Ryan Joseph. Bussone et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Dec 13, 2019

11694230 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Dec. 13, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/694,230 03/30/2007 Ryan Joseph BUSSONE 406778-000007 1630
106303 7590 12/13/2019
Nixon Peabody LLP
300 South Grand Avenue, Suite 4100
Los Angeles, CA 90071
EXAMINER
SHARVIN, DAVID P
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3692
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/13/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ipairlink@nixonpeabody.com
lapatentmb@nixonpeabody.com
slevy@nixonpeabody.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte RYAN JOSEPH BUSSONE, FRED JOHN SEIDELMAN, and
LISA SCAPPATICCI KRUEGER
____________________

Appeal 2019-001792
Application 11/694,230
Technology Center 3600
____________________

BEFORE JOHN A. EVANS, JAMES W. DEJMEK, and
STEPHEN E. BELISLE, Administrative Patent Judges.

DEJMEK, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a Final Rejection of
claims 1, 4–12, 16–37, 42, 43, and 45. Appellant has canceled claims 2, 3,
13–15, 38–41, and 44. See Appeal Br. 21–28. We have jurisdiction over the
remaining pending claims under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 Throughout this Decision, we use the word “Appellant” to refer to
“applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42 (2017). Appellant identifies
ROUTEONE LLC as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 1.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
Appellant’s disclosed and claimed invention generally relates to
“providing [a] customer with an opportunity, upon pre-approval, to instantly
receive and utilize such a line of credit based on another loan transaction.”
Spec. ¶ 2. In a disclosed example scenario, a customer wishing to acquire
(i.e., buy or lease) an asset, such as a vehicle, applies for a line of credit at
the vehicle dealership to finance the vehicle acquisition. Spec. ¶¶ 4–5.
Information provided on the credit application (to acquire the vehicle) is
extracted and used on a second credit application, which is submitted to a
credit card institution. Spec. ¶ 5. According to the Specification, “it may be
advantageous to instantly provide customers with an opportunity to receive
additional electronically provided credit services (e.g., credit cards) based on
another loan transaction, thereby increasing both potential retail sales and
customer buying potential.” Spec. ¶ 3.
Claim 1 is representative of the subject matter on appeal and is
reproduced below:
1. A method implemented by a credit aggregation
management computer system, the method comprising:
acquiring information for inclusion in a first credit
application for financing an asset for acquisition by a customer,
wherein the acquired information includes information acquired
from the customer;
determining at least one finance source for financing the
asset for acquisition by the customer;
generating based on the acquired information, the first
credit application for submission to the at least one finance
source, wherein generating the first credit application comprises
including the acquired information in the first credit application;
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determining a credit card institution associated with the at
least one finance source;
generating, based on a portion of the information acquired
from the customer, via a credit acquisition application program
in the credit aggregation management computer system, a second
credit application for submission to the credit card institution,
wherein generating the second credit application comprises
including the portion of the information acquired from the
customer in the second credit application, wherein the second
credit application is a different type of credit application than the
first credit application, and wherein generating said second credit
application further comprises extracting the portion of the
acquired information from the first credit application;
electronically sending the first credit application to the at
least one finance source;
electronically sending the second credit application to the
credit card institution by credit acquisition application program;
receiving an approval decision from the at least one
finance source;
receiving an approval decision from the credit card
institution by the credit acquisition application program; and
displaying a status indication associated with the approval
decision of the second credit application.

The Examiner’s Rejection
Claims 1, 4–12, 16–37, 42, 43, and 45 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.2 Final Act. 4–6.

2 Although the Examiner correctly identifies all of the pending claims as
being rejected on the cover sheet of the Final Rejection (see Disposition of
Claims), we note the Examiner incorrectly identifies the claims in the
statement of rejection. See Final Act. 4. Appellant has not indicated
prejudice as a result of the incorrect claim listing in the statement of
rejection and has, instead, set forth arguments in support of patent eligibility
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ANALYSIS3
Appellant disputes the Examiner’s conclusion that the pending claims
are directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Appeal Br. 9–20; Reply
Br. 2–5. In particular, Appellant argues the pending claims are not directed
to an abstract idea, but are instead directed to “very specific-computer
implemented methodologies that assist with offering credit based on credit
application information, that are unique to the Internet, and that solve
computer-related problems relating to manipulating multiple sets of data
using a computer or computer system that would not otherwise be done
without a computer.” Appeal Br. 13; see also Appeal Br. 16 (asserting the
pending claims are similar to the patent-eligible claims at issue in DDR
Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014)); Appeal
Br. 20 (asserting the pending claims are similar to the patent-eligible claims
at issue in Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
Moreover, Appellant asserts the claims recite “significantly more” than the
alleged abstract idea. Appeal Br. 10, 16–17. Specifically, Appellant asserts
the claims recite a non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of
elements, which provides an inventive concept to transform the claims into

of all pending claims. See Appeal Br. 9–20. Accordingly, we treat the
Examiner’s misidentification of pending claims in the statement of rejection
to be a harmless, typographical error. We correct herein the rejection to
apply to the currently pending claims.
3 Throughout this Decision, we have considered the Appeal Brief, filed
June 14, 2018 (“Appeal Br.”); the Supplemental Appeal Brief, filed July 30,
2018 (“Supp. Appeal Br.”); the Reply Brief, filed December 26, 2018
(“Reply Br.”); the Examiner’s Answer, mailed October 30, 2018 (“Ans.”);
and the Final Office Action, mailed March 8, 2018 (“Final Act.”), from
which this Appeal is taken.
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patent-eligible subject matter. Appeal Br. 16–17 (reviewing the court’s
analysis in BASCOM Global Internet Servs. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827
F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). In addition, Appellant argues the claims recite
more than generic computer components and functions that are well-
understood, routine, and conventional. Appeal Br. 11–12, 14–15, 17–19;
see also Reply Br. 3–5.
The Supreme Court’s two-step framework guides our analysis of
patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. In addition,
the Office recently published revised guidance for evaluating subject matter
eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101, specifically with respect to applying the
Alice framework. USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Office Guidance”). If a claim
falls within one of the statutory categories of patent eligibility (i.e., a
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter) then the first
inquiry is whether the claim is directed to one of the judicially recognized
exceptions (i.e., a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea).
Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. As part of this inquiry, we must “look at the ‘focus
of the claimed advance over the prior art’ to determine if the claim’s
‘character as a whole’ is directed to excluded subject matter.” Affinity Labs
of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Per
Office Guidance, this first inquiry has two prongs of analysis: (i) does the
claim recite a judicial exception (e.g., an abstract idea), and (ii) if so, is the
judicial exception integrated into a practical application. See 84 Fed. Reg.
at 54. Under the Office Guidance, if the judicial exception is integrated into
a practical application, see infra, the claim is patent eligible under § 101.
See 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55. If the claim is directed to a judicial exception
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(i.e., recites a judicial exception and does not integrate the exception into a
practical application), the next step is to determine whether any element, or
combination of elements, amounts to significantly more than the judicial
exception. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217; 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
Here, we conclude Appellant’s claims recite an abstract idea. More
specifically, Appellant’s claims are generally directed to generating and
sending two different credit applications (based on common information
about the applicant) to two different (but associated) financing sources, and
receiving approval decisions for each credit application. This is consistent
with how Appellant describes the claimed invention. See Spec. ¶¶ 4
(describing the invention as “providing a credit card offer to a customer
during a transaction for the customer to acquire an asset offered by a
dealer”) 15 (“providing a credit card offer to a customer applying for
automobile financing”); see also Appeal Br. 11 (“the present application is
directed towards a computer-implemented method for providing a credit
card offer to a customer during an automobile dealership transaction”);
Appeal Br. 13 (describing the claims as directed to methods and devices that
“involve extracting electronic information to automatically generate first and
second credit applications that are different from one another as well as
automatically determining the finance sources that should receive the credit
application[s]”); Reply Br. 3.
Consistent with our Office Guidance and case law, we conclude that
generating and sending two different credit applications (based on common
information about the applicant) to two different (but associated) financing
sources, and receiving approval decisions for each credit application is a
certain method of organizing human activity (e.g., a fundamental economic
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practice or commercial interaction, such as sales activities)—i.e., an abstract
idea. See 84 Fed. Reg. at 52; see also Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake
Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that “processing an
application for financing a purchase” falls within certain methods of
organizing human activities and is, therefore, an abstract idea); Alice, 573
U.S. at 219–20 (concluding that use of a third party to mediate settlement
risk is a “fundamental economic practice” and thus, an abstract idea); Bilski
v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611–12 (2010) (concluding hedging to be a
fundamental economic practice and, therefore, an abstract idea).4
Claim 1 is reproduced below and includes the following claim
limitations that recite generating and sending two different credit
applications (based on common information about the applicant) to two
different (but associated) financing sources, and receiving approval
decisions for each credit application, emphasized in italics:

4 In addition, in Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1331–34 (Fed.
Cir. 2012), the court concluded that claims 1, 3, and 4 of U.S. Patent
7,181,427 were patent-ineligible ideas under 35 U.S.C. § 101. In particular,
the court concluded the claims were directed to “processing information
through a clearinghouse,” an abstract idea (similar to that in Bilski).
Dealertrack, 674 F.3d at 1333. Similar to the instant pending claims, claim
1 of the ’427 patent recited, inter alia, receiving credit application data,
selectively forwarding the credit application data to funding source devices,
and receiving funding decision data (i.e., forwarding funding decision data
from the funding source devices). Dealertrack, 674 F.3d at 1331.
Moreover, claim 1 of the ’427 patent further recited that selectively
forwarding credit application data comprised sending at least a portion of the
credit application data to more than one funding source. Dealertrack, 674
F.3d at 1331. We further note that Appellant was also an appellee in the
Dealertrack matter. See Dealertrack, 674 F.3d at 1315.
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1. A method implemented by a credit aggregation
management computer system, the method comprising:
acquiring information for inclusion in a first credit
application for financing an asset for acquisition by a customer,
wherein the acquired information includes information acquired
from the customer;
determining at least one finance source for financing the
asset for acquisition by the customer;
generating based on the acquired information, the first
credit application for submission to the at least one finance
source, wherein generating the first credit application comprises
including the acquired information in the first credit application;
determining a credit card institution associated with the at
least one finance source;
generating, based on a portion of the information acquired
from the customer, via a credit acquisition application program
in the credit aggregation management computer system, a second
credit application for submission to the credit card institution,
wherein generating the second credit application comprises
including the portion of the information acquired from the
customer in the second credit application, wherein the second
credit application is a different type of credit application than the
first credit application, and wherein generating said second credit
application further comprises extracting the portion of the
acquired information from the first credit application;
electronically sending the first credit application to the at
least one finance source;
electronically sending the second credit application to the
credit card institution by credit acquisition application program;
receiving an approval decision from the at least one
finance source;
receiving an approval decision from the credit card
institution by the credit acquisition application program; and
displaying a status indication associated with the approval
decision of the second credit application.
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More particularly, the concept of generating and sending two different
credit applications (based on common information about the applicant) to
two different (but associated) financing sources, and receiving approval
decisions for each credit application comprises (i) generating the first and
second credit applications (i.e., the claimed steps of generating the first
credit application and generating the second credit application);
(ii) determining the financial institutions to send the credit applications
(i.e., the claimed steps of determining at least one finance source and
determining a credit card institution associated with the at least one finance
source); (iii) sending the credit applications to the financial institutions
(i.e., the claimed steps of sending the first credit application to the at least
one finance source and sending the second credit application to the credit
card institution); and (iv) receiving a decision from the financial institutions
(i.e., the claimed steps of receiving an approval decision from the at least
one finance source and from the credit card institution).
Because the claim recites a judicial exception, we next determine
whether the claim integrates the judicial exception into a practical
application. 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. To determine whether the judicial
exception is integrated into a practical application, we identify whether there
are “any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial
exception(s)” and evaluate those elements to determine whether they
integrate the judicial exception into a recognized practical application. 84
Fed. Reg. at 54–55 (emphasis added); see also Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure (“MPEP”) § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017,
Jan. 2018).
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Here, we find the additional limitation(s) do not integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application. More particularly, the claims do not
recite (i) an improvement to the functionality of a computer or other
technology or technical field (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)); (ii) use a “particular
machine” to apply or use the judicial exception (see MPEP § 2106.05(b));
(iii) a particular transformation of an article to a different thing or state (see
MPEP § 2106.05(c)); or (iv) any other meaningful limitation (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(e)). See 84 Fed. Reg. at 55; see also Final Act. 4–6.
Rather, the additional limitations merely provide additional detail
regarding the acquisition and use of information included in the credit
applications, the performance of activities by a credit aggregation
management system or a credit acquisition application program, and the
display of approval decisions for each credit application. These are the types
of extra-solution activities (i.e., in addition to the judicial exception) the
courts have determined to be insufficient to transform judicially excepted
subject matter into a patent-eligible application. See MPEP § 2106.05(g);
see also Bilski, 561 U.S. at 612 (holding the use of well-known techniques to
establish inputs to the abstract idea as extra-solution activity that fails to
make the underlying concept patent eligible); Elec. Power Grp., LLC v.
Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (explaining that
“selecting information, by content or source, for collection analysis, and
display does nothing significant to differentiate a process from ordinary
mental processes”); Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1354 (recognizing “that merely
presenting the results of abstract processes of collecting and analyzing
information, without more (such as identifying a particular tool for
presentation), is abstract as an ancillary part of such collection and
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analysis”); Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Can., 771 F.
Supp. 2d 1054, 1065 (E.D. Mo. 2011) aff’d, 687 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(explaining that “storing, retrieving, and providing data . . . are
inconsequential data gathering and insignificant post solution activity”).
In DDR Holdings, the Federal Circuit determined “the claimed
solution amount[ed] to an inventive concept for resolving [a] particular
Internet-centric problem,” i.e., a challenge unique to the Internet. DDR
Holdings, 773 F.3d 1245, 1257–59 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Further, The Federal
Circuit explained that the patent-eligible claims specified “how interactions
with the Internet are manipulated to yield a desired result . . . that overrides
the routine and conventional sequence of events ordinarily triggered by the
click of a hyperlink.” DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1258. Additionally, the
court reasoned that those claims recited a technological solution “necessarily
rooted in computer technology” that addressed a “problem specifically
arising in the realm of computer networks.” DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d
at 1257.
Contrary to Appellant’s assertions (see, e.g., Appeal Br. 16–17, 19–
20), the claims do not recite an advancement over conventional computer
technology or address a problem necessarily rooted in computer technology
to overcome a problem arising in the realm of computer networks. Rather,
as the Examiner notes (see Ans. 6), the processing of credit applications
would exist without computers. Thus, the pending claims do not improve an
existing technological process, but rather merely use computers and
computer devices that operate in their normal, expected manner. See DDR
Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1258–59; see also Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335–36
(distinguishing between claims wherein the focus of the claims is on an
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improvement in computer capabilities and those that invoke a computer as a
tool). Additionally, unlike the arrangement of elements (i.e., installation of a
filtering tool at a specific location) in BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1349–50, and
contrary to Appellant’s arguments (see Appeal Br. 17), Appellant’s claims
do not recite a non-conventional and non-routine arrangement of known
elements.
For at least the foregoing reasons, the claims do not integrate the
judicial exception into a practical application.
Because we determine the claims are directed to an abstract idea or
combination of abstract ideas, we analyze the claims under step two of Alice
to determine if there are additional limitations that individually, or as an
ordered combination, ensure the claims amount to “significantly more” than
the abstract idea. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77–
79). As stated in the Office Guidance, many of the considerations to
determine whether the claims amount to “significantly more” under step two
of the Alice framework are already considered as part of determining
whether the judicial exception has been integrated into a practical
application. See 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Thus, at this point of our analysis, we
determine if the claims add a specific limitation, or combination of
limitations, that is not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the
field, or simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities at
a high level of generality. See 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
Here, Appellant’s claims do not recite specific limitations (or a
combination of limitations) that are not well-understood, routine, and
conventional. Contrary to Appellant’ arguments (see, e.g., Appeal Br. 14–
15; Reply Br. 4–5), we agree with the Examiner (see, e.g., Final Act. 5,
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Ans. 6–8) that the claims merely recite generic computer components
(e.g., a computer system) performing generic computing functions that are
well-understood, routine, and conventional (e.g., receiving and transmitting
data, processing data, and presenting the results). See buySAFE, Inc. v.
Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“That a computer
receives and sends the information over a network—with no further
specification—is not even arguably inventive.”); SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic,
LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“merely presenting the results
of abstract processes of collecting and analyzing information . . . is abstract
as an ancillary part of such collection and analysis”) (quotations omitted).
Moreover, the Examiner finds, and we agree, Appellant describes the
computer devices at a high level of generality in the Specification. Ans. 8
(citing Spec. ¶¶ 20, 45).
Additionally, to the extent Appellant contends the claims do not seek
to tie-up an abstract idea (Appeal Br. 14), we are unpersuaded of Examiner
error. “[W]hile preemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter, the
absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.”
FairWarning IP LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1098 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (quoting Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371,
1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788
F.3d 1359, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[T]hat the claims do not preempt all
price optimization or may be limited to price optimization in the e-
commerce setting do not make them any less abstract.”). Further, “[w]here a
patent’s claims are deemed only to disclose patent ineligible subject matter
under the Mayo framework, as they are in this case, preemption concerns are
fully addressed and made moot.” Ariosa, 788 F.3d at 1379.
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For the reasons discussed supra, we are unpersuaded of Examiner
error. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 4–12,
16–37, 42, 43, and 45 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

CONCLUSION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1, 4–12, 16–37,
42, 43, and 45 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 4–12,
16–37, 42,
43, 45
101 Eligibility 1, 4–12,
16–37, 42,
43, 45

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(f).

AFFIRMED