Robins Federal Credit Union

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jan 9, 1985

273 N.L.R.B. 1352 (N.L.R.B. 1985)

1352 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Robins Federal Credit Union and Retail Clerks
Union Local No. 1063. Case 10-CA-19842
9 January 1985
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS
HUNTER AND DENNIS
On 20 July 1984 Administrative Law Judge
Lawrence W. Cullen issued the attached decision.
The General Counsel filed exceptions and a sup-
porting brief and the Respondent filed an answer-
ing brief.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has
decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings,' and
conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts as
its Order the recommended Order of the adminis-
trative law judge and orders that the Respondent,
Robins Federal Credit Union, Warner Robins,
Georgia, its officers, agents, successors, and as-
signs, shall take the action set forth in the Order.
1 The General Counsel has excepted to some of the Judge's credibility
findings The Board's established policy is not to overrule an administra-
tive law Judge's credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of
all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are Incorrect Standard
Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd 188 F 2d 362 (3d Ca
1951) We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for re-
versing the findings
DECISION
LAWRENCE W. CULLEN, Administrative Law Judge.
This case was heard before me on February 14 and 15,
1984, in Warner Robins, Georgia, pursuant to a com-
plaint filed by the Acting Regional Director for Region
10 of the National Labor Relations Board (the Board) on
January 13, 1984 The complaint, as amended at the
hearing, alleges a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (the Act) by the unlawful in-
terrogation of an employee by Respondent Robins Fed-
eral Credit Union (Respondent) and a violation of Sec-
tion 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by the unlawful discharge
of an employee because of her engagement in protected
concerted activities. The original charge was filed on
December 5, 1983, by the Retail Clerks Union Local No.
1063 (the Union). Respondent by its answer filed on Jan-
uary 20, 1984, as amended at the hearing, has denied that
it has committed any violations of the Act.
After due consideration of the evidence presented at
the hearing and the briefs filed by the General Counsel
and counsel for the Respondent, I hereby make the fol-
lowing recommended:1
' The following includes a composite of the testimony of the witnesses
at the heanng
I. JURISDICTION
The Business of Respondent
The complaint alleges, Respondent admits, and I find
that Respondent is and has been at all times material a
private nonprofit corporation chartered by the National
Credit Union Administration, with an office and place of
business located in Warner Robins, Georgia, where it is
engaged in the extension of consumer credit to member
civilian and military personnel of the United States Gov-
ernment; that during the past calendar year (prior to the
filing of the complaint), a representative period, Re-
spondent purchased and received at its office in Warner
Robins goods and services valued in excess of $50,000 di-
rectly from suppliers located outside the State of Geor-
gia; and that Respondent is, and has been at all times ma-
terial, an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION
The complaint alleges, Respondent admits, and I find
that the Union is, and has been at all times material, a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES2
A. Background
This case involves the discharge of Debra Montford, a
loan officer of Respondent, who had been employed by
Respondent for 10-1/2 years prior to her discharge on
October 19. The General Counsel contends that Mont-
ford was discharged because of her engagement in pro-
tected concerted activities in organizing on behalf of the
Union and that Respondent thereby violated Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. The Respondent while admit-
ting knowledge of Montford's union activities contends
that the General Counsel has failed to prove a prima
facie case as it has failed to prove union animus on the
part of the Respondent or that the reason given for the
discharge was pretextual. Specifically, Respondent con-
tends that Montford was discharged for cause because of
her violation of a written policy of Respondent prohibit-
ing the issuance of loans to relatives by loan officers and
engaging in "self dealing." Also alleged as a violation of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act is the interrogation of an em-
ployee concerning the union campaign by a supervisor of
Respondent on November 19 following the discharge of
Montford.
B. The Discharge of Debra Montford
Montford initially became a loan officer with Re-
spondent in 1981, having previously filled several other
positions in her employment with Respondent including
that of loan clerk. A loan officer has the responsibility of
interviewing applicants for loans of various types (i e.,
signature loans, automobile loans), taking the loan back-
ground and information required to determine if a loan
2 All dates are in 1983 unless otherwise stated
273 NLRB No. 165
ROBINS FEDERAL CREDIT UNION 1353
should be made, and either making a decision to issue the
loan or referring the loan decision to the credit commit-
tee of Respondent which then passes on the loan deci-
sion. Respondent's written loan policy provided to loan
officers and to credit committee members states in part
that
Credit Committee and Loan Officers will not [em-
phasis in original] process or act on applications
submitted by their relatives or members of their
families, and
Credit union officials and employees have an obliga-
tion to the members to avoid all self-dealing and
self-serving
After a loan has been approved by a loan officer, the file
is put on a stack to be processed by the loan clerks who
prepare the documentation, check the application, and
issue the check to the borrower and/or to the seller of
the item being financed (i.e., an automobile). The loan
clerk also has the responsibility for calling the sellers of
the motor vehicles and verbally informing them of Re-
spondent's lien and arranging for the title to be processed
through the State reflecting the purchase and the lien of
Respondent.
On April 19 Michael Driggers, who is married to a
cousin of Montford, applied for a loan of $6000 with Re-
spondent to buy a 1983 truck for $7500 from Dixie
Truck & Parts Co. The truck had been damaged shortly
after it had been sold as a new vehicle by Youman Chev-
rolet to a Jim W. Renters. The truck had been "totaled"
for insurance purposes and repurchased by Youman
Chevrolet as a trade-in from Renters who ordered an-
other new truck from Youman to replace the damaged
vehicle. The amount of the damage to the truck paid by
the insurer was $2900. The original suggested retail pur-
chase price of the truck at the time of its purchase from
Youman Chevrolet by Renters was $10,500. Youman
Used-Car Manager William Durban testified that he
called several wholesale used car dealers and agreed to
sell the damaged vehicle to Dixie Truck & Parts Co.
(a/k/a Dixie Motors), the highest bidder. Dixie Motors
contacted Jimmy Sims of H & S Wholesale Motors, who
purchases damaged vehicles for repair and resale. Sims is
an uncle of Debra Montford and the father-in-law of
Driggers. Sims and Driggers testified that Sims told
Driggers of the truck, and Driggers agreed to purchase
it for his own use. When Dnggers applied for the auto-
mobile loan, he was interviewed by Debra Montford and
the loan was issued that date by Montford. Montford
also called Dixie Motors to secure Respondent's lien, al-
though this is normally done by the loan clerk rather
than by the loan officer. The truck was (according to the
testimony of Sims and Driggers) repurchased by Sims
from Driggers as Driggers decided he could not make
the payments and the truck was resold by Sims to C. E.
Edwards in May 1983. However, Respondent was not
informed of this transaction, nor was the loan repaid
until July when it was paid off by Sims rather than Drig-
gers During this period, Respondent did not have a se-
cured lien as title had never been applied for by Dixie
Motors or conveyed to Driggers by Dixie Motors. Nor
had notice been sent to the Georgia State Department of
Revenue Motor Vehicle Division to register the title in
Driggers' name with a lien on behalf of Respondent.
It was not until September 20, 1983, when Barbara
Marcu, a title clerk employed by Respondent, began a
routine telephone followup on titles which had not been
received by Respondent with Dixie Motors to ascertain
the reason for the delay in receiving the title that Re-
spondent was apprised that the vehicle had been sold.
Marcu and Edward Levins, Respondent's assistant man-
ager in charge of administration, testified that following
the issuance of a loan by the loan officer (such as Debra
Montford), the loan clerk has the responsibility for call-
ing the seller (in this case Dixie Motors) and obtaining
the title number of the vehicle and informing the seller
of Respondent's lien. In this case, Montford (the loan of-
ficer) made the call although normally (but not in every
case) the loan clerk makes the call which is her respon-
siblity. The seller is then responsible for sending the title
to the State of Georgia Motor Vehicle Unit to have the
title changed to show the new ownership by the pur-
chaser and Respondent's lien thereon. As a result of de-
layed processing by the State of Georgia Motor Vehicle
Unit and, as the result of the failure of certain sellers to
send the application for title changes and information to
the state office, titles are often delayed and Respondent
may not receive them for a period of 3 to 6 months. Re-
spondent maintains a list of sellers with whom it has had
trouble in the past in this regard. Neither Youman Chev-
rolet, Dixie Motors, nor H & S Sales was on this list of
sellers. Marcu maintains a late title file and routinely fol-
lows up with sellers and the State on titles which have
not been received for 90 days or more after the issuance
of the loan. She follows up on these late titles by the is-
suance of form letters and by telephone inquiries to the
seller.
On September 20 she contacted the title clerk of Dixie
Motors concerning the title of the vehicle on which the
loan had been made to Driggers. The title clerk told her
she would have to call her back concerning the title.
Marcu then received a telephone call from Debra Mont-
ford, who told her that the truck had been wrecked and
repaired and resold and that the loan had been repaid
and that Respondent would not receive a title. When
Marcu inquired as to the need of Driggers for a title, she
was told not to worry about the title as Dnggers was a
part owner of H & S Motors according to the testimony
of Marcu Marcu testified that when she put down the
phone, she exclaimed aloud, "That's not right," where-
upon Pat Parkerson, who is employed as an in-house
auditor, and who reports directly to Respondent's board
of governors, was walking by and asked Marcu what
was not right, whereupon Marcu advised her of the con-
versation. Parkerson advised Marcu to inform the man-
agement. Marcu then reported it to Assistant Manager
Edward Levins. Levins told Marcu to do nothing but to
reduce what had occurred to writing. At Levins' request
Marcu called Dixie Motors the following day. Marcu did
so and spoke to Phillip Sullivan who told her he thought
the truck had been "wrecked" and told her to speak with
an employee of H & S Wholesalers who was with him at
1354 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the time. Sullivan then put J. S. Sims on the telephone
and Sims told Marcu that the credit union (Respondent)
knew that the truck had been wrecked and that Mont-
ford was to have called her concerning the title and Re-
spondent should not worry about it. He also told her
that the truck had been sold to C. E. Edwards. Levins
launched an investigation into the matter, asked Marcu
to write the State concerning the transfer of the title to
the vehicle, and Levins contacted the used-car sales man-
ager of Youman Chevrolet, the original purchaser of the
vehicle, Renters, and the then-current owner of the auto-
mobile, Edwards, who had ultimately purchased the ve-
hicle from Sims in May. During the course of this inves-
tigation, Parkerson checked the loans made by Montford
and also those in which Dixie Motors and H & S Sales
had been the seller. She discovered that on at least one
other occasion Montford had made a loan to Driggers
who was a frequent borrower. Sims was not a member
of the credit union and was thus ineligible to make a loan
from Respondent. In response to a letter request for a
vehicle title search of September 21 by Marcu to the
Georgia State Motor Vehicle Unit, Respondent received
a response approximately October 6 or 7 that showed an
application for a title on the vehicle had been made and
then canceled on behalf of Renters and that an applica-
tion for title had been made on behalf of Edwards re-
flecting no lien or security holders
During the period of his investigation, Levins in-
formed Respondent's manager C. S. Moore of its ongo-
ing status. On October 12 Levins advised Moore that he
was ready to meet and discuss the matter. Levins,
Moore, and Henry Johnson, the assistant manager who is
in charge of the loan department, met on that date in the
afternoon and reviewed the above and at that time
Levins recommended that Montford be terminated for
having made a loan to a relative in violation of Respond-
ent's loan policy and that it had been made on a wrecked
vehicle and that the loan had never been secured. Ac-
cording to the testimony of Levins, he and Moore and
Johnson agreed but delayed the termination of Montford
as she was gone for the day at the time of the meeting.
Johnson also testified that as Montford was a long-term
employee, Manager Moore wanted to discuss the matter
with Respondent's attorney. Moore, Johnson, and Levins
had been scheduled to attend a state credit union meet-
ing at Jekyll Island, Georgia, the next day, October 13,
and ending on Sunday, October 16.According to the tes-
timony of Levins, on the morning of October 13 prior to
his leaving for work, he was informed by Manager
Moore of the advent of union activities by some of the
employees of Respondent. Moore instructed Levins to
meet with the management employees and inform them
to do nothing concerning the union activities but to con-
tinue their work and insure that the operations of the
credit union were carried on. Levins went to the office,
met individually with the management employees in
small groups, conveyed this information to them, and left
for Jekyll Island that afternoon. No discussion of the
Montford matter took place during the weekend. Levins
testified that he and Manager Moore discussed the
matter with Respondent's attorney who recommended
that a labor law practitioner in Atlanta be consulted.
This was done by Moore and Levins. On the afternoon
of October 19, Montford was called to a meeting by
Johnson. In attendance were Moore, Johnson, and
Levins. Manager Moore told Montford he had some-
thing unpleasant to discuss with her to which Montford
replied, "It usually is." He then reviewed the Dnggers'
loan situation with her. According to her testimony, she
denied knowledge that the prohibition against making
loans to relatives applied to other than members of the
immediate family and contended she was unaware of the
other transactions concerning the vehicle. At that time
Manager Moore signed her termination notice, which
had already been filled out, and directed Johnson to go
with her to clean out her desk and leave. Prior to her
departure, she turned to Levins and Johnson and asked,
"After ten and a half years, do you think this is fair?"
Montford testified she was unaware that the prohibi-
tion against loans to relatives applied to relatives as dis-
tant as the husband of her cousin, denied knowledge of
the damaged status of the automobile or any of the other
transactions involving it until she received a telephone
call from Sims on September 20 who informed her that
the vehicle had been damaged, the loan repaid, the vehi-
cle resold, and that Respondent would not get a title
She testified she verified that the loan had been repaid in
July and then called Marcu and informed her of the
above and that Marcu acted curious. She denied having
told Marcu that Driggers was part owner of H & S
Sales. Montford testified further that she had initially
contacted the Union in 1981, but had done nothing fur-
ther in this regard until August 1983 when, at the request
of another employee, she again contacted the Union, met
with union officials, signed a union card, and solicited
several union authorization cards of other employees and
set up a meeting between the employees and the Union
which was scheduled for October 20. Employee Susan
Curtis testified she was initially informed of the union
campaign by Montford in October 1983.
Analysis
I find that the General Counsel has failed to prove a
prima facie case of a violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1)
of the Act by Respondent's discharge of Montford In
making this determination, I have considered all of the
facts and circumstances leading up to the termination in
this case including the timing of the discharge of Mont-
ford after the advent of the union campaign and on the
eve of the scheduled union meeting with Respondent's
employees. I find that the testimony of Respondent's wit-
nesses Levins, Marcu, Johnson, and Parkerson should be
credited concerning the events that led up to the termi-
nation of Montford as set out above. I find their version
of the sequence of events that led up to the termination
of Montford to be credible, logical, and supported in part
by documentary evidence of their research into the
matter. I find the transactions engaged in by Sims and
Driggers in the absence of Respondent's knowledge
appear to have been highly irregular. The sale of the ve-
hicle by Dnggers to Sims and then by Sims to Edwards
at a time when the vehicle was to be titled in the name
of Dnggers with a security interest to be filed on behalf
ROBINS FEDERAL CREDIT UNION 1355
of Respondent placed Respondent in a vulnerable posi-
tion with an unprotected security interest. The careful in-
vestigation by Levins of this matter after it was called to
his attention by Marcu, which included writing to the
State for the required information and contacting the
original and ultimate owners of the vehicle, as well as
the used-car manager, but not contacting Dixie Motors,
H & S Sales, and Driggers, does not appear an unreason-
able course to pursue. I cannot accept the arguments of
the General Counsel that the length of time to investi-
gate this case by Respondent was unreasonable or indi-
cated Respondent's lack of concern with the matter. This
is a far different case than one in which a seller has been
delinquent in conveying the title information to the State
or in which the State has not processed the title and sent
it to a respondent. Under these circumstances I find that
Respondent was legitimately concerned about Mont-
ford's part in this transaction and the violation of its
stated policy prohibiting its loan officers from making
loans to relatives and engaging in self-dealing. Mont-
ford's telephone call to Marcu informing her that no title
would be forthcoming would understandably have given
rise to a suspicion by Respondent as to her involvement
in the matter.
I further find, as contended by Respondent, that the
General Counsel has failed to prove animus on the part
of Respondent against the Union in this case. Rather, I
credit the testimony of Levins that Montford's union ac-
tivities were not known by Respondent prior to his rec-
ommendation of her termination on October 12 and that
he was only initially informed of union activities of the
employees on the morning of October 13 and was told to
and did instruct the supervisors to carry out the business
of Respondent and not to become involved with these
activities. I do not fmd the interrogation of employee
Curtis by Supervisor Brand 3 following the discharge of
Montford sufficient to prove animus toward the Union
by Respondent as this was an isolated act of interroga-
tion by a single supervisor which was unaccompanied by
threats. I find that the General Counsel has failed to
prove that Respondent's discharge of Montford was mo-
tivated by her union activities rather than by its concern
for her alleged violation of its policy against making
loans to relatives, and self-dealing and the irregularities
of the transactions following the issuance of the loan to
Driggers. Meyers Industries, 268 NLRB 493 fn. 23 (1984).
Although the sequence of events in this case, particu-
larly the timing of the discharge of Montford and the
method by which she was summarily dismissed when she
was called into the termination meeting and presented
with a typed termination notice, give rise to a suspicion
as to whether Respondent terminated her because of her
union activities, mere suspicion is not sufficent to support
a violation of the Act. See Spearin, Preston & Burrows
Inc., 248 NLRB 1384 (1980), and Royal Coach Sprinklers,
268 NLRB 1019 (1984).
I have also considered Respondent's termination of a
long term supervisor which occurred after the discharge
of Montford for a violation of its loan policy to relatives
3 Brand's supervisory status was admitted by Respondent at the hear-
ing.
and Respondent's actions in permitting her to resign at
her request rather than be discharged as was Montford.
When the General Counsel sought to introduce this evi-
dence, Respondent initially objected and then withdrew
its objection and the testimony in this regard was re-
ceived. I find the evidence to be of questionable rel-
evance as it occurred substantially after the discharge of
Montford. However, assuming its relevance hereto, I
would find it supportive of Respondent's position that it
regarded the violation of this policy as a dischargeable
offense rather than evidence of disparate treatment, as I
regard the distinction between Respondent's discharge of
Montford and its allowance of its supervisor to resign
upon her request rather than be discharged to be of little
moment insofar as Respondent was concerned although I
recognize that the difference can be substantial to the
employee involved. I credit the testimony of Levins that
the supervisor requested permission to resign and was
permitted to do so whereas Montford made no such re-
quest.
Accordingly, I find that the General Counsel has
failed to prove a prima facie case of a violation by Re-
spondent of the Act by its termination of Montford. As-
suming that a prima facie case was established, I find
that Respondent has rebutted that case by the preponder-
ance of the evidence. Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083
(1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied
455 U.S. 989; NLRB v. Transportation' Management Corp.,
462 U.S. 393 (1983). In making the determinations set out
above, I have not found that Montford was engaged in
any wrongful activity nor that Respondent's interpreta-
tion of the loan to Driggers by Montford as a violation
of its policy against loans to relatives and self-dealing
was necessarily correct or the only interpretation as to
whether "relative" included the husband of a cousin.
Rather, I have found that Respondent's concern about
the perceived violation of its policy by Montford and the
irregularities of the transactions involved following the
loan to Driggers were the motivating factors in its dis-
charge of Montford. It is a sad matter to see an employ-
ee of over 10 years' experience, who has progressed to a
substantial position, be terminated under these circum-
stances, but I do not find a violation of the Act was
committed by the Employer by reason of her termina-
tion. Nor have I found that Montford did in fact violate
Respondent's policy or that she was engaged in any ir-
regular or fraudulent transactions as contended by Re-
spondent in its brief.
C. The Interrogation of Employee Susan Curtis by
Supervisor Brand
Susan Curtis, a loan clerk employed by Respondent,
testified that the union campaign began in October, that
she signed an authorization card and solicited other cards
from Respondent's employees on behalf of the Union,
that she had initially been informed of the union cam-
paign by Montford and was informed of the union meet-
ing scheduled for October 20 "a couple of days" before
Montford's discharge. Curtis testified that "a few Satur-
days after Debra (Montford) was fired," Supervisor
Ronnie Brand asked her "how we were coming along on
1356 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
that." She inquired, "What? Do you mean the Union?"
and Brand "kind of laughed" and she told him, "Well, if
you mean the Union, we're coming along, but these
things take time." She testified further that he asked how
many cards had been signed, and she replied she did not
know as the cards were given to the Union and that the
Union kept track. Brand then asked her how many cards
were required, and she told him it "depended on who
would vote in the election."
Analysis
I credit the testimony of Curtis which is unrebutted as
Brand did not testify. I find the interrogation of Curtis
by Brand was violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act and
went beyond a casual question but was a pointed effort
to discover the Union's progress in its campaign. I find
this type of questioning to have been inherently coercive.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
The unfair labor practice of Respondent as found in
section III, in connection with Respondent's operations
as found in section I, has a close, intimate, and substan-
tial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among
the several States, and tends to lead to labor disputes
burdening and obstructing. the flow of commerce.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent Robins Federal Credit Union is an em-
ployer within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of
the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(3) and (1)
of the Act by its discharge of Debra Montford.
4. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by
the interrogation of its employee Susan Curtis by its su-
pervisor Ronnie Brand
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practice has a close, inti-
mate, and substantial effect on the free flow of com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of
the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act, I shall recommend that it cease and
desist therefrom and post the appropriate notice.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and
on the entire record, I issue the following recommend-
ed:4
ORDER
The Respondent, Robins Federal Credit Union,
Warner Robins, Georgia, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from unlawfully interrogating its
employees concerning their union activities in violation
of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
2. Take te following affirmative action necessary to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Post at its facilities in Warner Robins, Georgia,
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."5
Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 10, after being signed by the Re-
spondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by
the Respondent immediately upon receipt and maintained
for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including
all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respond-
ent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20
days from the date of this Order what steps Respondent
has taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dis-
missed with respect to the allegations of a violation of
Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by Respondent's dis-
charge of Debra Montford
5 If this Order is er forced by a Judgment of a United States Court of
Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the Nation-
al Labor Relations Board"
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing at which all parties participated, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has found that we have
violated the National Labor Relations Act. We have
been ordered to post this notice and abide by its terms.
Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protec-
tion
To choose not to engage in any of these protect-
ed concerted activities.
WE WILL NOT unlawfully interrogate our employees
concerning their union activities.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
4 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the Board's
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses
ROBINS FEDERAL CREDIT UNION