated that the employ-
ees could have a 3- or 5-year contract, that the warehouse em-
ployees would have a separate contract from the drivers, and
instructed the employees to select a negotiating committee.
Madrzykowski explained that he commenced this meeting as
the result of the Region’s dismissal of the unfair labor practice
charge.
Subsequently, after a five-member negotiating committee
was chosen by the warehouse employees, the warehouse em-
ployees met with District 2A officials to develop collective-
bargaining proposals.
On August 26 and 27, 1997, Ryder and District 2A, along
with the warehouse employees’ negotiating committee, met to
negotiate the collective-bargaining agreement. On August 27,
the parties reached agreement and signed a draft agreement
covering warehousemen and shipping clerks, but excluding all
other employees. The switchers appear to be left under the
coverage of the drivers’ collective-bargaining agreement. Em-
ployee Pascal Smith and Nolan Hall were members of the
committee and signatories to the new agreement. During the
beginning of October, Ryder began deducting union dues from
warehouse employees’ paychecks on behalf of District 2A.
The 3-year collective-bargaining agreement provided for
wage increases from $8.25 to $9.50 per hour and $2000 in
backpay for each warehouse employee.
Subsequently, the Regional Director, during the pendency of
an appeal, rescinded the dismissal of the charge and issued the
complaint in this case.
3. Accretion
a. The Redford warehouse
The basic operation of the Redford facility was as follows:
A driver picked up a truck from Ryder’s Highland Park facility
(consisting of loads of empty containers from Deham) and
drove to the Redford warehouse at its east dock. Once at the
Redford warehouse, the driver informed an office clerical of
his/her arrival. The clerical advised the driver to either stay
with the load or directed the driver to the west side of the ware-
house to pick up a load of sorted empty containers going to
their respective suppliers. The shipping clerks documented the
containers the drivers brought in and shipped out of the ware-
house. The empty containers were unloaded from the trucks by
forklift operators, also known as hi-lo drivers, and were logged
and sorted by the warehouse employees. The forklift operators
then collected these sorted containers and loaded them onto
another truck on the other side of the warehouse. The driver
then took a truck loaded with containers destined for specific
suppliers and delivered the containers to their respective sup-
pliers. The forklift operators, not the drivers, loaded or un-
loaded material from the trucks and operated the forklifts. On
occasion, if a load fell out of the back of a trailer into the yard,
a driver would pick up and rearrange the load or ask a forklift
operator to do so. Drivers did not perform any work inside the
Redford warehouse. None of the routes that transported actual
containerized parts stopped at the Redford warehouse. Initially,
there were 15 drivers assigned to routes that supported the Red-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1498
supported the Redford warehouse.4 However, the drivers did
not park their trucks at the Redford warehouse facility, and
there was no need for switchers to move parked vehicles.
Rather, drivers picked up and returned their trucks every day to
Highland Park.
Jennings testified that from the time that Ryder made its ini-
tial study of the business solution for GM in August or Septem-
ber 1994, it anticipated that they were going to have warehouse
people in this supply chain. Jennings testified that without the
warehouse people at the LOC, even with a full complement of
drivers, the system could not work. Jennings testified that Ry-
der could not provide the transportation solution required to
allow Deham to do the production schedules that they needed
to do without the codependence of these groups (i.e., ware-
house/drivers). Jennings testified that there would never be a
load of containers that came into the Redford LOC that was not
handled by a warehouse person and, similarly, without the driv-
ers bringing the containers into the LOC, there would have
been no need for the warehouse people.
b. The Canton LOC
Jennings testified that the Redford LOC was restricted by
size to handle only empty containers that were on their way
back to suppliers and also to serve as a holding facility for
some pilot part activity. He testified that the Canton LOC was
meant to operate in those two roles, as well as be a facility that
would eliminate the space problems that were occurring at De-
ham. The initial phase of the LOC in Canton also included the
processing of containerized parts.
When Ryder began to process containerized parts through
the Canton facility, those parts were separated by delivery zone
so that parts destined for the west dock at Deham would go to
one delivery zone, parts destined for the east dock would go to
another delivery zone, etc. Ryder processed the material ac-
cording to its next storage location throughout the Canton LOC.
Additionally, as Canton continued to process returning empty
containers, there was some warehousing and inventory of obso-
lete parts, and the Canton facility is also involved in the trans-
port of empty containers to new suppliers.
Ryder drivers shuttle to Deham in a three-shift operation.
There are approximately 20–22 drivers and 4 switchers at the
facility, 15 tractors, and 55 trailers—all designed to support the
shuttle activity from the LOC to the Deham assembly plant.
According to Jennings, except for a few logistical reasons,
Ryder’s Highland Park region drivers begin and end their
workday at the Highland Park facility. Only three types of
drivers report to work at the LOC: (1) those who run between
the LOC and Deham with parts and empty containers; (2)
switchers who move vehicles from the east LOC dock to the
west dock; (3) a few drivers whose routes start at supplier
plants in an area west of Canton, for whom it would make no
sense for logistical reasons to drive first to the eastern Highland
Park. The others, an indeterminate number, report first to the
Highland Park facility and end their day there. There are also
drivers who depart from the Highland Park facility, drive to a

4 Ryder drivers in the Highland Park Region serviced eight GM as-
sembly plants. According to stipulation of the parties, the collective-
bargaining agreement with District 2A, exclusive of warehouse em-
ployees and shipping clerks, covered up to 300 of those employees.
About 500 employees, however, were covered by that agreement, ap-
parently including employees not domiciled at the Highland Park facil-
ity.
supplier, and pick up an entire truckload of the same parts that
do not need sorting, which can be and are delivered directly to
the specific Deham dock without stopping at the LOC.
The Ryder drivers and switchers assigned to the LOC remain
on the Highland Park seniority list with the 300 drivers covered
by the District 2A collective-bargaining agreement. Eight other
GM assembly plants are serviced by Ryder drivers covered by
that agreement.
The drivers receive their daily assignments at the LOC,
where they maintain lockers and receive their paychecks. A
lounge is provided for their exclusive use to which access by
warehouse employees is barred. The drivers do not punch a
timeclock but drive in and out on a logged schedule. The logs
are turned in at the Highland Park facility.
The Deham assembly plant originates a signal through an
EDI transaction that goes out to a supplier. That signal is also
received by copy at Highland Park. Ryder does an electronics
part matching and distributes the signal and a parts manifest to
the LOC. The driver at the LOC will then be assigned to make
the collection on the route and bring the vehicle back to the
LOC. The vehicle is then backed into a preassigned dock im-
mediately or parked in the lot if the arrival is premature accord-
ing to a predetermined schedule. The Canton LOC attempts to
unload three or four vehicles per hour by forklift operators in
order to stay level. The driver will go around to the west dock
to pick up empty containers to deliver loads to their supplier.
As material comes off the vehicle, it is identified by sorters
through a scanning device that will determine the delivery
zone. Sorters or forklift operators separate the load. Forklift
operators move the material across the dock onto the appropri-
ate vehicle by destination and then, either by volume or a pre-
determined time, it is sent to the Deham assembly plant with
another driver who is also assigned to the LOC.
When the tractor-trailer pulls into a door at the LOC with a
load of containerized parts, the material is unloaded by forklift
operators who also do the loading. These parts are typically
staged in one of two staging areas in the LOC. Once the trailer
is unloaded, it is rotated around to the other side of the dock
and it is then reloaded with empty containers for the following
day’s activity. The movement of the tractor-trailer around to
the west side of the facility is handled by a switcher. Yard
supervisors document the date and time the tractor-trailers ar-
rive and direct drivers to their outgoing loads. They also direct
the switchers’ cross-movement of material from east to west
docks. There are no “shipping clerks” at Canton. Depending
on the commodity, it is taken directly to the assembly line or it
is placed in one of several small storage areas at the Deham
assembly that will eventually disappear as Ryder moves into
phase 3 at the LOC. After the trailer is unloaded at the Deham
assembly plant, it is then reloaded with empty containers which
are then transported back to the LOC, unloaded, and then be-
come the material to go on the trailers for the following day’s
activity (i.e., a return to the supplier). Jennings testified that
approximately 85 percent of all parts that are supplied to the
Deham assembly plant move directly through the LOC.
Drivers do no work within the warehouse. They check their
loads for proper loading prior to departure from the dock. On
rare occasions, they may call upon a forklift operator to assist
them in adjusting a load that was improperly loaded. On rare
occasions, in transit, the driver has stopped his vehicle to reload
material that has fallen off, including times when such has oc-
curred upon approaching the dock. On those admittedly rare
RYDER INTEGRATED LOGISTICS, INC. 1499
occasions at the dock, the driver may call on a forklift operator
to assist him.
The Canton LOC services only the Deham account. None of
the Redford or Canton warehouse employees previously
worked at another Ryder facility, nor have any of the ware-
house employees been employed at another Ryder facility.
Moreover, no employees from another Ryder facility have per-
formed warehouse work at the Redford or Canton facilities.
The drivers covered by the District 2A collective-bargaining
agreement have no right to bid for warehouse work, have no
right to work overtime at the warehouses, and have no right to
relieve warehouse employees who might be absent or on vaca-
tion.
A separate seniority roster is maintained for LOC warehouse
employees.
Higher management at Ryder has responsibility for its over-
all operation covering both drivers and warehouse employees.
Jim LaRue, operations manager of the LOC facility, has sepa-
rate and direct day-to-day supervision over the warehouse em-
ployees. Warehouse supervisors are authorized to discipline
warehouse employees. Scott Tonkovich is responsible for the
day-to-day operations out of Highland Park and for drivers
assigned to the Canton warehouse. LaRue testified that shift
supervisors at the Canton warehouse also have authority over
the drivers assigned to Canton. However, there is very limited
testimony as to the actual exercise of any authority by the shift
supervisor over the drivers. A nonsupervisory, salaried “yard
supervisor” directs the routine flow of traffic in the yard and
tells a driver where to park in the yard. The shift supervisor
directs a driver as to which load to take, i.e., either containers
or containerized parts. There is no evidence as to what inde-
pendent discretion, if any, the shift supervisor has to deviate
from the preprogrammed pickup and delivery system. There is
no evidence that a shift supervisor or any LOC manager disci-
plined any driver. No driver ever received any written disci-
pline from a LOC shift supervisor or manager.
Betty Burdette is the Human Resources manager for Ryder’s
automotive division, specifically the GM account. Her office is
at the Highland Park facility. She is responsible for employees
located at Deham, all drivers domiciled in Michigan, and all
LOC employees with respect to recruiting, training, compensa-
tion, and collective-bargaining negotiation. She also hired the
LOC supervisory staff. She testified that she maintains a
weekly or twice weekly communication with LOC supervisors
regarding disciplinary matters of LOC employees other than the
most routine, e.g., discipline for attendance. She explained that
she has instructed those supervisors to consult with her as to
written discipline or where a “real issue” is involved. All cop-
ies of LOC employee written discipline are forwarded to her
from the LOC. Separate duplicate copies of LOC employee
files are maintained at both the LOC and at the Highland Park
facility.
c. Analysis
If the Redford-Canton warehouse operation formed an accre-
tion under Board law, then the issue of whether the Respondent
recognized an uncoerced majority of the warehouse employees
becomes mooted.
As stated in Safety Carrier, Inc., 306 NLRB 960, 969 (1992),
and recently quoted in Progressive Service Die Co., 323 NLRB
1182 (1997), “[t]he board has defined an accretion as the ‘addi-
tion of a relatively small group of employees to an existing unit
where these additional employees share a sufficient community
of interest with the unit employees and have no separate iden-
tity.’” In determining whether the new employees share suffi-
cient common interests with the members of the existing bar-
gaining unit, the Board weighs various factors including “inte-
gration of operations, centralization of management and admin-
istrative control, geographic proximity, similarity of working
conditions, skills and functions, common control of labor rela-
tions, collective-bargaining history and interchange of employ-
ees.” Id. at 969; GHR Energy Corp., 294 NLRB 1011, 1051
(1989) (quoting Gould, Inc., 263 NLRB 442, 445 (1982)). The
General Counsel points out, however, that the Board has also
stated that because the accretion process fails to accord em-
ployees any representational choice, it will follow a “restrictive
policy in its application.” Dennison Mfg. Co., 296 NLRB 1034,
1036 (1989).
The Respondent argues that the following factors support the
application of the accretion process: (1) functional integration,
(2) geographic integration, (3) common working conditions and
the 1995 collective-bargaining agreement, (4) common supervi-
sion, and (5) bargaining history.
District 2(a) additionally argues that there is a “significant
employee interchange,” but that is clearly unsupported by the
facts. There is functional integration and some employee inter-
action, but there is no exchange of employees between ware-
house and driver work functions. Their jobs are separate and
distinct. With respect to functional integration, i.e., integration
of operations, the Respondent is correct. The work of the driv-
ers covered by the 1995 collective-bargaining agreement who
service the LOC is integrated with warehouse employees’ work
to the extent that the flow of containers, full or empty, is sus-
tained. The Respondent stresses the necessity of each clarifica-
tion of workers to sustain this flow. However, production ne-
cessity, as far as I am aware, is not a factor to resolve the ques-
tion of community of interest. The Respondent characterizes
the transportation flow as akin to an “assembly line.” By that
criteria, an almost infinite number of persons whose regular
services are “necessary” for production or the maintenance
thereof could arguably be characterized as integrated into the
operation, but that would hardly determine employee commu-
nity of interest. The real question is whether integration of
operations effectuates an integration of employee interests. The
Respondent’s and District 2A’s emphasis on functional integra-
tion are relevant more to the Employer’s needs than to the ques-
tion of employee community of interest, particularly where
there is minimal and rare contact between drivers and ware-
house employees in the loading and unloading process where
the trailers are detached at the docks and the drivers remain
with their tractors or rest in their tractors in the exclusive
lounges, impervious to the work conditions in the warehouse
and where their work skills and hiring requirements (i.e., a
CDL license) are so different.
The Respondent argues that in Nave, Inc., 306 NLRB 926,
932 (1992), the Board adopted the administrative law judge’s
finding of accretion in consideration of evidence of work inte-
gration which, it is argued, is less than that in the instant case.
In that case, however, the judge found that the employees had
similar working conditions, skills, functions, and were obliged
to obtain a similar chauffeur’s driving license.
With respect to geographic proximity, the Respondent argues
“the issue of a geographically remote location does not even
come into play” because the drivers “work at the same location
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1500
as the warehouse employees.” Well, yes, the drivers generally,
but not always, do report to the LOC but they do not work to-
gether therein or on the dock, and drivers do no warehouse
work. The Respondent cites Mercy Health Services North, 311
NLRB 367, 368 (1993), where a unit of RNs was accreted into
an existing unit despite a “40 mile geographic distance between
the two locations and the difference in hours of operation and
pay structure.” In that case, however, the Board stressed the
factors, “commonality of day to day supervision,” “significant
employee interchange,” and “common skills and functions.”
Three of those sets of factors are clearly absent here, i.e., em-
ployee interchange in job function, and common skills and
work functions.
With respect to working conditions, the Respondent argues
that commonality exists because all employees are subject to
the same “generalized conditions of employment,” even though
they perform different work tasks. The Respondent argues
simply and briefly that common working conditions exist be-
cause recognition was granted pursuant to an existing collec-
tive-bargaining agreement, thus granting the warehouse em-
ployees, “except for wages,” “identical” terms and conditions
of employment, that the employees worked at the same ware-
house and that although they had different functions, those
functions were executed in sequence, i.e., deliver, unload, load,
deliver, with the Respondent inaccurately asserting a “high
degree of interchange and assistance among employees.”
The facts, however, support the contrary conclusion, as
found above and as is accurately summarized by the General
Counsel in the brief
Their hours of employment, wages, and job classifications
(of drivers and warehouse employees) are different and Inter-
state Commerce Commission and Department of Transporta-
tion regulations apply solely to the drivers. There are differ-
ences in their respective contract provisions, including but not
limited to the loss of seniority rights, paid holidays, coverage
and entitlement to vacations, and lost time coverage, which
differences demonstrate that the warehouse employees, due to
the nature and conditions of their employment, require different
terms of employment from the drivers.
The 1995 collective-bargaining agreement admittedly con-
tains provisions which do not apply to the LOC employees
including CDL (commercial driver’s license) testing, certified
driver training, and references to DOT regulations. The senior-
ity lists are separate. The drivers’ hourly rate of pay is $14,
whereas that of LOC employees is $9.50 after the raise under
their separate contract. Moreover, District 2A, in effect, con-
ceded that the separate interests of the warehouse employees
necessitated a separate contract.
I conclude that the performance of sequential interdependent
functions with a minimal contact at a common worksite does
not constitute “common working conditions.”
With respect to supervision, the Respondent argues that the
drivers and LOC employees have common supervision, point-
ing to the centralized human relations department inclusive of
recruitment, training, collective bargaining, and discipline; the
common authority of Manager LaRue over drivers, switchers,
and warehouse employees; and the supervision of LOC persons
over warehouse employees and drivers.
However, when the warehouse operation was initiated, local
management and subordinate supervision was created for day-
to-day work activity. As found above, the authority over driv-
ers by local shift supervisors, and even local management, was
testified to in generalized and conclusionary terms and there-
fore of little probative value. There is no hard evidence of any
discretionary direction of drivers’ work by local supervisors,
nor of any decision on their part that significantly affected the
drivers’ working conditions in their disciplinary status.
The Respondent and the General Counsel both cite Manito-
woc Shipbuilding, 191 NLRB 786 (1971), and Aerojet-General
Corp., 185 NLRB 794, 798 (1970), for the significant role of
bargaining history in the resolution of an accretion issue.
With respect to bargaining history, the Respondent argues:

although the bargaining history for the [Deham] assembly
plant operation is not long, it is absolutely clear the LOC em-
ployees would be covered [by the 1995 contract]. There is no
contrary history. Again this factor favors accretion.

Although the Respondent anticipated a LOC operation, GM
did not agree to it under the initial business agreement between
it and Ryder. The 1995 collective-bargaining agreement ad-
dressed itself to the drivers’ jobs and working conditions and
not those of warehouse employees. When the parties did nego-
tiate the terms and conditions of employment for warehouse
employees, they were later memorialized into a separate collec-
tive-bargaining agreement containing different terms, different
provisions, and a different expiration date. Implicitly, if not
explicitly, the parties therefore recognized the separate distinct
interests of the warehouse employees.
I conclude that despite the factors of operational integration
and overall centralized managerial control, including labor
relations, they are outweighed by the factors of different work
functions, different skills, different working conditions, differ-
ent hiring requirements, the lack of interchangeability, minimal
personal interaction, and the lack of a clear probative evidence
of common daily supervision. I, therefore, find that the evi-
dence fails to demonstrate that the drivers and warehouse em-
ployees share a sufficient community of interest to warrant the
warehouse employees’ accretion to the drivers’ unit without
reference to their choice of representation. Accordingly, the
next issue is whether District 2A represented an uncoerced
majority of warehouse employees when the Respondent ex-
tended recognition to it for those employees.
4. Majority status of District 2A at recognition
The Respondent argues that after the Redford facility opera-
tion in February 1997, of about 25 warehouse employees, 11
signed District 2A membership application cards on April 7,
and 5 or 6 more signed on April 25. The Respondent claimed
that by April 25, a majority of the warehouse employees had
become District 2A members, giving it a “lawful card majority
and as such the grant of recognition was proper.”
However, the recognition was granted prior to the employ-
ment of any permanent warehouse employees. The General
Counsel argues that such recognition at a time when no em-
ployees were employed within the bargaining unit constituted a
violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act, citing Garment
Workers (Bernard–Alltmann Texas Corp.) v. NLRB, 366 U.S.
731, 738 (1961).
The Party in Interest argues as follows:

While § 8(a)(2) is violated when an employer grants a CBA to
a union prior to employing a substantial and representative
complement of the projected workforce or at a time when the
employer is not engaged in normal operations, Kosher Plaza
Supermarkets, 313 NLRB 74 (1993); Lowe’s Markets, 311
RYDER INTEGRATED LOGISTICS, INC. 1501
NLRB 1281 [1285] (1993), there is no per se violation of §
8(a)(2) by the employer’s recognition of a union as the bar-
gaining representative for a future facility. Apex Investigation
and Security Co., 302 NLRB 815 [819], 138 LRRM 1205
(1991).

In the Apex case, however, the employer contended that a
broad future recognition clause was per se unlawful as “an
illegal accretion clause.” The administrative law judge, whose
decision was adopted by the Board, rejected that contention,
citing Frazier’s Market, 197 NLRB 1156 (1972), which held
that such clauses will not necessarily compel an accretion but
will be considered as one factor by the Board which will deter-
mine the accretion issue. Thus, we come full circle to the point
in this case where I have concluded that no accretion existed.
Apex provides no exculpation for future recognition of a union
for a unit in which no unit members, i.e., permanent employees,
are employed on the date of recognition, and when the Respon-
dent was still hiring and not fully operative. As the General
Counsel points out, subsequent representation authorizations
executed prior to the execution of the collective-bargaining
agreement does not excuse the earlier unlawful conduct. R. J.
E. Leasing Corp., 262 NLRB 373, 380 (1982).
5. Majority taint
a. Misrepresentation
The General Counsel argues that the membership application
cards obtained by the District 2A representative, Lindke, do not
constitute valid evidence of majority status because they are
tainted by misrepresentation.
Hal Lindke, a driver domiciled at Highland Park and District
2A steward, testified that at 6 a.m. on April 7, 1997, he entered
the picnic table break area of the Redford warehouse and intro-
duced himself to a group of about 14 employees as an agent for
District 2A and asked them to sign forms to join District 2A,
answered questions about District 2A, and obtained 11 “signed
applications.” He testified that he had never previously been
involved in soliciting union representation authorization forms.
The forms he used were entitled on the very top in light print
“Application For Membership And Dues Checkoff Authoriza-
tion.” Thereafter followed the name of District 2A in larger,
bolder letters. The body of the document in finer print refers to
dues check-off authorization and place for signature. Thereaf-
ter, also in fine print, is application for membership language
with space for a signature. District 2A introduced into evidence
five such documents signed in both signature spaces by ware-
house employees Pascal Smith, Rhonda Owens, Patrick Swift
(alleged supervisor), and Nolan Hall. The signatures of Hall
and Smith were dated April 7. The others were dated April 25,
1997.
Smith and Hall testified that when Hall asked Lindke the
purpose of the document, they were told that it was only to
obtain a meeting with a District 2A representative and that
when Smith asked if the forms bound them in any way, Lindke
stated that they did not. They both testified that they did not
read the document they had signed.
Lindke testified, with hesitancy and uncertainty, that he
could not recall whether any of the employees asked about the
representational import of the form but that he told the employ-
ees that the purpose of the form was membership in District
2A. He then denied that any employee asked whether the form
would be binding upon them, despite having no recollection
about representational questions one way or the other. On redi-
rect examination, he gave a curious distinction to union orga-
nizing “pledge cards” and “membership applications.” The
pledge form, he defined, “is something you sign to join a un-
ion” and the latter, i.e., membership application, as “something
that goes in your file as for dues and stuff like that.”
Lindke testified that on April 25, he again visited the facility
and met with eight second-shift employees from whom he so-
licited five or six similar signed documents, none of which
were offered into evidence.
Because of Lindke’s uncertainty in demeanor, his ambiva-
lence as to the definition of the purpose of membership forms,
and the greater certainty of Owens and Smith, I credit the latter
two witnesses.
Generally, the Board does not invalidate an executed, clear,
and unambiguous written authorization for representation, even
when accompanied by statements of other purposes such as an
election, unless the signature is solicited by a clear statement
that the authorization will be used for no other purpose than an
election. Cumberland Shoe, 144 NLRB 733, 1268 (1963); Levi
Strauss & Co., 172 NLRB 732, 734 fn. 7 (1968); Southern
Moldings, 255 NLRB 839, 838, 840, 867–868 (1981); and DTR
Industries, 311 NLRB 833, 838 (1993). I conclude that when
Lindke solicited the 11 membership applications on April 7, he
told the employees that the only purpose of the document was
to obtain a meeting with representatives of District 2A and that
the document did not bind them in any way. I find that this
conduct constituted misrepresentation in the solicitation of
majority designation which tainted District 2A’s majority
status.
b. Coercion
Patrick Swift is alleged to have occupied the position of a
shift supervisor at the Redford warehouse who coerced third-
shift employees into executing membership applications for
District 2A. I agree with the Respondent that the evidence is
insufficient to establish that whatever directions Swift gave to
employees on the third shift, it involved use of independent
judgment and discretion rather than routine conveyance of pre-
determined work flow orders. M. J. Metal Products, 325
NLRB 240 (1997). There is some evidence that Swift desired
promotion to supervisory status but was rejected by the ware-
house manager—the third shift already possessed one supervi-
sor. Swift did attempt to assign ad hoc janitorial–type cleanup
work to warehouse employees, some of whom refused to do it
with impunity. Although Swift was observed to have per-
formed some kind of paper processing work, he spent most, if
not the predominant part, of his time operating a forklift truck.
He dressed as a warehouse employee, was hourly rated and not
salaried as a supervisor, and did not attend supervisory meet-
ings. There is insufficient evidence that he used his own inde-
pendent, unreviewable discretion to hire, fire, or discipline
employees.
There is, however, evidence that Swift’s duties placed him in
a position as agent or spokesperson for the Respondent’s poli-
cies, sufficient to have made the Respondent liable for his con-
duct in assisting District 2A.
When Rhonda Owens was hired as a warehouse employee at
Redford, during her orientation process, Shift Supervisor Bran-
don Gray identified Swift to her as an “acting supervisor” who
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1502
would be “running things.”5 She observed Swift initialing
timecards and soliciting information from employees as to
which of them desired to go home early when work was slow
or who desired to work overtime on those rare occasions when
it was available. Swift informed them of the Respondent’s
approval. Although it is not clear that he exercised any discre-
tionary judgment in the approval announcement, he was the
Respondent’s representative on these occasions. Swift was also
seen spending some time in the warehouse office and giving
instruction to the warehouse clerical in that office. Swift
checked to see whether the containers were properly placed in
the warehouse. Finally, and most significantly, he conducted
meetings of the third-shift warehouse employees during which
he informed them as to the quality of their job performance,
announced when uniforms were to be distributed, and distrib-
uted Ryder notices to employees concerning their employment
benefits package and other company memoranda. If employees
had questions as to which route to finish—for example, when 2
different points could not be serviced at the same time—he
instructed them as to how to proceed.
I conclude that Swift’s duties put him in the role of a conduit
for the Respondent’s policies and decisions so that when he
represented the Respondent’s position regarding union repreen-
tation, it was reasonable for employees to believe that he spoke
for the Respondent. Therefore, even though Swift may not
have exercised sufficient independent discretion to be a super-
visor, I find that the Respondent was liable for his conduct as
its spokesperson. Propellex, Inc., 254 NLRB 839 (1981); Ty-
son Foods, Inc., 311 NLRB 352, 561–566 (1993); and Kosher
Plaza Supermarket, 313 NLRB 74, 85 (1993).
Rhonda Owens testified that she first heard about District 2A
on April 24 at the break area picnic table of the Redford ware-
house when Swift threw some District 2A membership applica-
tion forms down on the table while six or seven employees ate
lunch. Swift told the employees that they had to sign the forms.
When asked what this meant, Swift explained that although
District 2A was already the majority bargaining agent, the
forms needed to be signed. The employees resisted and refused
to sign. Swift told them that if they did not sign the forms,
Ryder was going to close the facility and they would be out of
jobs.6
Lindke testified that on April 24 at 11 a.m., he walked into
the Redford warehouse and encountered Swift who escorted
him to the picnic table break area where Lindke spoke with
about eight employees gathered there, of whom five or six
signed District 2A membership applications. Lindke testified
that Swift made no comments during the meeting, which lasted
beyond midnight into the morning of April 25.
Owens testified that Swift had again repeated the closure
threat to the employees at the picnic table, but it is not clear
from her testimony whether it occurred before Lindke’s arrival.
Since she did not place Lindke as being present, it must have
occurred prior to his arrival because she testified it occurred
before she signed the form. She testified without contradiction
to a similar threat made to her individually in the warehouse
area by Swift.
I conclude that not only did the Respondent, by its agent
Swift, taint District 2A’s majority status by his coercive con-
duct, but that it also violated Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act.

.
5 Owens’ testimony in this regard is uncontradicted.
6 Owens’ is uncontradicted. Swift did not testify.
6. Subsequent coercion
After Madrzykowski had visited the warehouse and ex-
plained that District 2A would attempt to negotiate a separate
contract for warehouse employees, Hall had contacted the
UAW representatives. A meeting was arranged between UAW
representatives and warehouse employees on the last Sunday in
April, at which a petition designating the UAW as bargaining
agent was drafted and later signed by 27 warehouse employees.
Tower initiated the conversation by asking Hall if the em-
ployees were interested in the UAW. When Hall responded
affirmatively, Tower stated, without any qualification, that if
the employees obtained UAW representation, the Respondent’s
Redford facility would “go under.” Hall’s testimony is uncon-
tradicted and must be credited. Tower’s remarks cannot be
interpreted to be a mere personal opinion or a prediction based
upon objective economic data. His statement constitutes an
unqualified, absolute threat of closure and is violative of Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Hall testified that on some subsequent but unspecified date
during the week of April 30, Human Resources Manager Bur-
dette was visiting the facility when she approached Hall on the
dock. Hall was again wearing UAW buttons on his shirt.
Three other employees were present. According to Hall,
Burdette told them that if the employees chose UAW represen-
tation, the Ryder facility would be closed. She gave no
qualification or explanation
Warehouse employee Pascal Smith testified that on May 5,
between 2 and 3 p.m., he was present at a conversation between
warehouse employee Andre Avery in the presence of several
employees near the break area picnic table. Smith testified, in
general terms, that they were discussing “about issues that were
going on at the facility” when Burdette stated that if the em-
ployees became represented by the UAW, the GM account
would be pulled and all warehouse employees would lose their
jobs. He recalled that she also stated that the employees could
meet that day with visiting Senior Vice President Myles Raper
from Ann Arbor, Michigan, and express their concerns to him.
Burdette admitted that she did indeed have a conversation
with Avery in the Redford warehouse on about May 1, on a day
when Senior Vice President Raper was visiting the facility.
According to Burdette, while on his forklift, he questioned her
as to who the visitors were and whether they were GM repre-
sentatives. According to Burdette, she explained that they were
Ryder managers, including Raper, and that he had come to
investigate and “to determine if he is going to keep the [GM]
business or give it back.”
Burdette testified that Raper had told her at the time when
GM had not yet signed a contract, that productivity “was shot,”
that GM had numerous Deham people visiting the Redford
facility “telling us what to do,” contrary to what Ryder wanted
done; and that because of “all those problems,” Raper did not
“know whether we should do the business or not.” Burdette
failed to testify that she related Raper’s comments to Avery to
explain her remarks to him. She denied the remarks attributed
to her by Smith and Hall. She admitted that she observed em-
ployees wearing UAW buttons in the warehouse that day. She
admitted that although Raper is superior to Jennings, it is
Jennings’ function to monitor Ryder’s business relationship
with GM. Nothing in Jennings’ testimony in any way reflects
any doubt of viability of the GM business arrangement nor of
any operational friction. Thus, she is uncorroborated as to
Raper’s alleged expressed concerns, and she is inconsistent
RYDER INTEGRATED LOGISTICS, INC. 1503
with the thrust of Jennings’ optimistic characterization of the
viability of the venture. Despite Burdette’s loudly, dramatic
protestation of sincerity, I found her demeanor to have been
exaggerated and ultimately unconvincing. I find Hall and
Smith more convincing. Moreover, her remarks parallel those
of Shift Supervisor Tower when he reacted to Hall’s wearing of
UAW buttons. I find that Burdette, unqualifiedly and without
reference to objective criteria, threatened employees that UAW
representation of itself would cause closure of the warehouse
and loss of their jobs; Respondent, by her conduct, violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
7. Procedural defenses
a. Section 10(b)
The Respondent argues that the underlying unfair labor prac-
tice charge was not filed until May 1997, i.e., 2 years after the
May 1995 collective-bargaining agreement which included
warehouse employees in the unit. The Respondent argues “To
the extent that the contract recognized an ‘illegal’ unit, the vio-
lation would have ripened upon the execution of the agreement
in 1995.” The Respondent argues that the 1995 agreement is
“presumptively valid” and unambiguous on its face and, there-
fore, the General Counsel “is prevented from using parole or
subsequent extrinsic evidence to attempt to prove a violation.
Bryan Mfg. Co., 119 NLRB 502 (1957).
The issue here, however, is not the legality of the 1995 con-
tract nor whether the Respondent violated the Act by entering
that agreement. No LOC existed in 1995. The alleged viola-
tion occurred well within the 10(b) period when the Respondent
recognized District 2A as representative of a nonaccreted new
unit of warehouse employees at a time when it did not possess
an uncoerced majority support of the unit employees, who were
in the process of being hired. I conclude, however, that a pre-
existing contract covering nonexisting employees cannot shield
subsequent unlawful conduct and that any earlier unfair labor
practice charge would have been premature.
b. Laches
Although the Respondent invokes the doctrine of laches, in
effect it argues that it was just unfair for the Regional Director
to have dismissed the first charge, in effect encouraging the
parties to negotiate a separate contract for warehouse employ-
ees, and then revoke the dismissal and issue a complaint against
the Respondent who acted in reliance on the dismissal. This
argument is entwined with the Respondent’s final defense that
the Board should allow the parties to “voluntary agree to the
enlargement or alteration of an existing unit,” citing, inter alia,
Ohio Power Co., 203 NLRB 203, 238 (1973), enfd. 490 F.2d
1383 (6th Cir. 1974). I find nothing in precedent cited by the
Respondent which encourages the parties to voluntarily agree
to an expanded unit when such agreement violates the represen-
tational rights of nonaccreted employees.
With respect to laches, such does not lie against the General
Counsel, particularly where no prejudice had been shown.
F. M. Transport, Inc., 302 NLRB 241 (1991); Tri-County Roof-
ing, 311 NLRB 1368, 1384 (1993). With respect to the pur-
ported detrimental reliance on the Regional Director’s dismissal
of the original charge, nothing in the Regional Director’s basis
for dismissal, either implicitly or explicitly, suggested that it
was appropriate for the Respondent and District 2A to negotiate
a separate collective-bargaining agreement covering the ware-
house employees. As the General Counsel correctly observes, a
reinstatement of a charge by a Regional Director during the
pendency of an appeal of its dismissal is proper and consistent
with long-standing practice. As long as the appeal is pending,
the charge continues to exist. Children’s National Medical
Center, 322 NLRB 205 (1996). Inasmuch as the charge was
still pending, I conclude that the Respondent proceeded at its
risk when it negotiated a separate contract for the warehouse
employees.
CONCLUSION OF LAW
On the foregoing findings of fact, I conclude that the Re-
spondent, an employer engaged in commerce within the mean-
ing of the Act, violated Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act on
February 1997 by granting recognition to District 2A as the
representative of its loaders, dockmen, and warehouse employ-
ees then located at its Redford, Michigan warehouse facility but
later employed at its Canton, Michigan LOC facility, at a time
when those employees had not been accreted to a preexisting
collective-bargaining unit and a time when District 2A did not
represent an uncoerced, untainted majority of those employees.
Further, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of the
Act in August 1997 by entering a collective-bargaining agree-
ment with District 2A covering that non-accreted unit of LOC
facility warehouse employees.
I further find that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1)
and (2) of the Act in April and early May 1977 by the conduct
of its agent, Pat Swift, and Human Resources manager, Betty
Burdette, in threatening closure of its facility and loss of jobs
for warehouse employees if they refused to sign membership
applications for District 2A. Finally, I find that the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act in early May 1997 by the
conduct of its supervisor, John Tower, and Human Resources
manager Betty Burdette in threatening employees with the clo-
sure of its warehouse facilities if they designated the UAW as
their bargaining agent.
I find that these unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I recommend that it be ordered to cease and
desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative actions de-
signed to effectuate the purposes and policies of the Act.
Having found that the Respondent unlawfully granted recog-
nition to District 2A as the exclusive bargaining representatives
of its loaders, dockmen, and warehousemen now employed by
it at its Canton, Michigan LOC facility, I recommend that the
Respondent be ordered to withdraw and withhold recognition
from District 2A as to those employees and cease giving effect
to any collective-bargaining agreement, modification, exten-
sion, renewal, or supplemental agreement between it and Dis-
trict 2A as to those loaders, dockmen, and warehousemen until
such time as District 2A shall have been certified by the Board
as the exclusive bargaining representative of an appropriate
bargaining unit of loaders, dockmen, and warehousemen em-
ployed at the Canton, Michigan LOC facility. Nothing in this
proposed Order will authorize or require the withdrawal or
elimination of any wage increase or other benefits, terms, or
conditions of employment which may have been established for
the Canton LOC facility loaders, dockmen, and warehousemen
by any such agreement. Inasmuch as certain of those employ-
ees signed dues-checkoff authorizations pursuant to a collec-
tive-bargaining agreement to which the Respondent must cease
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1504
giving effect, the Respondent may no longer withhold dues or
other moneys from the earnings of its Canton LOC facility
loaders, dockmen, and warehousemen pursuant to any such
agreement. I further recommend that the Respondent reimburse
all present and/or former Redford or Canton, Michigan LOC
facility loaders, dockmen, and warehousemen for all initiation
fees, dues, or other moneys exacted by on or behalf of District
2A pursuant to any dues-checkoff authorizations, or any collec-
tive-bargaining agreement or otherwise, together with interest
thereon to be computed in the manner prescribed in New Hori-
zons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987).
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended7
ORDER
The Respondent, Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc., Canton,
Michigan, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Threatening employees with the closure of its warehouse
operations if they refuse to sign membership applications for
District 2A, Transportation, Technical, Warehouse, Industrial
and Service Employees Union, affiliated with American Mari-
time Officers.
(b) Threatening employees with the closure of its warehouse
operations if they designate the International Union, United
Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers
of America (UAW), AFL–CIO as their collective-bargaining
representative.
(c) Recognizing and bargaining with District 2A, Transporta-
tion, Technical, Warehouse, Industrial and Service Employees
Union, affiliated with American Maritime Officers, its succes-
sor, or assigns, as the collective-bargaining representative of
loaders, dockmen, and warehousemen employed at its Canton,
Michigan LOC facility unless and until that Union has been
certified by the National Labor Relations Board as the exclu-
sive bargaining representative of any such employees in an
appropriate unit.
(d) Giving effect to its collective-bargaining agreement with
District 2A, Transportation, Technical, Warehouse, Industrial
and Service Employees Union, affiliated with American Mari-
time Officers, its successor, or assigns, with respect to the
warehouse employees referred to above and any modifications,
extensions, renewals, or supplements that may have been ap-
plied to those employees, provided that nothing in this Order

7 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.
shall require the withdrawal or enhancement of any wage in-
crease or other benefits, terms, and conditions of employment
that may have been established pursuant to any such agreement.
(e) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed to
them under Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Reimburse all former and present loaders, dockmen, and
warehousemen employed at the Redford or Canton, Michigan
LOC for all initiation fees, dues, and other moneys, if any, paid
by or withheld from them in the manner set forth in the remedy
section of this decision.
(b) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, make available
to the Board or its agents for examination and copying, all pay-
roll records, social security payment records, timecards, per-
sonnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to
analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Or-
der.
(c) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its
Redford and Canton, Michigan LOC facility copies of the at-
tached notice marked “Appendix.”8 Copies of the notice, on
forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 7, after
being signed by the Respondent's authorized representative,
shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt
and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to
ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material. In the event that, during the pendency of
these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or
closed the facility involved in these proceedings, the Respon-
dent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the
notice to all current employees and former employees em-
ployed by the Respondent at any time since February 28, 1997.
(d) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.
8 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”