Royal Himmel Distilling Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsApr 30, 1973

203 N.L.R.B. 370 (N.L.R.B. 1973)

370 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Royal Himmel Distilling Company and Gerald Gold- man. Case 21 -CA-11053 April 30, 1973 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS JENKINS , KENNEDY, AND PENELLO On January 31, 1973, Administrative Law Judge Maurice M. Miller issued the attached Decision in this proceeding . Thereafter , the General Counsel filed exceptions and a supporting brief and the Respondent filed an answering brief.' Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended , the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,2 and conclusions 3 of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela- tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that the Respondent, Royal Himmel Distilling Company, Los Angeles, California, its officers, agents , successors, and assigns , shall take the action set forth in said Order. i The Respondent did not file exceptions 2 The General Counsel has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Administrative Law Judge It is the Board 's established policy not to overrule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to credibili- ty unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions were incorrect Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc, 91 NLRB 544, enfd. 188 F 2d 362 (C A 3). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings. 3 The General Counsel has excepted to the Administrative Law Judge's discussion of Respondent 's right to unilaterally grant wage increases in sec III(c)(2) par. six of sec Ill(C)(2)(a) of his decision on the ground that the Administrative Law Judge erred in his interpretation of the applicable law The Respondent concurs. As it is well established that an employer can only make unilateral changes in working conditions consistent with its rejected offer to a union after bargaining has reached an impasse , to the extent that the Administrative Law Judge's discussion is inconsistent with this principle it is hereby corrected. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE MAURICE M. MILLER, Administrative Law Judge: Upon a charge filed June 22, 1972, and duly served, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board caused a Complaint and Notice of Hearing dated August 25, 1972, to be issued and served upon Royal Himmel Distilling Com- pany, designated as Respondent within this Decision. Therein, Respondent was charged with the commission of unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the mean- ing of Section 8(axl) and (5) of the National Labor Rela- tions Act, as amended . 61 Stat . 136, 73 Stat. 519 . Through its answer , duly filed, Respondent has conceded certain factual allegations within General Counsel 's Complaint, but has denied the commission of any unfair labor practice. Pursuant to notice , a hearing with respect to the issues was held at Los Angeles , California , on November 8, 1972, before me. The General Counsel , Respondent , and Com- plainant were represented by counsel. Gerald Goldman, Complainant herein on behalf of Food Processors , Packers, Warehousemen and Clerical Employees , Local No. 547, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware- housemen and Helpers of America, noted his appearance for the record , declared his readiness to leave this case's presentation in General Counsel 's hands, and-thereafter- participated briefly. The record reflects his waiver of protest with respect to matters which transpired following his de- parture . Each party was afforded a full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross -examine witnesses, and to in- troduce evidence pertinent to the issues. Since the hearing's close , briefs have been received from General Counsel's representative and Respondent 's counsel ; these briefs have been duly considered. FINDINGS OF FACT Upon the entire testimonial record , documentary evi- dence received , and my observation of the witnesses, I make the following findings of fact: I JURISDICTION Respondent raises no question herein with respect to General Counsel's jurisdictional claim. Upon the Complaint 's relevant factual declarations-specifically, those set forth in detail within the second paragraph there- of-which are conceded to be correct, and upon which I rely, I find that Respondent herein was , throughout the period with which this case is concerned, and remains, an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act, engaged in commerce and business operations which affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the statute. The Royal Himmel Distilling Company, 195 NLRB 39. Further, with due regard for presently applicable juris- dictional standards , I find assertion of the Board's jurisdic- tion in this case warranted and necessary to effectuate statutory objectives. II THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Food Processors , Packers, Warehousemen and Clerical Employees, Local No . 547, International Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America , designated as Complainant Union within this De- cision , is, and at all times material herein has been , a labor 203 NLRB No. 62 ROYAL HIMMEL DISTILLING CO. organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act, as amended , which admits certain of Respondent's employ- ees to membership. III THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Issues Within his Complaint, General Counsel contends that during May, June, and July, 1972, particularly, the Respon- dent, through its president, Mickey Beckenfeld, promised employees increased benefits if they would sign a petition seeking Complainant Union's decertification as their bar- gaining representative ; that he threatened employees with a loss of benefits should they fail to sign such a petition; that he solicited, directed, and assisted Respondent's employees to sign the petition ; and that he met with Respondent's workers and bargained with them directly concerning wag- es, hours, and conditions of work, outside the presence of Complainant Union's representatives. Respondent's coun- sel-conceding that Complainant Union has been, since December 10, 1970, the certified representative of Respondent 's employees within a designated unit found ap- propriate for collective-bargaining purposes-pleads a lack of knowledge with respect to whether Complainant Union is still entitled, currently, to claim such representative status. General Counsel's charges, with respect to President Beckenfeld's purportedly improper conduct, are categori- cally denied. B. Facts 1. Background With respect to this case's relevant background, certain matters are conceded. Specifically, Respondent concedes that all production, maintenance , shipping and receiving employees, and warehousemen employed at its facility lo- cated at 2417 East 26th Street, Vernon, California, exclud- ing office clerical employees, professional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the statute. Further, Respondent concedes that, on December 2,1970, a majority of the firm's employees, within the bargaining unit just de- scribed, through a Board-conducted, secret ballot vote, de- signated and selected Complainant Union as their representative for collective-bargaining purposes, and that Complainant Union was certified, on December 10, thereaf- ter, as their exclusive collective-bargaining representative, by virtue of Section 9(a) of the statute. Respondent concedes, further, that on or about January 25, 1972, this Board issued a Decision and Order wherein it found Respondent had violated, and was violating, Sec- tion 8(a)(5) of the statute, by failing and refusing to bargain with Complainant Union in good faith. The Royal Himmel Distilling Company, supra. Therein Respondent was ordered to bargain collectively, upon request, with Complainant Union ; to provide certain relevant and essential informa- tion which Complainant Union had previously sought; and, should an understanding be reached, to embody such un- 371 derstanding , upon request, within a signed agreement. Gen- eral Counsel alleges , within his present Complaint, that this Board, further, ordered the period within which Respon- dent would be required to bargain extended "for a period of not less than one year" from such time as Respondent has complied with its directive . Respondent 's counsel herein- though he concedes the promulgation of this Board 's Deci- sion and Order just noted-denies that there was any provi- sion within the Board's Order regarding an extension of the period during which Respondent would be considered obli- gated to bargain . Reference to the Board 's Decision, howev- er, does reveal its concurrence with the Trial Examiner's prior remedial recommendation that: "In view of the com- plete failure of the Respondent to bargain in good faith, it will also be recommended [that] the bargaining period shall not be deemed to have commenced until such time as Re- spondent does comply with the Remedy herein, and shall extend for a period of not less than one year from said date." This Board, within its Decision, did affirm the Trial Examiner's rulings, findings , and conclusions , and did adopt his Recommended Order. The parties have stipulat- ed, further, that following the various May-July events with which this case is concerned, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit entered its decree with respect to this Board's prior case, dated October 2, 1972; thereby, this Board's Order against Respondent herein was granted enforcement, by default. The current status of renewed contractual nego- tiations between Respondent's spokesman and Complain- ant Union's representatives , so far as they may be material, will be noted, within this decision, hereinafter. 2. President Beckenfeld 's alleged conversation with Gutirrez Respondent 's president and sole shareholder , Beckenfeld, likewise functions as president and sole shareholder of Mu- tual Wholesale Liquor Company, a separately incorporated firm which wholesales and distributes various alcoholic bev- erage products. Throughout the period with which this case is concerned, his principal office was maintained within Mutual Wholesale's facility, located some "ten or twelve" blocks distant from Respondent's plant. According to Beck- enfeld, whose testimony, in this respect, stands without con- tradiction, he normally visits Royal Himmel's premises no more than once every 4 or 6 weeks, and, when he does so, normally spends very little time there. Respondent's pro- ductive operations are directly supervised by Sandy Dun- can, plant superintendent. However, sometime during late May or early June 1972, employee Manuel de Jesus Gutirrez declared he was ap- proached by President Beckenfeld while working in Respondent's plant. Following a preliminary conversation- al gambit, Gutirrez testified: ... He [Beckenfeld] started saying things about the Union . . . He said that he would like to give me more money, but he couldn't do it because the Union was tying up his hands . . . [H]e told me to talk to the others and see if we [could] get together and come here ... Well, now, I know he . . . referred to this place [the Board's Regional Office] but at that time he told me he could give me an address where we could go to 372 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD and ask to have another election . He told me to try to talk to the other people in reference to that . . . Well, to ask the people if they would like some changes, if they wanted to make a petition either against or in favor of the Union and after that he could pay us more. Respondent 's president was told , so Gutirrez recalled, that he [Gutirrez] held union membership , and could not comply with these suggestions ; the employee commented , further, that he wanted no "trouble" with Beckenfeld , if he desired union representation . Respondent 's president, according to Gutirrez, replied that it made no difference "for him" whether the latter wanted continued union representation, or whether he wanted to work without such representation. Confronted with this testimony , Beckenfeld's rebuttal was succinct ; he testified that he and Gutirrez had never had such a conversation . He recalled , merely , that Gutirrez had been notified , once , with regard to his qualification following his completion of 2 years ' service for Respondent 's pension plan, and that he had been told he could confer with a visiting insurance company representa- tive , qualified to explain the plan 's provisions. Upon this record , we are confronted, herein, with a threshold credibility problem . My determination with re- spect thereto , however, will be deferred , pending a recapitu- lation of further relevant developments within Re- spondent's plant. 3. The plant meeting Sometime during early June , Beckenfeld met with Respondent 's production workers . Their meeting took place within Respondent 's plant lunchroom , to which Plant Su- perintendent Duncan had summoned the firm's employees. Some "ten" workers-the plant 's total complement-were present . Since most of them were , concededly, fluent in Spanish only, which language Beckenfeld did not speak or comprehend, the latter had, beforehand , requested employ- ee Maggie Sperlock, who was bilingual , to serve as his trans- lator . Respondent 's president did not-so far as the present record shows-request Plant Superintendent Duncan, who was likewise bilingual , to provide this service ; no reason for his failure to do so has been suggested . Ralph Bert, Mutual Wholesale 's warehouse superintendent, was also present. The record warrants determinations , which I make , that he was then visiting Respondent 's plant on Mutual Wholesale 's business; that Beckenfeld , when he arrived, had fortuitously discovered him [Bert] there ; and that Respondent's president, knowing that he could speak Span- ish, had requested him, likewise , to attend the scheduled employee meeting , for the purpose of serving as a translator, should his services be required. The particular circumstances which had preceded and generated Beckenfeld 's decision to meet with his production line workers have been , herein, variously described by Gen- eral Counsel 's and Respondent 's witnesses , who proffered somewhat divergent testimony ; further, General Counsel's representative and Respondent 's counsel differ, with re- spect to that testimony 's significance. The record reflects a general testimonial consensus that Respondent 's employees had requested the meeting . Previ- ously, there had been "much talk" within the group , focused upon their generally shared desire for wage raises. Sum- moned as Respondent 's witness , Sperlock testified credibly, within my view, that she and her fellow workers had, like- wise , discussed the possibility that they might "vote the Union out" somehow . And continuing, Sperlock recalled that: Well, the girls , especially, wanted to have a meeting with Mr. Beckenfeld and there was the supervisor and his name is [Joe or Jose] and we asked him to ask Mr. Beckenfeld that we would like to have a meeting with him. . . . We spoke about it before that we were trying to get the Union out, to vote the Union out . . . and we asked him [Joe] that we would like to know what we could do about it. When cross-examined , however, Sperlock conceded, sub- stantially , that their request for a meeting with President Beckenfeld had followed several conversations wherein the firm's bottling line inspector-known to Respondent's workers as "Joe" or "Jose" merely-had initially suggested the possibility of their union representative 's decertification. Specifically, she testified that she had first learned from "Joe" that Respondent's workers might be entitled to a second election , since more than 1 year had passed follow-, ing their first one ; Sperlock declared that this communica- tion had sparked their request for a meeting . Her further testimony , in this connection , reads as follows: This Jose who was working there he was always talk- ing to us about the Union and all this and-Jose is the supervisor who used to work there some time and he was always talking to us about the Union, how to get out of it and sometimes he would say, like I [Jose] didn't vote. I didn 't have any vote ... . Q. [Mr. Goldman ] He would talk to you? A. Yes, sir, all the time . . . . Well, yeah, to get out of the Union if we wanted to get a raise , that is right , because he didn't think that-he didn't think that the Union will ever get in there ... . Q. And Mr. Jose , whatever his last name is, suggest- ed what to you? A. That we could have another elec- tion . . . I think he worked with the Union, I don't know, but he said after a year and nothing happened that you are entitled to have another election. Q. Then, you and Jose go to see Mr . Beckenfeld, what happens then ? A. No, I don't go to see him, Jose did. He went by himself . . . Yes. We asked for a meeting and then he went and seen Mr. Beckenfeld, I suppose. I don't know. The present record shows, otherwise, that Sperlock 's suppo- sition was correct . And Beckenfeld's testimonial recitals, which I credit in this particular connection , reveal that he promised to consult counsel with respect to Jose's request; that he subsequently did so; and that, following such con- sultation, he requested Duncan to arrange a meeting where- in questions propounded by Respondent's workers would be answered. Upon this record , General Counsel suggests that since "Joe" or "Jose" has functioned as Respondent 's bottling line inspector and had generally been considered a supervi- sor by Respondent 's plant workers , he should be considered a supervisor within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the statute , for whose conduct, detailed in Sperlock's testimony, ROYAL HIMMEL DISTILLING CO. 373 Respondent should be considered responsible. Respondent, however, contends that "Joe" or "Jose" had no authority to hire, discipline, or discharge workers; that he had no au- thority even to recommend such action; that he merely "watched over" the firm's two bottling lines, checked to see whether bottle labels and revenue stamps had been properly affixed, and checked further to determine whether such bottles, properly labeled and stamped, were being properly packed in cases. President Beckenfeld testified, without contradiction, that, when bottling line workers had prob- lems or difficulties, Plant Superintendent Duncan, rather than Jose, was consulted; further, he declared that Jose had never been given authority to schedule production, and had not participated in preparing production schedules. These contradictory contentions will be considered, fur- ther, within this Decision. For the present, determination seems warranted, merely, that "Joe" or "Jose" had partici- pated, significantly, with respect to various conversations which had precipitated the workers' decision to seek a con- ference with Respondent's president. I so find. When the plant meeting now under consideration was convened, President Beckenfeld opened the discussion- ,speaking English himself-with some remarks which Sper- lock translated. The present record reflects some diversity of recollection with respect to what various workers heard Sperlock report in her translator's capacity. Summoned as Respondent's witness, however, Sperlock was questioned directly with respect to Beckenfeld's remarks. With due re- gard for the record, considered in totality, I credit her prof- fered recapitulation, so far as it goes. Her testimony reads as follows: Well, I can't recall his exact words, but he said that a year had passed since the company had the last elec- tion and we were entitled to have another one. That only two of the people that were still there had voted the last year and that he felt that we should all vote there and that he said that we had our free mind to either vote for the Union or against it. That the compa- ny was starting to grow up a little bit and that we could get some-that he felt that we should get some benefits with it, but if this situation would go on, that he couldn't do anything for us. You see, sir, if I may say, that we were always asking Sandy [Duncan] for a raise all the time . . . . We was asking him for raises, not just me, not just one, ev- erybody .. . Well, I think that was the main sources of the conver- sation. Then, I asked him what can we do to have another election and he told me in order to have anoth- er election we have to come here [the Board office] and ask for it . . . I did ask him how much money could he raise us, you know, if we would vote the Union out. He said he couldn't say anything. He couldn't promise anything. So, I told him that I could come by myself and somebody [Beckenfeld or Duncan] said that it had to be more than just me . . . we had to have some signatures. So, I said, well, maybe after work we can go from here . . . and somebody asked me if I had a car and I said no. Then, I asked either Mr. Beckenfeld or Sandy afterwards if he could bring us here and he said fine , he could bring us after work . . . . No, it wasn't Mr. Beckenfeld . It must have been Sandy. Employee Angela Ramos, testifying previously as General Counsel's witness , had recalled that Beckenfeld said he "couldn't do anything" while his employees remained un- ionized , because-should he raise their wages-the Union could "sue" him . And Employee Hilda Lares, likewise em- ployed on Respondent 's bottling line-though seemingly traumatized by the strangeness and tension of her witness chair experience-had corroborated Ramos' recollection in this respect . Since Sperlock did, subsequently , report herein that Beckenfeld had said he "couldn't do anything" for Respondent's workers if "this situation " continued , her tes- timony substantially paralleled that which Ramos and Lares had proffered ; I credit their somewhat more detailed recitals with respect to this particular segment of Beckenfeld's remarks despite his subsequent testimonial de- nial. Following Beckenfeld 's initial remarks , Sperlock's several questions, and his [Beckenfeld's] replies, some general dis- cussion ensued . With respect thereto , Respondent 's workers have , however , proffered somewhat divergent testimony. The record , considered in totality , constrains me to con- clude that no single witness , herein , can legitimately claim more than partial recollections regarding what was said. Further , with respect to some of them , subconscious ration- alization may well have colored memory. Necessarily , therefore , the situation , within my view, calls for factual determinations based , not upon the complete testimony which one particular witness or several witnesses deemed generally credible may have proffered, but upon some reasonable synthesis , derived from the complete testi- monial record , with due regard for the natural logic of prob- ability . Cf. Galpin Motors, Inc., 183 NLRB 447 , enfd. (C.A. 9, 1972 unreported); Inter-Mountain Dairymen, Inc., 157 NLRB 1590 , 1609-10 ; Phaostron Instrument and Electronics Company, 146 NLRB 996 , enfd . 344 F.2d 855 (C.A. 9); Southeastern Motor Truck Lines, 113 NLRB 1122 , 1124-27, citing N. L.R.B. v . Universal Camera Corporation , 179 F.2d 749 (C.A. 2). My determinations , herein, derive from such a synthesis ; whenever necessary , however, reasons for particular factual conclusions will be noted. During the general discussion which followed Beckenfeld's opening remarks-conducted in Spanish, pri- marily or completely-some worker asked whether Respon- dent had a health plan. Bert, Mutual Wholesale 's warehouse superintendent , volunteered an affirmative reply; he de- clared that employees were eligible to participate , therein, following 6 months ' work . Another worker, then, asked whether Respondent had a pension plan. The warehouse superintendent, so I find, declared that Beckenfeld had such a plan , with workers having 2 years ' seniority qualified to participate . While a witness , Beckenfeld recalled being questioned by Sperlock, who seemed to be translating an- other worker 's question with regard to Respondent 's health insurance program . He testified that he had replied affirma- tively, describing both Respondent 's health insurance pro- gram and its retirement pension fund , and that both Sperlock and Bert had, seemingly , translated his reply. Bert went on to declare , further, that he was covered by Beckenfeld 's plan , and considered it good ; he may have likewise said "something to the effect" that Respondent's 374 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD pension plan was better than a possible Teamsters Union plan, while specifying his reason for that belief . Bert was asked , inter alia , how much Mutual Wholesale's workers were being paid ; when replying , he cited dollar amounts, but proffered no comparison with Respondent 's pay scale. The fact that Mutual Wholesale 's employees were not un- ionized may have been mentioned by someone , other than Respondent 's president , not identified within this case's re- cord , but I find it unnecessary to reach a determination with respect thereto . Sperlock testified , without contradiction, that Mutual Wholesale 's nonunion status was a matter of common knowledge in Respondent 's plant . When queried, further , regarding his own starting wage rate , Mutual Wholesale's warehouse superintendent voluntarily reported both his previous beginning rate of pay, and the rate which he was currently receiving . And when asked , finally, whether Mutual Wholesale's employees were then getting raises, Bert replied affirmatively . The warehouse superintendent did not testify, herein , personally. Though Respondent had planned to call him , counsel learned , belatedly , that he would be unavoidably detained , elsewhere , while this case was being heard . To preclude any possible continuance, herein , counsel thereupon stipulated that Bert , when sum- moned as Respondent 's witness , would have proffered a recital-substantially corroborative of Beckenfeld 's testi- monial recollection-with respect to what the latter had said , plus the replies which he had received , couched in English . Counsel further stipulated , likewise , that Bert would testify consistently with his sworn statement given a Regional Office field examiner some 3 months previously regarding various conversational exchanges with respect to which he had participated during Respondent 's plant meet- ing. My findings with respect thereto , which have just been summarized , reflect a synthesis , therefore , derived from Bert 's sworn statement , together with corrobative testimony proffered by witnesses who testified personally. With mat- ters in this posture , some employee-possibly more than one-declared that he would visit the Board 's Regional Of- fice to seek some resolution regarding the matter of their continued union representation. Someone , so I find , raised the question of transportation ; consistently with Sperlock's testimony, previously noted , I find that she, then , queried whether Plant Superintendent Duncan could provide trans- portation for Respondent 's workers to the Regional Office, after working hours . He declared that he could . Upon this note , the meeting terminated. 4. The decertification petition On June 13, 1972, some 5 or 7 days following the plant meeting, seven of Respondent 's workers , led by Sperlock, were transported , after work , to the Board 's Regional Office location , within two cars. Duncan drove one; the other was driven by someone not designated by name within the pre- sent record. While these workers were visiting the Regional Office , Respondent 's plant superintendent , so I find , waited for them outside. Following a brief solo consultation with a Regional Office representative , Sperlock prepared a handwritten decertifi- cation petition pursuant to the Board representative's sug- gestions with respect to language which she, together with six of Respondent 's other workers , promptly signed. They were told , however, that no Regional Office proceedings could , then , be taken with respect to their petition , since this Board 's previously decided case-wherein Respondent had been charged and found guilty of refusing to bargain collec- tively, in good faith , with the Union certified as their repre- sentative-had not , yet, been closed . The record, previously noted herein , reveals that this Board's Decision and Order, with respect to General Counsel 's prior Section 8(aX5) com- plaint , had been issued January 25, 1972; the Board's peti- tion for judicial enforcement with respect thereto, subsequently filed with the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, was, on June 13 , still pending final disposition. Respondent 's workers then left. Six dispersed homeward; Sperlock , however, returned to Respondent 's plant with Duncan, where her husband was awaiting her. Nine days later, on June 22, the Complainant 's initial charge herein, was filed. C. Conclusions 1. The purported Beckenfeld-Gutirrez conversation As previously noted, Gutirrez' testimony regarding Presi- dent Beckenfeld 's purported conversation with him, which allegedly took place shortly before the June plant meeting herein detailed, has been categorically denied by Respondent 's president . Upon this record , considered in totality, I credit Beckenfeld 's denial , specifically, with re- spect thereto. Gutirrez testified in Spanish , through a translator. While a witness , he declared , inter alia , that he would find it diffi- cult to give thoughtfully considered replies , should he be required to provide English language responses when con- fronted with English language questions . Further, he con- ceded that, while he was in Respondent 's hire, Plant Superintendent Duncan had spoken Spanish when commu- nicating with him, since he could not understand "ev- erything" when English was being spoken. These concessions, within my view, would necessarily raise thresh- old doubts regarding his testimony's probative worth should I determine , arguendo, that Respondent 's president did, re- ally, solicit his personal cooperation, looking toward a pos- sible union decertification. Considered in totality, however, the present record per- suades me that Gutirrez was not , thus, solicited . First: Gen- eral Counsel 's presentation would , seemingly , call for a determination that Gutirrez was the sole plant worker whose cooperation Beckenfeld sought to enlist . I find it difficult to believe , however, that Respondent 's president would have, deliberately, chosen to solicit cooperation or help from a worker-one of two still in Respondent's hire- who had presumably voted during the prior representation election ; who had struck Respondent's plant for 5-1/2 months thereafter ; and who had subsequently resumed work. There were more workers-some of them persons who had crossed the Union's picket line, during the strike, or who had been hired subsequently-whom Beckenfeld could have solicited with a greater prospect of success. Nothing within the present record, however, would warrant a determination that Respondent's president broached the ROYAL HIMMEL DISTILLING CO. 375 subject with them . Second : The record contains credible testimony calling for a determination , which I make despite Gutirrez' contrary protestation , that , while in Respondent's hire , he had been seriously perturbed when Plant Superin- tendent Duncan failed to hire his brother for some presum- ably available work ; Sperlock reported credibly , without subsequent rebuttal or contradiction , that Gutirrez had, sometime during July 1972, declared that , because of his resentment against Respondent 's management, "he would tell the truth and a little bit of lies" when giving his testimo- ny herein . Third: I note Gutirrez ' testimony when proffering his recollections with respect to the June plant meeting, that Respondents president was the person who had , then, report- ed Mutual Wholesale 's workers were making more money than Respondent's personnel ; that they were not unionized; and that they were , nevertheless , covered by health insur- ance , plus a pension plan. General Counsel 's further wit- nesses , when queried , subsequently, regarding the June meeting's discussion , either professed no recollection, or considered Mutual Wholesale's warehouse superintendent responsible for these comments . The testimony which Ra- mos-one of General Counsel 's witnesses-proffered, in this connection , matched that of Sperlock , Respondent's sole "rank -and-file" witness . Mindful of these various con- siderations , I find Gutirrez ' contradictory testimony , gener- ally, undeserving of credence . Fourth : When asked whether he had heard , before the June plant meeting , that some of his fellow workers were "against" continued union repre- sentation , Gutirrez professed a failure of recollection. How- ever, both Ramos , for the General Counsel , and Sperlock, for Respondent, testified that their union representation had been discussed within the plant ; Sperlock's testimony, which I have herein credited , warrants a determination that Respondent 's bottling line inspector , Joe or Jose , had been vocal on the subject . With matters in this posture , Gutirrez' claimed failure to remember plant discussions on that sub- ject, within my view, reflects dissimulation . For these sever- al reasons , I reject his testimony , previously noted, with regard to Beckenfeld's purported promises of higher pay, coupled with a request or suggestion that he should discuss, with fellow workers , the possibility of seeking a new repre- sentation vote. 2. The plant meeting and subsequent developments a. Interference, restraint, and coercion Section 8(a)(1) of the statute makes it unlawful for an employer to instigate and promote a decertification pro- ceeding, or to induce workers to sign any other form of union-repudiating document , particularly where such solici- tations have been strengthened by express or implied threats of reprisal , or promises of economic benefit, N.L.R.B. v. Birmingham Publishing Co., 262 F.2d 2, 7 (C.A. 5). Accord, N.L.R.B. v. Sky Wolf Sales d/b/a Pacific Industries of San Jose, 470 F.2d 827 (C.A. 9, December 7, 1972), enfg. 189 NLRB 933; N.L.R.B. v. Parma Water Lifter Co, 211 F.2d 258, 262 (C.A. 9). Guided by this well-settled decisional principle , I conclude that when Beckenfeld told Respondent 's workers that a year had passed since the Board-conducted election ; that they were "entitled" to re- quest a new representation vote ; that he "felt" they "should" have one ; that this Board's Regional Office was the place where their request should be presented ; that Re- spondent was "starting to grow" somewhat ; that he "felt" the workers should get some "benefits" from their employer's growth ; but that he "couldn't do anything" with respect to raising their wages , while the Union remained their collective-bargaining representative , the Respondent's president was engaged in conduct which interfered with, restrained , and coerced his workers, with respect to their exercise of rights statutorily guaranteed. In reaching this conclusion , I have not relied upon Sperlock's credible testimony that Respondent 's bottling line inspector-Joe/Jose--may have been the first person who declared that Royal Himmel's production workers would be well advised to discard union representation. True , he (Joe/Jose) reportedly did comment , when the Union's representative status was being discussed, that he had not participated , personally , during the prior Board election , which had taken place before he was hired; there- by, Respondent's workers were effectively reminded that most of them , who were, likewise, comparatively recent ac- cessions to Respondent's payroll, were being represented by a labor organization which they had been given no chance to designate or select . True, further, the bottling line inspec- tor had reportedly suggested that they should "get out of the Union" if they wanted raises ; that more than 1 year had passed since the Union's certification ; and that a new vote, whereby the Union might be decertified , could therefore be requested . The record does not warrant a deduction, which I would make , that these comments may, substantially, have motivated the firm's workers , when they requested Joe/Jose to communicate their desire for a conference with Respondent 's president . Nevertheless , I cannot concur with General Counsel's contention , herein , that Respondent should be held liable for the bottling line inspector's decla- ration or suggestions . General Counsel argues that he (Joe/ Jose) should be considered a supervisor . However , the pre- sent record-developed rather sparsely in this connection-will not, within my view, support such a deter- mination . No reliable substantial , or probative testimony has been proffered that Respondent 's bottling line inspector exercised supervisory authority , or held supervisory respon- sibilities within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the statute with respect to Respondent 's plant personnel ; his work seemingly required him merely to check and maintain prop- er operational standards , with respect to Respondent's bot- tling line. I note , further, in this connection, record testimony which reveals that Joe /Jose had not been in Respondent's employ when the December 2, 1970, repre- sentation vote was conducted ; and that his present position was, then , being held by a person no longer in Respondent's hire . No one present , when this case was heard , could recall or report whether the person then serving as Respondent's bottling line inspector had voted during the election, or had been denied a vote because of his claimed or conceded supervisory status . For lack of such information , the posi- tion which Board personnel and concerned parties then took, regarding the bottling line inspector 's status, cannot be considered now. Several witnesses herein when queried regarding Joe/Jose's position did call him a supervisor. The 376 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD record , however , warrants a determination , which I make, that he is considered responsible merely for the mainte- nance of efficient bottling line operations , checking to see whether Respondent's products , processed thereon, have been handled properly ; he does not "supervise" Respondent's personnel . Within his brief , General Counsel contends , alternatively , that Joe/Jose was considered a so- called "conduit ," who carried communications back and forth between Respondent 's plant workers and the firm's managerial personnel . However , nothing within this record will support a conclusion that Respondent 's bottling line inspector regularly functioned as such a communications conduit , with respect to personnel matters . Compare A. W. C., Inc., 162 NLRB 1119 , 1136-37, in this connection. His sole performance which might be thus characterized con- cerned the message, which he carried to Beckenfeld, that Respondent 's plant workers desired a conference to discuss a second representation vote . Such conduct could hardly be considered sufficient to warrant his characterization as Respondent's agent, for statutory purposes. In reaching my previously stated conclusion , I have, how- ever, relied upon Sperlock's credible testimony-supple- mented by that which Ramos and Lares provided-with respect to Beckenfeld 's plant meeting remarks . Their prof- fered recollections clearly warrant a determination that Respondent's president , whatever his subjective intention may have been , did more than merely provide "informa- tion" responsive to questions . He described his personal "feeling" that Respondent's workers "should" have a sec- ond chance to vote , held out the subtly stated prospect that Respondent's workers would be permitted to share "bene- fits" consequent upon their employer 's continued growth, but then declared, specifically or by clear implication, that Respondent could not raise their wages , so long as they remained unionized . When he suggested , in this connection, that should he raise wages , unilaterally , without union con- currence the labor organization could "sue" him , presum- ably trying to convey the thought that he could , then, be charged with committing an unfair labor practice, the Respondent's president misstated his legal position. Under certain circumstances , raises granted without a certified bargaining representative 's concurrence may be privileged. N.L.R.B. v. Crompton -Highland Mills, Inc., 337 U .S. 217, 224 (1949). The Supreme Court therein noted: "We do not here have a unilateral grant of an increase in pay made by an employer after the same proposal has been made by the employer in the course of collective bargaining but has been left unaccepted or even rejected in those negotiations. Such a grant might well carry no disparagement of the collective bargaining proceedings . Instead of being regarded as an unfair labor practice , it might be welcomed by the bargain- ing representative , without prejudice to the rest of the nego- tiations ." In this connection , I note the Board decision wherein respondent was found to have violated Section 8(a)(5) of the statute ; that decision contains a finding that, during the parties' first series of bargaining sessions, Respondent 's counsel had proffered a March 25, 1971, con- tract proposal , which the union representatives subsequent- ly rejected . Assuming , arguendo, that counsel 's submission compassed a wage proposal , Respondent would presumably have been free , thereafter, to grant raises , at least within the limits defined by its rejected proffer , without rendering itself liable to challenge . Further , even now setting aside , for the moment , whatever upper limits the nation 's recently revised wage and price "guidelines" may suggest, the Respondent's president remains privileged to present the Union with a wage proposal which he considers reasonable , and thereaf- ter to grant raises consistent therewith , should his proposal be rejected , or left unaccepted , by union negotiators. Beckenfeld 's statements , thus summarized , clearly consti- tuted solicitation and encouragement , calculated to per- suade Respondent 's plant workers that they would be well advised to repudiate their union representative , and to seek that representative 's decertification . Such solicitation and encouragement was clearly coupled , so I have found, with a not too subtle contingent promise of benefit , latent within the suggestion that their wages could be raised, by some nonspecified amounts , should their designated representa- tive be ousted . Thus construed , Beckenfeld 's remarks, con- sidered with due regard for their total impact upon his relatively unsophisticated listeners , merit Board interdic- tion. Beside relying on record testimony with regard to Beckenfeld's statements , considered in totality, I have weighed the context within which they were made. More particularly , in that connection , I have relied upon a com- posite record showing with respect to various other state- ments which were made, derived from the personally proffered testimony of Sperlock and Ramos coupled with Bert's prior sworn statement , validated for testimonial pur- poses herein pursuant to stipulation . Their composite recol- lections warrant determinations , which I have made, that Beckenfeld's remarks were proffered within a situational context which compassed : ( 1) Bert's several references to Respondent's currently maintained health insurance pro- gram and retirement pension plan, with respect to which company workers might already be qualified to participate, or with respect to which they might thereafter become quali- fied ; (2) his concurrent reference to wage rates then being paid within Beckenfeld's related Mutual Wholesale facility, which Respondent 's workers could, obviously , compare with their own; and (3) Bert's further declaration that Mutu- al Wholesale 's workers , then , were "getting" raises. The warehouse superintendent, concededly a supervisor within Respondent 's sister concern , had been secondarily requested by Beckenfeld to serve as a translator, should his services be required , during the plant meeting now under consideration . There can be no doubt , therefore, that be was, because of his dual status , clothed with either "actual" or "apparent" authority to function as Respondent 's agent; his statements , under the circumstances , clearly constituted part of the total presentation for which Respondent's presi- dent, herein , must be considered responsible . Compare J. A. Conley Company, 181 NLRB 123; American Door Company, Inc., 181 NLRB 37, 43, and cases therein cited. I so find. Within their context , these Bert comments , though prof- fered, nominally , in response to questions, were reasonably calculated to persuade Respondent 's workers that their Employer's currently maintained health insurance and pen- sion programs , which his nonunionized Mutual Wholesale employees likewise enjoyed , would be continued in force, ROYAL HIMMEL DISTILLING CO. and that their wages, like those at Mutual Wholesale, might thereafter be raised, should they succeed in ridding them- selves of union representation. Construed thus, the ware- house superintendent's various remarks contributed integrally-so I find-to Respondent's overall program of solicitation and encouragement, statutorily proscribed. Compare Texas Electric Coop, Inc., 197 NLRB 10; Pembek Oil Corporation,165 NLRB 367,374-375, in this connection. General Counsel herein contends, further, that Plant Su- perintendent Duncan, by declaring his readiness to provide Respondent's workers with transportation to the Board's Regional Office, and by providing such transportation thereafter, assisted Respondent's programmed decertifica- tion maneuver. With matters in their present posture, I find merit in this contention. Had Beckenfeld's meeting remarks, considered with due regard for their total context, been less nocuous, I would hesitate to find Respondent guilty of sta- tutorily forbidden "assistance" merely because the firm's top supervisor had "accommodated" some of his subordi- nates by providing them with transportation, looking to- ward a decertification petition's preparation and presentation , after working hours. Upon this record, howev- er, Duncan's declared readiness to provide the requested transportation, coupled with his subsequent conduct, must be considered, like Bert's various statements previously not- ed, part and parcel of Respondent's statutorily proscribed program or plan. Compare Dayton Blueprint Company, Inc., 193 NLRB 1100 (TXD). So construed, Duncan's declara- tion, plus his subsequent follow through, contributed to Beckenfeld's statutory violation, herein found. Despite these particular conclusions, which the record- within my view-will fully support, no further determina- tion seems warranted, herein, that Respondent's president threatened his employees with their possible loss of benefits currently enjoyed, should they fail to sign a decertification petition. Nor can a determination be considered warranted that Respondent's president, during the meeting now under consideration, really bargained directly with his employees concerning their particular wages, hours, or working condi- tions. The record with respect to these further charges, which General Counsel's complaint does set forth, cannot be considered sufficient, within my view, to sustain conclu- sions that Respondent thus transgressed national labor poli- cy. b. The refusal to bargain If Royal Himmel was still obligated, when Beckenfeld met with Respondent's plant workers, to recognize the Union as their collective-bargaining representative, then the firm's course of conduct, which I have herein found part of a plan reasonably calculated to promote the Union's ouster, would merit characterization as clearly inconsistent with that obligation. Respondent's course of conduct, then, would have violated not only Section 8(a)(1) of the statute, but likewise Section 8(a)(5) therein. See Suburban Homes Corporation, 173 NLRB 497, 500-501; Wahoo Packing Com- pany, 161 NLRB 174, 179; compare Sky Wolf Sales, 189 NLRB 933, fn. 2, in this connection. I find that it did. First: The record, herein, reveals clearly that when Beckenfeld's meeting with Respondent's plant workers was 377 held the firm was functioning subject to a Board Order, promulgated less than 5 months previously, whereby Respon- dent had been directed to bargain collectively with the Union, upon request, and further, should some under- standing be reached, to embody such understanding within a signed contract. Inter aha, the Board's Decision had spe- cifically "affirmed" the Trial Examiner's rulings, findings, and conclusions, and had, likewise, "adopted" his recom- mended Order. The Trial Examiner's Decision had incorpo- rated his remedial recommendation that: In view of the complete failure of the Respondent to bargain in good faith, it will also be recommended [that] the bargaining period shall not be deemed to have commenced until such time as Respondent does comply with the Remedy, herein, and shall extend for a period of not less than one year from said date. Though I note, consistently with Respondent's answer here- in, that no such caveat provision can be found, set forth in so many words, within the Trial Examiner's recommended order -which this Board subsequently adopted without change-this seeming failure to specify the prospective du- ration of Respondent's bargaining obligation provides Re- spondent with no escape hatch herein. Employers found guilty of refusing to bargain with a certified union, who have consequentially been directed to so bargain, must do so, thereafter, for a reasonable time. N.L.R.B. v. Warren Company, Inc., 350 U.S. 107, 112. And this Board, when confronted with a respondent employer's failure or refusal to bargain in good faith, directly following a certification, has consistently held, with judicial concurrence, that: In order to insure that the employees in the appropriate unit will be accorded the services of their selected bar- gaining agent for the period provided by law, we shall construe the initial period of certification as beginning on the date Respondent commences to bargain in good faith with the Union as the recognized bargaining rep- resentative in the appropriate unit. Particularly, in this connection, see Mar-Jac Poultry, Inc., 136 NLRB 785, 786-787; Commerce Company d/b/a/ La- mar Hotel, 140 NLRB 226, 229-231, enfd. 328 F.2d 600, 601 (C.A. 5), cert. denied 379 U.S. 817; Burnett Construction Company, 149 NLRB 1419, 1421-22, enfd. 350 F.2d 57 (C.A. 10). In Mar Jac Poultry, which was a representation case, this Board articulated its policy. Subsequently, within its Commerce Company decision, the Board adopted a Trial Examiner's recommended bargaining order premised upon a direct refusal to bargain which had followed the conclu- sion of the complainant union's original certification year. That recommended order contained no reference, in haec verba, to the fact that the Board had, previously, within a supplemental representation case decision, extended the complaining union's certification period. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals, when it enforced the Board's Order, spe- cifically noted that the agency's formal directive was "not beyond its powers" and that extension of the union's certifi- cation period, within a decision dispositive of the underly- ing representation proceeding, was reasonable and proper. In Burnett Construction, this Board adopted, and the Court of Appeals enforced, a Trial Examiner's recommended or- der which expressly required the respondent employer therein to "Regard, the Union upon resumption of bargain- 378 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ing and for 7 months thereafter as if the initial year follow- ing certification had not expired ." Though the Board does not, currently , draft formal orders with such caveat language when it disposes of Section 8(a)(5) complaints on summary judgment motions, it has modified Trial Examiner's recom- mended orders by the supplementary insertion of "Regard the Union" provisions when requested. South Hoover Hospi- tal, 196 NLRB 1077. Thus, should a determination be con- sidered warranted herein , consistently with certain testimony which Respondent's counsel has proffered, that Respondent did, indeed , commence bargaining following the Board's Order previously noted, that bargaining was really taking place, so I find, within Complainant Union's substituted "initial" certification year. And during that peri- od, absent unusual circumstances , the Union 's majority sta- tus-under well-settled decisional doctrines-must be conclusively presumed to have continued, and Respondent must be considered statutorily bound to bargain , regardless of whatever showing might be made calculated to suggest that the Union had lost majority support. See Ray Brooks v. N. L. R. B., 348 U.S. 96, 98-104. This decisional principle, within my view, should be considered dispositive, with re- spect to General Counsel's Section 8(a)(5) contention here- in. With matters in this posture , therefore, I conclude and find consistently with General Counsel's contention that Respondent was statutorily bound to bargain with Com- plainant Union , when President Beckenfeld conducted his plant meeting, and that Respondent 's course of conduct, while that meeting was in progress and thereafter , was clear- ly inconsistent with its bargaining duty. Respondent-so I conclude-violated Section 8(a)(5) thereby. Second: Should the particular principles noted not be considered determinative , Respondent would , nevertheless, still merit treatment as duty bound to bargain . As previously noted, respondent employers found guilty of 8(a )(5) viola- tions without regard for their initial certification year's ter- mination must, clearly , bargain for a reasonable time, at least, thereafter. N.L.R.B. v. Warren Company Inc., supra. Bargaining for a 5-month period following the Board's Jan- uary 25, 1972, directive--even were this Board to presume, arguendo, that such bargaining was conducted in good faith-could not, in any event, be considered sufficient to satisfy this "reasonable time" requirement. Respondent makes no contention , herein , that recent neg- otiations with the Union, conducted since January 25, 1972, had by the time of Beckenfeld 's plant meeting produced impasse . Indeed, counsel's testimony with respect thereto, proferred pursuant to my suggestion that this case 's proper disposition might require some record showing regarding the course of negotiations , reveals that a bargaining meeting had been held, with Federal Conciliators present, 10 days before this case was heard. Negotiations , though currently suspended-according to Respondent's counsel-have not been broken off. Further, while such post Board Order bargaining contin- ued, Complainant Union, herein-were its majority status not conclusively presumed-would still be privileged to claim at least a rebuttal presumption of continued majority support, which Respondent herein could challenge , but only with clean hands . Respondent does not contend , within its formal answer previously noted , that it "does not know" whether Complainant Union still represents a majority within the bargaining group found appropriate herein. Whatever doubts Respondent may currently profess, how- ever, derive clearly from the situation created through its statutorily proscribed course of conduct. Respondent can- not claim, herein, that its course of conduct flouted no bargaining duty, because of defections among presumed union supporters which that very course of conduct in- duced. Such a patently "bootstrap" contention would hard- ly merit serious consideration. Compare N.L.R.B. v. Sky Wolf Sales, supra, and N.L.R.B. v. Parma Water Lifter Co., supra, 263, in this connection. I conclude therefore that, for the reasons just stated as well as those previously noted, Respondent must be considered properly subject to statuto- ry sanctions. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with the operations de- scribed in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and sub- stantial relationship to trade, traffic , and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burden- ing and obstructing commerce and the free flow of com- merce. V. THE REMEDY Since I have found that Respondent did engage in certain unfair labor practices , I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom, and take certain affirmative action, in- cluding the posting of appropriate notices, designed to ef- fectuate the policies of the Act. The General Counsel has not, herein, charged Respon- dent with a direct refusal to bargain in good faith; he con- tends, merely, that Respondent's course of conduct-reasonably calculated to interfere with, restrain, or coerce workers with respect to their choice of a bargain- ing representative-falls within Section 8(a)(5)'s prescrip- tive provisions. Since the record shows without contradiction that Respondent did resume negotiations fol- lowing this Board's previous bargaining order, and has con- tinued to negotiate, the Board may not consider a renewed bargaining directive, which would merely be repetitive, re- quired herein. See El Sol Mexican Foods, Inc., 200 NLRB No. 119, fn. 2. Nevertheless, with matters in their present posture, there can be no doubt that Respondent's course of conduct was "inconsistent" with its statutorily determined bargaining duty. It must be required to cease and desist therefrom. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW In light of these findings of fact, and upon the entire record in this case, I make the following conclusions of law: 1. Respondent herein , Royal Himmel Distilling Compa- ny, is an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act, engaged in commerce and business activities which affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. ROYAL HIMMEL DISTILLING CO. 379 2. Food Processors, Packers, Warehousemen and Cleri- cal Employees, Local No. 547, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, is a labor organization within the meaning of Sec- tion 2(5) of the Act, as amended, which admits certain employees of Royal Himmel Distilling Company to mem- bership. 3. All production, maintenance , shipping and receiving employees, and warehousemen employed by Royal Himmel Distilling Company at its facility located at 2417 East 26th Street, Vernon, California, excluding office clerical employ- ees, professional employees , guards and supervisors as de- fined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 4. At all times material herein , the Union has represented a majority of Respondent 's employees within the bargaining unit just described; by virtue of Section 9(a) of the Act, the Union has been entitled to recognition as the exclusive rep- resentative of all Respondent 's employees within the said unit, for the purpose of collective bargaining with respect to their rates of pay, wages , hours of employment , and other terms and conditions of work. 5. By soliciting, encouraging , and assisting Respondent's employees to seek a new Board election whereby the Union might be decertified as their collective-bargaining represen- tative , and by promising them benefits should they do so, Royal Himmel Distilling Company has engaged, and is en- gaging, in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Sec- tion 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. 6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, as amended. Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:] ORDER Respondent, Royal Himmel Distilling Company, its offi- cers, agents, successors , and assigns , shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Soliciting, encouraging , and/or assisting employees to seek a Board-conducted representation election , whereby they might repudiate or decertify Food Processors, Packers, Warehousemen and Clerical Employees, Local No. 547, International Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauffeurs, Ware- housemen and Helpers of America , as their exclusive collec- tive-bargaining representative, in order to avoid its obligation to recognize and bargain with the Union. (b) Promising employees benefits , for the purpose of en- couraging or persuading them to seek a Board-conducted representation election, whereby the above-designated Union might be repudiated or decertified as their exclusive collective-bargaining representative. (c) Interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employ- ees, in any like or related manner , with respect to their exercise of rights which Section 7 of the statute guarantees. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is neces- sary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Post at its place of business in Vernon, California, Spanish and English language copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." s Copies of the notice, on forms pro- vided by the Regional Director for Region 21, shall be posted , immediately upon their receipt, after being duly signed by Respondent's representative. When posted, they shall remain posted , for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted . Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that these notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 21, in writ- ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that General Counsel 's complaint be, and it hereby is, dismissed insofar as it charges Respon- dent with statutory violations otherwise than as found here- in. 1 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board , the findings, conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become its findings , conclusions , and Order , and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. 2 in the event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals , the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." APPENDIX NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government After a hearing , during which all parties were given an opportunity to present evidence and argument , it has been determined that we violated the law by committing an un- fair labor practice. In order to remedy such conduct, we are being required to post this notice. We intend to comply with this requirement, and to abide by the following commit- ments: WE WILL NOT solicit, encourage, or assist you to seek a representation election, conducted by the National Labor Relations Board, whereby Food Processors, Packers, Warehousemen and Clerical Employees, Lo- cal No. 547, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs , Warehousemen and Helpers of America, might be repudiated or decertified as your collective- bargaining representative , in order to avoid our obliga- tion to recognize and bargain with that labor organiza- tion. WE WILL NOT promise you better terms or conditions of employment, for the purpose of encouraging or per- suading you to seek a representation election, conduct- ed by the National Labor Relations Board , whereby the above-named Union might be repudiated or decer- tified as your collective -bargaining representative. 380 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD WE WILL NOT interfere with, restrain, or coerce you, in This is an official notice and must not be defaced by any like or related manner, with respect to your exer- anyone. cise of rights which Section 7 of the National Labor This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days Relations Act guarantees. from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning ROYAL HIMMEL DISTILLING this notice or compliance with its provisions may be direct- COMPANY ed to the Board's Office, Eastern Columbia Building, 849 (Employer) South Broadway, Los Angeles, California 90014, Telephone 213-688-5229. Dated By (Representative) (Title)