Rucker Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 29, 1970

183 N.L.R.B. 1290 (N.L.R.B. 1970)

1290 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Rucker Company, The, Roylyn Division and Interna-
tional Association of Machinists , District #727,
Local #758, AFL-CIO. Case 31-CA-1641
June 29, 1970
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, BROWN , AND JENKINS
On March 18, 1970, Trial Examiner George H.
O'Brien issued his Decision the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that the Respondent had en-
gaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices within the meaning of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, and recommending that
it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affir-
mative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Ex-
aminer 's Decision. Thereafter, the Respondent filed
exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision,
together with a supporting brief.'
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner and finds that no prejudicial, error was
committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The
Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Deci-
sion , the exceptions and brief, and the entire record
in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclu-
sions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor-
Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recom-
mended Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby
orders that the Respondent, The Rucker Company,
Roylyn Division, Glendale, California, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action
set forth in the Trial Examiner's recommended
Order.
' As the record, exceptions, and brief adequately present the contentions
of the parties, we hereby deny Respondent's request for oral argument
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
GEORGE H. O'BRIEN, Trial Examiner: The case
arises on a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by
counsel for the General Counsel upon an admitted
refusal by the Respondent' to bargain with the cer-
tified Charging Union, the Respondent contending
that the certification of the Union in the related
representation case is invalid.
The Representation Proceeding2
Upon a petition filed under Section 9(c) of the
National Labor Relations Act on July 19, 1968, by
Roylyn, Inc., Respondent herein, Respondent and
International Association of Machinists, District #
727, Local #758, AFL-CIO, herein called the
Union, entered into a Stipulation for Certification
Upon Consent Election on July 29, 1968, which
was approved by the Regional Director for Region
31 on July 30, 1968.
On August 28, 1969, the Board handed down its
Decision and Order To Open and Count Chal-
lenged Ballots (178 NLRB 197) wherein it stated:
Pursuant to a stipulation for certification
upon consent election, an election by secret
ballot was conducted on August 9, 1968, under
the direction and supervision of the Regional
Director for Region 31, among the employees
in the unit agreed upon by the parties. At the
conclusion of the election, the parties were
furnished with a tally of ballots which showed
that of approximately 132 eligible voters, 117
cast ballots, of which 36 were for the Union,
53 were against, and 28 were challenged. The
challenged ballots were sufficient in number to
affect the results of the election. No objections
were filed to conduct affecting the results of
the election.
Pursuant to the provisions of the National
Labor Relations Board Rules and Regulations,
after reasonable notice to the parties and op-
portunity to present relevant evidence, the Re-
gional Director conducted an investigation of
the issues raised by the challenges and on
November 6, 1968, issued and served upon the
parties his Report on Challenges to the ballots
cast by Charles Weyhrauch, Otto Hager,
Robert Knapp, Frank Van Wagner, and John
Bozis be sustained, and further recommending
that the challenges to the ballots cast by Imants
Bozis , Thomas Byrd, James Brazier, Jarold
Comer, Lynn Davis, Walter Dietrich, Emery
Gant, Donald Heath, Frank Lewis, John
Roberts, William Stuckenbroker, Jack Wiley,
James Anderson, A. E. Berthold, Lawrence
' The complaint was amended to conform to an averment in Respon-
dent 's answer that "Respondent alleges that it is now a Division of The
Rucker Company, a California Corporation, successor to Roylyn, Inc "
I Administrative or official notice is taken of the record in the represen-
tation proceeding, Case 31-RM-142, as the term "record" is defined in §§
102 68 and 102 69(f) of the Board's Rules and Regulations and Statements
of Procedure, Series 8, as amended . See LTV Electrosystems, Inc , 166
NLRB 938, enfd. 388 F 2d 683 (C.A 4, 1968), Golden Age Beverage Co,
167 NLRB 15 1, Intertype Company v N L R B , 401 F 2d 41 (C A 4),Fol-
lett Corporation, 164 NLRB 378, enfd. 397 F 2d 91 (C A 7), § 9(d) of the
Act
183 NLRB No. 132
THE RUCKER COMPANY
Clarke, Lawrence Henry, Garvin Keith, James
Maclsaac, Frank Rodriquez, Stephen Scordato,
Mitchell Truesdale, Ralph Wortelboer, and
Faustina Asbury be overruled and that their
ballots be opened and counted. Thereafter, the
Employer filed timely exceptions to the Re-
gional Director's recommendation regarding
the challenges to ballots cast which were over-
ruled, and to the challenge of the ballot of
Charles Weyhrauch, which was sustained. No
exceptions were filed by the Union.
Upon the entire record in this case, the
Board finds:
1. The Employer-Petitioner is engaged in
commerce within the meaning of the Act and it
will effectuate the purposes of the Act to assert
jurisdiction herein.
2. The Union is a labor organization claim-
ing to represent certain employees of the Em-
ployer.
3. A question affecting commerce exists
concerning the representation of the em-
ployees of the Employer within the meaning of
Section 9(c)(1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
4. The parties agreed, and we find, the fol-
lowing employees constitute a unit appropriate
for the purpose of collective bargaining within
the meaning of the Act:
All production and maintenance em-
ployees, including shipping and receiving
employees, janitors, truckdrivers, leadmen
and working foreman; but excluding all of-
fice clerical employees and watchmen,
and also excluding guards, supervisors,
and professional employees, as defined in
the Act.
5. The Board has considered the Regional
Director's Report and the Employer's excep-
tions thereto, and as the exceptions raise no
material or substantial issues of fact or law
which would warrant reversal or require a
hearing, we hereby adopt the Regional
Director's findings and recommendations.
Our dissenting colleagues conclude that
some of the strikers abandoned their jobs, ap-
parently basing this upon their interpretation
of employee rights or employer obligations
under the contractual vacation clause. It is
clear from that Article of the contract that em-
ployees could request vacations for periods
other than the general vacation period which
the employer customarily designated.' It can-
not be determined from the face of the con-
tract what rights were conferred by that provi-
sion upon the employees or what obligations
devolved upon the company. We are not called
upon and do not purport to determine that
question.
The sole issue [before the Board] in this
1291
proceeding ... is whether the action of certain
employees herein, i.e., signing a quit slip in
order to obtain vacation pay, is sufficient to
show that economic strikers abandoned their
interest in their struck jobs and lost the status
of economic strikers for purposes of eligibility.2
On the facts of this case it is patent that the
strikers did not wish to abandon their em-
ployyee status and did not sign the quit slips
with that intent. Therefore, there could be no
such abandonment regardless of other possible
legal effects of their action.3 Accordingly, we
find that the Employer has not affirmatively
shown by objective evidence that these strikers
abandoned their interest in their struck jobs,
and that the presumption that an economic
striker remains in such status has not been
rebutted.4
As we have adopted the Regional Director's
recommendation that the challenges to the 23
above-designated ballots be overruled and
these ballots may effect the results of the elec-
tion, we shall direct that the Regional Director
open and count these ballots and cause to be
served on the parties a revised tally of ballots
and an appropriate certificate.
' [The article reads as follows I
ARTICLE VII VACATIONS
' Vacation periods shall conform to the requirements of the Com-
pany's operations and the Company reserves the right , in accordance
with its past practice to designate a general vacation period for all em-
ployees, provided ninety (90) days notice thereof is given It is further
agreed that such general vacation period will fall between the dates of
June 15th and September 15th The company agrees, however , to give
due consideration to requests made by employees for vacation during
periods other than those herein set forth.
2 Pacific Tile and Porcelain Company, 137 NLRB 1358, 1359
3 We do not, of course , question the validity of the statement that an
employer need not finance a strike against itself However , this is not
relevant in the instant case, where the only issue is whether an aban-
donment occurred
' Cf Guyqn Machinery Company, 155 NLRB 591, 593-594, S & M
Manufacturing Company, 165 NLRB 663.
On September 8, 1969, Respondent filed with the
Board a motion for reconsideration and the Board
on October 13, 1969, handed down the following:
ORDER DENYING MOTION
On August 22, 1969, the National Labor
Relations Board issued a Decision and
Direction To Open and Count Challenged Bal-
lots in the above-entitled proceeding.' The
Board, after consideration of the Regional
Director's Report on Challenged Ballots dated
' 178 NLRB 197, Chairman McCulloch and Member Zagona dis-
senting
427-258 O-LT - 74 - 83
1292 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
November 6, 1968, and the Employer's excep-
tions thereto, concluded that the exceptions
raised no material or substantial issues of fact
or law which would warrant reversal or require
a hearing, and adopted the Regional Director's
findings and recommendations with respect to
the challenged ballots. Therefore, the Board,
inter alia, overruled the challenges to 23 bal-
lots, and directed the Regional Director to
open and count said ballots, cause to be served
on the parties a revised tally of ballots, and
issue an appropriate certification.
Thereafter, on September 8, 1969, the Em-
ployer filed a motion for reconsideration,
requesting that the Board reconsider the Deci-
sion and Direction to Open and Count Chal-
lenged Ballots and, upon reconsideration,
revise its Decision to sustain the Employer's
challenges. In the alternative, the Employer
requests that the Board order a hearing on is-
sues affecting the validity of the challenges and
the results of the election. On September 10,
1969, the Union filed opposition to the Em-
ployer's motion.
The Board having duly considered the
matter,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Employer's
motion for reconsideration or hearing be, and
it hereby is, denied as it contains nothing not
previously considered by the Board and is
lacking in merit.2
As an inadvertent error appears in the Deci-
sion,
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Decision and
Direction To Open and Count Challenged Bal-
lots be, and it hereby is, corrected by striking
the first line of the [last] paragraph on page
[ 197] and substituting therefor the following:
"The sole issue in this proceeding upon which
our colleagues disagree is whether the."
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Decision and
Direction To Open and Count Challenged Bal-
lots, as printed, shall appear as hereby cor-
rected.
' Chairman McCulloch and Member Zagona adhere to their dissent
expressed in the original decision
Pursuant to the foregoing order of the Board the
Regional Director opened and counted 23 chal-
lenged ballots and on October 20, 1969, issued a
revised tally of ballots showing 58 votes cast for,
and 54 votes cast against, the Union. Certification
issued October 24, 1969.
The Instant Unfair Labor Practice Case
On November 20, 1969, the Union filed the un-
fair labor practice charge initiating this proceeding,
alleging that Respondent had refused and con-
tinued to refuse to bargain with the Union.
On December 11, 1969, the Regional Director
for Region 31 issued a complaint and notice of
hearing alleging that Respondent had committed
unfair labor practices in violation of Sections
8(a)(1) and (5) and 2(6) and (7) of the Act, by
refusing and continuing to refuse to bargain collec-
tively with the Union as the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of all the employees in
the appropriate unit described above.
On January 9, 1970, Respondent filed its answer
to the complaint in which it admitted certain allega-
tions in the complaint and denied others. Among
other things Respondent did admit that it has been
and is refusing to bargain collectively with the
Union, but it specifically denied that a majority of
the employees in the appropriate unit selected the
Union as their bargaining agent and denied that the
Union has been or is now their exclusive collective-
bargaining agent. By way of affirmative defense the
answer avers that the certification is void because:
1. Among the 23 persons casting ballots chal-
lenged by Respondent, but counted by the Re-
gional Director were the ballots of 12 persons
who had voluntarily quit their employment and
thereby abandoned their status as strikers eligi-
ble to vote.
2. Among the said 23 persons were 10 persons
who were not employees within the meaning of
the Act, because each had, prior to the date of
the election obtained other regular and sub-
stantially equivalent employment and thereby
abandoned his status as a striker.
3. The action of the Board in holding that the
said 22 persons or any of them were strikers
eligible to vote was without warrant in the
record or a reasonable basis in law, was ar-
bitrary and capricious and constituted an abuse
of discretion.
4. By failing and refusing to direct a hearing
on the factual matters raised by Respondent's
exceptions to the Regional Director's report,
the Board deprived Respondent of its constitu-
tional rights to due process of law, and acted
arbitrarily and capriciously and abused its dis-
cretion.
On January 21, 1970, counsel for the General
Counsel filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and
a memorandum in support thereof on the ground
that Respondent's answer raised no issues not al-
ready disposed of in the representation proceeding,
but that, in fact, it admitted violations of Section
8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. I issued an order to
show cause to which Respondent filed a timely
response on February 24, 1970. Respondent also
filed with the Regional Director an amended
answer.
Respondent in its Statement in Opposition to
Motion for Summary Judgment reargues each of
the points which it lost before the Board in the
representation case and further argues that I should
grant a hearing on "newly discovered evidence" set
forth as a further affirmative defense in Respond-
THE RUCKER COMPANY 1293
ent's amended answer. The evidence newly ten-
dered is:
13. Respondent's normal general vacation
period for the bargaining unit was between
June 15 and September 15 of 1968 and prior
years.
14. Acting without discrimination and for
valid business purposes, Respondent did not
allow any bargaining unit employees, including
striker replacements and strikers who had
returned to work, to take vacations from the
onset of said strike until July 8, 1968, Respon-
dent's purpose was to maximize production
during the strike.
15. Under Respondent's vacation practice
then in effect, accrued vacation pay was not
available to employees except at scheduled va-
cation time or except in case of prior termina-
tion of employment.
16. In case of a voluntary quit by an em-
ployee Respondent's practice in effect between
the dates of January 4, 1968 and July 8, 1968
was to pay accrued pro rata vacation pay.
17. When said persons after hearing said ex-
planation by Respondent proceeded with their
voluntary quits Respondent accepted their
quits and in compliance with said practice
proceeded to pay them their respective ac-
crued pro rata vacation pay.
18. But for their having voluntarily quit
their employment Respondent would not have
granted them or any of them said accrued pro
rata vacation pay, since workers were urgently
needed in the plant, since accordingly no vaca-
tions were being scheduled or allowed, since in
any event Respondent's normal bargaining unit
vacation period had not yet begun.
Respondent's argument on this point is that:
. even where a hearing was held by the
Regional director, the existence of newly-
discovered or previously-unavailable evidence
requires a new hearing....
This is true even though the proffered
evidence is "newly relevant ' rather than ac-
tually discovered after the hearing. Bausch &
Lomb, Inc. [v. N.L.R.B., 404 F.2d 122 (C.A. 2,
1968), denying enforcement of 171 NLRB No.
114]....
* * *
The instant case is not dissimilar from
Bausch and Lomb. Here the meaning of the va-
cation provisions of the contract between
Respondent and the union and the prior prac-
tice, if any, of the Respondent became signifi-
cant after the Regional Director filed his Re-
port and the Board its decision....
3 Krieger-Ragsdale & Co, Inc, 159 NLRB 490 , enfd 379 F 2d 517 (C A
7) cert denied 389 U S 1041, N L R B v Macomb Pottery, 376 F 2d 450
(C A 7), Howard Johnson Company, 164 NLRB 801, Metropolitan Life In-
The evidence of this vacation practice is also
made relevant because the majority's position
is seen to be in error in the light of the Board's
recent decision in Texaco, Inc., 179 NLRB No.
152(1969)....
As it now appears for the first time that
these facts are relevant and create obvious fac-
tual issues, the Motion for Summary Judgment
herein must be denied. Rule 56(c), Fed. R.
Civ. Proc. NLRA, Sec. 10(b).
In summation Respondent states:
The prior proceeding herein contains signifi-
cant and prejudicial errors, including those
discussed above-failure to order a hearing
herein and failure to find for Respondent on
the basis of evidence on the record taken as a
whole. Respondent submits that either of these
errors would require a Court of Appeals to
deny enforcement or remand for a full hearing.
As was said in N.L.R.B. v. Air Control
Products, [355 F.2d 245 (C.A. 5, 1964)]:
Of course, it is clear that § 8(a)(5) or-
ders which rest on crucial factual deter-
minations made after ex parte investiga-
tions and without hearing cannot stand. Id.
at 249.
The hearing argument is developed, supra, and
need not be reiterated here.
Neither could the present record support an
order by the Board to bargain collectively. It is
devoid of facts supporting the certification of
representatives, and therefore no enforcement
order would be proper. NLRA § 10(e); Univer-
sal Camera Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 340 U.S.
474 (1951). Because it is apparent that seeking
enforcement herein, given the defects in the
prior proceedings, will not advance the in-
terests of any party but will defeat the purposes
of the Act by causing extensive delay in the ul-
timate resolution of the question of representa-
tion, Respondent urges the Trial Examiner to
take remedial steps immediately by denying
the Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the
alternative, dismissing the complaint herein.
Ruling on the Motions
It is established Board policy in the absence of
newly discovered evidence or previously unavaila-
ble evidence not to permit litigation before a Trial
Examiner in an unfair labor practice case of issues
which were or could have been litigated in a prior
related representation proceeding. It is equally
well established that where all material issues have
surance Company , 163 NLRB 579 See Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co v
N L R B , 313 US 146, 162 ( 1941), NLRB Rules and Regulations, §§
102 67 (f) and 102 69(c)
1294 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
either been previously decided by the Board, or are
admitted in the pleadings, a hearing is not required
as a matter of due process.'
The question before me is whether the "newly
relevant" evidence first tendered by Respondent in
its amended answer warrants a reopening of the
issue of voting eligibility and a hearing thereon. I
find that it does not. This evidence was at all times
in the possession of and available to Respondent. It
became "newly relevant" (on Respondent's theory)
on August 28, 1969, when the Board handed down
its Decision and Order. No explanation is offered
by Respondent for its failure to make this evidence
known to the Board when it moved, on September
8, 1969, for reconsideration.
There are thus no unresolved matters requiring
an evidentiary hearing. The General Counsel's Mo-
tion for Summary Judgment is granted. Respon-
dent's motion to dismiss the complaint is denied. I
shall not order oral argument herein since the
pleadings and briefs adequately treat with all issues
before me. On the basis of the record, I make the
following:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
Respondent is a California corporation which
through its Roylyn Division manufactures com-
ponents for aircraft, marine vessels, and industrial
systems in Glendale, California. Respondent's Roy-
lyn Division in the normal course and conduct of its
business operations annually sells directly to
customers outside California products valued in ex-
cess of $50,000.
It is admitted, and it is hereby found, that
Respondent is, and has been, at all times material
herein, an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Union is, and has been at all times material
herein , a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2 (5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The following employees of Respondent con-
stitute a unit appropriate for purposes of collective
bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of
the Act.
All production and maintenance employees of
Respondent at Respondent's Roylyn Division,
Glendale, California plant, including shipping
and receiving employees, janitors, truckdrivers,
leadmen and working foremen; but excluding
all office clerical employees and watchmen;
also excluding guards, supervisors and profes-
sional employees as defined in the Act.
On or about October 24, 1969, the Board cer-
tified the Union as the exclusive collective-bargain-
ing representative of the employees in the above-
described unit with respect to rates of pay, wages,
hours of employment, and other terms and condi-
tions of employment.
Commencing on or about November 4, 1969,
and continuing to date, Respondent has refused,
and continues to refuse, to recognize and bargain
collectively with the Union as the collective-bar-
gaining representative of the employees in the ap-
propriate unit.
By thus refusing to bargain collectively Respon-
dent has engaged in unfair labor practices in viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act and has inter-
fered with, restrained, and coerced employees in
violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7)
of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings and conclusions and
pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I recommend
that the Board issue the following:
ORDER
The Rucker Company, Roylyn Division, its of-
ficers, agents, successors , and assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with Interna-
tional Association of Machinists, District #727,
Local #758, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of the employees in the
following appropriate unit:
All production and maintenance employees of
Respondent at Respondent's Roylyn Division,
Glendale, California plant , including shipping
and receiving employees , janitors, truckdrivers,
leadmen and working foremen ; but excluding
all office clerical employees and watchmen;
also excluding guards, supervisors and profes-
sional employees as defined in the Act.
(b) Interfering with the efforts of said Union to
negotiate for or represent employees as such exclu-
sive collective-bargaining representative.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is
necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively with In-
ternational Association of Machinists, District #
727, Local #758, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive
representative of all employees in the appropriate
unit with respect to rates of pay, wages , hours of
4 Bufkor-Pelzner Division , Inc, 169 NLRB 998, N L R B v E-Z Davies
Chevrolet and N L.R B v Carl Simpson Buick , Inc , 395 F 2d 191 (C A 9),
enfg 161 NLRB 1380 and 1389
THE RUCKER
employment, and other terms and conditions of em-
ployment, and embody in a signed agreement any
understanding reached.5
(b) Post at its place of business in Glendale,
California, copies of the attached notice marked
"Appendix. "6 Copies of said notice, on forms pro-
vided by the Regional Director for Region 31, after
being duly signed by Respondent's representative,
shall be posted by the Respondent immediately
upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by the
Respondent for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in
conspicuous places, including all places where
notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent
to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 31,
in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this
Decision, what steps have been taken to comply
herewith.'
'For the purpose of determining the duration of the certification , the ini-
tial year of certification shall be deemed to begin on the date the Respon-
dent commences to bargain in good faith with the Union as the recognized
exclusive bargaining representative in the appropriate unit The purpose of
this provision is to insure that the employees in the appropriate unit will be
accorded the services of their selected bargaining agent for the period pro-
vided by law See Mar-Jac Poultry Company, Inc, 136 NLRB 785, Com-
merce Company dlb/a Lamar Hotel, 140 NLRB 226, 229, enfd 328 F 2d
600 (C A 5), cert denied 379 U S 817, Burnett Construction Company,
149 NLRB 1419,142 1, enfd 350 F 2d 57 (C A 10)
e In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102 46 of
the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the
findings , conclusions , recommendations, and recommended Order herein
shall, as provided in Section 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be
adopted by the Board and become its findings , conclusions , and order, and
all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes In the event
that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court
of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board "
' In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this
provision shall be modified to read "Notify the Regional Director for Re-
gion 31, in writing , within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps
Respondent has taken to comply herewith "
COMPANY 1295
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively
with International Association of Machinists,
District #727, Local #758, AFL-CIO, as the
exclusive collective-bargaininrepresentative
of all the following employees:-
All production and maintenance em-
ployees, including shipping and receiving
employees, janitors, truckdrivers, leadmen
and working foremen; but excluding all of-
fice clerical employees and watchmen;
also excluding guards, supervisors and
professional employees as defined in the
Act.
WE WILL NOT interfere with the efforts of the
Union to negotiate for or represent employees
as exclusive collective-bargaining representa-
tive.
WE WILL bargain collectively with the Union
as the exclusive collective-bargaining represen-
tative of the employees in the appropriate unit,
and if an understanding is reached we will sign
a contract with the Union.
THE RUCKER COMPANY,
ROYLYN DIVISION
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative ) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced
by anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecu-
tive days from the date of posting and must not be
altered , defaced , or covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or com-
pliance with its provisions may be directed to the
Board 's Office , Federal Building , Room 12100,
11000 Wilshire Boulevard , Los Angeles , California
90024, Telephone 824-7357.