Rubber Workers Local 510

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 24, 1970

186 N.L.R.B. 765 (N.L.R.B. 1970)

RUBBER WORKERS LOCAL 510
United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers
of America, Local 510, AFL-CIO (Uniroyal, Inc.)
and Sophia M. Coats. Case 21-CB-3230
November 24, 1970
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS BROWN
AND JENKINS
On May 14, 1969, Trial Examiner E. Don Wilson
issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding,
finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was
engaging in certain unfair labor practices within the
meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, and recommending that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set
forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision.
Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the
Trial Examiner's Decision and a brief in support
thereof.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-member
panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and brief, and
the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the
findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the
Trial Examiner only to the extent consistent herewith:
The Trial Examiner found that the Respondent
violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by imposing an
unreasonably excessive fine upon its member, Sophia
M. Coats, the Charging Party, for crossing its picket
line at Uniroyal, Inc., Coats' place of employment,
and by attempting to collect said fine.
For the reasons more fully explicated in Arrow
Development Co.,' which issued after the Trial
Examiner's Decision herein, we disagree with the
Trial Examiner's findings and shall dismiss the
complaint in its entirety.2 In that case the Board held
that where, as here, a fine seeks to implement a
legitimate union rule which is not in conflict with any
policies of the Act, the Board is without authority to
determine whether the fine is reasonable in amount.
Accordingly, we shall dismiss the complaint in its
entirety.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
765
Relations Board hereby orders that the complaint
herein be, and it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety.
I International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers,
AFL-CIO, Local Lodge No 504 (Arrow Development Co), 185 NLRB No
22
2 In view of our conclusion herein , we deem it unnecessary to consider
or pass upon the Respondent 's contentions that this action is barred by
Section 10(b) of the Act , and that, in any event , the fine did not exceed
Coats' total earnings for the period she worked behind the picket line and
therefore , was not excessive
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
E. DON WILSON, Trial Examiner : Upon a charge filed by
Sophia M. Coats, an individual , herein Coats , on October 9,
1968, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations
Board , herein the Board , issued a complaint dated
December 20, 1968 , alleging that United Rubber, Cork,
Linoleum and Plastic Workers of America, Local 510,
AFL-CIO, herein Respondent , violated Section 8(b)(1)(A)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended , herein
the Act.
Pursuant to due notice a hearing in this matter was held
before me , at Santa Ana , California , on March 4, 1969.
General Counsel and Respondent fully participated, and
each submitted a brief on April 17 , 1969. The briefs have
been considered . Upon the entire record in the case and
from my observation of the witnesses , I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF UNIROYAL, INC.
Uniroyal, Inc., herein the Employer, is a multistate and
multiplant corporation with a place of business, inter alia,
in Santa Ana , California . In the course and conduct of its
business i t annually purchases goods, materials, and
supplies valued in excess of $50 ,000 directly from points
outside California. It also annually sells products valued in
excess of $50,000 directly to purchasers outside California.
At all material times, it has been an employer engaged in
commerce and in a business affecting commerce within the
meaning of the Act.
U. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION
At all material times, Respondent has been a labor
organization within the meaning of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Issue
Is attempted court enforcement of a fine of $525 imposed
by Respondent on Sophia M. Coats, a member of
Respondent, for crossing Respondent's picket line during a
strike called by Respondent, and working for the Employer,
a violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act, because the
fine, in the circumstances of this case was arbitrary,
unreasonably large, excessive, and unreasonable discipline
adversely affecting her employment status?
186 NLRB No. 106
766 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
B. The Facts
Coats has been an employee of the Employer, at its Santa
Ana plant, since the fall of 1961, and since that time until
the present has been a member of Respondent. Her
initiation fee was $4.25 and since she became a member, her
monthly dues have been $4.25.
Respondent has been the bargaining representative for
the Employer's production employees for a number of
years. On April 21, 1967, Respondent went on strike at the
Employer for a contract and the strike continued until July
26, 1967.1 Coats left work with the other strikers on April
21, 1967.
On June 20, 1967, Coats crossed Respondent's picket line
and returned to work, working the next 21 working days,
through July 15, 1967. Her hourly rate of pay was $2.31 an
hour. She performed some overtime work during these 21
days. Her total earnings for this time were $425, $55 of
which was for overtime.
On June 29, 1967, Respondent notified Coats that
charges of engaging in conduct unbecoming a union
member2 in violation of the Respondent' s International's
Constitution had been brought against her by Respondent's
vice president, Rosa Lee Blair . Coats was further advised
that Respondent's Executive Committee intended to
proceed on the charges. A Trial Board was selected and
Coats was notified that a trial would be held on July 30,
1967.
On July 30, 1967, the trial opened at 11:30 a.m., and
adjourned at 12:15 p.m.3 Coats was present and protested
the legality of the proceedings. Blair listed the days Coats
worked during the strike and pointed out that it was a total
of 21 days.
The Trial Board found Coats guilty of the charges of
crossing the picket line and recommended a penalty of
suspension from Respondent for 1 year during which time
she would be debarred from taking part in Respondent's
activities but would have to pay her regular monthly dues,
and a fine of $25 for each of the 21 days she worked, for a
total of $525. Payment of the fine was to be made within 30
days, or court action would be instituted to collect it.
On August 13, 1967, the membership adopted the
recommendations of the Trial Board. Coats exhausted her
appeal remedies and her appeal was denied on November
29, 1967. Coats, as of the date of the hearing, had not paid
the fine. Respondent initiated legal action against Coats on
September 17, 1968, by filing a complaint in the Municipal
Court of the Anaheim-Fullerton Judicial District of
California, seeking recovery of the fine, plus interest and
costs. On October 14, 1968, Coats filed answer denying the
material allegations of the complaint with the exception of
approval of the fine by the membership. The proceeding
was pending at the time of the hearing herein.
Prior to learning that charges had been filed against her
by Blair, Coats had no notice of any kind that Respondent
would take action against her for crossing the picket line.
The Respondent's president, Medina, knew that during a
previous strike in 1959, employees had crossed the picket
I Respondent believes it got a good contract from the Employer, as a
result of the strike.
2 Crossing the picket line and working for the Employer.
line, but he did not know whether they were brought to trial
by Respondent.4 Another member besides Coats crossed
the picket line in 1967, Bussey, and he was fined for the
most part at a slightly higher rate than Coats. Medina did
not know why the fines differed.
In addition to supporting herself, Coats had to support
four minor children. She had no husband at home, but he
provided $56 a week support at the time. She had no other
source of income but her job. Since she did not picket, she
received no strike benefits. During the spring or winter
preceding the strike, her home was damaged by the
elements and it cost her $750 to have it repaired. The Trial
Board, at her trial, made no inquiry into the above facts and
obviously did not consider them or anything else concern-
ing Coats' financial circumstances in determining the
amount of fine it would recommend.
There is some evidence in the record of picket line
disorder and an assault on Coats by a picket and a
subsequent arrest of the picket. Coats engaged in no
misconduct on the picket line and did not cause the arrest
of the picket.
After appeal, and about a year later, Coats received
unemployment compensation for the period starting with
the beginning of the strike and ending with the time she
returned to work.
CONCLUDING FINDINGS
Simple arithmetic shows that Respondent fined Coats
$100 more than she earned, including overtime, during the
strike. As General Counsel points out, the fine of $525
would have paid Respondent's initiation fees for about 123
members and amounted to about 10 years dues for one
member. It is noted that Coats was required in addition to
pay $51 in dues for a year, while she was unable to
participate in Respondent's activities. Further, Respondent
now seeks interest on the $525 fine plus unknown costs.
Since the fine exceeds the total amount of Coats' earnings
for the 21 days she worked, I find the attempted court
enforcement of it affects her employment status even more
than if the Union had caused the Employer to lay her off
from her job without pay and even more than if it had
coercively restrained her from exercising her Section 7 right
to work during the strike. Such action by Respondent
violated Section 8(b)( I)(A) of the Act. The Supreme Court
stated in N. L. R. B. v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Compa-
ny, et. al., 388 U.S. 175, that by enacting Section
8(b)(IXA), Congress intended to bar "enforcement of a
Union's internal regulations to affect a member's employ-
ment status." By fining Coats $100 more than she earned,
Respondent sought to foreclose Coats in particular, and all
its members, from exercising their statutorily protected
right to work during a strike. The fine of $525 was not a
mere deterrent. Itsl excessive nature was not a reasonable
exercise of internal union discipline but was a device
designed to affect the employment status of all members
during any strike. Imposing a fine amounting to $100 more
than Coats' earnings during the strike makes illusory the
Board's long-established holdings that Section 8(b)(1)(A)
3 The transcript is in evidence as Resp. Exh. No. 12.
{ Medina was only a member and not an officer in 1959.
RUBBER WORKERS LOCAL 510 767
protects an employee's right to work during a strike.
International Longshoremen 's and Warehousemen 's Union
(Sunset Line and Twine Company), 79 NLRB 1487. The fine
in this case , being clearly excessive , it is necessarily
unreasonable.
It has been noted that in imposing this fine on Coats,
Respondent made no effort to determine her economic or
family circumstances . There is no evidence that anyone had
ever been fined before by Respondent for working during a
strike. Bussey was fined at a different5 rate than Coats and
there is no explanation in the record for the difference.
Indeed it may be that Bussey's financial condition was
much better than that of Coats. No warning that any sort of
fine would be imposed was given to Coats before she
returned to work . Respondent's action in imposing the
excessive and unreasonable fine on Coats was arbitrary and
amounted to nothing more than a bare fiat . There is no
evidence that Respondent resorted to any standard or rule
of reason in fining Coats almost 25 percent more than she
earned during the strike . Such an arbitrary , excessive fine
can act only as a total deterrent to exercising the protected
right of a union member to work during a strike and the
attempted court enforcement constitutes restraint and
coercion within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the
Act. The fine of Coats was clearly unreasonable and the
fact that the imposition of the fine took place beyond the
10(b) period does not negate the finding of a violation
because the attempted court enforcement establishes the
continuing nature of Respondent's efforts to collect the
arbitrary and unreasonable fine. The Boeing Company, 173
NLRB No. 71.
The Supreme Court in Allis-Chalmers, supra, 65 LRRM
2451, stated:
It was because the national labor policy vested unions
with power to order the relations of employees with
their employer that this Court found it necessary to
fashion the duty of fair representation. That duty "has
stood as a bulwark to prevent arbitrary union conduct
against individuals stripped of traditional forms of
redress by the provisions of federal labor law ." Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182... .
Integral to this federal labor policy has been the
power in the chosen union to protect against erosion its
status under that policy through reasonable discipline of
members who violate rules and regulations governing
membership.... [Emphasis supplied.]
I read the Court's decision as holding that a union may
fine a member to protect its status but not at an arbitrary or
unreasonable rate which affects the member 's employment
status.
Coats was engaging in statutorily protected activity and
Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) by court action to
collect an excessive , arbitrary , and unreasonable fine
imposed on her by Respondent' s mere fiat.
In Scofield et. al. v. N.L.R.B., 70 LRRM 3105, the
Supreme Court, in discussing its holding in Allis-Chalmers,
supra, stated, "A union rule, duly adopted and not the
arbitrary fiat of a union officer , forbidding the crossing of a
picket line during a strike was therefore enforceable against
voluntary union members by expulsion or a reasonable
fine." (Emphasis supplied .) The Court further stated that a
union may enforce a rule which "is reasonably enforced
against union members." (Emphasis supplied .) The Court
further noted that in the case before it, "there is no showing
in the record that the fines were unreasonable or the mere
fiat of a union leader ." Such is not the situation in the
instant case . The evidence establishes that Coats ' fine was
unreasonable and was the mere fiat of the Respondent
which made no inquiry into her financial circumstances.
The court action to collect the arbitrary and unreasonable
fine affects the employment status of Coats and all
Respondent 's members and is proscribed by Section
8(b)(1)(A). Coats' membership in Respondent did not
amount to a consent for the imposition of such a fine. A
finding and conclusion contrary to the one I have here
made would completely eliminate Coats' Section 7 right to
exercise her individual freedom to work during the strike
and render Section 8 (b)(1)(A) of the Act ineffective and
meaningless in a case like that of Coats.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The unfair labor practices of Respondent set forth in
section III, above , occurring in connection with the
operations of the Employer , described in section I, above,
have a close , intimate and substantial relation to trade,
traffic , and commerce among the several States , and tend to
lead to labor disputes , burdening and obstructing com-
merce and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices , it will be recommended that it cease and
desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action
designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact , and on the
entire record in the case , I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Employer is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of the Act.
2. Respondent is a labor organization within the
meaning of the Act.
3. By seeking court enforcement of the arbitrary,
unreasonably large, and excessive fine it imposed on Coats
for exercising her Section 7 right to work during a strike
called by Respondent , thereby affecting Coats' employ-
ment status, Respondent did and has been restraining and
coercing Coats and the Employer's other employees who
are members of Respondent , in the exercise of rights
guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, and thereby has been
engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8(b)(I)(A) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
5 Slightly higher
768 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and upon the entire record in the case, it
is recommended that Respondent, its agents, officers,
representatives, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Seeking court enforcement of arbitrary, or unreason-
ably large, or excessive fines imposed upon Coats or any
other employee members of Respondent for exercising the
right to work during a strike called by Respondent, thereby
affecting Coats' and other members' employment status
and restraining and coercing Coats and other employee
members in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of
the Act.
(b) In any like or related manner, restraining or coercing
employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7
of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which I find
will effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Expunge from any of its records any and all reference
to the fine imposed on Coats and Respondent's attempts to
collect it through a court.
(b) Withdraw and seek dismissal of its court suit against
Coats to collect the fine imposed on Coats by Respondent,
pending in the Municipal Court of the Anaheim-Fullerton
Judicial District, California.
(c) Institute no further action to collect the fine imposed
on Coats.
(d) Reimburse Coats, with 6 percent interest, for any
expenses she may have incurred in defending against
Respondent's court action against her.
(e) Post at its offices in conspicuous places including all
places where notices to members are customarily posted,
copies of the notice attached hereto and marked
"Appendix."6 Copies of said notice on forms provided by
the Regional Director for Region 21 shall, after being duly
signed by a representative of Respondent, be posted by the
Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be
maintained by it for a period of 60 consecutive days
thereafter. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent
to insure that such notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
(f) Promptly mail to said Regional Director signed copies
of the Appendix for posting, the Employer willing, at
conspicuous places in the Employer's Santa Ana plant,
where the Employer posts notices to its employees.
(g) Notify said Regional Director in writing, within 20
days from the receipt of this decision, as to what steps
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.?
6 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the
Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice . In the further
event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States
Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of
Appeals, enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a
Decision and Order."
T In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read : "Notify the Regional Director for
Region 20, in writing , within 10 days from the date of this Order, what
steps it has taken to comply herewith."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To ALL MEMBERS
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial
Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in
order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify you that:
WE WILL NOT seek court enforcement of an arbitrary,
and unreasonably large , and excessive fine we imposed
upon Sophia M. Coats for exercising her right to work
during the strike we had at Uniroyal, Inc., in 1967,
thereby affecting her employment status at Uniroyal,
Inc., and restraining and coercing Coats and our other
employee members in the exercise of their rights
guaranteed in Section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain
or coerce Coats or other employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL expunge from any of our records any and
all reference to the fine we imposed on Coats and our
attempts to collect it through court action.
WE WILL withdraw and seek dismissal of our court
suit against Coats to collect the fine we imposed on
Coats, now pending in the Municipal Court of the
Anaheim-Fullerton Judicial District of California.
WE WILL institute no further action to collect the fine
we imposed on Coats.
WE WILL reimburse Coats, with 6 percent interest, for
any expenses she may have incurred in defending
against our court action against her.
UNITED RUBBER, CORK,
LINOLEUM AND PLASTIC
WORKERS OF AMERICA,
LOCAL 510, AFL-CIO
(Labor Organization)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
If members have any question concerning this notice or
compliance with its provisions, they may communicate
directly with the Board's Regional Office, Eastern Colum-
bia Building,849 South Broadway, Los Angeles, California
90014, Telephone 688-5229.