Rochester Gas & Electric

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Jun 12, 2008

03-CA-025915 (N.L.R.B. Jun. 12, 2008)

JD–31-08
Rochester, NY
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORPORATION
And Case 3-CA-25915
LOCAL UNION 36, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD
OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, AFL-CIO
Linda Leslie, Esq.,
Of Buffalo, New York
For the General Counsel
James R. LaVaute, Esq.,
Of Syracuse, New York
For the Charging Party Union
James J. Gleason, Esq.,
Of Binghamton, New York
For the Respondent Employer
DECISION
Statement of the Case
WALLACE H. NATIONS, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried in Buffalo, New
York on February 11, 2008. Local Union 36 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
AFL-CIO (Union) filed the original charge in this case on June 13, 2006. An amended charge
was filed on June 15, 2006 and a second amended charge was filed on September 8, 2006.
The Regional Director for Region 3 issued a Complaint and Notice of Hearing (Complaint) on
October 31, 2006.1 The Complaint alleges, inter alia, that Rochester Gas & Electric Corporation
(Respondent, RG&E or Company) has engaged in certain conduct that is in violation of Section
8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act (Act). Respondent filed a timely Answer to
the Complaint wherein it admits, inter alia, the jurisdictional allegations of the Complaint.
On the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and
after considering the briefs filed by the General Counsel, Charging Party and Respondent, I
make the following:

1 All dates are in 2006 unless otherwise indicated.
JD–31-08
Findings of Fact
I. Jurisdiction
The Respondent, a corporation, with its principal place of business in Rochester, New
York, has been engaged in the generation, transmission, distribution and sale of electricity and
natural gas. During the 12 month period ending October 31, 2006, Respondent, in conducting
its business described above, derived gross revenues in excess of $250,000. During the same
time period, Respondent purchased and received at its Rochester, New York, facility, goods
valued in excess of $50,000, directly from points outside the State of New York. The
Respondent admits and I find that it is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act and that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. Alleged Unfair Labor Practices
A. The Complaint Allegations
The Complaint alleges and the Respondent admits that the following individuals held the
positions opposite their respective names and have been supervisors of Respondent within the
meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act and agents of Respondent within the meaning of Section
2(13) of the Act:
Cathleen Frain RGE/NYSEG Labor Relations
Richard Frank Manager of Electrical Operations2
The Complaint alleges and Respondent admits that at all material times, the Union has
been the designated representative of Respondent’s employees in the following Unit which is
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the
Act:
All employees of Respondent described in Section 1 – Representation and Recognition,
of the collective-bargaining agreement between Respondent and Union, which is
effective from September 1, 2003 to May 31, 2008.
The Complaint further alleges that on or about January 10, 2006, Respondent
discontinued the practice of allowing certain Unit employees to take a service vehicle home after
work. It alleges that this practice relates to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment of the Unit and is a mandatory subject of bargaining. It also alleges that
Respondent engaged in this conduct without prior notice to the Union and without affording the
Union an opportunity to bargain with Respondent with respect to the effects of this conduct.3
In its Answer, Respondent admits that on January 10, 2006, it discontinued the practice

2 Frank testified that his job title was Manager of Regional Operations. Though it is relatively
immaterial, I will accept Frank’s version as he should know best what his job is titled.
3 The Complaint was amended at hearing to remove an allegation that Respondent did not
afford the Union prior notice and an opportunity to bargain over its decision to cease the
involved practice.
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of requiring certain Unit employees to take service vehicles home after work, but denies the
other allegations of the preceding paragraph.
The Complaint further alleges that on or about March 7, 2006, the Union, by letter,
demanded bargaining over Respondent’s decision to terminate the practice, (called “benefit” by
the Union) noted above and requested that Respondent furnish the Union with the following
information with respect to that benefit:
1. A listing of jobs and unit personnel that have the benefit;
2. Any Company analysis of the cost of this to the Company;
3. A listing of non-unit personnel who have the benefit, so that we may assess the
significance of this issue to the Company; and,
4. Whether the Company announced to any non-unit personnel the same restriction
now being imposed upon members of the bargaining unit.
The Complaint alleges that this information is necessary for, and relevant to, the Union’s
performance of its duties as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the Unit. The
Complaint further alleges that on or about March 7, 2006, Respondent, by Cathleen Frain, by
letter, failed and refused to furnish the Union with the information requested above. Respondent
admits that the Union filed the information request, but denies the other allegations related to it.
B. Facts Related to the Decision to End the Practice of Allowing Certain Employees to
Take Company Vehicles Home and the Union’s Response.
1. Facts Related to the Making of this Decision.
Richard Frank testified that the Company provides gas service to about 370,000
customers and electricity to about 280,000 customers in a nine county area around Rochester,
New York. Frank is Regional Operations Manager for Respondent. Within the geographic area
of his responsibility, he manages the trouble maintenance and repair operation (TM&R) and
also electrical construction of such things as substations. There are two groups of employees in
TM&R, high voltage and low voltage. The high voltage group works with the overhead and
underground electric transmission system with voltages as high as 35,000 volts, whereas the
low voltage group primarily deals with residences with voltages under 480 volts. The high
voltage crews use a material handling truck with a bucket attachment. These crews have never
taken a Company vehicle home at night. When there is an emergency for them to handle, they
report to the Respondent’s Rochester, New York West Avenue facility and are dispatched in
their trucks from that facility.
The low voltage group works on commercial and residential meter and service work.
They do a lot of meter installations and meter change-outs. They do maintenance work on what
is called a current transformer which uses voltages up to 480 volts. They do both scheduled and
emergency work. The emergency work accounts for about 40 per cent of the work of the low
voltage group. In this group are eight employees, seven electric meter technicians and one
electric meter inspector. On a day to day basis, the employees in this group work solo. They use
a ¾ ton van in their work. These vans have two front seats with a bulkhead behind them to keep
material in the rear from coming into the driver compartment. The vans are equipped with a
computer and any materials the employee needs to do his work are in the rear of the van. Their
work is divided into two shifts, one from 7 am to 3 pm and the other from 3 pm to 11 pm. Usually
the first shift is manned by four to six employees, Monday through Friday. The second shift is
manned by one or two employees normally, Monday through Friday. The Saturday and Sunday
shifts are manned by one employee for each shift. Emergency work coming after 11 pm is
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handled by the high voltage crews.
Emergency situations can arise from employees calling in sick or storm situations. On
these occasions, off duty employees may have to be called in. Employees are called in order
from a list supplied to the Company by the Union. They can refuse the call out and in that event,
the next person on the list is called. Prior to January 1, 2006, these employees took their
service van home at night. If called in for an emergency while at home, they would drive the
Company vans to the West Avenue facility to pick up the packet of material needed to do the
emergency work, then go to the work site. The Company also provides a helper for emergency
work and the low voltage employee would pick this person up at West Avenue. On what Frank
termed “rare” occasions, the employee might be dispatched to a work site without first going by
the West Avenue facility.
Subsequent to January 1, 2007, the employees now always report to West Avenue for
their van, material and a helper if needed. In November, 2005, Frank decided he wanted to end
the practice of the employees taking their assigned vans home at night.4 He testified that
garaging them at West Avenue at night would be a cost savings to the Company. He was also
concerned that having the Company trucks parked at employees’ homes presented some sort
of negative public reaction. He did not elaborate on this point. He also did not do any formal
cost analysis of the savings associated with the decision.
He recommended to one of the Company’s Labor Relations specialists, Cathleen Frain,
that the practice be discontinued. He made the recommendation to her because he wanted to
be sure he was allowed to do it under the collective-bargaining agreement. He made the
request by e-mail. The communication, dated November 3, 2005, reads:
“As you are probably aware, Operations across NY State is looking at reducing costs to
meet budget constraints. One of the cost savings ideas for my group would be to have the 8
Low Voltage employees who currently take home their vehicles, park them here at West Ave
now and commute back and forth to work in their personal vehicles. This makes good business
sense in that these employees start their shift each day here at West Ave.
These employees get called in from home approximately 1 time per month. If the call-in
is storm related, they are reporting to West Ave. first to meet up with their rider anyway. One
call-out per month doesn’t constitute having their vehicles at their homes for emergency
response. As mentioned above, they report to West Ave. each day at the beginning of their shift
to get their work assignments for that day. They also have their morning tailboard at that time.
Rarely do they have a job scheduled earlier than their start time.
Currently, these employees would finish their last job for the day and head home from
there. If they have to report back to West Ave to drop off their vehicle, they would pretty much
be leaving the work site at about 30 minutes or so before the end of their shift in order to be
back to West Ave. at the end of their shift. We’re not 100% certain they are on the job site much
past that anyway even if they are going home from the site.
My recommendation is that you and I sit with Rick Irish5 and give him a heads up that
this is coming. The sooner the better. I would then communicate this to the 8 employees
involved. I would like to pull the trigger on this as soon as 11/28/05. If we were to let the

4 This practice had been in operation for about 29 years.
5 Richard Irish is the Union’s President.
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employees know next week, they would have nearly 3 weeks to prepare.”
A chart introduced by the Respondent reflects the emergency call-outs for 2005. By
months it shows for January, 6 call-outs. June and July, 2 call-outs for each month, August, 8
call-outs, September, 1 call-out, October, 4 call-outs and no call-outs in the other months.
2. Notice of the Decision is Given to Affected Employees and the Union Responds.
Frain approved the recommendation and Frank set a meeting for November 18, 2005,
and explained the Company’s plans to the eight affected employees.
Steven Parnell is a low voltage employee of Respondent and a Union steward. He is one
of the employees affected by the decision to stop letting employees take home Company
vehicles. He attended a meeting on November 18 at Respondent’s West Avenue facility. In
attendance for management were Frank and Supervisor Jim Connell. The employees in
attendance in addition to Parnell were Tom Eichle, Dick Shamp, Alford Smith, Tom Spratt and
Tony Proctor. All are electric field technicians, except for Smith, who is an electric meter
inspector and all are considered low voltage employees. Frank informed the employees that as
of January 1, 2006, they would no longer be allowed to take Company vehicles home at night.
Smith then asked Frank if management had considered other options such as charging the
employees for taking the vehicles home at night. Smith added that he considered the benefit of
taking the Company vehicle home part of his compensation. Frank responded that the decision
had already been made. Frank also noted that other employees under his management were
similarly going to lose the use of Company vehicles to get to and from work. Presumably these
were non-Unit employees. Parnell testified that he used the Company vehicle about twice a year
to answer emergency call-outs from his home. On these occasions, Parnell might report to the
emergency directly or he might first go to the West Avenue facility.
Parnell was not allowed to take a Company vehicle home after January 1, 2006. He had
been taking one home since 1990. He did not have to buy gas for the Company vehicle. The
Company withheld an amount from his pay to cover what the Internal Revenue Service deemed
the value of the right to use the Company vehicle to go to and from work. This value was
considered to be income to the employee. An exhibit in this record lists the value or imputed
income assigned for the years 2004 and 2005 for each affected employee. The annual values
range from a low of $426 to a high of $663. For Parnell, the imputed income was listed as $597
for 2004 and $549 for 2005. Parnell lives about 17 miles from the involved Company facility. He
now uses his personal vehicle to get to the West Ave. facility.
Thomas Spratt is a low voltage employee of Respondent. As noted above, Spratt also
attended the meeting with Frank.6 According to Spratt, Frank gave as the reasons for taking
away the Company vehicles budget cuts and restraints. Spratt remembered asking if other
employees would also lose the use of Company vehicles to go to and from work. According to
Spratt, Frank said, “Probably, this is just the start of it.” Spratt lives about 25 miles from his
place of work and had to take a personal vehicle out of storage and use it to go to work after his
Company vehicle was taken away January 1, 2006. The imputed income for Spratt for the
benefit of taking home the Company vehicle for 2004 was $645 and for 2005 was $636.

6 With this witness, General Counsel indicated the date of the meeting was November 8,
2005, whereas with Parnell it was identified as taking place on November 18. Based on
correspondence in the record, the correct date is November 18 2005.
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Spratt also testified that he was on a Company hiring committee in the spring of 2005.
Also serving on this committee were employees Tony Proctor and supervisor Jim Connell.
Spratt said there was a fourth member, but failed to identify him. This committee screened
candidates for employment in two openings for electric meter technicians in their department.
The candidates with the highest scores were offered employment. Spratt told each candidate
that the use of a company vehicle to go to and from work was part of the job’s compensation
package. According to Spratt, supervisor Connell agreed with him.
Richard Irish is the President, Business Manager and Financial Secretary of the Union.
The Union was certified at Respondent’s facility in 2003 and the Unit has 395 members. He
testified that in November, 2005, he had a telephone conversation with Richard Frank. Frank
informed Irish that effective January 1, 2006, Respondent would no longer allow the low voltage
teams and meter men to take their service vehicles home at night. Instead, Respondent planned
on garaging them at its West Avenue Facility. Irish responded that Respondent could not take
this action unilaterally, but rather, was required to bargain over it as the existing benefit was a
mandatory subject of bargaining. Frank said that he would relate the Union’s position to Labor
Relations and added, that the workers affected were not using the vehicles to answer
emergency calls at night and that when they did, they first reported to the West Avenue Facility
anyway. Frank called the decision a good one and noted the expense to the Respondent
involved in the employees using the vehicles to go to and from their homes and the West
Avenue Facility. Irish did not conduct an investigation among the affected employees to
determine if Frank were correct in his assertions.
Later on the same day, Irish spoke to Steve Parnell. Parnell informed him that he and
other affected employees had had a meeting with Frank where the loss of the benefit was
announced. Parnell told Irish that the employees were upset about the decision as they would
have to get another vehicle or find some other means to get to work.
On January 10, 2006, Irish sent a letter to Respondent’s Labor Relations Analyst, Jay
Shapiro, which stated that it was formal grievance, adding:
“This grievance is being filed in reference to January 1, 2006 requirement that Low
Voltage TM&R employees with the Company with Company vehicles park the vehicles
overnight at West Ave.
This unilateral action was a violation of past practice. This removes the benefit of use of
the vehicles for commuting to work and responding to callouts directly from home. Wages,
benefits, hours and working conditions are mandatory topics of collective bargaining. The
Company refused collective bargaining in this matter.
The resolution to this instant case is that all affected members are made whole.”
The Union met with the Company on three occasions to discuss the removal of the
benefit. The first meeting took place on December 20, 2005. The meeting lasted two hours and
the matter of the benefit was just one of a number of topics discussed. Appearing for the
Respondent was Jay Shapiro and for the Union, IBEW International agent, Mike Flanagan and
Irish. Irish testified that the discussion of the removal of the benefit took about five minutes. Irish
did not remember the substance of the discussion. The next meeting where this matter was
discussed took place in January 2006. Appearing for the Respondent were Cathleen Frain and
Richard Frank. Appearing for the Union were Irish and employee-steward Steve Parnell. The
portion of the meeting relating to the grievance took about twenty minutes. The Union pointed
out that the cost of the decision to its affected members was about $5000-$6000 for
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transportation. There was no detailed explanation given for how this figure was calculated and it
is not entirely clear whether Irish meant the figures given related to each individual affected
employee or was for the whole group of eight employees combined. I would think the latter
would be more likely. Irish noted that one of these affected members, Dick Shamp, had taken
the job with Respondent at a pay cut as the use of the Company vehicle made up for the cut. He
again pointed out that the removal of the benefit was a mandatory subject of bargaining.
Respondent’s representative took the position that it was a good business decision and that it
had the right to remove the benefit under the contract.
There was a third step meeting held in July, 2006. Appearing for the Company were
Frain, Shapiro, labor relations analyst George Savaker, Frank and his immediate boss, Walt
Matias. Appearing for the Union were Irish, Parnell and then Union Vice-President, Craig Rody.
The Union reiterated its position that Respondent’s decision was a mandatory subject of
bargaining, and that the benefit had been explained to some job applicants as being part of the
compensation for the job. The Union also took the position that by making the unilateral change
in the involved benefit, the Respondent had violated the Act. The Company again took the
position that it had the right to make the change under the contract and that it was a good
business decision.
On March 7, Irish sent Frain the letter requesting information noted above at page 3 of
this decision. Frain responded with a letter dated March 17, 2006, which stated:
“Respectfully the Company is not rescinding the determination it has made with regards
to the Low Voltage TM&R group garaging their vehicles at night. I disagree with your
characterization of the issue as being a benefit. This issue is currently in the grievance process
and we will be willing to discuss your concerns within that forum. As for your request for
information, we will provide you the information relevant to the matter.”
Irish testified that he sent this letter and another on June 5 in an attempt to get the
Company to bargain over the removal of the vehicles, “have them bargain over some
recompense, you know, some typ of compensation for removing the vehicles, . . .”
Irish wrote Frain again on June 5. This letter is practically identical to the one sent on
March 7, with the difference being that he notes that Respondent had not yet complied with the
information request as of the date of the later letter.
Frain responded with a letter dated July 10, which reads:
“This letter is in response to your letter dated June 5, 2006 requesting information
regarding the Employer Vehicle Program. I have enclosed a report listing bargaining unit
members, their job title and the company vehicle they have been assigned to take home at
night. The company believes that it is not obligated to provide you with any financial information
on company vehicle costs more does the company believe the Union’s request for information
on non-union employee vehicles is relevant or necessary to your duties and responsibilities.
As stated in the company’s March 17, 2006 response, we disagree with your
characterization of this issue as a “benefit” and the company is not rescinding its determination
to have these vehicles garaged at night.
Please note that the information being provided is being provided for use by the Union
strictly for the purposes of contract administration and/or collective bargaining. The information
remains confidential and proprietary and may not be distributed or used for anything but the
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above stated purpose, without the written consent of the Company. If you have any questions
on the information provided, please call me.”
Respondent thus supplied the information requested in paragraph one of the information
request, but no information was supplied for the other three paragraphs.
On July 21, 2006, Irish wrote to Shapiro, stating that the Union was withdrawing the
grievance over the removal of vehicles and stating that it would pursue the matter before the
NLRB.
Irish testified that he requested the information, including that for non-Unit employees to
see how many people were affected and what was the cost of the program to the Respondent.
He testified the Union needed this information in order to develop a bargaining position. As he
was not sure of the total number of employees affected, he was not sure what the cost savings
the Respondent might realize by the removal of the vehicles. He implied that the proposal might
be affected by the total amount of the cost savings. Other than the information provided by Frain
in her July 10 letter in response to paragraph 1 of the Union’s request, Respondent has not
made available any other information sought.
On July 10, Irish had a phone conversation with Shapiro who told him the Respondent
did not see the relevance of the information sought about non-Unit employees (Paragraphs 3
and 4 of the request). According to Respondent, Irish did not give either Shapiro or anyone else
with the Company reasons why these two requests involving non-Unit employees were relevant.
I cannot find any evidence that Respondent asked the relevance. With respect to Paragraph 2
of the request, Irish was never told the Company could not afford to let the employees take
Company vehicles home. Irish testified that the Respondent never bargained or offered to
bargain with the Union over the effects of the decision to remove the company vehicles from the
eight employees who had been allowed to use them to go to and from work. Similarly, he
testified that Respondent never offered any compensation to these employees for taking away
the vehicles that they had been allowed to take home at night.
3. The Relevant Provisions of the Collective-Bargaining Agreement.
Irish was part of the negotiating team that reached the current collective bargaining
agreement. The parties, and primarily, Respondent makes some fairly broad contentions about
Irish’s testimony related to bargaining. I think it important to see exactly what Irish did say, which
is not easy to summarize otherwise. This testimony was fragmented by numerous evidentiary
objections from all parties. The testimony was given starting at page 25 of the transcript and
questions are by Respondent’s counsel and answers by Irish. The exchange, excluding
objections and arguments reads:
Q. In the course of that bargaining for that agreement, you discussed, did you not, taking
vehicles home - - -union members taking vehicles home, is that correct?
A. Yes, we did.
Q. You also discussed, in the course of that agreement that the - - -there would be certain rights
that the company would retain with regard to work rules and work practices, did you not?
A. Yes, we did.
Q. As part of that agreement the union agreed, did they not, that the company was free to
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unilaterally change any work rule or any practice that had been ongoing at RG&E during the
course of this collective bargaining agreement, except as provided in the agreement itself, is
that right?
A. No answer given as the parties engaged in a number of objections and counsel went to
another question.
Q. You bargained over the company’s right to retain the ability to make certain unilateral
changes with regard to work practices and work rules, did you not?
A. yes, we did.
Q. And, the result of that bargaining is set forth in the collective bargaining agreement, is it not?
A. No answer was given as the parties again objected and counsel opted to ask another
question.
Q. You told us you bargained over the company’s ability to make changes - - unilateral changes
with regard to certain work rules and certain work practices as they existed and the result of that
bargaining is contained in the collective bargaining agreement itself, is it not?
A. No answer was given and objections were made. Counsel chose to ask another question.
Q. You bargained about work rules, did you not?
A. Yes, we did.
Q. You bargained about whether or not the company would have the right to make unilateral
changes in work rules as they existed at RG&E, did you not?
A. Yes, we did.
Q.You arrived at an agreement with regard to that, did you not?
A. Yes, we did.
Q. And that’s reflected in the collective bargaining agreement, is that right?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. With regard to work practices, you bargained about that, did you not?
A. Yes, we did.
Q. And, you arrived at an agreement which would give the company certain rights with regard to
making unilateral changes to work practices?
A. Objections were made and no answer was given. Counsel then asked another question.
Q. Did you bargain, during the course of the negotiations, about the company’s right to make
certain unilateral changes to existing work practices at RG&E?
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A. Yes, we did.
Q. And the result of that bargaining is set forth in the collective bargaining agreement, is it not?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. With regard to just for the convenience of the judge, the agreements with regard to work
practices and work rules are contained in Article 7 of the collective bargaining agreement, is that
correct?
A. Yes, they are.
Q. Now, you also - - let me back up for a second. You told me that you had recited the union’s
position on a number of occasions to the company with regard to this change in the practice of
taking - - the low voltage TMR people taking trucks home; isn’t that right?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. I believe, and correct me if I am wrong, that the thrust of your discussions with the company
was that you viewed that a benefit to be allowed to take the trucks home; is that right?
A. It was a benefit or compensation.
Q. And, in your mind was this dollar amount that there would be some value in taking the truck
home so you didn’t have to pay for a vehicle of your own to get work in the morning, is that
right?
A. That’s correct.
Q. And to get home at night too, right?
A. Yes.
Q. And, your view was that that was a benefit to the employees, right?
A. A benefit or compensation?
Q. A benefit and compensation?
A. Or compensation, to me they’re kind of analogous terms.
Q. Meant the same thing to you?
A. Yes.
Q. During the course of negotiations for this collective bargaining agreement, Joint Exhibit No.
7, you bargained about benefits, did you not?
A. Yes, we did.
Q. And, the company retained certain - - the company’s position was that they should be able to
retain certain rights with regard to changing those benefits unilaterally; isn’t that right?
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A. Would you ask that again, please?
Q. The company’s position during the bargaining was that they should be able to retain the right
to change benefits unilaterally, isn’t that right?
A. I don’t know if I agree that it was the company’s position.
Q. You don’t know what - - you don’t recall the company’s position?
A. I don’t recall that position.
Q. But you do remember this concept of benefits being discussed?
A. Yes.
Q. Let’s set wages aside for a second, okay? There are certain things that the employees get by
virtue of their employment at RG&E that have some economic benefit to them, is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. That’s aside from the wages that they earn, right?
A. That’s correct.
Q. There are certain things like clothing allowance and some other things that just for an
example of a benefit that employees get; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. And that’s separate and apart from their wages, right?
A. That’s correct.
Q. This benefit or let me ask it another way, taking a vehicle home after work, is that one of
those benefits that you get that’s separate and apart from your wages, if you’re in that category?
A. It’s a benefit or compensation separate and apart from wages.
Q. Taking the concept of wages out of it for a second, all right, it’s a benefit in terms of
something that they get that’s of value apart from their wages: is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. During the course of the negotiations that you had with the company to arrive at this
collective bargaining agreement, you discussed this concept of benefits that were separate from
the compensation, right?
A. Yes we did.
Q. You arrived at an agreement with regard to that, is that right?
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A. Yes, we did.
Q. The agreement that you arrived at with regard to benefits is set forth in Article 25 of the
collective bargaining agreement that’s in front of you, is that correct?
A. Yes, it is.
The next questioning of Irish on the subject of negotiation was by General Counsel.
Q. If you would refer to Joint Exhibit 7, and specifically Article 7. In the first paragraph, there is a
reference to a joint committee?
A. That’s correct.
Q. Do you know who was on that Joint Committee?
A. No, I do not.
Q. In the terms of the article on benefits, were vehicles ever discussed?
A. Objections were made and no answer was given. Another question was asked.
Q. So were vehicles ever discussed in relation to benefits?
A. I don’t remember vehicles being discussed in relation to Article 25.
The next questions about negotiations of Irish were asked by counsel for the Union.
Q. Mr. Irish, in the course of the negotiations, I’m referring to Article 7 here, was there any
discussion in the negotiations about the interplay or how you reconciled the first paragraph of
Section A with the second paragraph of Section A; was there any discussion about that?
A. I don’t recall a discussion of how they interplayed.
Q. In the course of negotiations did the company ever state to the union that it retained the right
to withdraw the take-home vehicles?
A. No they did not.
Article 7 of the collective bargaining agreement states:
(7) SAFETY AND WORK RULES
(A) It is understood and agreed that there are in existence specific safety and/or
work rules, customs, regulations, or practices which reflect detailed
application of subject matters within the scope of this Agreement and which
are consistent with it. It would be impractical to set forth in this Agreement all
of these rules, customs, regulations, and/or practices, or to state which of
these matters may have been eliminated. A joint committee will be formed to
review safety and work rules, customs, regulations, and practices. It is
understood and agreed that if a dispute arises as to the existence or
enforceability of a specific safety or work rule, custom regulation, or practice,
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such dispute shall not be subject to the grievance and arbitration provisions
of this Agreement, but shall instead become the exclusive concern of the
Director of Human Resources for the Company and the International
Representative of the Union or their specifically authorized deputies.
In addition, it is understood and agreed that the Company shall have the
exclusive right to issue, amend, and revise safety and/or work rules, customs,
regulations, and practices, except as expressly modified or restricted by a
specific provision of this Agreement. This provision shall include job
specifications for the classifications which were recognized by the NLRB
Certification dated April 11, 2003, Case No. 3-RC-11307, except as expressly
modified or restricted by a specific provision of this Agreement.
Paragraphs (B) and (C) of this Article are confined to safety rules and safety
training and are not relevant to the issue under consideration.
Article (8) MANAGEMENT RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
It is mutually understood and agreed by the parties to this Agreement that: except as
expressly modified or restricted by a specific provision of this Agreement, all statutory and
inherent managerial rights, prerogatives, and functions are retained and vested exclusively in
the Company, including but not limited to the rights, in accordance with its sole and exclusive
judgment and discretion to reprimand, suspend, discharge, and otherwise discipline employees
for just cause; to determine the number of employees to be employed; to hire employees,
determine their qualifications and assign and direct their work; to promote, demote, transfer, lay
off, recall employees to work; to set the standards of productivity, the products to be produced
and/or the services to be rendered; to maintain the efficiency of operations; to determine
personnel, methods, means, and facilities by which operations are conducted; to determine the
size and number of crews; to determine the shifts to be worked; to use independent contractors
to perform work or services; to subcontract, contract out, close down, or relocate the Company’s
operations or any part thereof; to expand, reduce, alter, combine, transfer, assign, or cease any
job, department, operation or service; to regulate the use of machinery, facilities, equipment,
and other property of the Company; to introduce new or improved research, production, service,
distribution, and maintenance methods, materials, machinery, and equipment; to determine the
number, location and operation of departments, divisions, and all other units of the Company; to
issue, amend and revise reasonable policies, rules, regulations, and practices not in conflict with
any express provisions of the collective bargaining agreement; and to direct the company
employees. The Company’s failure to exercise any right, prerogative, or function hereby
reserved to it, or the company’s exercise of any such right, prerogative, or function in a
particular way, shall not be considered a waiver of the Company’s right to exercise such right,
prerogative, or function or preclude it from exercising the same in some other way not in conflict
with the express provisions of this Agreement.
The parties at hearing referred to Article 25 as the Benefits Article in error. Article 25 is a
one line article dealing with the Company’s Pension. Article 26 is a one line Article dealing with
the Company’s 401(k) plans. Article 24 deals with benefits other than pension or 401(k). It
reads:
(2) BENEFITS (other than Pension or 401(k))
During the term of this Agreement, the Company will provide “General Benefits” and
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“Benefit Plans” described in the “Rochester Gas and Electric Union Employee Benefit
Handbook”, subject to the terms and conditions of the plan documents. The terms of the plan
documents, including the summary plan descriptions are specifically incorporated herein by
reference.
Except as set forth below, it is understood and agreed that during the term of this
Agreement the Company (consistent with the plan documents) shall have the exclusive and
unilateral right to issue, amend, revise or terminate any or all benefits and benefit plans:
There follows four numbered paragraphs dealing with medical plans and flex fit credits,
none of which are relevant to the issued involved in this case.
Though the parties discussed the matter of employees taking home Company vehicles,
it is not mentioned in the agreement. The only mention of vehicles I find is in Article 16 which
deals with overtime. The last sentence of this Article reads. “The Company may require
employees to take home vehicles.”
C. Discussion and Conclusion with Respect to the Issues.
1. Did the Respondent Violate the Act by Refusing to Bargain Over the Effects of its
Decision?
Wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment are mandatory subjects of
bargaining, which cannot be changed by an employer without providing the union with timely
notice and an opportunity to bargain. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962); NLRB . Borg-
Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958). Making unilateral changes in mandatory subjects of
bargaining “circumvent[s] . . . the duty to negotiate which frustrates the objectives of Section
8(a)(5) as much as does a flat refusal.” Katz, at 743. The effects on employees of losing the
benefit of a service vehicle to drive to and from their residences is a mandatory subject of
bargaining as it relates to their wages and conditions of employment.
The Respondent has argued that the Union has waived its right to this statutory mandate
to bargain over unilateral changes by its agreement to the parties’ collective bargaining
agreement. Whether that is correct or not is moot as the General Counsel has amended the
Complaint to remove the allegation that Respondent was obligated to bargain over its decision
to cease the practice of allowing the low voltage workers to use its vehicles to commute to and
from work.
On the other hand, there remains the issue of whether Respondent was obligated to
bargain with the Union over the effects of its decision. Under Board law, I find that Respondent
was obligated to give the Union notice and an opportunity to bargain about the effects on unit
employees of its decision to eliminate the benefit of the employee’s use of Company vehicles to
go to and from work and home. That is true even if it had no obligation to bargain about the
decision itself. Good Samaritan Hospital, 335 NLRB 901, 902 (2001); Kiro, Inc., 317 NLRB
1325, 1327 (1995). In Good Samaritan Hospital, the Board held that contractual language that
waives the union’s right to bargain about a decision is not a waiver of its right to bargain about
that decision’s effects. Id. at 902. Specifically, in Good Samaritan Hospital, the Board found that
the language in the parties’ collective bargaining agreement waived the union’s right to bargain
over the hospital’s decision to change its staffing matrix, but did not waive the union’s right to
bargain over the effects of this decision. Id. at 901-903. The Board found that the hospital’s
decision impacted the employees’ terms and conditions of employment and that the hospital
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had to bargain over these effects. Id. at 903-904.
Here Respondent’s decision had a substantial monetary effect on the affected
employees. Whether one accepts the Respondent’s own estimate of the value to the employees
of its practice, the value or income imputed to the employees because of their use of
Respondent’s vehicles to commute to work, or the higher $5000 to $6000 figure asserted by the
Union or something in between, the value was substantial. The costs incurred by the
employees as a result of the decision included providing a vehicle to replace the one provided
by Respondent, and paying the maintenance, insurance and gasoline costs for the vehicle. It is
obvious to anyone who drives a car these days that these costs are very real and substantial.
Thus, the effects of Respondent’s decision included changes to employees’ terms and
conditions of employment in ways that were material, substantial and significant. It is clear that
Respondent realized the truth of this as the value of the use of the Company vehicle was
considered income by Respondent and was represented to prospective employees and relied
upon by some of those taking involved jobs, as being part of their total compensation. As such,
Respondent had a duty to bargain over the effects of the decision. Kiro, Inc., supra; Union Child
Day Care Center, 304 NLRB 517 (1991)(finding that the employer violated Section 8(a)(5) of the
Act by unilaterally discontinuing its practice of allowing employees to use a company vehicle to
obtain their lunches); Yellow Cab Co., 229 NLRB 1329, 1333, 1354 (1977)(finding that the
employer violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by unilaterally changing its policy allowing
employees to use their cab for transportation to and from work).
I cannot find any evidence that the Union has clearly and expressly waived its right to
bargain over the effects of the Respondent’s decision. Nothing in the evidence relating to the
negotiations for collective bargaining speaks to any intent by the Union to consciously waive its
right to effects bargaining and the collective bargaining agreement is silent as to effects
bargaining, though arguably giving the Respondent the right to unilaterally make changes in
otherwise mandatory subjects of bargaining. Clearly there were no negotiations over the effects
of the decision to take away the private use of Respondent’s vehicles by low voltage employees
and there is no language dealing with this issue in the collective bargaining agreement. The
Supreme Court, in Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 708 (1983), held that it
would not “infer from a general contractual provision that the parties intended to waive a
statutorily protected right unless the undertaking is ‘explicitly stated. ‘” The Board has held that
to meet the clear and unmistakable standard, “the contract language must be specific, or it must
be shown that the party alleged to have waived its rights consciously yielded its interest in the
matter.” Allison Corp., 330 NLRB 1363, 1365 (2000). Furthermore, in addressing effects
bargaining, the Board has held that it must be clear and unmistakable that effects bargaining is
being waived. Good Samaritan Hospital, supra at 902.
None of the contractual provisions, Article 7, Article 24 or Article 8, all set forth in their
relevant entirety above, address the effects of taking any action under their wording nor do they
address the removal of service vehicles at all. There is nothing that clearly gives Respondent
the right to avoid effects bargaining from any action it might take in reliance on these Articles.
There is nothing in the evidence in this record about negotiations that deals with effects
bargaining. I find that Respondent has failed to meet its burden that the Union clearly and
unmistakably waived its right to bargain over the effects of Respondent’s unilateral removal of
the low voltage employees longstanding benefit.
Likewise it is clear that the Union timely and continuously requested to bargain over the
matter. Irish made clear requests for bargaining in his November 2005 telephone conversation
with Frank, in his meeting with Respondent’s representatives in December 2005, and again in
its official grievance over the matter submitted on January 10, 2006. The grievance in part
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states:
“This unilateral action was a violation of past practice. This removes the benefit of the
use of vehicles for commuting to work and responding to callouts directly from home. Wages,
benefits, hours and working conditions are mandatory subjects of collective bargaining. The
Company refused collective bargaining in this matter. The resolution to this instant case is that
all affected members be made whole.”
The grievance is clear that the loss of a benefit of using the vehicles for commuting
purposes is at issue and equally clear is the fact that, inter alia, the Union is seeking
compensation for the losses its members incurred as a result of Respondent’s decision. At both
grievance meetings in January and July 2006, Irish repeated the Union’s position that
Respondent’s conduct was a unilateral change and that hours, wages and conditions of
employment were mandatory subjects of bargaining. The Union also maintained that position in
its letters of March 7 and June 5, 2006. During the grievance meetings, Irish informed
Respondent that the use of Company vehicles was part of the employees’ compensation and
that its loss was costing the employees $5000 to $6000 annually. I find that this makes perfectly
clear that the Union was seeking an effects remedy in addition to seeking bargaining over the
decision itself. On the issue of waiver, The Board has held that “[i]n the absence of a clear and
unmistakable waiver by the union concerning effects bargaining, such bargaining is still
required.” Good Samaritan Hospital, supra at 902. Though I find that it is clear that the Union
here requested by effects and decision bargaining, the Board has held that no magic words are
required to establish a demand to bargain. They made it clear that the loss of the vehicle for
commuting to work and the costs associated with that loss were substantial. Implicit in such a
position is that a remedy is due to the employees for the effects of the lost benefit. AT&T Corp.,
325 NLRB 150 (1997); Legal Aid Bureau, 319 NLRB 159 fn. 2 (1995). Any argument by
Respondent that the practice of letting the low voltage employees use their Company vehicles
to commute is not a benefit, as was made in the testimony, is disingenuous as their best
argument for waiver with respect to the decision to discontinue the practice is found in the
section of the collective bargaining agreement dealing with benefits.
In conclusion, I find that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by refusing to
bargain with the Union over the effects of its decision to cease the practice and benefit of
allowing the low voltage employees to use their Company vehicles to commute to and from
work.
2. Did Respondent Violate Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by Refusing to Supply the Union
with Requested Information?
Though Respondent did supply one part of the Union’s information request, it continues
to refuse to supply the following portions of it:
Any Company analysis of the cost of this to the Company;
A listing of non-unit personnel who have the benefit, so that we may assess the
significance of this issue to the Company; and,
Whether the Company announced to any non-unit personnel the same restrictions now
being imposed upon the members of the bargaining unit.
The Respondent has informed the Union that it does not consider the last two requests
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to be necessary and relevant to the Union’s duties as representative of the unit employees and
with respect to the first one, has stated that no analysis of the costs associated with its decision
has been made. This latter information was first given at the hearing in this case and was not
given to the Union prior to the hearing.
With respect to the cost request, General Counsel asserts that the Union is seeking an
analysis of the cost to the Company of providing service vehicles to bargaining unit personnel,
not an analysis of the cost savings achieved by taking the service vehicles away. I would agree
though would note they might be the same thing. Whether any formal analysis was performed or
not, the underlying cost information is available. Certainly the Respondent thought there were
cost savings to be achieved by stopping the longstanding practice of letting the low voltage
employees take Company vehicles home at night. Budget constraints and budget cuts were the
reasons given to employees when they were informed of the Company’s decision. I find that
such information is highly relevant and necessary to the Union to be able to effectively bargain
with the Company over the effects of its decision. Whether the costs are associated with
increased mileage on the vehicles, increased maintenance costs or increased fuel costs are all
matters within the knowledge of the Respondent. If it did not understand what the Union was
seeking, it could have sought a clarification, but instead it simply chose to not comply without
giving a legitimate reason.
Respondent is obligated to furnish the Union with information about the cost of providing
the benefit to bargaining unit employees. Information relating to wages, hours and working
conditions of employees in the bargaining unit is presumptively relevant. North Star Steel Co.,
347 NLRB No. 119, slip op. 1, 5 (2006). Accordingly, the Board has held that financial
information related to the cost of providing benefits to the bargaining unit is presumptively
relevant for purposes of collective bargaining and must be furnished upon request. E.I. Dupont
& Co., 346 NLRB 553, 577 (2006); V&S Schuler Engineering, 332 NLRB 1242 (2000). There is
no contention made in the evidence that such information does not exist and common
knowledge would affirm that it does exist. Simply stating some years after the request was
made that no analysis was made is just not sufficient. Respondent has violated the Act by not
complying with this request.
With respect to the information sought concerning non-unit personnel, I believe this
information is similarly necessary and relevant for the Union to properly represent the involved
unit employees. Frank announced to the low voltage employees that ceasing the practice of
letting them use their Company vehicles to commute to and from work was just the start of
similar steps the Company intended to take. Thus he opened the door to legitimate inquiry by
the Union as to the scope of Respondent’s cost savings program. With respect to information
pertaining to employees outside the bargaining unit, the Union must demonstrate the
information is relevant. National Grid USA Service Co., 348 NLRB No. 88 (2006). The burden in
demonstrating relevance is “not exceptionally heavy.” Leland Stanford Junior University, 262
NLRB 136, 139 (1982). The Union need only show a “probability that the desired information
was relevant, and that it would be of use to the union in carrying out its statutory duties and
responsibilities. NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432, 437 (1967).
The Union’s information request was based on Respondent’s representations regarding
the reason it eliminated the vehicle benefit. Frank notified the low voltage employees that they
were losing the use of the vehicles and in doing so indicated that it was a cost savings measure
and that other employees would also lose the use of the vehicles. Frank made similar assertions
to Irish. On this basis, the Union stated in its request, that it need the information to “assess the
significance of this benefit and its cost to the company and to aid the Union in responding to
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employer demands to terminate the benefit.” The information relating to non-unit personnel
would demonstrate the significance of the benefit, including whether the change was going to be
instituted Company-wide or if it was only being applied to the low voltage members of the
bargaining unit. This information would aid the Union in bargaining over the effect of losing the
benefit, as it would clarify its impact on Respondent and assist the Union in preparing
bargaining proposals. It would clearly affect the Union’s bargaining position as it relates to the
size of the cost savings sought by Respondent, whether minimal in the case of the low voltage
employees or substantial if a number of non-unit employees were similarly losing the use of
Company vehicles for their commute. I believe the Unions approach would be different in one
case versus the other. Further, other than its claim of non relevance, Respondent has offered
no reason why it cannot supply the information or what harm could result if it did. Relevancy of
the information is also established by Frank’s statements that the removal of the benefit was a
cost savings measure that would be borne by other employees as well. The request information
would verify the assertion that Frank made to the low voltage employees.
I find that Respondent has violated the Act by not providing the information sought with
respect to non-unit employees.
3. Deferral is Not Appropriate in the Circumstance of this Case.
On brief and in its answer, Respondent urges deferral of this case to the parties'
grievance and arbitration procedures. I think deferral in this case is inappropriate for two
reasons. First, the use of take home Company vehicles at employer expense is a non-
contractual term and condition of employment. The grievance and arbitration procedure allows
processing only of an alleged “violation of the specific terms of this Agreement.” Section 10(A).
It states:
“No other matter may be submitted to the grievance and arbitration procedure.”
“Work rules, customs, regulations, or practices which reflect detailed application of
subject matters within the scope of this Agreement” are excluded from the grievance and
arbitration procedure. Section 7 (A). Deferral is not appropriate here because the arbitration
clause in the collective bargaining agreement does not cover the item at issue.
Second, deferral is not appropriate as the Complaint alleges violations of Section 8(a)(5)
of the Act for failing and refusing to provide information. Postal Service, 302 NLRB 767 (1991);
DaimlerChrysler, 344 NLRB 1324 fn. 1 (2005). The Board held in DaimlerChrysler Corp. that
“under the Board’s decision in Postal Service, (citation omitted), the 8(a)(5) complaint
allegations concerning failure to provide requested information are not appropriate for deferral
pursuant to Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB 837 (1971). Id. at fn. 1. Thus the information
request allegations are not deferrable. Insofar as deferring the other allegation of this Complaint,
the Board has held that it does not favor piece-meal deferral and prefers to have an entire
dispute resolved in a single proceeding. DaimlerChrysler Corp., supra.
Conclusions of Law
1. Respondent, Rochester Gas & Electric Corporation, is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6) and (7) of the Act.
2. Local Union 36, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
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3. By failing to timely notify the Union and afford it an opportunity to bargain over the
effects of discontinuing the benefit of allowing the low voltage TM&R employees to
take their service vehicles home after work, Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1)
and (5) of the Act.
4. By failing and refusing to provide the Union with the information it requested on
March 7, and June 5, 2006, namely, the cost to Respondent of allowing the
bargaining unit employees to have the benefit of taking a company vehicle home, a
listing of all employees who have the benefit of taking a company vehicle home, and
whether Respondent announced to any employee or group of employees not in the
bargaining unit that the benefit would be discontinued, and by failing to inform the
Union that certain requested information did not exist, Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
5. The unfair labor practices committed by Respondent affect commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Remedy
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I find
that it must be ordered to cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
Respondent should be ordered to, on request, bargain collectively with the Union
concerning the effects of its decision to discontinue the benefit of allowing the low voltage
TM&R employees to take their service vehicles home after work. It should further be ordered to
make whole its employees for any losses they may have suffered as a consequence of its
decision to eliminate the vehicle benefit, with interest as computed in New Horizons for the
Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987). Respondent should further be ordered to furnish the Union
with the information it requested on March 7 and June 5, 2006, which is relevant and necessary
to the Union’s duties as statutory representative of the Respondent’s employees. And last,
Respondent should be ordered to post an appropriate notice.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended7
ORDER
The Respondent, Rochester Gas & Electric Corporation, Rochester, New York, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from:
a. Failing to timely notify the Union and afford it an opportunity to bargain over

7 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and
Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
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the effects of discontinuing the benefit of allowing the low voltage TM&R
employees to take their service vehicles home after work;
b. Failing and refusing to provide the Union with requested information relevant
to the effects of its decision to discontinue the benefit of allowing the low
voltage TM&R employees to take their service vehicles home after work,
and/or failing to inform the Union that certain requested information did not
exist, so as to enable the Union to discharge its function as statutory
representative of Respondent’s employees; and,
c. In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing
employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
a. On request, bargain collectively with the Union concerning the effects of its
decision to discontinue the benefit of allowing the low voltage TM&R
employees to take their service vehicles home after work.
b. Make whole its employees for any losses they may have suffered as a
consequence of the Respondent’s refusal to bargain over the effects of its
decision to eliminate the vehicle benefit.
c. Furnish the Union with the information it requested on March 7 and June 5,
2006, which is relevant and necessary to the Union’s duties as statutory
representative of the Respondent’s employees.
d. Preserve and within 14 days of a request, or such additional time as the
Regional Director may allow for good cause shown, provide at a reasonable
place designated by the Board or its agents, all payroll records, social
security payment records, timecards, personnel records and report, and all
other records, including an electronic copy of such records if stored in
electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of money due under the
terms of this Order.
e. Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its facility in Rochester,
New York, copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”8 Copies of the
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 3, after being
signed by the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places

8 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the
notice reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted
Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
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including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the
event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has
gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these proceedings, the
Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice
to all current employees and former employees employed by the Respondent
at any time since June 13, 2006.
f. Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a
sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region
attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. June 12, 2008
____________________
Wallace H. Nations
Administrative Law Judge
JD–31-08
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this Notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities
WE WILL NOT do anything that interferes with, restrains or coerces you with respect to these
rights. More specifically,
WE WILL NOT refuse to give the Union all the information it requested on March 7 and June 5,
2006, concerning the elimination of the benefit of allowing the low voltage TM&R employees to
take their service vehicle home at the end of their shift and/or fail to inform the Union that certain
requested information does not exist.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain with the Union over the effects of our elimination of the benefit
of allowing the low voltage TM&R employees to take their service vehicle home at the end of
their shifts.
WE WILL make whole all low voltage TM&R bargaining unit members who previously enjoyed
the benefit of taking their service vehicle home for any losses incurred as a result of our
elimination of this benefit.
WE WILL bargain with the Union over the effects of our decision to eliminate the benefit of
allowing low voltage TM&R employees to take their service vehicle home at the end of their
shifts.
WE WILL provide the Union with the information it requested on March 7 and June 5, 2006,
namely, the cost to Respondent of allowing the bargaining unit employees to have the benefit of
taking a company vehicle home, a listing of all employees who have the benefit of taking a
company vehicle home, and whether Respondent announced ot any employee or group of
employees not in the bargaining unit that the benefit would be discontinued.
ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC
CORPORATION
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
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The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor
Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it
investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under
the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s
Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
111 West Huron Street, Federal Building, Room 901
Buffalo, New York 14202-2387
Hours: 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m.
716-551-4931.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST
NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS
NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, 716-551-4946.