Roger K. Alexander

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 26, 2019

13547420 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Sep. 26, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/547,420 07/12/2012 Roger K. Alexander 3034.42US01 7620
24113 7590 09/26/2019
PATTERSON THUENTE PEDERSEN, P.A.
80 SOUTH 8TH STREET
4800 IDS CENTER
MINNEAPOLIS, MN 55402-2100
EXAMINER
FIGUEROA, KEVIN W
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2124
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/26/2019 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte ROGER K. ALEXANDER
________________

Appeal 2018–001741
Application 13/547,420
Technology Center 2100
____________

Before JEREMY J. CURCURI, KARA L. SZPONDOWSKI,
and MATTHEW J. McNEILL, Administrative Patent Judges.

McNEILL, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 1–37, which are all the claims pending in this application.
An oral hearing was held August 1, 2019, and a transcript of that hearing
will be made of record in due course. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).1
We reverse.

1 Appellant identifies Cooper Technologies Company as the real party in
interest. Appeal Br. 2.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
Appellant’s application relates to a system and method for facilitating
a central system that collects individual sensor data from a plurality of
endpoints without increasing the burden on system communications
bandwidth. Abstract. In one embodiment, Appellant describes a computer-
implemented method for calculating an activity score value to rank an
identified document. Spec. 1:8‒14. Claim 1 is illustrative of the appealed
subject matter and reads as follows:
1. A method for operating a sensor data collection system
for collecting data from a plurality of endpoint devices, the
method comprising:
receiving, at a central data collection point, sensor data
generated at each of the plurality of endpoint devices, the
sensor data representing a series of actual measured power
usage values;
maintaining, at the central data collection point, a
database containing records corresponding to the individual
endpoint devices and including historic power usage values of
sensor data for those endpoint devices;
computing, at the plurality of endpoints, predicted power
usage values representing presumed sensor data for at least one
endpoint device, wherein the predicted power usage values are
computed based on the historic power usage values of sensor
data corresponding to the at least one endpoint device;
comparing a discrepancy between at least one of the
predicted power usage values and a corresponding sensor data
value to determine whether the corresponding sensor data value
constitutes either exception data or sufficiently accurate data;
sending, from each of the plurality of endpoints, the
exception data generated by the at least one endpoint device,
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and not the sufficiently accurate data, to the central data
collection point at a first time granularity;
sending, from each of the plurality of endpoints, the
sufficiently accurate data at a second time granularity different
from the first time granularity; and
in response to receiving the exception data, superseding,
at the central data collection point, the at least one of the
predicted power usage values based on the exception data by
replacing the predicted power usage values with the exception
data.

The Examiner’s Rejections
Claims 1–37 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to
patent-ineligible subject matter. Ans 2‒4.
Claims 15, 16, 18, 19, and 21 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Dodderi (US 2012/0029710 A1; pub.
Feb. 2, 2012); Egnor (US 2011/0251933 A1; pub. 13, 2011); and Irving
(US 2011/0231320 A1; pub. Sept. 22, 2011). Final Act. 2‒6.
Claims 1‒14, 17, 20, and 22‒37 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Dodderi, Egnor, Irving, and
Beaty (US 2008/0295096 A1; pub. Nov. 27, 2008). Final Act. 6‒24.
ANALYSIS
Subject Matter Eligibility
An invention is patent eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
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ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Alice, 573 U. S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that
framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See
Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the
concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate
settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010)
(“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of
hedging, or protecting against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 183 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
(15 How.) 252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S.
at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
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mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176, 191 (“We view respondents’
claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not
as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the
Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that
formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent
laws,[] and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the
use of the formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. at 187 (“It
is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical
formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”), and 191 (citation omitted) (citing Benson and Flook).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A
claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The PTO recently published revised guidance on the application of
§ 101. USPTO’s January 7, 2019 Memorandum, 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (“Revised Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg.”). Under that guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
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human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see Manual of Patent Examining Procedure
(“MPEP”) §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that
exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 56.

Revised Guidance Step 1
Step 1 of the Revised Guidance asks whether the claimed subject
matter falls within the four statutory categories of patentable subject matter
identified by 35 U.S.C. § 101: process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter. See Revised Guidance, Fed Reg. 54. Claim 1 recites
“[a] method.” Appellant does not argue the Examiner erred in concluding
claim 1 falls within the four statutory categories of patentable subject matter.
We agree with the Examiner’s conclusion because claim 1 falls within the
process category.
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Revised Guidance Step 2A, Prong 1
Under Step 2A, Prong 1 of the Revised Guidance, we determine
whether the claims recite any judicial exceptions, including certain
groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or
mental processes). See Revised Guidance.
The Examiner concludes claim 1 is directed to receiving sensor data,
maintaining a database containing records of sensor data for individual
devices, computing predicted power usage values, comparing discrepancies,
sending exception data, sending accurate data, and superseding values in
response to received exception data. Ans. 2. The Examiner concludes this is
an abstract idea of “simply collecting data and comparing it.” Ans. 2.
Appellant argues the Examiner erred in concluding claim 1 is directed
to an abstract idea. See Reply Br. 2‒6. In particular, Appellant argues “the
Examiner has not properly considered the relevant case law and has
improperly extended the abstract idea exception beyond the fact patterns of
any of the relevant cases.” Reply Br. 4–5. Appellant further argues “there is
no human analog to the claimed invention as humans do not have any innate
processes for using low frequency communication for accurate data and high
frequency communication for exception data.” Reply Br. 5–6.
Claim 1 recites, in relevant part, (1) “computing . . . predicted power
usage values representing presumed sensor data for at least one endpoint
device, wherein the predicted power usage values are computed based on the
historic power usage values of sensor data corresponding to the at least one
endpoint device;” (2) “comparing a discrepancy between at least one of the
predicted power usage values and a corresponding sensor data value to
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determine whether the corresponding sensor data value constitutes either
exception data or sufficiently accurate data;” and (3) “in response to
receiving the exception data, superseding . . . the at least one of the predicted
power usage values based on the exception data by replacing the predicted
power usage values with the exception data.”
We agree with the Examiner that these limitations, under their
broadest reasonable interpretation, recite collecting data and comparing it.
See Ans. 2. For example, the “computing” step recited in limitation (1)
characterizes computing predicted power usage values for an endpoint
device based on historic power usage values of the endpoint device. The
“comparing” step recited in limitation (2) characterizes comparing
discrepancies between predicted power usage values and actual power usage
values to determine whether data is exception data or accurate data. The
“superseding” step recited in limitation (3) characterizes replacing stored
data with exception data based on the comparison in step (2). These
processes constitute an evaluation or judgement, which are identified as
example mental processes in the Revised Guidance. See Revised Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
Thus, under the broadest reasonable interpretation, claim 1 recites
collecting and comparing data. We, therefore, conclude claim 1 recites an
evaluation or judgment, which falls within the mental processes category of
abstract ideas identified in the Revised Guidance.
Revised Guidance Step 2A, Prong 2
Under Step 2A, Prong 2 of the Revised Guidance, we next determine
whether the claims recite additional elements that integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application (see MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
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The “additional elements” recited in claim 1 include: (1) “receiving, at
a central data collection point, sensor data generated at each of the plurality
of endpoint devices, the sensor data representing a series of actual measured
power usage values;” (2) “maintaining, at the central data collection point, a
database containing records corresponding to the individual endpoint
devices and including historic power usage values of sensor data for those
endpoint devices;” (3) “[computing] at the plurality of endpoints;” (4)
“sending, from each of the plurality of endpoints, the exception data
generated by the at least one endpoint device, and not the sufficiently
accurate data, to the central data collection point at a first time granularity;”
(5) “sending, from each of the plurality of endpoints, the sufficiently
accurate data at a second time granularity different from the first time
granularity;” and (6) “[superseding,] at the central data collection point.”
To integrate the exception into a practical application, the additional
claim elements must, for example, improve the functioning of a computer or
any other technology or technical field (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)), apply the
judicial exception with a particular machine (see MPEP § 2106.05(b)), affect
a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or
thing (see MPEP § 2106.05(c)), or apply or use the judicial exception in
some other meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial
exception to a particular technological environment (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(e)). See Revised Guidance, Fed Reg. 55.
Appellant argues claim 1 is directed to an improved computer network
that uses a novel distribution of functionality within the network. Id. at 4‒6.
Appellant argues that contrary to conventional systems, the claims recite
determining predicted power usage values at a plurality of endpoints and
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determining discrepancies between actual power usage values and the
predicted values at the plurality of endpoints. Id. at 5.
Appellant has persuaded us of Examiner error. The additional
elements recited in claim 1 integrate the mental process identified above into
a practical application. In particular, the “computing” step is performed by
the “plurality of endpoints” and the “superseding” step is performed by the
“central data collection point.” Appellant argues that this distribution of
functionality “allows the central system to maintain accurate predictions for
future power use, while significantly reducing the necessary communication
bandwidth across the network” compared to conventional systems. Reply Br.
5. Appellant’s Specification explains the importance of this distribution of
functionality. See Spec. 3:16‒5:5. On this record, we agree with Appellant
that this distribution of functionality constitutes an improvement to the
functioning of a computer or any other technology or technical field. See
MPEP § 2106.05(a); see also Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Systems, Inc., 879
F.3d 1299, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding a claim that “employs a new kind
of file that enables a computer security system to do things it could not do
before” improved the functioning of computer security systems); Core
Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 880 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir.
2018) (holding a claim directed to “an improved user interface for
computing devices, not to the abstract idea of an index” improved the
functioning of the computing devices).
Thus, Appellant has persuaded us of Examiner error with respect to
Step 2A, Prong 2 of the Revised Guidance. We, therefore, conclude the
judicial exception is integrated into a practical application under the Revised
Guidance.
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Obviousness
We have reviewed the Examiner’s obviousness rejections in
consideration of Appellant’s contentions and the evidence of record.
Appellant persuades us the Examiner fails to establish that the claims are
unpatentable over the cited references.
The Examiner finds the combination of Dodderi, Egnor, and Irving
teaches or suggests “wherein the data selector module is further configured
such that, in response to receiving the exception data, the data selector
module supersedes the at least one of the predicted power usage values
based on the exception data by replacing the predicted power usage values
with the exception data,” as recited in claim 15. Final Act. 4‒5 (citing Irving
¶ 492); Ans. 10‒11.
Appellant argues the Examiner erred because Irving does not teach or
suggest the claimed superseding. See Appeal Br. 28‒29; see also Reply Br.
8‒10. In particular, Appellant argues Irving teaches a central data collection
point transmits updated solutions to an endpoint instead of teaching an
endpoint transmitting updated data values to the central data collection
point. See Appeal Br. 29.
The Examiner responds that the rejection only relies on Irving for the
“general teaching of replacing a value with another.” Ans. 10‒11. The
Examiner finds an ordinarily skilled artisan would have combined Dodderi’s
central collection point with Irving’s teaching that if an improvement is
identified, then data is replaced with the improvement. Id. at 11. The
Examiner further finds Irving “does indeed teach the superseding of data as
it states replacing a value with an improved one.” Id. at 11.
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Appellant has persuaded us of Examiner error. The Examiner finds
Irving teaches superseding data by replacing a value with another, but the
Examiner has failed to establish that Irving teaches the limitation
“supersed[ing] the at least one of the predicted power usage values based on
the exception data.” The cited portion of Irving teaches replacing a building-
specific solution with a new solution. Irving ¶ 492. This replacement occurs
as part of a re-optimization process that can be triggered by the user
updating information associated with the user’s account. See id. ¶¶ 480‒491.
The Examiner has not explained how the user updating account information
teaches or suggests “exception data” that is used to supersede power usage
values. Nor has the Examiner sufficiently explained how superseding
Irving’s building-specific solution, which relates to managing power for a
building, constitutes superseding predicted power usage values that
“represent[] presumed sensor data for at least one endpoint device,” as
recited in claim 15.
Accordingly, we are constrained by the record to agree with Appellant
that the Examiner has not sufficiently established Dodderi, Egnor, and Irving
teach or suggest “wherein the data selector module is further configured
such that, in response to receiving the exception data, the data selector
module supersedes the at least one of the predicted power usage values
based on the exception data by replacing the predicted power usage values
with the exception data,” as recited in claim 15. We, therefore, do not sustain
the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 15 as unpatentable over
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Dodderi, Egnor, and Irving.2 We also do not sustain the obviousness
rejection of dependent claims 16, 18, 19, and 21.
The Examiner rejects independent claims 1, 23, and 31 as
unpatentable over Dodderi, Egnor, Irving, and Beaty. Final Act. 6‒24.
Independent claim 1 recites commensurate subject matter to claim 15.
Independent claims 23 and 31 do not explicitly teach the central data
collection point performing the claimed superseding, but recite “exception
reports contain actual data that replaces at least one of the predicted power
usage values.” Claims 23 and 31 thus recite limitations commensurate with
the “superseding” limitation in claim 15, at least insofar as the limitations
relate to superseding “values” instead of Irving’s solutions. Accordingly, we
do not sustain the rejection of independent claims 23 and 31. We also do not
sustain the rejection of dependent claims 2‒14, 17, 20, 22, 24‒30, and 32‒
37.

2 Because we agree with at least one of the dispositive arguments advanced
by Appellant with respect to the obviousness rejections, we need not reach
the merits of Appellant’s other arguments regarding claim 15.
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CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claim(s) Rejected Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–37 § 101 1–37
15, 16, 18, 19, 21 § 103(a) Dodderi,
Egnor, Irving
15, 16, 18, 19, 21
1‒14, 17, 20,
22‒37
§ 103(a) Dodderi,
Egnor, Irving, and
Beaty
1‒14, 17, 20, 22‒37
Overall Outcome 1–37

REVERSED