Ryan, James et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals BoardAug 3, 2020

12970930 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Aug. 3, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 12/970,930 12/16/2010 James Ryan 0102-US-I1 7013 83579 7590 08/03/2020 LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS, LLC Attn: Patent Docketing 1025 Eldorado Blvd. Broomfield, CO 80021 EXAMINER YOUNG, STEVE R ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2477 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 08/03/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): patent.docketing@centurylink.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________________ Ex parte JAMES RYAN, MARCUS HADAVI, MICHAEL RENNER, JERRY COX, and JAMES DWYER ____________________ Appeal 2019-001053 Application 12/970,930 Technology Center 2400 ____________________ Before CARL W. WHITEHEAD JR., JOHN P. PINKERTON, and NABEEL U. KHAN, Administrative Patent Judges. PINKERTON, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1 and 6–23, which are all of the claims pending in the application. Claims 2–5 are canceled. On July 9, 2020, an oral hearing was held in this appeal. A transcript of the hearing will be added to the record in due course. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We reverse. 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies Level 3 Communications, LLC as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 3. Appeal 2019-001053 Application 12/970,930 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Introduction Appellant generally describes the disclosed and claimed invention as relating to “identifying, provisioning, and reporting virtual [local] area network (VLAN) domains.” Spec. ¶ 2.2 The Specification explains that a VLAN is a logical network (i.e., with logical connections between devices) within a physical network, which is often created to facilitate the administration of the network, by separating logical segments of the network, or to reduce network bandwidth usage by reducing the broadcast domain. Id. at ¶ 3. The Specification also explains that “[a] plurality of individual VLANs are assigned to one or more individual VLAN domains,” and that each VLAN must be uniquely identifiable within the domain. Id. at ¶ 22. Claims 1 and 10 are independent claims. Claim 1, which is reproduced below, is illustrative of the subject matter on appeal: 1. A computer-implemented method of managing a virtual local area network (VLAN) domain associated with a network, the method comprising: defining a VLAN domain comprising a list of a plurality of connectively coupled ports of the network associated with the VLAN domain; assigning, to the VLAN domain, at least one VLAN associated with the plurality of connectively coupled ports; 2 Our Decision refers to the Final Office Action mailed Feb. 28, 2018 (“Final Act.”), Appellant’s Appeal Brief filed July 30, 2018 (“Appeal Br.”) and Reply Brief filed Nov. 20, 2018 (“Reply Br.”), the Examiner’s Answer mailed Sept. 20, 2018 (“Ans.”), and the Specification filed Dec. 16, 2010 (“Spec.”). Appeal 2019-001053 Application 12/970,930 3 querying a plurality of network elements in the network to request actual network element configuration data of a first object type, wherein the actual network element configuration data identifies one or more VLANs to which at least some of the plurality of network elements are allocated according to configurations observed at the at least some of the plurality of network elements; correlating the actual network element configuration data with administrative VLAN data of a second object type to identify one or more VLANs that are not commonly identified in both the actual network element configuration data and the administrative VLAN data within the defined VLAN domain, wherein the administrative VLAN data is business data stored during the administration of VLANs in the network, wherein correlating comprises generating administrative VLAN data of the first object type based on the administrative VLAN data of the second object type; and based on the correlation, reporting a status of the identified one or more VLANs. Appeal Br. 17 (Claims App.). Rejections on Appeal Claims 1, 6, 8–11, and 19–23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over McNeill et al. (US 6,167,052; issued Dec. 26, 2000) (“McNeill”) and Graves et al. (US 2004/0249916 A1; published Dec. 9, 2004) (“Graves”). Final Act. 2–14. Claims 7 and 12–18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over McNeill, Graves, and Virdy et al. (US 2004/0044754 A1; published Mar. 4, 2004) (“Virdy”). Final Act. 14–22. Appeal 2019-001053 Application 12/970,930 4 ANALYSIS The dispositive3 issue raised by the arguments in Appellant’s briefs is whether the combination of McNeill and Graves teaches or suggests “correlating comprises generating administrative VLAN data of the first object type based on the administrative VLAN data of the second object type,” as recited in claim 1 (“the disputed limitation”), and as similarly recited in independent claim 10.4 The Examiner rejects claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) for obviousness over the combination of McNeill and Graves. Final Act. 2–7. In particular, the Examiner finds Graves teaches the “correlating” step of claim 1, including “generating administrative VLAN data of the first object type based on the administrative VLAN data of the second object type.” Id. at 5–6 (citing Graves ¶¶ 41, 42, 48). In that regard, the Examiner finds “[the] first object type and [the] second object type can be the same.” Id. at 5, 23. In the Answer, the Examiner finds “the claims do not require that the first object type and the second object type be different object types.” Ans. 24–25 (emphasis omitted). Thus, the Examiner finds that Graves reads on the disputed limitation, as broadly construed, because Graves teaches “correlating the reference information with the configuration information . . . then determining discrepancies between the two data sets, followed by 3 Appellant raises other arguments in its briefs, but we do not address them because we determine that this issue is dispositive. 4 Appellant argues claims 1, 6, 8–11, and 19–23 as a group focusing on claim 1. See Appeal Br. 5–14. Accordingly, we select claim 1 as illustrative, and the remaining claims stand or fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Appeal 2019-001053 Application 12/970,930 5 updating the reference information to reflect the configuration information.” Id. at 25 (citing Graves ¶¶ 46, 48). We are persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that the Examiner erred. Initially, we agree with Appellant’s argument that the Examiner erred in determining that the claimed “first object type” and “second object type” can be the same type. Appeal Br. 12–13; Reply Br. 2. Our reviewing court dictates that we assume two different terms in a claim have two different meanings. See Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 448 F.3d 1324, 1333 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[T]he use of two terms in a claim requires that they connote different meanings . . . .”); see also CAE Screenplates Inc. v. Heinrich Fiedler GmbH, 224 F.3d 1308, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, we must presume that the use of these different terms in the claims connotes different meanings.”). Thus, because the Examiner has not provided contrary evidence, we presume the language of claim 1 that requires a “first object type” and a “second object type” means that these object types are different. Appellant also argues, and we agree, the Specification provides “an example where data of an object type (e.g., Java objects) is generated from data of a different object type (e.g., SQL, Oracle, or other databases).” Reply Br. 5–6 (citing Spec. ¶ 128). Accordingly, we agree with Appellant’s argument that “the Examiner’s interpretation cannot stand” because the claims must be given “their broadest reasonable construction ‘in light of the specification . . . .’” Id. at 5 (citing in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). Thus, in finding that Graves’s teaching of correlating actual VLAN data (configuration data) with presumed to be Appeal 2019-001053 Application 12/970,930 6 correct stored VLAN data (reference data), followed by a discrepancy report, teaches or suggests the disputed limitation, we determine the Examiner’s rejection relies on an unreasonably broad and incorrect construction of the claimed “first object type” and “second object type” as being the same type. See In re Smith Int’l, Inc., 871 F.3d 1375, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“‘[T]he protocol of giving claims their broadest reasonable interpretation . . . does not include giving claims a legally incorrect interpretation’ ‘divorced from the specification and the record evidence.”’) (internal citation omitted)). We further agree with Appellant’s arguments that Graves’s comparison of configuration information (allegedly the claimed “actual network element configuration data”) and reference information (allegedly the claimed “administrative VLAN data”), followed by generation of a report message that either identifies any discrepancies or indicates the as- built configuration of the VLAN is correct, fails to teach or suggest the disputed limitation for several reasons. See Appeal Br. 7–12; Reply Br. 3–5. First, Appellant argues, and we agree, “Graves is entirely silent with respect to its ‘configuration information’ and ‘reference information’ having opposing object types - let alone, generating reference information of a first object type based on reference information of a second object type.” Appeal Br. 9 (emphasis omitted). Second, Appellant argues, and we agree, Graves’s paragraph 48 teaching that “VLAN verification software 520 (depicted in Fig[ure] 5) compares design information (allegedly the claimed, ‘administrative VLAN data’) and configuration information (allegedly the claimed ‘actual network element configuration data’), and produces a report that lists any discrepancies and agreements,” does not teach or suggest the Appeal 2019-001053 Application 12/970,930 7 disputed limitation. Id. at 10–11. In that regard, Appellant argues, and we agree, “generating corrective actions does not disclose or even infer that the corrective actions include generating design information – or even configuration information for that matter -- of a different data type.” Id. at 11. Third, Appellant argues, and we agree, that Graves’s teaching of updating the referencing information based on the discrepancy report fails to teach or suggest the disputed limitation. Reply Br. 2–4 (citing Graves ¶¶ 46, 48). Graves teaches that the referencing information is updated based on the “differences” identified by the discrepancy report, but as Appellant argues, the disputed limitation requires “generating administrative VLAN data of the first object type based on the administrative VLAN data of the second object type,” and Graves does not teach generating administrative VLAN data of “any type whatsoever.” Id. at 4 (emphasis omitted). Accordingly, we find the preponderance of the evidence establishes that the cited portions of Graves do not teach or suggest the disputed limitation of claim 1. The Examiner does not rely on McNeill to teach this limitation. Thus, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1. For the same reasons, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 10, and dependent claims 6, 8, 11, and 19–23, which stand together with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). For the same reasons, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 7 and 12–18. Cf. In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“dependent claims are nonobvious if the independent claims from which they depend are nonobvious”). DECISION We reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 6, 8–11, and 19–23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over McNeill and Graves. Appeal 2019-001053 Application 12/970,930 8 We reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claims 7 and 12–18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over McNeill, Graves, and Virdy. DECISION SUMMARY In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1, 6, 8–11, 19–23 103(a) McNeill, Graves 1, 6, 8–11, 19–23 7, 12–18 103(a) McNeill, Graves, Virdy 7, 12–18 Overall Outcome 1, 6–23 REVERSED