Robert P. Nemitz, Appellant,v.Rodney E. Slater, Secretary, Department of Transportation, (Federal Aviation Administration)) _________________________________)

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMar 10, 1999
01982694 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 10, 1999)

01982694

03-10-1999

Robert P. Nemitz, Appellant, v. Rodney E. Slater, Secretary, Department of Transportation, (Federal Aviation Administration)) _________________________________)


Robert P. Nemitz, )

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Appeal No. 01982694

) Agency No. 1981037

Rodney E. Slater, )

Secretary, )

Department of Transportation, )

(Federal Aviation Administration)) Agency. )

_________________________________)

DECISION

Appellant filed a timely appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (EEOC or Commission) from a final decision of the agency

concerning his complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq. and �501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,

as amended, 29 U.S.C. �791 et seq.. The Commission hereby accepts the

appeal in accordance with EEOC Order No. 960, as amended.

The issue on appeal is whether the agency properly dismissed the

appellant's complaint, pursuant to 29 C.R.R. �1614.107(a), for failure

to state a claim, and also for failure to sustain a claim of a continuing

violation.

Based on a review of the record, we find that the agency properly

dismissed appellant's entire complaint. Allegation 1 was dismissed

for failure to state a claim, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. �1614.107(a) upon a

finding that appellant was not an �aggrieved employee�; and, allegation 2

was dismissed for failure to establish a claim of a continuing violation.

Appellant alleges that he was discriminated against on the bases of color

(white), and physical disability (unspecified), when he did not make

the Best Qualified List when he applied for a position under Vacancy

Announcement ANE-AAF97-108-17244, in October, 1997. He further alleges

that he has consistently failed to make the Best Qualified List for all

positions he has applied for dating back to 1989. Appellant contends

that he is deliberately not placed on the Best Qualified List because

the hiring preference accorded to his status as a disabled veteran would

result in his selection over the other candidates on the Best Qualified

List, especially female and minority candidates.

Allegation 1

In both its FAD, and on appeal, the agency states that the appellant is

not aggrieved because Vacancy Announcement AAF97-108-17244 was canceled

and no one was selected for the position. Appellant does not contend

that the cancellation was based on discriminatory motives.

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.107(a) provides, in relevant part, that

an agency shall dismiss a complaint, or portion thereof, that fails to

state a claim. An agency shall accept a complaint from any aggrieved

employee or applicant for employment who believes that he or she has been

discriminated against by that agency because of race, color, religion,

sex, national origin, age or disabling condition. 29 C.F.R. �1614.103;

�1614.106(a). The Commission's federal sector case precedent has long

defined an "aggrieved employee" as one who experiences a present harm

or loss with respect to a term, condition, or privilege of employment

for which there is a remedy. Diaz v. Department of the Air Force,

EEOC Request No. 05931049 (April 21, 1994).

In addressing an allegation very similar to this allegation 1, the

Commission, in Heath v. Department of Defense, EEOC Appeal No. 01931470,

request for reconsideration denied, EEOC Request No. 05931005 (Feb. 17,

1994), found that the appellant was not �aggrieved� because she failed

to allege that the position was canceled in a discriminatory manner.

In Heath, just as in the instant complaint, the appellant alleged

discrimination when she did not make the Best Qualified List, but the

position was canceled by the agency and no selection was made. The

Commission held that there is no direct harm which affected a term,

condition or privilege of employment under these circumstances unless

the appellant alleges that the cancellation was based on a discriminatory

motive. As noted, the appellant here fails to make this allegation.

Accordingly, we find that the appellant failed to shown that he is an

aggrieved employee within the meaning of the law and regulations cited

above, and that the agency's decision to dismiss the complaint for

failing to state a claim was proper and is AFFIRMED.

Allegation 2

Appellant further alleges that he is routinely and deliberately excluded

from the Best Qualified List each time he applies for a position at the

agency. He alleges that the exclusion is based on discriminatory motives,

and that this constitutes a continuing violation dating back to 1989.

The Commission has held that the time requirements for initiating EEO

counseling could be waived as to certain allegations within a complaint

when the complainant alleged a continuing violation; that is, a series

of related discriminatory acts, one of which fell within the time period

for contacting an EEO Counselor. See McGivern v. U.S. Postal Service,

EEOC Request No. 05901150 (December 28, 1990); Starr v. U.S. Postal

Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01890412 (April 6, 1989).

A determination of whether a series of discrete acts constitutes

a continuing violation depends on the interrelatedness of the past

and present acts. Berry v. Board of Supervisors, 715 F.2d 971, 981

(5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 868 (1986). It is necessary

to determine whether the acts are interrelated by a common nexus or

theme. See Vissing v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, EEOC Request

No. 05890308 (June 13, 1989); Verkennes v. Department of Defense, EEOC

Request No. 05900700 (September 21, 1990); Maldonado v. Department of

the Interior, EEOC Request No. 05900937 (October 31, 1990). Should such

a nexus exist, appellant will have established a continuing violation

and the agency would be obligated to "overlook the untimeliness of the

complaint with respect to some of the acts" challenged by appellant.

Scott v. Claytor, 469 F. Supp. 22, 26 (D. D.C. 1978).

Relevant to the determination are whether the acts were recurring or were

more in the nature of isolated employment decisions; whether an untimely

discrete act had the degree of permanence which should have triggered an

employee's awareness and duty to assert his or her rights; and whether the

same agency officials were involved. Woljan v. Environmental Protection

Agency, EEOC Request No. 05950361 (October 5, 1995).

Further, it is important, in determining whether a claim for a continuing

violation is stated, to consider whether an appellant had prior knowledge

or suspicion of discrimination and the effect of this knowledge. Jackson

v. Department of the Air Force, EEOC Request No. 05950780 (June 27, 1997).

Although it is certainly arguable that appellant had reason to suspect

discrimination at the time of his prior exclusions from the Best Qualified

List given that he appears to have filed a grievance or EEO complaint

concerning each instance, the instant allegation fails because allegation

1 fails to state a claim. As noted above, a claim of a continuing

violation can only be sustained if one of the alleged discriminatory

acts fell within the time period for contacting an EEO Counselor.

The �nexus� analysis described above focuses on whether the present act

of alleged discrimination is sufficiently connected to prior acts to

find a continuous pattern of discrimination. Here, we have determined

that allegation 1 is not actionable, so that there is no present act,

i.e. there are no alleged discriminatory acts falling within the 45 day

EEO Counselor contact time period. Without an actionable claim of a

present act, a nexus cannot be established, and a claim of a continuing

violation cannot, on its face, be maintained.

Accordingly, we find that the appellant failed to establish the necessary

elements to sustain a claim of a continuing violation, within the meaning

of the law and regulations cited above, and that the agency's decision

to dismiss the complaint was proper and is AFFIRMED.

Accordingly, we AFFRIM the FAD.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,

the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604.

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the

date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action

is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30)

CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult

an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction

in which your action would be filed. In the alternative, you may file a

civil action AFTER ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY (180) CALENDAR DAYS of the date

you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your appeal with the

Commission. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT

IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT

HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE.

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.

"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the

local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(C.F.R.).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a

request for an attorney does not extend your time in which to file

a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be filed

within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File

A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

March 10, 1999

____________________________

DATE Ronnie Blumenthal, Director

Office of Federal Operations