Royal Manufacturing Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 30, 1969

177 N.L.R.B. 264 (N.L.R.B. 1969)

264 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Royal Manufacturing Company and Textile
Workers Union of America , AFL-CIO-CLC. Case
11-CA-3758
June 30, 1969
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, BROWN, AND JENKINS
On February 13, 1969, Trial Examiner Thomas F.
Maher issued his Decision in the above-entitled case,
finding that the Respondent had not engaged in
certain unfair labor practices as alleged in the
complaint, and recommending that the complaint be
dismissed in its entirety, as set forth in the attached
Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, the General
Counsel filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's
Decision and a supporting brief. The Charging Party
filed a supporting brief to the General Counsel's
exceptions. The Respondent moved to dismiss the
Charging Party's brief on the ground that it did not
as a purported exception comport with rule 102.46
of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor
Relations Board.'
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a
three-member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and the briefs,
and the entire record in this case, and finds merit in
the exceptions. Accordingly, the Board adopts the
Trial Examiner's findings and conclusions only to
the extent consistent herewith.
As found by the Trial Examiner, the record shows
that on Friday, October 11, 1968, the three alleged
discriminatees, Annette Rorie, Beulah McDaniel,
and Sam Watson, asked permission of Plant
Superintendent John Lominac to take the following
Monday off from work because they had been
subpoenaed to appear at a representation hearing
scheduled for that day. Annette Rorie, speaking for
the others, said: "Mr. John, we have subpoenas to
attend a representation hearing on the 14th of
October and we would like the day off." Lominac
responded, "Okay," and then examined Rorie's
subpoena and returned it to her. Mary Winchester,
another employee, was present at the time and
overheard this conversation. He then informed the
three that Graeme Ross, the Respondent's vice
president, was delivering a talk to all employees at
'The Charging Party filed "Exceptions To The Trial Examiner's
Decision In Support of the General Counsel's Brief." Although martfully
styled as "exceptions ," the document is clearly a brief, and as such not
subject to rule 102.46 which outlines the specificity with which exceptions
must be filed . Accordingly , the Respondent ' s motion is denied.
their 2:45 p.m. break in front of the plant. Ross'
statement was not alleged to be in violation of the
Act.
Rorie, McDaniel, and Watson appeared at the
representation hearing on Monday morning, took
seats at the Union's table, and, although not called
to testify, they did offer assistance to the union
representative during the proceeding, in particular
during his examination of company personnel.
Toward the end of the hearing which closed at 11
a.m. the Respondent's counsel, Brown Boswell,
stated for the record that the employees were "in
violation of company rules for failing to report to
work or failing to call in to explain their absence,"
and that they were "to immediately return to
work." Whereupon the union representative took
issue with Attorney Boswell, stating that the
employees "informed their superior that they would
be out, and that they [had] the subpoenas to prove
it." At that point Boswell asked to see the
subpoenas, and the parties went "off the record" for
a brief discussion and the subpenas were returned.
The hearing officer then asked the parties whether
they had anything further to add before
adjournment. Thereupon, the union representative
requested that the record show that the employees
were there pursuant to subpena and had made their
appearance. The Respondent's attorney had nothing
further to present and the proceeding was closed.
The Trial Examiner found that the testimony of
Rorie was in substantial accord with the
representation case record. Further, he found, and
Rorie testified, that Attorney Boswell stated that no
supervisor had the authority to grant these
employees the day off and that they were expected
to return to work after the noon hour. Employee
McDaniel also testified that Boswell had told them
"to report back to work after lunch." As for the
testimony of Watson, the Trial Examiner credited a
statement he gave in an affidavit that "At the end of
the hearing, as the lawyer was leaving, he said he
was ordering the three of us, Bet.. i, Annette and
myself back to work at noon time." The Trial
Examiner discounted as being evasive Watson's
testimony that counsel was about to step outside
with the subpenas, but instead returned them to the
union representative and made no further comment.
After the hearing, the three employees
accompanied by the union representative went back
to the union hall where they signed vouchers for pay
and other papers and, in general, discussed the case.
Around 2:45 p.m. the three employees, who had not
yet eaten lunch and were still in their dress clothes,
left the union headquarters and went home. Their
usual quitting time at the plant was 4:30 p.m., but
they did not return to work or call in to say they
would not be in until the next day. When the
employees reported to work the next day they noted
that their timecards had been pulled and sought out
Lominac for an explanation. He read to them their
separation notice and gave them their wages. The
177 NLRB No. 80
ROYAL MANUFACTURING CO.
termination slip stated simply that they had been
discharged for unexplained absence from work on
the preceding day.
The Trial Examiner concluded that the employees
were terminated for not obeying a lawful order to
return to work and, finding no evidence that
attendance at the hearing precipitated their
discharge or that Board processes were thereby
impeded, recommended that the complaint be
dismissed in its entirety. As for the testimony that
the dischargees were given the day off, he found that
any such permission was rescinded at the end of the
hearing and that the employees had no justifiable
excuse for not going back to the plant after leaving
the union hall. Beyond that, the Examiner reasoned
that the subpoena would have clothed the employees
with an immunity from employer control only while
the proceeding was actually in progress, but not
afterward when they were conducting union related
business.
We find merit in the General Counsel's
exceptions. That the employees were given the day
off by Superintendent Lominac is not disputed. That
permission was countermanded near the end of the
representation proceeding is in dispute. Upon a
careful consideration of all the relevant evidence in
this case, we find that the Respondent's counsel did
not reiterate his demand after he returned the
subpoenas. Coming as it did from a stranger to
these employees, the order understandably had the
markings of an intemperate command without
foundation because the employees had indeed
complied with company rules when they requested
Lominac to give them the day off. To say that the
three had not obtained permission, as Respondent's
counsel did, was clearly unfounded because they had
been granted permission in the customary manner.
Further, there was no indication by Lominac that
someone above him in the Company had to add his
approval. On the contrary, the evidence shows that
in the past Lominac had on many occasions given
them time off and more than once gave them time
off with pay.
When the Respondent's attorney made his
statement, the union representative objected and
offered the subpenas as proof of the justified
absences of the employees. Counsel then asked that
they go off the record. There is an indication in the
testimony of Annette Rorie that the Respondent's
counsel asserted that no supervisor had authority to
grant time off. If this was said, and the record offers
nothing that would cause us to find otherwise, then
the Respondent, through counsel, was formulating a
novel rule to which it clearly had not adhered in the
past. We deem this remark, coupled with the
assertion that the employees were then in violation
of plant rules or without permission , to be further
indication of the Respondent' s intention to deal with
these employees in a discriminatory manner,
because the record supports the finding that the
plant supervisor had authority to excuse absence.
265
Other testimony to the effect that at the end of the
hearing as counsel was leaving he told the employees
to go back to work is at best ambiguous in that it
could be merely the witnesses' summations of
counsel's order which appeared on the record or
something that was said after the parties went off
the record.- In any case, it is irrebuttable that all
three dischargees testified that nothing more was
said by the Respondent's counsel after the subpenas
had been read and returned. We accordingly find the
affidavit of Watson to be ambiguous on this relevant
point and the Trial Examiner's reliance on it
misplaced. Watson clearly testified that the
Respondent's lawyer was silent and did not
elaborate again on his demand to return to work
after viewing the subpoenas.
Further, we find that the Respondent's announced
reason for the discharges was pretextual, and that
the employees were in fact fired for their expressed
interest in the Union. In so concluding, we take
special note of the disparate treatment meted out to
these three longtime workers. Past practice indicated
that employees were given an opportunity to explain
the reason for their absence from work. Generally,
no disciplinary action was taken except that
employees were not compensated for the time
missed from work. The record does not reveal that
the employees in the instant case had ever been
disciplined for absenteeism. All had been
complimented for their work and each of them had
been with the Respondent for some time; Rorie,
McDaniel, and Watson had been with the
Respondent for 2, 3, and 16 years, respectively.'
Also, we note that Respondent's counsel at the
representation hearing alleged that no supervisor
had authority to grant time off. This utterance, if
true, must have been a rule formulated especially for
these three employees, for there is no question but
that supervisors, and in particular Plant
Superintendent Lominac, not only had the authority
to permit absences, but also exercised that authority.
In summary, to us it appears that the discharges
were motivated by the protected concerted activity
of these employees on behalf of the Union and the
reason given by the Respondent is pretextual, and
that, therefore, the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act, as amended. We do not
rest our conclusion on one incident but rather on the
totality of events that transpired. Specifically, we
rely on the finding that the employees were given
the day off, that the Respondent tried to vitiate that
permission by taking the position that the
dischargees were in violation of company rules and
had not been given permission when, in fact, they
had complied with customary practice, and that the
Respondent acted arbitrarily without just cause in
'Indeed , it appears the discharge penalty was out of proportion to the
alleged misconduct especially since absenteeism was prevalent and, as far
as the record shows, was excused. As the Trial Examiner stated , and the
Board adopted in Newland Knitting Mills, 165 NLRB No 104•
266 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
not allowing them a chance to present their case.'
We are also of the opinion that such conduct
impeded Board processes in that it was precipitated
by these employees' appearance in support of the
Union pursuant to subpena at a representation
hearing . Employer conduct which penalizes
employees for their participation in such proceedings
unquestionably interferes with the Board's duty to
maintain an open , impartial forum in administering
the Act." We therefore find that the Respondent has
also violated Section 8(a)(4).s
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board orders that the Respondent, Royal
Manufacturing Company, Charlotte, North
Carolina, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall take the following action:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discharging employees or exercising other
reprisals against them for participating in Board
proceedings or engaging in union activities.
(b) In any other manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise
of their rights to self-organization, to form labor
organizations, to join or assist Textile Workers
Union of America, AFL-CIO-CLC, or any other
labor organization, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing , and to engage
in any other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining, or other mutual aid or
protection, or to refrain from any or all such
activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is
necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer Annette Rorie, Beulah Mae McDaniel,
and Sam Watson immediate and full reinstatement
to their former or substantially equivalent positions
without prejudice to their seniority or other rights
and privileges previously enjoyed and make them
whole for any loss they may have suffered by reason
of their discharges by payment to each of them of a
sum of money equal to the amount which each
would normally have earned as wages from October
15, 1968, to the date of offer of reinstatement, less
their net earnings , to which is to be added interest at
the rate of 6 percent per annum in accordance with
the formula set forth in F. W. Woolworth
The failure of [the dischargcesl to return to the plant , if at all improper,
is at worst more akin to common absenteeism than to any other breach
of discipline It is not analogous to any serious disciplinary breach which
in ordinary industrial practice would be readily accepted as cause for the
maximum disciplinary penalty on the basis of a single offense
'In our view it is immaterial whether Respondent's counsel repeated to
the employees his "order " to return to work after viewing the subpoenas,
though for the reasons set out earlier , we would find that he did not repeat
it, if the matter were material
See Newland Knitting Mills. supra , and the cases cited therein.
'In light of our conclusion that there is merit to the General Counsel's
exceptions , and that they are supported by a preponderance of the record
evidence in this case , we deem it unnecessary to discuss the other reasons
advanced by the Charging Party for overruling the Trial Examiner.
Company, 90 NLRB 289, and Isis Plumbing &
Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716.
(b) Notify the above-named employees if presently
serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of
their right to full reinstatement upon application in
accordance with the Selective Service Act and the
Universal Military Training and Service Act, as
amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces.
(c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to
the Board or its agents, for examination and
copying, all payroll records, social security payment
records, timecards, personnel records and reports,
and all other records relevant and necessary to a
determination of compliance with paragraph 2(a)
above.
(d) Post at its Charlotte, North Carolina, place of
business , copies of the attached notice marked
"Appendix."' Copies of said notice to be furnished
by the Regional Director for Region 11, after being
duly signed by Respondent's representative, shall be
posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and
be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days
thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent
to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
(e) Notify said Regional Director, in writing,
within 10 days from the receipt of this Decision,
what steps Respondent has taken to comply
herewith.
'In the event that the Board ' s Order is enforced by a decree of a United
States Court of Appeals , the words "a Decree of the United States Court
of Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a
Decision and Order "
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National
Labor Relations Board and in order to effectuate the
policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended,
we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT discharge employees or exercise other
reprisals against them for participating in Board
proceedings or engaging in union activities.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of
their rights to self-organization, to form labor
organizations, to join or assist Textile Workers of
America, AFL-CIO-CLC, or any other labor
organization , to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing , or to engage in
any other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining , or other mutual aid or protection,
or to refrain from any or all such activities.
WE WILL offer to Annette Rorie, Beulah Mae
McDaniel , and Sam Watson immediate and full
reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent
positions without prejudice to their seniority or other
rights and privileges , and WE WILL make them whole for
any loss they may have suffered as a result of the
discrimination against them with interest at 6 percent.
ROYAL MANUFACTURING CO.
WE WILL notify the above-named employees if
presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United
States of their right to full reinstatement upon
application in accordance with the Selective Service Act
and Universal Military Training and Service Act, as
amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces.
Dated By
ROYAL MANUFACTURING
COMPANY
(Employer)
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered , defaced,
or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice
or compliance with its provisions , they may communicate
directly with the Board ' s Regional Office, 1624 Wachovia
Building , 301 North Main Street, Winston -Salem, North
Carolina 27101 , Telephone 919-723-9211 , Extension 360.
TRIAL EXAMINER 'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
THOMAS F . MAHER , Trial Examiner : Upon a charge
filed on October 15 , 1968, by Textile Workers of
America, AFL-CIO, herein referred to as the Union, the
Regional Director for Region 11 of the National Labor
Relations Board , herein called the Board, on November
21, 1968 , issued a complaint on behalf of the General
Counsel of the Board against Royal Manufacturing
Company , Respondent herein , alleging violations of
Section 8 (a)(1), (3), and (4) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended (29 U.S .C. Sec . 151, et seq.),
herein called the Act . In its duly filed Answer
Respondent , while admitting certain allegations of the
complaint , denied the commission of any unfair labor
practice . Pursuant to notice a trial was held before me in
Charlotte , North Carolina , where all parties were present,
represented , and afforded a full opportunity to be heard,
present oral arguments , and file briefs with me. Briefs
were filed on February 5, 1969.
Upon consideration of the entire record , including the
briefs submitted , and specifically upon my observation of
each witness appearing before me, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
Respondent Royal Manufacturing Company is a New
Jersey corporation with a place of)usiness at Charlotte,
North Carolina , where it is engaged in the processing and
manufacturing of cotton and syn thetic products. During
the past 12 months, being a representative period,
Respondent manufactured , sold, and shipped from its
Charlotte , North Carolina, plant, nshed products valued
in excess of $50,000 directly to poi is in the United States
outside the State of North Carotin .
Upon the foregoing admitted fats I conclude and find
that Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) nd (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
267
It is admitted and I accordingly conclude and find that
Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, the
Charging Union herein , is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ISSUE
The extent of immunity from discipline derived from
participation in an official Board hearing.
IV. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Sequence of Events
On Friday, October 11, 1968, Employee Annette Rorie,
accompanied by employees Beulah McDaniel and Sam
Watson , and in the presence of employee Mary
Winchester , sought out Plant Superintendent John
Lominac and told him they had "subpoenas to attend a
representation hearing ' on the 14th of October and we
would like the day off.": Lominac said , "okay." He was
(reluctant to read the subpoena shown to him but did so
and returned it to Miss Rorie . He then told the employees
that Respondent 's president , Graeme Ross, wished to talk
to all of the employees at the 2 :45 p.m . break . Ross spoke
to the employees as scheduled and in his speech (not
alleged to be in violation of the Act) stated the
Respondent' s position opposing the organization of its
employees . Thus, according to Miss Rorie , he told them
that "the Union was only just something only for taking
our money, and he made some comparisons as to how the
Union didn ' t work out with other companies."
The hearing in Case 11-RC-2912 convened on Monday
morning, October 14, as scheduled , and employees Rorie,
McDaniel and Watson were present pursuant to their
subpenas which directed them to appear before a
designated official of the Board at a designated time and
place "to testify" in a designated matter. All three
employees sat at the counsel table with the Union's
representative and consulted with him from time to time
throughout the proceeding . The hearing closed at 11 a.m.
On or about the time the hearing actually closed
Attorney Brown Boswell, representing the Company in the
representation matter, stated on the record:
Mr. Boswell : The Company would like for the record
to show that there are a number of employees present
today who are in violation of company rules for failing
to report to work or failing to call in to explain their
absence in that they are expected to immediately return
to work.
Whereupon the union representative took issue which
Boswell , stating, "The Union takes the opposite position,
that they informed their superior that they would be out,
and they have subpenas to prove it ." Attorney Brown then
asked to see the subpenas.
Because this particular incident is critical to a full
understanding of what followed the testimony of all three
'The hearing in Case 11-RC-2812 conducted in the Public Library,
Charlotte, North Carolina , on October 14, 1968.
'The credited testimony of Employee Rorie whose account of the
incidents herein form the basis of my findings . To the extent that it is
corroborative I also rely upon the testimony of Employees Watson,
McDaniel and Winchester.
I
268 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
principals to the event must necessarily be reviewed. Thus
employee Rorie testified substantially in accord with the
above-quoted excerpt of the R case record , stating
specifically that "he requested their presence back to work
after noon time ." On cross-examination she again testified
that the company lawyer instructed them to go back to
the plant at the close of the hearing , and that no one
protested. She also stated that she heard the attorney tell
the Union representative that no supervisor had authority
to give them the day off and once again admitted that the
attorney, in the presence of President Ross, told them,
"We want you to go back to the plant and go to work."
Employee McDaniel also described the incident as it
was detailed in the representation case record quoted
above . She also stated that no one told them at the
hearing why it was necessary to return to work. On
cross-examination Miss McDaniel repeated her testimony
that Attorney Boswell told them "he want them to report
back to work after lunch."
Employee Watson gave a Board agent an affidavit
during the investigative stages of the case . Therein he
stated : "At the end of the hearing, as the lawyer was
leaving, he said he was ordering the three of us, Beulah,
Annette and myself back to work at noon time."' When
confronted with this statement at the hearing Watson,
after much evasion , affirmed it, stating , "Yes, he made
that statement ." To the extent that Watson ' s evasive
testimony suggests the contrary , upon my observation of
him as he testified , I reject it, and rely only upon the
statement in the affidavit and his grudging admission of it.
At the close of the hearing all three employees, in the
company of the Union' s representatives , returned to the
Union' s headquarters where they engaged in discussions
involving the hearing and union matters generally. They
remained there until 2:45 p .m. and then left for home.
Although it was still some time before their normal 4:30
p.m. quitting time none of the three made any effort to
report for work as directed . In this respect it is to be
noted that all three were dressed in their good clothing.
On the following morning the three absentees of the
previous day reported to work to find their timecards
missing from their usual places in the rack. When they
reported to Superintendent Lominac he presented them
with their wages to date and read to them from notes to
the effect that each was being discharged for unexplained
absence from their job on the entire afternoon of October
14 after a direct order to be present at work. Each
received a termination notice bearing the same reason for
discharge.
B. Conclusions
The thrust of the proof in this matter , judging from the
evidence adduced by the General Counsel, appears to be
that participation in a Board proceeding, here a
representation matter, carries with it an immunity from
employer discipline and control. I cannot agree . It is one
thing to discharge an employee because he has given his
testimony under the Act or has been in attendance at a
'There was some question at the hearing as to Watson's ability to read
It is to be noted that his affidavit, which appears in the record , bears an
amendment signed and sworn to by him wherein he states that his full
statement was read to him by counsel for the General Counsel and that he
subscribes to it as true. I accordingly rely fully upon the matter quoted
above.
hearing, for that is precisely what Section 8(a)(4)
prohibits. It is something else again , however, to discharge
an employee for refusing to follow a proper order. That is
this case.
Essential to any finding that the three employees'
discharges were caused by their presence at the hearing
would be proof of that very fact - and disproof of any
other given reason . Nowhere in this record, however, is
there even the suggestion that it was the employees'
attendance at the hearing that motivated Respondent's
action . It is true , of course , that on the previous Friday
Plant Superintendent Lominac was not overcome with
delight that three of his complement would not be at work
on Monday morning . But it is equally evident that he
manifest no opposition to their attendance when shown
their subpenas . I must conclude and find , therefore, that
nothing in Lominac's conduct or statements would suggest
a trace of discriminatory intent.
It is equally true that the three employees, and all the
others, were addressed by the Company' s president in
what was referred to in oral argument as an antiunion
speech but described otherwise in the credited testimony
as an expression of the Company's viewpoint respecting
the Union. Viewing such remarks in the light of an
employer 's statutory right to so express himself and in the
absence of any unfair labor practice charge directed to it
or of any claim that the speech was such as to destroy the
laboratory conditions favored in representation matters,' I
see nothing in President Ross ' remarks, as summarized by
General Counsel' s witnesses, that would suggest a motive
on Respondent's part to visit reprisal upon those who
actively supported the Union.
On the contrary, the evidence in this matter, all
supplied by General Counsel in his case-in-chief, amply
supports several critical conclusions : (1) the three
employees were specifically told to report back to work
upon the conclusion of the hearing , (2) they heard these
instructions, given to them by the Company's attorney in
the presence of its president , and finally, (3) they chose to
ignore the instructions given to them and failed to report
to work until the following morning.
I am not persuaded by arguments offered in opposition
to the foregoing conclusions which I deem so obvious.
Thus it is claimed that the employees had initially asked
for and were given the day off. The short answer to this is
their own testimony that the last instructions they received
were to get back to work. Nor does the nature of the
subpoena lend any more comfort to their case. I cannot
interpret that document as requiring a subpoened witness
not only testify at the hearing but as permitting him
thereafter to participate in such related union business as
may arise . I am aware of no official usage of subpoenas
for the prosecution of private, nongovernmental business.
And finally, I am not impressed by the difficulties
inherent in appearing at a hearing in dress clothing and
thereafter, at 11 a.m., being required to change to work
clothing and go to work. The distances in the Charlotte
area are not so great nor the task of changing to one's
work clothes so time consuming as to make going to work
in the afternoon an impossible or even a difficult task.
Upon the foregoing, I would conclude and find that
employees Annette Rorie , Beulah McDaniel , and Sam
Watson were each discharged for failing to report to work
in response to a direct order to do so, as stated to each in
'General Shoe Corp, 77 NLRB 124.
ROYAL MANUFACTURING CO. 269
their respective termination slips . I accordingly
recommend that the complaint alleging that these
discharges were in violation of Section 8(a)(l), (3), and (4)
be dismissed.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
It is recommended that the complaint in this matter be
dismissed in its entirety.