Robert Wartenfeld et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Aug 1, 2019

14145908 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Aug. 1, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/145,908 12/31/2013 Robert Wartenfeld 1158.613 7280
12973 7590 08/01/2019
Medley, Behrens & Lewis, LLC
6100 Rockside Woods Blvd.
Suite 440
Independence, OH 44131
EXAMINER
MORGAN, ROBERT W
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3626
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/01/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
admin-docketing@medleybehrens.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte ROBERT WARTENFELD, ZIV OFEK, EYAL GREENBERG,
ZIV GOME, and SHIRI BEN-TAL
____________

Appeal 2018-002562
Application 14/145,908
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before JAMES R. HUGHES, JOHN A. EVANS, and JASON M. REPKO,
Administrative Patent Judges.

EVANS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants1 seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner’s final rejection of Claims 37–56, all pending claims.2 Claims 1–

1 Appellants state the real party in interest is Allscripts Healthcare Solutions,
Inc. App. Br. 3.
2 Appellants recite “claims 35–50” as appealed. App. Br. 1. At least
because Claims 35 and 36 are not pending, we view this recitation as due to
harmless, typographic error.
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36 have been cancelled. See App. Br. 26–30 (Claims Appx.); Final Act. 1.
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM-IN-PART.3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The claims relate to a method of using a health information exchange
(HIE) system, which stores patient record data in electronic medical records
(EMRs), in order for a health provider to obtain context information
pertaining to the patient. See Abstract.
Invention
Claims 37 and 56 are independent; Claim 41 is dependent. An
understanding of the invention can be derived from a reading of Claim 37,
which is reproduced below with some formatting added. In addition,
Appellants’ arguments make reference to Claim 41, which is also
reproduced below:
37. A method of providing health information of a patient from a
health information exchange (HIE) system for view by a health
provider with health information of the patient from an EMR
application of an EMR system of the health provider, the
method comprising:

3 Rather than reiterate the arguments of Appellants and the Examiner, we
refer to the Appeal Brief (filed May 24, 2017, “App. Br.”), the Reply Brief
(filed January 9, 2018, “Reply Br.”), the Examiner’s Answer (mailed
November 9, 2017, “Ans.”), the Final Action (mailed October 3, 2017,
“Final Act.”), and the Specification (filed December 31, 2013, “Spec.”) for
their respective details.
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(a) running on a computerized device an instance of an agent
application that is bound to an instance of an EMR application
running on the computerized device;
and
(b) responsive to a health provider using the EMR application
instance running on the computerized device to acquire health
information of a patient from an EMR system of the EMR
application and display it within a graphic user interface
generated by the EMR application instance running on the
computerized device, acquiring by the agent application
instance running on the computerized device health information
of the patient from the HIE system and displaying it within a
graphic user interface generated by the agent application
instance running on the computerized device;
(c) wherein the agent application instance performs a context
interception process which determines a patient context within
the EHR application instance in order to acquire and display the
health information of the patient from the HIE system.

41. The method of claim 37, further comprising determining
context by screen scraping by the agent application instance
information displayed by the EMR application instance.
References and Rejections4
Mahesh et al. (“Mahesh”)

US 2006/0074633 A1 Oct. 1, 2004
Brummel et al. (“Brummel”) US 2002/0083075 A1 Dec. 5, 2001

4 The present application was examined under the pre-AIA first to invent
provisions. Final Act. 2. Claims 37–56 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 as directed to non-statutory subject matter without significantly more,
and Appellants’ arguments relate only to Claim 41. Final Act. 3.
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1. Claims 37–56 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed
to non-statutory subject matter without significantly more. Final Act.
3.
2. Claims 37–56 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Mahesh and Brummel. Final Act. 4–18.

ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the rejections of Claims 1 and 21–39 in light of
Appellants’ arguments that the Examiner erred. We have considered in this
Decision only those arguments Appellants actually raised in the Brief. Any
other arguments which Appellants could have made but chose not to make in
the Brief are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). With
respect to the rejections under §§ 101 and 103, we are not persuaded that
Appellants identify reversible error except for the rejection of Claim 41,
which we reverse under §§ 101 and 103. We provide the following
explanation to highlight and address specific arguments and findings
primarily for emphasis. We consider Appellants’ arguments as they are
presented in the Appeal Brief, pages 7–25.
CLAIMS 37–56: INELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER
Claims 37–56 stand rejected as being directed to patent-ineligible
subject matter. See Final Act. 4. However, Appellants direct their
arguments solely to the merits of Claim 41. App. Br. 6, 8. Because
Appellants presents no arguments directed to Claims 37–40 and 42–56, the
rejection of those claims is summarily affirmed. See MPEP § 1204 II (“If an
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appellant does not file an amendment cancelling claims that the appellant
does not wish to appeal, but then also fails to provide any argument in the
appeal brief directed to those claims, any challenge to that ground of
rejection has been waived, and the Board has discretion to simply affirm any
rejections against such claims.”) (citing Hyatt v. Dudas, 551 F.3d 1307,
1314 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
We review the record de novo. SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade
Comm’n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Whether a claim is drawn
to patent-eligible subject matter is an issue of law that we review de novo.”).
Based upon our review of the record in light of recent policy guidance with
respect to patent-eligible subject matter rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 101, we
reverse the rejection of claim 41 for the specific reasons discussed below.
Statutory Construction in View of International Agreements.
Appellants discuss that in 1994, a number of agreements were signed
in Marrakesh, Morocco, pursuant to the Uruguay Round talks. App. Br. 21.
According to Appellants, these agreements included an Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization Appendix 1C of which was an
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS). Id. at 22. Appellants maintain Congress approved these
agreements in the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (HR 5110, 103rd
Congress) and this Act was codified as, inter alia, 19 U.S.C. § 3511. Id.
Appellants contend the Supreme Court has held that “an act of
congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any
other possible construction remains.” App. Br. 24 (quoting Alexander
Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64 (1804)). Appellants
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argue, thus, if a statute is subject to two different interpretations, one of
which would violate an international agreement the U.S. has entered into,
and another which is consistent with the international agreement, the statute
should be construed so as to be consistent with the international agreement.
This has become known as the Charming Betsy cannon of statutory
construction.
According to Appellants, TRIPS requires that “‘patents shall be
available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of
technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are
capable of industrial application.’” App. Br. 23 (quoting TRIPS § 5, Art.
27). Appellants argue TRIPS provides “the terms ‘inventive step’ and
‘capable of industrial application’ may be deemed by a Member to be
synonymous with the terms ‘non-obvious’ and ‘useful’ respectively.” Id.
Appellants argue 35 U.S.C. § 101 is currently interpreted to “contain an
important implicit exception: Laws of nature, natural phenomenon, and
abstract ideas are not patentable,” but that this exception violates the
Charming Betsy canon. Id. at 18. Therefore, according to Appellants,
because the Examiner finds that the claims “‘distinguish[] over the prior
art,’” the claims should be subject matter eligible. App. Br. 18 (internal
citation omitted).
Appellants’ invocation of the Trade–Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property agreement (“TRIPs”) is unavailing. TRIPs is not self-executing as
19 U.S.C. § 3512(a)(1) specifically provides that “[n]o provision of any of
the Uruguay Round Agreements [including TRIPs], nor the application of
any such provision to any person or circumstance, that is inconsistent with
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any law of the United States shall have effect.” 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a)(1)
(2000). Congress has also specifically precluded any person other than the
United States from using TRIPs as a cause of action or a defense, and from
challenging government action on the ground that such action is inconsistent
with TRIPs. 19 U.S.C. § 3512(c) (1) (2000). See In re Rath, 402 F.3d 1207,
1210, n. 2 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing 19 U.S.C. § 3512(c)(1)).
We, thus, decline to reach the Constitutional question posed by
Appellants. “It is well settled that administrative agencies are without
authority to determine the constitutionality of statutes.” Elgin v. Dept. of
Treasury, 567 U.S. 1, 16 (2012) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). The Supreme Court has also stated that “‘adjudication of the
constitutionality of congressional enactments has generally been thought
beyond the jurisdiction of administrative agencies.’” Id. (quoting Thunder
Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 215 (1994)).5
Patent Owner’s arguments, with respect to Constitutional questions,
are noted and they are preserved for appeal.
Prima Facie Case and Preemption.
Appellants contend the Examiner fails to make a prima facie case that
Claim 41 recites patent-ineligible subject matter. See App. Br. 8–9.

5 The Board has previously “declin[ed] to consider [the] constitutional
challenge as, generally, ‘administrative agencies do not have jurisdiction to
decide the constitutionality of congressional enactments.’” Square, Inc.
Unwired Planet LLC, IPR2014-01165, Paper 32, 25 (PTAB Oct. 30, 2015)
(quoting Riggin v. Office of Senate Fair Employment Practices, 61 F.3d
1563, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). We, likewise, decline to consider Patent
Owner’s constitutionality argument.
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We conclude that the Examiner did initially set forth a prima facie
case of patent-ineligibility, i.e., the Examiner’s reasons are sufficient to set
forth the basis for the rejection so as to put the patent applicant on notice of
the reasons why the applicant is not entitled to a patent. Cf. In re Oetiker,
977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
Citing Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International,6 Appellants contend
that patents which pose no risk of preemption remain eligible. App. Br. 9, 6–
8. While preemption may denote patent ineligibility, its absence does not
demonstrate patent eligibility. See FairWarning, IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc.,
839 F.3d 1089, 1098 (Fed. Cir. 2016). For claims covering a patent-
ineligible concept, preemption concerns “are fully addressed and made
moot” by an analysis under the Mayo/Alice framework. Ariosa Diagnostics,
Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015). We conduct
such an analysis below. In response to Supreme Court and Federal Circuit
opinions, the USPTO has issued updated guidance. We review this appeal
within the framework of the Revised Guidance which specifies and
particularizes the Mayo/Alice framework.

35 U.S.C. § 101
Section 101 provides that a patent may be obtained for “any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court has

6 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, 573 U.S. 208, 134 S. Ct. 2347,
2354 (2014).
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long recognized, however, that § 101 implicitly excludes “[l]aws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” from the realm of patent-eligible
subject matter, as monopolization of these “basic tools of scientific and
technological work” would stifle the very innovation that the patent system
aims to promote. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216
(2014) (quoting Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.,
569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013)); see also Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72–78 (2012); Diamond v. Diehr, 450
U.S. 175, 185 (1981).
Under the mandatory Revised Guidance, we reconsider whether
Appellants’ claims recite:
1. any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas
(i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human
interactions such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes), and
2. additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
Only if a claim, (1) recites a judicial exception, and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then reach the
issue of whether the claim:
3. adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
4. simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
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generality, to the judicial exception.

A. Whether the claims recite a judicial exception.
The Revised Guidance extracts and synthesizes key concepts
identified by the courts as abstract ideas to explain that the abstract idea
exception includes the following groupings of subject matter, when recited
as such in a claim limitation(s) (that is, when recited on their own or per se):
(a) mathematical concepts,7 i.e., mathematical relationships, mathematical
formulas, equations,8 and mathematical calculations9; (b) certain methods of
organizing human activity—fundamental economic principles or practices
(including hedging, insurance, mitigating risk); commercial or legal
interactions (including agreements in the form of contracts; legal
obligations; advertising, marketing or sales activities or behaviors; business
relations); managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions
between people (including social activities, teaching, and following rules or

7 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“The concept of hedging . . .
reduced to a mathematical formula . . . is an unpatentable abstract idea.”).
8 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191 (“A mathematical formula as such is not accorded
the protection of our patent laws”); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594
(1978) (“[T]he discovery of [a mathematical formula] cannot support a
patent unless there is some other inventive concept in its application.”).
9 SAP America, Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(holding that claims to a “series of mathematical calculations based on
selected information” are directed to abstract ideas).
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instructions)10; and (c) mental processes—concepts performed in the human
mind (including observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion).11
The preamble of independent Claim 37 recites: “A method of
providing health information of a patient from a health information
exchange (HIE) system for view by a health provider with health
information of the patient from an EMR application of an EMR system of
the health provider, the method comprising.” The limitations recited in the
body of the claim are analyzed in Table I against the categories of abstract
ideas as set forth in the Revised Guidance.
Claim 37 Revised Guidance, p. 52
(a) running on a computerized
device an instance of an agent
application that is bound to an
instance of an EMR application
running on the computerized
device; and
Incidental use of a computer.12

10 Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20 (concluding that use of a third party to mediate
settlement risk is a “fundamental economic practice” and thus an abstract
idea); see Revised Guidance, p. 52, n.13 for a more extensive listing of
“certain methods of organizing human activity” that have been found to be
abstract ideas.
11 Mayo, 566 U.S. at 71 (“‘[M]ental processes[ ] and abstract intellectual
concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and
technological work’” (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67
(1972))).
12 See CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1376,
1372 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that the incidental use of ‘‘computer’’ or
‘‘computer readable medium’’ does not make a claim otherwise directed to
process that ‘‘can be performed in the human mind, or by a human using a
pen and paper’’ patent eligible).
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(b) responsive to a health provider
using the EMR application instance
running on the computerized device
to acquire health information of a
patient from an EMR system of the
EMR application and display it
within a graphic user interface
generated by the EMR application
instance running on the
computerized device, acquiring by
the agent application instance
running on the computerized device
health information of the patient
from the HIE system and displaying
it within a graphic user interface
generated by the agent application
instance running on the
computerized device;
(c) Mental processes—concepts
performed in the human mind
(including an observation,
evaluation, judgment, opinion).
(c) wherein the agent application
instance performs a context
interception process which
determines a patient context within
the EHR application instance in
order to acquire and display the
health information of the patient
from the HIE system.
(c) Mental processes—concepts
performed in the human mind
(including an observation,
evaluation, judgment, opinion).

In view of Table I, we find independent Claim 37 recites an abstract idea,
i.e., mental processes.
Dependent Claim 41 recites: “[t]he method of claim 37, further
comprising determining context by screen scraping by the agent application
instance information displayed by the EMR application instance.” To define
“screen scraping, Appellants’ Specification incorporates by reference the
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disclosure of US 13/208,417 (“the ’417 Application”). See Spec. 1:4–6.
The ’417 Application discloses suitable methods for capturing information
from said display screen are known including “computerized solutions such
as ScreenScraping Studio, described online at the following http location:
screen-scraper.deskperience.com.”13 US 13/208,417, 30:13–14.
The deskperience.com website discloses:
WordCaptureX WordCaptureX is a software library that allows
your application (i.e. single click dictionary) to capture words
on the screen, up to an entire line of text. So the most common
usage is for a dictionary app that empowers users to look up
any word in any application with just a single click on that
word. In order to achieve this goal we are offering support for
the two major tasks involved. The first one is about defining
and monitoring the actions that an user is supposed to do on the
screen of another application and informing your app when
such an action has been detected. The second task is about
screen scraping (or capturing) the word/text pointed by the user
action.
http://wordcapturex.deskperience.com/ (accessed July 26, 2019). Thus, a
user may point to a word or text on a screen and manually write the
indicated text on a piece of paper, or may use a software product to perform
essentially the same task.
In terms of the Revised Guidance, the recitation “screen scraping” in
Claim 41 is equivalent to: (c) Mental processes—concepts performed in the
human mind (including an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion). See

13 Our attempt to navigate to “screen-scraper.deskperience.com,” resulted in
re-direction to “http://wordcapturex.deskperience.com/.” Our discussion of
screen scraping is as disclosed in this related deskperience.com website.
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Rev. Guid., 52. “If a claim, under its broadest reasonable interpretation,
covers performance in the mind but for the recitation of generic computer
components, then it is still in the mental processes category unless the claim
cannot practically be performed in the mind.” Rev. Guid., 52, n. 14; See
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) (‘‘[W]ith the exception of generic computer-implemented steps,
there is nothing in the claims themselves that foreclose them from being
performed by a human, mentally or with pen and paper.’’); Synopsys, Inc. v.
Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1139, (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that
claims to the mental process of ‘‘translating a functional description of a
logic circuit into a hardware component description of the logic circuit’’ are
directed to an abstract idea, because the claims ‘‘read on an individual
performing the claimed steps mentally or with pencil and paper’’).
In accordance with the Revised Guidance, we conclude under Prong 1 that
“screen scraping” and the “context interception process which determines a
patient context” are mental processes, normally carried out by medical
professionals who routinely view computer monitors to acquire health
information for patients and determine the patient’s “context.” Thus, Claim
41 recites a judicial exception, per se.
2. Integration of the judicial exception into a practical application.
Under the Prong 2, where, as here, we determine the claims recite a
judicial exception, we look to determine the presence of additional elements
that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. The Revised
Guidance is “designed to more accurately and consistently identify claims
that recite a practical application of a judicial exception and thus are not
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‘directed to’ a judicial exception.” Revised Guidance, at 53. The claims
recite a practical application where an additional element reflects an
improvement in the functioning of a computer, or an improvement to other
technology or technical field.14 Revised Guidance, at 55.
Appellants contend that in “accord with DDR, Claim 41 is patent
eligible because it is directed to a technical solution necessarily rooted in
computer technology.” App. Br. 11. Appellants argue that “[a]s noted in the
Specification . . . , ‘[c]ertain embodiments of the present invention seek to
provide a technical solution for the problem of allowing medical data to be
effectively retrieved, stored, and presented to medical service providing
users where the medical data exists in digital form in a plethora of non-
compatible partially overlapping software systems which are constantly
being updated.’” App. Br. 12 (quoting Spec., 4, ll. 2–5). Appellants contend
the claims “address the problem that medical data exists in a plethora of non-
compatible partially overlapping software systems” by using a “health
information exchange (HIE) network[]” which “provides the capability to
electronically move clinical information among disparate health care
information systems. Id. (quoting Spec., 4, ll. 22–24).
The Examiner finds Appellants’ analogy to DDR Holdings to be inapt
because the “problem addressed by the claim is not one ‘arising within the
realm of computer networks’ as required by the Court in DDR Holdings, nor

14 The Revised Guidance also finds integration into a practical application
where the judicial exception is used in medical treatment or to transform an
article to a different state. Revised Guidance, at 55. Such considerations are
not before us.
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is the solution one that is necessarily rooted in computer technology as
opposed to use in implementation.” Ans. 23. We disagree.
Appellants disclose:
Generally, Health Information Exchange (HIE) is defined as the
mobilization of healthcare information electronically across
organizations within a region, community or hospital system.
HIE provides the capability to electronically move clinical
information among disparate health care information systems
while maintaining the meaning of the information being
exchanged.
Spec., 4, ll. 21–24 (cited by Appellants). As disclosed by Appellants, the
claims address a problem (making disparate system compatible) that
“aris[es] within the realm of computer networks.” The claimed solution,
“screen scraping,” arguably, improves the technical functioning of the
computer system. Therefore, under Prong 2, we find Claim 41 is not
“directed to” an abstract idea and decline to sustain the rejection of Claim 41
under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

CLAIM 41: OBVIOUSNESS OVER MAHESH AND BRUMMEL.
Claims 37–56 stand rejected as obvious. See Final Act. 4. However,
Appellants direct their arguments solely to the merits of Claim 41. App. Br.
6. Because Appellants presents no arguments directed to Claims 37–40 and
42–56, the rejection of those claims is summarily affirmed. See 37 C.F.R. §
41.31(c) (“An appeal, when taken, is presumed to be taken from the
rejection of all claims under rejection unless cancelled by an amendment
filed by the applicant and entered by the Office.”); 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(iv)
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(“[A]ny arguments or authorities not included in the appeal brief will be
refused consideration by the Board for purposes of the present appeal.”);
MPEP § 1205.02 (9th ed. January 20184)15 (“[T]he Board may summarily
sustain any grounds of rejections not argued.”).
Claim 41 depends from independent Claim 37 and further recites:
“determining context by screen scraping by the agent application instance
information displayed by the EMR application instance.”
Appellants contend Mahesh fails to disclose “screen scraping at all.”
App. Br. 7. R. 50. Appellants argue Mahesh fails to determination of
context by the agent application instance via “screen scraping,” but instead
relies on obtaining information from the context manager based on “a
query” by the user. Id., 7–8.
The Examiner finds the rejection of Claim 41 relies on the
combination of Brummel and Mahesh to teach the claimed “screen
scraping.” Ans. 21. However, contrary to the Examiner’s finding, in
mapping the claimed “screen scraping” onto the prior art, the Examiner cites
only the disclosure of Mahesh. See Ans. 21–22. Thus, we cannot credit the
Examiner’s conclusion that “one cannot show nonobviousness by attacking
references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of
references.” Ans. 21.
Appellants argue that a text search of Mahesh fails to disclose any recitation
of “screen”, “capture”, “capturing”, “intercept”, “intercepting”, “scrape”, or
“scraping”. App. Br. 7. The Answer fails to respond to this argument.

15 Revision 08.2017, Revised January 2018.
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Appellants contend obtaining information by screen scraping differs from
obtaining information via a query. The Answer fails to respond to this
argument. See Ans. 21 (“user may access desired information from a
plurality of systems with unwanted information removed.”) (citing Mahesh,
¶ 4). However, the portion of Mahesh cited by the Examiner fails to
provide disclosure of obtaining information from a screen:
Thus, management of multiple and disparate devices,
positioned within an already crowded environment, that are
used to perform daily tasks is difficult for medical or healthcare
personnel. Additionally, a lack of interoperability between the
devices increases delay and inconvenience associated with the
use of multiple devices in a healthcare workflow. The use of
multiple devices may also involve managing multiple logons
within the same environment. A system and method for
improving ease of use and interoperability between multiple
devices in a healthcare environment would be highly desirable.
Mahesh, ¶ 4.

In view of the foregoing, we do not sustain the rejection of Claim
41 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.16

DECISION
The rejection of Claims 37–40 and 42–56 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is
SUMMARILY AFFIRMED.

16 Should prosecution continue, the Examiner might consider whether the
original Specification provides adequate written description support, under
35 U.S.C. § 112, for the claim term “screen scraping.”
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The rejection of Claim 41 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is REVERSED.
The rejection of Claims 37–40 and 42–56 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is
SUMMARILY AFFIRMED.
The rejection of Claim 41 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is REVERSED.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART