Robb D'Egidio et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jun 24, 2020

2018009180 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 24, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/708,513 05/11/2015 Robb D'Egidio 102005.021860 1633
71581 7590 06/24/2020
BakerHostetler / Comcast
Cira Centre, 12th Floor
2929 Arch Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-2891
EXAMINER
TRAN, TONGOC
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2434
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/24/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
eofficemonitor@bakerlaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte ROBB D’EGIDIO, STEVEN LEARDI,
PETER SIMON, MARCUS LOECHNER, and ZHE ZHANG
____________

Appeal 2018-009180
Application 14/708,513
Technology Center 2400
____________

Before MAHSHID D. SAADAT, JOHN P. PINKERTON, and
STEVEN M. AMUNDSON, Administrative Patent Judges.

AMUNDSON, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final
rejection of claims 1–11 and 14–22, i.e., all pending claims. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42 (2017). Appellant identifies the real party in interest
as Comcast Cable Communications, LLC. Appeal Br. 1.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Invention
According to the Specification, the invention relates to “remote
control of user permissions by an administrator such as a parent, superior,
manger [sic], guardian, etc.” Spec. ¶¶ 2, 8.2 The Specification explains that
“[c]ontent permissions can allow an administrator to block certain users
from accessing certain content,” e.g., permitting “parents to supervise the
entertainment content their children can play by setting restrictions on
content ratings, content schedule, content channels, and the like.” Id. ¶ 1.
But the Specification also explains that “using current systems,
administrators must establish rules to govern the permissions relating to
certain content and cannot address permissions requests in real-time.” Id.
Hence, the invention endeavors to address “[t]hese and other shortcomings
of the prior art.” Id.
Exemplary Claim
Independent claim 1 exemplifies the claims at issue and reads as
follows:
1. A method, implemented by one or more computing
devices, comprising:
receiving a request to perform one or more restricted
activities, wherein the request comprises at least an identifier
of a first user associated with the request and an identification
of the one or more restricted activities;

2 This decision uses the following abbreviations: “Spec.” for the
Specification, filed May 11, 2015; “Final Act.” for the Final Office Action,
mailed June 16, 2017; “Advisory Act.” for the Advisory Action, mailed
September 19, 2017; “Appeal Br.” for the Appeal Brief, filed January 29,
2018; “Ans.” for the Examiner’s Answer, mailed May 18, 2018; and
“Reply Br.” for the Reply Brief, filed July 18, 2018.
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determining that the first user is inside a location zone
and a second user is outside the location zone;
causing, in response to determining the second user is
outside the location zone, presentation of the identifier of the
first user associated with the request and the identification of
the one or more restricted activities to the second user;
receiving a response to the request comprising
information relating to one or more of a grant, denial, or
modification of the performance of the one or more restricted
activities; and
causing transmission of the response to a source of the
request, wherein the transmitted response is configured to be
processed by the source to effect grant, denial, or modification
of the performance of the one or more restricted activities.
Appeal Br. 10 (Claims App.).
The Prior Art Supporting the Rejection on Appeal
As evidence of unpatentability under 35 U.S.C. § 103, the Examiner
relies on U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2013/0254288 to Harrison,
titled “System and Method for Verifying Parental Approval,” filed on
February 22, 2013, and published on September 26, 2013 (“Harrison”).
The Rejection on Appeal
Claims 1–11 and 14–22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Harrison. Final Act. 4–8.
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the rejection in light of Appellant’s arguments that
the Examiner erred. For the reasons explained below, we concur with the
Examiner’s conclusion concerning unpatentability under § 103. We adopt
the Examiner’s findings and reasoning in the Final Office Action, Advisory
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Action, and Answer. See Final Act. 3–8; Advisory Act. 2; Ans. 3–11. We
add the following to address and emphasize specific findings and arguments.
Claim 1: Causing Information Presentation “in Response
to Determining the Second User Is Outside the Location Zone”
As noted above, the § 103 rejection of claim 1 rests on Harrison. See
Final Act. 4–5. Appellant argues that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 1 because Harrison fails to teach or suggest the following limitation in
claim 1: “causing, in response to determining the second user is outside the
location zone, presentation of the identifier of the first user associated with
the request and the identification of the one or more restricted activities to
the second user.” See Appeal Br. 3–5; Reply Br. 1–3.
According to Appellant, the Examiner acknowledges that Harrison
lacks the disputed limitation. Appeal Br. 3 (citing Final Act. 5); see Final
Act. 5. Appellant asserts that “the Examiner attempts to remedy the
deficiency of Harrison by offering” the following reasoning:
it would have been obvious . . . to implement the claimed
feature of presenting the child’s request to the parent’s for
authorization if the parent is out of the child’s proximity or out
of the child’s location zone since it is suggested that the parent
is not in the vicinity as the child to monitor the child’s activity
and thus to ensure the child in the absence of the parent to
protect the child by ensuring the parent is approved of the
child’s request.
Appeal Br. 3–4 (alteration by Appellant) (quoting Final Act. 5); see Final
Act. 3, 5. Appellant then contends that “a suggestion regarding ensuring a
child in the absence of a parent is protected by ensuring the parent approves
a child’s request is entirely absent from Harrison.” Appeal Br. 4 (emphasis
by Appellant).
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We disagree. Harrison discloses a system that enables “website
operators and online service providers to comply with,” among other things,
the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (“COPPA”). Harrison ¶ 13,
code (57); see id. ¶¶ 3–5. The COPPA “regulates the online collection of
personal information from children less than 13 years of age” and seeks to
“give parents control over what information is collected from their children
online.” Id. ¶ 3; see Appeal Br. 4 (citing Harrison ¶¶ 1–13).
With Harrison’s system, a child “starts a registration or sign in process
to access a website or online content,” e.g., by “attempting to establish a user
name and password for” the website or content provider. Harrison ¶ 52,
Fig. 3; see id. ¶ 14. Then, a server presents the child “with a page that asks
for the name and email address of a parent.” Id. ¶ 52, Fig. 3; see id. ¶ 14.
After the child provides the requested information, the system informs the
child that the parent “will receive an email with instructions for granting
permission.” Id. ¶ 52, Fig. 3. Next, the system sends an email to the parent
“informing the parent that the child has requested permission to establish an
account on, and provide personal information to,” a website or content
provider. Id. ¶ 53, Fig. 3; see id. ¶ 14. The email may include a hyperlink or
URL “to provide the parent with an opportunity to review the site prior to
granting or denying permission.” Id. ¶ 53, Fig. 3; see id. ¶ 14.
To confirm the parent’s identity, the system asks the parent for certain
information, e.g., the “parent’s name, address, phone number, date of birth,
and last four digits of their social security number.” Harrison ¶ 54, Fig. 3;
see id. ¶¶ 14, 21. After the parent provides the requested information, the
system attempts to validate the parent’s identity, e.g., by “determining
whether the personal information of the parent” matches “data for that
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identity using one or more commercially available third party data brokers,
aggregators, or like information services providers,” such as credit bureaus.
Id. ¶ 55, Fig. 3; see id. ¶ 14; Ans. 10.
If the system validates the parent’s identity, “the parent is informed,”
e.g., by “a web page displayed in a browser window on the parent computer
system,” that “the child has been approved for the site.” Harrison ¶ 56,
Fig. 3; see id. ¶¶ 14, 16. Further, if the system validates the parent’s
identity, the “child may then register to use or access the site or online
content.” Id. ¶ 56, Fig. 3; see id. ¶ 14. But if the system does not validate
the parent’s identity, “the parent is informed” and given an “opportunity to
provide additional identification information,” such as “his or her full social
security number.” Id. ¶ 57, Fig. 3; see id. ¶ 14. After the parent provides the
additional information, the system again attempts to validate the parent’s
identity “using the additional information provided.” Id. ¶ 57, Fig. 3.
Hence, contrary to Appellant’s assertion, Harrison discloses ensuring
that a child “is protected by ensuring the parent approves a child’s request”
to access a website or online content. See Harrison ¶¶ 13–14, 52–57, Fig. 3;
Final Act. 3, 5; Advisory Act. 2; Ans. 4; see also Appeal Br. 4.
In addition, Harrison discloses providing protection based on a
parent’s proximity to a child, i.e., “the absence of the parent to protect the
child” according to the Examiner’s reasoning. See Harrison ¶¶ 26, 59; Final
Act. 3, 5; Advisory Act. 2; Ans. 4. Specifically, as another security
measure, Harrison’s system (1) determines the parent’s geographic location
based on “the IP address of the parent computer system”; (2) determines the
child’s geographic location based on “the IP address of the child computer
system”; and (3) compares the respective geographic locations. Harrison
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¶¶ 26, 59; see Final Act. 3, 5; Advisory Act. 2; Ans. 4. If the respective
geographic locations of the parent and child are “inconsistent” or “not
sufficiently close,” the system does not validate the parent’s identity.
Harrison ¶¶ 26, 59; see Final Act. 3, 5; Advisory Act. 2; Ans. 4. If the
system does not validate the parent’s identity, “the parent is informed.”
Harrison ¶ 57, Fig. 3.
Thus, as the Examiner properly reasons, if the respective geographic
locations of the parent and child are “inconsistent” or “not sufficiently
close,” the “parent may not be able to closely monitor the child’s activity.”
Final Act. 3.
Claim 1: “Location Zone”
Appellant advances another reason why Harrison fails to teach or
suggest the disputed limitation—Harrison does not determine user location
relative to a “location zone.” See Reply Br. 2.
We disagree. The Specification explains that a “location zone”
includes any of the following: (1) a “residence,” (2) a “geo-fenced area,”
and (3) “premises.” Spec. ¶¶ 5, 9, 33. The Specification also explains that
“premises” include an “enclosure, house, office, etc.” Id. ¶ 18. Harrison’s
system determines whether the respective geographic locations of the parent
and child are “inconsistent” or “not sufficiently close,” e.g., not within the
same residence. Harrison ¶¶ 26, 59; see Final Act. 3–5; Advisory Act. 2;
Ans. 4. Harrison’s disclosure about determining whether the respective
geographic locations of the parent and child are “inconsistent” or “not
sufficiently close” within the same residence teaches or suggests
determining user location relative to a “location zone.”
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An obviousness analysis should assess a reference in its entirety
for what it fairly teaches or suggests to those skilled in the art. See In re
Fracalossi, 681 F.2d 792, 794 n.1 (CCPA 1982); see also Merck & Co. v.
Biocraft Labs., Inc., 874 F.2d 804, 807 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Here, as discussed
above, Harrison discloses (1) informing a parent that a child has requested
permission to access a website, (2) giving the parent an opportunity to
review the website before granting or denying permission, (3) determining
the parent’s geographic location, (4) determining the child’s geographic
location, and (5) causing a response if the respective geographic locations
are “inconsistent” or “not sufficiently close,” e.g., “the parent is informed.”
See Harrison ¶¶ 13–14, 26, 52–57, 59, Fig. 3; Final Act. 3–5; Advisory
Act. 2; Ans. 4.
“[D]uring examination proceedings, claims are given their broadest
reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification.” In re Hyatt,
211 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Under that standard, Harrison’s
disclosures teach or suggest the disputed limitation, i.e., “causing, in
response to determining the second user is outside the location zone,
presentation of the identifier of the first user associated with the request and
the identification of the one or more restricted activities to the second user.”
As the Examiner properly reasons, “deriving the claimed feature with
Harrison’s determination of the parent’s IP address or geolocation
information would have been [an] obvious modification” because Harrison
“requires the condition of parent’s location needs to be met in order to allow
the parent[] to approve or disapprove of the child’s content access.”
Ans. 10; see id. at 10–11.
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Claim 1: Impermissible Hindsight
Appellant asserts that the Specification “discloses ‘remote control of
user permissions by an administrator such as a parent, superior, manger
[sic], guardian, etc.’” Appeal Br. 4 (alteration by Appellant) (quoting Spec.
¶ 2); see Spec. ¶¶ 2, 8. Appellant then contends that “[d]ue to the lack of
suggestion of a parent remotely approving a child’s request in Harrison and
disclosure of remote control of user permissions by a parent in Appellant’s
specification, it logically follows that the finding of obviousness of the
identified feature is an exercise of impermissible hindsight.” Appeal Br. 4;
see Reply Br. 3–4.
We disagree that the Examiner relies on impermissible hindsight to
reject claim 1. Like the Specification, Harrison discloses a parent remotely
controlling a child’s user permissions. See Harrison ¶¶ 13–14, 26, 30, 41,
52–59, code (57), Fig. 3; Final Act. 3–5; Advisory Act. 2; Ans. 4. For
example, Harrison explains that the system may include a “parent module”
that “associates currently approved content for a plurality of underage users
associated with the parent.” Harrison ¶ 30. The “parent module includes a
user interface” for receiving parental input “withdrawing a previously
granted approval” and “reapproving a previously withdrawn approval.” Id.
Harrison’s system permits parents to (1) “monitor what sites their children
have approval to visit” and (2) “withdraw approval at any time for any
site(s) previously approved using the system.” Id. ¶ 13, code (57).
“Any judgment on obviousness is in a sense necessarily a
reconstruction based upon hindsight reasoning, but so long as it takes into
account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the
time the claimed invention was made” without relying on “knowledge
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gleaned only from applicant’s disclosure, such a reconstruction is proper.”
In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395 (CCPA 1971). Here, the Examiner
relies on “only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the
time the claimed invention was made,” i.e., Harrison’s disclosures, to reject
claim 1. See Final Act. 4–5; Advisory Act. 2; Ans. 3–4. Hence, the
Examiner does not rely on impermissible hindsight to reject claim 1.
Claim 1: Teaching Away
Appellant asserts that “Harrison appears to teach that close proximity
of a child and parent are required to validate a parent identity.” Appeal
Br. 6 (emphasis by Appellant) (citing Harrison ¶ 59); see Reply Br. 4 (citing
Harrison ¶ 59). Appellant then contends that “[s]uch a teaching would
clearly lead one of skill in the art away from” presenting information to a
parent “in response to determining the second user [parent] is outside the
location zone” according to claim 1. Appeal Br. 6; see Reply Br. 4–5.
We disagree that Harrison teaches away from claim 1’s subject
matter. “A reference does not teach away . . . if it merely expresses a
general preference for an alternative invention but does not ‘criticize,
discredit, or otherwise discourage’ investigation into the invention claimed.”
DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1327
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir.
2004)).
Here, Appellant does not show how Harrison “criticize[s],
discredit[s], or otherwise discourage[s]” investigation into claim 1’s subject
matter. See Appeal Br. 6–7; Reply Br. 4–5. To the contrary, as discussed
above, Harrison discloses (1) determining a parent’s geographic location,
(2) determining a child’s geographic location, and (3) causing a response
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if the respective geographic locations are “inconsistent” or “not sufficiently
close.” See Harrison ¶¶ 26, 57, 59, Fig. 3; Final Act. 3–5; Advisory Act. 2;
Ans. 4. Hence, Harrison does not teach away from claim 1’s subject matter.
Claim 1: Improper Official Notice
Appellant asserts that in the Final Office Action “the Examiner did
not provide a citation to the cited art in support of an alleged teaching or
suggestion of” the disputed limitation. Appeal Br. 7. Appellant then
contends that “the Examiner appears to take Official Notice that the features
are allegedly obvious.” Id.
We disagree that the Examiner takes official notice of a fact
supporting the legal conclusion of obviousness. Rather, in reaching the legal
conclusion of obviousness, the Examiner cites evidence of the prior art’s
scope and content and does not take official notice of the prior art’s scope or
content. See Final Act. 3–5 (citing Harrison ¶¶ 13–14, 59); Advisory Act. 2
(citing Harrison ¶¶ 26, 59); Ans. 3–4, 9–10 (citing Harrison ¶¶ 8, 13–14,
59); see also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). After citing
evidence of the prior art’s scope and content, the Examiner correctly
analyzes the differences between the prior art and claim 1’s subject matter
before determining that claim 1’s subject matter would have been obvious.
See Final Act. 5; Advisory Act. 2; Ans. 4, 9–11.
Summary for Claim 1
For the reasons discussed above, Appellant’s arguments have not
persuaded us that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 for obviousness
based on Harrison. In our view, the claimed subject matter exemplifies the
principle that “[t]he combination of familiar elements according to known
methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable
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results.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007). Thus, we
sustain the § 103 rejection of claim 1.
Independent Claims 8 and 15 and
Dependent Claims 2–7, 9–11, 14, and 16–22
Appellant does not argue patentability separately for independent
claims 8 and 15 or dependent claims 2–7, 9–11, 14, and 16–22. See Appeal
Br. 3–8; Reply Br. 1–5. Thus, we sustain the § 103 rejection of these claims
for the same reasons as claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
CONCLUSION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–11 and 14–22.
In summary:
Claims
Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–11,
14–22 103 Harrison
1–11,
14–22
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED