Ryanv.Dierking, Complainant, v. Ray H. LaHood, Secretary, Department of Transportation (Federal Aviation Administration), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJan 25, 2012
0120100782 (E.E.O.C. Jan. 25, 2012)

0120100782

01-25-2012

Ryan V. Dierking, Complainant, v. Ray H. LaHood, Secretary, Department of Transportation (Federal Aviation Administration), Agency.




Ryan V. Dierking,

Complainant,

v.

Ray H. LaHood,

Secretary,

Department of Transportation

(Federal Aviation Administration),

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120100782

Agency No. 2007-21172-FAA-04

DECISION

On December 4, 2009, Complainant filed an appeal from the Agency’s

November 10, 2009, final decision concerning his equal employment

opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in

violation of Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation

Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq. The Commission deems the

appeal timely and accepts it pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a).

For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency’s final

decision.

ISSUE PRESENTED

Whether the Agency erred in finding that it did not retaliate against

Complainant for engaging in EEO activities in 2004 when it did not raise

his pay after he completed training for his position in 2007.

BACKGROUND

Complainant worked as an Air Traffic Control Specialist (ATCS), at the

Agency's Chicago Center located in Aurora, Illinois. While training,

he developed a thyroid infection (sub-acute thyroiditis) that made it

difficult for him to concentrate. As a result, he failed a training

class and was removed from his ATCS position. He then took a lower-level

position in the Agency’s “Flight Data” division. Complainant

eventually brought his condition under control through treatment.

First EEO Complaint

In 2001, he filed an EEO complaint against the Agency, alleging

discrimination on the basis of disability when the Agency removed him from

his ATCS duties, including prohibiting him from attending ACTS training.

The parties settled the complaint on January 29, 2003. The Agency agreed

to reinstate Complainant to the ATCS position and place him in the next

available training class. As a result, the Agency reinstated Complainant,

and he resumed his training in April 2004.

Agency’s Pay Plans

In September 2006, the Agency introduced a new pay plan for air traffic

controllers. According to Complainant, under the old plan, air traffic

controllers who completed their training received substantial increases

in salary levels and compensation. But under the new pay plan, air

traffic controllers who completed their training did not receive the

substantial increase in compensation.

Complainant completed his training in January 2007. The Agency told him

that he would not receive the pay increase because he did not complete

training before the September 2006 implementation of the new pay plan.

Second EEO Complaint

On March 23, 2007, Complainant filed a new EEO complaint, alleging

that the Agency discriminated against him on the bases of disability

(Subacute Thyroiditis) and in reprisal for prior protected EEO activity

when the Agency did not increase his pay after he completed his training.

Specifically, he maintained that his lack of a pay increase was due

to a two-year delay in his training, caused by the Agency’s previous

disability discrimination and his participation in the EEO process.

At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant

with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of his right

to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ).1 In

accordance with Complainant’s request, the Agency issued a final

decision pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b).

Final Agency Decision

For the disability claim, the Agency found that Complainant was not

an individual with a disability, as defined by the Rehabilitation Act.

For reprisal, the Agency found that Complainant could not establish a

prima facie case because (1) the relevant management officials were not

aware of his prior EEO activity, (2) there was too long a period between

his protected activity and the adverse action to establish a temporal

nexus. And even if Complainant had established a prima facie case of

reprisal, the Agency articulated a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason

for not increasing Complainant’s pay upon his completion of training.

The terms of his previous settlement agreement contained no provision

to preserve his pay status. Upon completing his training, the Agency

handled his compensation in accordance with the pay plan that was in

effect at the time.

The Agency determined that Complainant did not establish that this

reason was a pretext to mask a retaliatory motive. The Agency found

specious Complainant’s argument that, but for the Agency’s previous

disability discrimination, he would have completed the training program

two years earlier and would have been eligible for the pay increases

under the old pay plan. The Agency noted that the previous allegations

of discrimination had been resolved through a settlement agreement.

Therefore, there were no findings of discrimination on those allegations,

and Complainant cannot attribute any subsequent monetary losses to those

settled events. In addition, the Agency found no evidence suggesting that

he was not given the same training opportunities as other air traffic

controllers. Therefore, the Agency found that Complainant failed to

establish pretext. The decision concluded that Complainant failed to

prove that the Agency subjected him to discrimination as alleged.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

On appeal, Complainant essentially challenges only the Agency’s

finding regarding his reprisal claim.2 He argues that “there is a

direct connection between [his] initial EEO case” and his lack of a pay

increase. If his original EEO complaint had not occurred and taken more

than two years to resolve, he would have easily completed his training

before the new pay plan went into effect in September 2006. He argues

that other air traffic controllers, who started with the Agency around

the time he did in December 2001 but did not engage in EEO activities, are

currently earning more than him because they had no delays in training.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Standard of Review

As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b), the Agency's decision is subject to de

novo review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a). See Equal

Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614,

at Chapter 9, § VI.A. (November 9, 1999) (explaining that the de novo

standard of review “requires that the Commission examine the record

without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous

decision maker,” and that EEOC “review the documents, statements,

and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions

of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission’s

own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law”).

Retaliation

To establish unlawful retaliation, there must be proof that the Agency

took an adverse action because the employee engaged in protected

EEO activity. EEOC Compliance Manual Section 8, “Retaliation,”

No. 915.003, at 8-II.E (May 20, 1998). In a circumstantial evidence

framework, a complainant must first establish a prima facie case of

unlawful retaliation by showing that: (1) the complainant engaged in a

protected activity; (2) the Agency was aware of the protected activity;

(3) the Agency subsequently subjected the complainant to adverse

treatment; and (4) a nexus exists between the protected activity and the

adverse treatment. Whitmire v. Dep’t of the Air Force, EEOC Appeal

No. 01A00340 (Sept. 25, 2000).

Upon review, we find that Complainant could not establish element (4)

of the prima facie case for reprisal. For the sake of argument, we will

assume that Complainant last engaged in protected EEO activity in April

2004, the time when he resumed his training. The adverse treatment at

issue in this case is the lack of a pay increase when he completed his

training in January 2007. Typically, to show that the protected activity

and the adverse treatment are related, the evidence should demonstrate

that the adverse action occurred shortly after the protected activity.

Here, the time-period between the protected activity and adverse treatment

was well over two-years.

Even if we assumed, for the sake of argument, that Complainant could

establish a prima facie case through the direct causation theory, we

find that the Agency articulated legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons

for not increasing Complainant’s pay when he completed his training.

The Agency states that it adhered to the provisions of a new pay plan,

which went into effect in September 2006. The new pay plan provided that

air traffic controllers who finished their training after September 2006

would not be entitled to pay increases for completing their training.

Because Complainant completed his training in January 2007, he was not

eligible for a pay increase, under the new pay plan.

We determine that Complainant did not sufficiently show that the

Agency’s articulated reason was a pretext to hide a retaliatory

motive. According to Complainant, the Agency changed his pay status

in September 2006, which coincides with the time the new pay plan went

into effect. This demonstrates that the Agency acted in conformance with

a consistently applied nondiscriminatory pay policy, and suggests there

was no retaliatory motive. We also find no relevant comparator evidence

indicating that the Agency increased pay for air traffic controllers

who finished training after September 2006 and who had no prior history

of EEO activities. Finally, the Commission cannot find the Agency’s

business decision to apply the new pay plan to Complainant’s situation

to be retaliatory simply because Complainant believes the decision to

be in error or misjudgment.3 Therefore, we find that Complainant did

not show that the Agency subjected him to retaliation.

CONCLUSION

Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal,

including those not specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the

Agency’s final decision, finding no discrimination on the bases alleged.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0610)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive

for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency

head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full

name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal

of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the

national organization, and not the local office, facility or department

in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a

civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative

processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits

as stated in the paragraph above (“Right to File a Civil Action”).

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

__1/25/12________________

Date

1 We note that the Agency initially dismissed this complaint. Upon

review, the Commission reversed the Agency’s decision to dismiss the

complaint, and remanded the matter for investigation. Dierking v. Dep’t

of Transportation, EEOC Appeal No. 0120081782 (Oct. 15, 2009).

2 On appeal, Complainant does not challenge the Agency’s finding that

he was not an individual with a disability, under the Rehabilitation Act.

The Commission has the discretion to review only those issues specifically

raised in an appeal. Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive

for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614, 9-10 (Nov. 9, 1999). Accordingly, we will not

address the disability claim in this decision.

3 If Complainant believes that the Agency’s actions fail to adhere

to relevant personnel policies or practices, in that he should be

classified under a different pay scale, he should challenge the substance

of the Agency’s decision in the appropriate administrative forum.

The Commission has no authority to determine the merits of whether the

Agency correctly applied the new pay plan to Complainant’s situation,

as someone who was rehired after a two-year absence.

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01-2010-0782

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

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0120100782