Roadmaster Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 31, 1988

288 N.L.R.B. 1195 (N.L.R.B. 1988)

ROADMASTER CORP. 1195
Roadmaster Corporation and Production and Main-
tenance Employees' Local 504, af-
filiated with Laborers' International Union of
North America. Case 14-CA-18644
May 31, 1988
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN STEPHENS AND MEMBERS
JOHANSEN AND BABSON
On April 28, 1987, Administrative Law Judge
Mary Ellen R. Bittner issued the attached decision.
The Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting
brief; the General Counsel filed cross-exceptions
and a supporting brief, and the Respondent filed an
answering brief to the General Counsel's cross-ex-
ceptions.1
The National Labor Relations Board has delegat-
ed its authority in this proceeding to a three-
member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has
decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings, 2 and
conclusions as modified, and to adopt the recom-
mended Order.3
The Respondent also filed a motion to reopen and/or supplement the
record The motion is granted to the following extent. The Decision and
Order issued by Federal District Court Judge James L. Foreman on
April 29, 1987, in which he vacated an arbitration award that has been
submitted by the parties as a joint exhibit, is received into evidence. We
reject, however, the Respondent's request that we return the matter to
the judge with instructions to make 'appropriate findings or, in the alter-
native, direct the parties to submit bnefs directly to the Board addressing
the effect of that Decision and Order. We find that the decision has no
bearmg on the issue before us to decide
2 Notwithstanding the Respondent's statement that it has not excepted
to any of the judge's credibility findings, it is clear from its brief that in
fact it excepts to somc of them. The Board's established policy is not to
overrule an administrative law judge's credibility resolutions unless the
clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they
are Incorrect Standard Thy Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd.
188 F.2d 362 (3d Qr. 1951) We have carefully examined the record and
find no basis for reversing the findings.
The judge made two inadvertent factual errors, which we find do not
affect her ultimate conclusions In sec. III,C,1, of her decision, the judge
found that employee Bishop telephoned the union hall to talk with discri-
mmatee Gardner about filing a grievance to challenge his discharge. The
record indicates that Bishop telephoned Gardner for assistance in obtain-
ing reinstatement Bishop and Gardner, however, did not then explicitly
discuss the filing of a grievance In sec of her decision, the judge
found that Gardner has signed the names of employees Gary Sachau and
Ralph Harris Jr. to their grievance The record more fully indicates that
Gardner signed his name to this grievance followed by "for Gary Sachau
and Ralph Harris, Jr
3 In accordance with our decision in New Horizons for the Retarded,
283 NLRB 1173 (1987), interest on and after January 1, 1987, shall be
computed at the "short-term Federal rate" for the underpayment of taxes
as set out in the 1986 amendment to 26 U.S.0 § 6621. Interest on
amounts accrued prior to January 1, 1987 (the effective date of the 1986
amendment to 26 U S C. § 6621), shall be computed in accordance with
Florida Steel Corp., 231 NLRB 651 (1977).
We agree with the judge's denial of the General Counsel's request for
the inclusion of a visitatonal clause in the Order See Cherokee Marine
Terminal, 287 NLRB 1080 (1988)
1. The judge found, and we agree, that the Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act
by suspending and subsequently discharging em-
ployee John David Gardner in October 1986 for al-
legedly violating a company rule prohibiting the
falsification of company documents because he
signed the names of other individuals to grievance
forms. In adopting the judge's fmding that the as-
signed reason for the suspension and discharge was
pretextual and that the real reason the Respondent
took action against Gardner was his activity that
was protected by the Act, we note the following.
We agree that the General Counsel made a
prima facie showing that Gardner's protected
union activity was a motivating factor in the Re-
spondent's decision to suspend and discharge him
This activity consisted of Gardner's continued
union-related involvement in the alleged bicycle-
mislabeling controversy. 4 In finding a prima facie
case, the judge relied on the statement of the Re-
spondent's president, Nebel, at a meeting of sala-
ried employees in the fall of 1986 5 (immediately
after viewing a video-tape of Gardner's discussing
the bicycle-mislabeling controversy on the TV
news) that Gardner was "like a cancer." The judge
also relied on a statement contained in the Compa-
ny's December holiday greeting to its employees
about "distorted and harmful campaigns in local
newspapers and in prompted government investiga-
tions." We are satisfied that this statement referred
to the mislabeling controversy that had been in the
newspaper and to Gardner's participation in that
controversy as late as September. 6 We find further
elements of a prima facie case in Plant Superintend-
ent Atkison's comment at the September 25 labor-.
management meeting that "it seemed that every
time he gave the union information, it was repeated
in the newspapers or on television" and in the
timing of the suspension and subsequent discharge
that occurred shortly after Atkinson's remarks and
the "like a cancer" remark of the Respondent's
president.
For the following reasons, we also agree with
the judge's further fmding that the Respondent's
stated reason for suspending and discharging Gard-
ner was pretextual. As noted, the Respondent
argues that Gardner falsified company documents
because he signed the names of other individuals to
4 The controversy involved the Respondent's allegedly modifying bi-
cycles made in Taiwan to make it appear that they had been domestically
manufactured.
5 All dates that follow are in 1986.
6 Gardner had sent a letter to the Federal Trade Commission inform-
ing it of the Respondent's alleged involvement in the bicycle-mislabeling
activity This prompted the FTC to initiate a criminal investigation of the
matter. Gardner's name then appeared in two front-page newspaper arti-
cles covering the investigation.
288 NLRB No. 135
1196 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
grievance forms that he submitted to the Respond-
ent. 7 Contrary to the Respondent's contention,
grievance forms, such as Gardner submitted, writ-
ten on union letterhead cannot reasonably be con-
sidered company documents within the meaning of
the Respondent's rule in this case. As the judge
noted, there is no evidence that prior to October
15, when it suspended Gardner, any member of
management has ever claimed to the Union that
grievances became company documents once filed.
Furthermore, Gardner's signing of other individ-
uals' names to grievance forms is distinguishable
from the falsification of medical excuses, employ-
ment applications, or personnel records, offenses
that the Respondent had used as a basis for dis-
charge of employees in prior years. Gardner's ac-
tions, as described more fully below, merely initiat-
ed a procedure through which personnel decisions
would later be determined. He derived no personal
benefit from his conduct; nor did it in itself have
any substantive consequence. By contrast, the falsi-
fication of medical excuses, employment applica-
tions, or other personnel records affect the substan-
tive aspect of the employee-employer relationship
because the Respondent may rely on this informa-
tion in making personnel decisions about the indi-
viduals in question.
In addition, Gardner did not demonstrate an
intent to deceive the Respondent by the signing of
other individuals' names to the grievance forms.
Nor was there any actual deception in this case.
Regarding the particular facts that led to Gardner's
eventual discharge, as elaborated more fully by the
judge, we note that employee Bishop had tele-
phoned Gardner after being discharged by the Re-
spondent to request his assistance in obtaining rein-
statement. Gardner told him to contact his supervi-
sor, apparently in compliance with step 1 of the
grievance procedure. Gardner then telephoned
Bishop twice in order to obtain his signature for
the step 2 grievance form. Reasonably concerned
about contractual time limits and duty of fair repre-
sentation obligations, Gardner, when he was unable
to reach Bishop, signed Bishop's name and filed the
grievance. With respect to the signing of an em-
ployee's and supervisor's names to one prior griev-
ance and a supervisor's name to another grievance,
on which the Respondent also relied in discharging
Gardner, Gardner credibly explained that during
the period of time when these grievances were
filed the Respondent did not recognize the Union,
and no step 2 grievance meetings were being held.
7 Gardner was the secretary-treasurer of the Union and a member of
its executive board, which, inter alia, functioned as the grievance com-
mittee Gardner was authorized to submit employee grievances to the Re-
spondent.
Under these circumstances, as noted by the judge,
it was Gardner's procedure to discuss grievances
with the supervisor, sign the supervisor's name to
show that the grievance had been discussed, and
then, if the matter was not resolved at step 1, to
send the grievance to the Respondent, return re-
ceipt requested, pending resolution of the question
whether the Respondent would recognize the
Union. Critically, had these grievances been proc-
essed, it would have become apparent at the step 2
meeting that Gardner signed other individuals'
names to the grievance forms because the grievant
and the supervisors would have been present pur-
suant to the requirements of both the expired and
the subsequently implemented collective-bargaining
agreements. There was, thus, no intent to deceive
by Gardner's actions in signing these grievances.
Furthermore, Gardner admitted readily to the Re-
spondent during the October 15 meeting that re-
sulted in his suspension that he signed Bishop's
name to the grievance form, explained why, and
repeatedly acknowledged that he should have indi-
cated on the grievance that he was signing it for
Bishop.
We also note that the Respondent did not chal-
lenge the conduct of union representatives who
had indicated that they were signing the grievance
form for other individuals by use of "per" or "for"
and their signatures. 8 Its failure to challenge this
conduct demonstrates that the Respondent was not
truly concerned with obtaining the employees' sig-
natures. Rather, this suggests that the Respondent
was only concerned with the alleged deception
that might result from the signing of other individ-
uals' names to grievance forms. The Respondent,
however, could not reasonably believe that such
deception could occur in view of the participation
of all relevant parties at the step 2 hearing.8
Finally, the timing of the Respondent's assertion
that Gardner had committed a dischargeable of-
fense supports a fmding of pretext. The assertion
was raised 3 weeks after Gardner's name had ap-
peared in two front-page newspaper articles and he
had been interviewed on television news broadcasts
concerning the Respondent's activities with respect
to the alleged mislabeling of imported bicycles.
8 The Union's president, Groves, had signed grievances in such a fash-
ion. There is also record evidence that after March 1, when the Respond-
ent's implemented contract proposal required employee signatures, Gard-
ner had signed employees' names to two grievance forms, but indicated
by his own signature followed by "for" and the grievant's name that he
was doing so
9 The Respondent concedes that on one occasion, apparently because,
of extenuating circumstances, it did not discharge an employee who had
signed a leadman's initials on a "downtime slip." Clearly, then, the Re-
spondent does not, in practice, consider discharge for such "falsification"
to be a hard and fast rule; instead, it takes other factors into account in
assessing the penalty for such conduct
ROADMASTER CORP. 1197
,
The Respondent's hostility towards Gardner's ac-
tivities, as discussed above, was clear.
For these reasons, we fmd that the General
Counsel made a prima facie showing that Gardner
was suspended and then discharged because of his
protected union activity, and that the Respondent's
stated reason for its actions against Gardner was
pretextual. Accordingly, we find that the suspen-
sion and subsequent discharge violated Section
8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
2. The General Counsel contends that even if the
Respondent actually fired Gardner not because of
his activities regarding the bicycle-mislabeling
matter, but because he had signed the names of
other individuals to grievance forms, his termina-
tion still was unlawful because Gardner's actions in
this respect were protected under the Act. 1 ° We
find merit in the General Counsel's contention.
It is well settled that filing grievances under a
collective-bargaining agreement constitutes protect-
ed concerted activity." Union stewards filing and
processing grievances on behalf of other employees
similarly enjoy the protection of the Act, even if,
while doing so, they "exceed the bounds of con-
tract language, unless the excess is extraordinary,
obnoxious, wholly unjustified, and departs from the
res gestae of the grievance procedure."12
As we have already discussed, Gardner signed
Bishop's name to one grievance because he was
unable to contact Bishop and because he was con-
cerned at the prospect of missing the contractual
deadline for filing grievances and wanted to pro-
tect the Union from any allegation that he mishan-
dled the matter. Gardner signed supervisors' names
to two earlier grievances simply to show he had
discussed the grievances; he did so during a period
in which the Respondent did not recognize the
Union and was not holding step 2 grievance meet-
ings. There was no intent on Gardner's part to de-
ceive the Respondent on any of those occasions.
There was also no prospect of his doing so, be-
cause if any of those grievances had proceeded to a
step 2 meeting, both the grievant and the supervi-
sors would have been present," and the fact that
those individuals had not personally signed the
grievances would have been made plain. Any mis-
understanding that might have existed prior to a
step 2 meeting would have involved only proce-
dural, not substantive, issues. Finally, it bears re-
10 The General counsel has cross-excepted to the judge's failure to
reach the merits of this contention.
" NLRB v City Disposal System, 465 U S 822, 836 (1984).
12 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co, 271 NLRB 343, 345 (1984); Union Fork
& Hoe Co., 241 NLRB 907, 908 (1979) See also NLRB v. Thor Power
Tool Co., 351 F 2d 584, 587 (7th Cir. 1965).
13 As noted earlier, Gardner also signed an employee's name to one of
those grievances.
peating that Gardner did not stand to profit in any
way from deceiving the Respondent.
We find that Gardner's act of signing other indi-
viduals' names to grievance forms was part of the
res gestae of the grievance procedure. In addition,
we find that those acts were neither extraordinary
nor wholly unjustified—indeed, they appear to
have been reasonable responses to the unusual situ-
ations Gardner faced, in his capacity as grievance
committeeman, when attempting to ensure that em-
ployees' grievances were processed to the extent
possible. Nor were Gardner's actions obnoxious,
because they were taken with neither the intent nor
the prospect of deceiving the Respondent. We find,
therefore, that under the particular circumstances
of this case, Gardner's signing of the names of
other individuals on the grievance forms was not
sufficiently egregious to render his grievance-filing
activity unprotected.14
We do not wish to imply that, by our decision
here, we are placing the Board's imprimatur in a
generalized way on employees' falsification of doc-
uments. To the contrary, we acknowledge that
there are few, if any, circumstances in which falsi-
fying the substance of medical records, employ-
ment, applications, and other similar documents that
are vital to the conduct of employers' personnel
policies, could reasonably be found to be protected.
We simply hold that where, because of extenuating
circumstances, Gardner signed the names of other
individuals to grievance forms with neither the
intent nor the ability to deceive the Respondent,
his action was neither extraordinary, obnoxious,
nor wholly unjustified, and did not cause his griev-
ance-filing activities to lose their protected charac-
ter.
Accordingly, we find that Gardner's signing
other individuals names to grievance forms did not
remove his grievance-filing activities from the pro-
tection of the Act. Consequently, even if the Re-
spondent terminated Gardner for doing so, as it
contends, his termination still violated Section
8(a)(3) and (1).
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the
recommended Order of the administrative law
judge and orders that the Respondent, Roadmaster
Corporation, Olney, Illinois, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall take the action set
forth in the Order.
14 We note that under the expired agreement grievances were not re-
quired to be signed by the individual employee-grievants
Stephen D. Smith, Esq., for the General Counsel.
1198 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Kevin J. Kinney, Esq. (Krukowski & Costello, S.C.), of
Milwaukee, Wisconiin, for the Respondent.
Michael W. O'Hara, Esq. (Cavanagh, Hosteny & O'Hara),
of Springfield, Illinois, for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MARY ELLEN R. BirrNER, Administrative Law Judge.
The original charge in this proceeding was filed on 17
October 1986 by Production and Maintenance Employ-
ees' Local 504, L.I.U.N.A., affiliated with Laborers'
International Union of North America, against Roadmas-
ter Corporation (the Respondent). On 28 November 1986
the complaint issued, alleging, in substance, that the Re-
spondent had suspended and then discharged employee
John David Gardner because of his union and other con-
certed activities protected by Section 7 of the National
Labor Relations Act and that by these actions the Re-
spondent had violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
The Respondent has denied the commission of any unfair
labor practices.
A hearing was held before me on 3 February 1987 in
Olney, Illinois. Following the hearing the General Coun-
sel and the Respondent filed briefs, which have been
considered.'
On the entire record in this proceeding and from my
observation of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make
the following
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The Respondent is a corporation with an office and
place of business in Olney, Illinois, there it is engaged in
the manufacture and nonretail distribution of toys and re-
lated products. During the 12-month period ending 31
October 1986, the Respondent, in the course and conduct
of its business, purchased and received at its Olney facili-
ty products, goods, and materials valued in excess of
$50,000 directly from points outside the State of Illinois
and shipped products, goods, and materials valued in
excess of $50,000 directly to points outside that State.
The answer admits, and I find, that the Respondent is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
the Act, and I further find that it will effectuate the pur-
poses of the Act to assert jurisdiction herein.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Production and Maintenance Employees' Local 504,
L.I.U.N.A., affiliated with Laborers' International Union
of North America is a labor organization within the
meaning of the Act.
THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
The Respondent has been manufacturing juvenile
riding toys, bicycles, tricycles, and fitness equipment at
The Charging Party filed a letter waiving its right to submit a bnef
its plant in olney, Illinois, since about November 1982.
For some unspecified period of time prior to that date,
the plant was operated by AMF Incorporated, Wheel
Goods Division, whose production and maintenance em-
ployees were represented by the United Employees
Union No. 1 (UEU). After acquiring the facility, the Re-
spondent recognized the UEU and negotiated a collec-
tive-bargaining agreement that was effective from 1 De-
cember 1982 to 28 February 1986 and included a wage
reopener provision.
At the time the Respondent acquired the Olney plant,
employee John David Gardner, the alleged discriminatee
in this proceeding, was the UEU financial secretary and
had been on the Union's grievance and negotiating com-
mittees since 1979. Gardner credibly testified that in De-
cember 1984 the Respondent and the UEU began bar-
gaining pursuant to the wage reopener but were unable
to reach agreement, and the Respondent implemented its
final proposal in February 1985. In consequence, on 15
July 1985, the UEU began a strike that lasted for 3
weeks and resulted in the UEU's changing its affiliation,
becoming Production and Maintenance Employees'
Local 504, L.I.U.N.A., affiliated with Laborers' Interna-
tional Union of North America (the Union), in August
1985.
It is undisputed that during the strike the UEU's offi-
cers selected Gardner to act as the Union's spokesman to
the press. It is also undisputed that from the date of the
affiliation until 1 March 1986, 2 the Respondent refused
to recognize the Union or to pro- cess grievances, assert-
ing a doubt whether the Union had succeeded to the rep-
resentation rights of the UEU, and that by letter dated
16 December 1985, the Respondent notified the Union of
its intention to terminate the contract. On 28 February,
however, the Respondent learned of the Supreme
Court's decision in NLRB v. Financial Institution Employ-
ees of America, 475 U.S. 192 (1986), that involved the va-
lidity of union affiliation elections. In consequence, on 1
March the Respondent offered to bargain with the Union
to negotiate a contract to succeed that which had ex-
pired the day before. The resulting negotiations did not
achieve agreement, and on 31 March the Respondent im-
plemented its final offer, making some items retroactive
to 1 March.
Both the expired contract and the implemented pro-
posal contained a three-step grievance procedure culmi-
nating in arbitration: Step 1 was the verbal filing of the
grievance to the grievant's supervisor, with a verbal
answer; step 2 required that the grievance be reduced to
writing and submitted to the supervisor and that follow-
ing that submission there be a meeting that included the
grievant, the supervisor, and other representatives of
management and the Union; and step 3 called for presen-
tation of the grievance to the labor relations manager
and another meeting involving higher level representa-
tives of both parties. Insofar as is relevant to this pro-
ceeding, the most significant differences between the
grievance procedure in the expired contract and the im-
plemented proposal were that the latter reduced the time
2 All dates hereinafter are 1986 unless otherwise indicated.
ROADMASTER CORP. 1199
period for submission of grievances at step 1 from 4 days
to 3, and required that grievances submitted at step 2 be
"presented to the Foreman in writing and signed by the
employee . . . ."
In the meantime, the Union had filed a grievance on
27 February asserting that the Respondent's notice of
intent to terminate the contract was defective and that,
in consequence, the contract continued in effect for an-
other year. That grievance went to arbitration and was
upheld by Arbitrator Robert Howlett in an award dated
31 December. At the hearing in the instant case, counsel
for the Respondent represented that the Respondent
might move to vacate that award, but there is no indica-
tion in the record that to date the Respondent has done
SO.
B. Gardner's Activities with Respect to Alleged .
Mislabeling
Gardner credibly testified s that in late 1984 James
Kuhl, the leadman in the shipping and receiving depart-
ment where Gardner worked, talked to him about a
problem with bicycles being imported by the Respond-
ent. Specifically, it appears, that Kuhl told Gardner that
bicycles manufactured in Taiwan were being shipped to
the Respondent's Olney plant, where they were modified
to look as if they had been made in the United States.
Gardner further credibly testified that he subsequently,
in or about December 1984, discussed the matter with
the Respondent's vice president of operations, Edward
Shake, and the then president of the UEU, Norman Hol-
land, at a meeting in Shake's office, and that the UEU
unsuccessfully asked Shake to stop the practice.
In January or February 1985 Gardner wrote on UEU
letterhead to a Martha Vera, whose title is not indicated
in the record, at the Federal Trade Commission in Wash-
ington, D.C., confirming an earlier telephone conversa-
tion in which he had advised her that the Respondent
was modifying bicycles made in Taiwan so that they
would appear to be domestically manufactured, and also
specifically noting his concern as a union representative
that the Respondent's action could cause a loss of jobs in
the area. According to Gardner, sometime after the first
of January 1985 he had a conversation with the Re-
spondent's president, George Nebel, in which Nebel told
him that Shake had advised him of the UEU's concerns
on the labeling matter and that the customer who was
receiving, the bicycles in issue Was aware of the practice.
Also, according to Gardner, 4 Nebel further said that the
Respondent had overestimated the number of units to be
imported from Taiwan and that rather than make them
domestically when a customer ordered them, "they were
being, so to speak, converted."
In the early spring of 1985 Gardner prepared another
letter to Vera that was sent over Kuhl's signature. That
letter stated, among other things, that "it has come to
our attention that hundreds of units imported since Janu-
ary, 1985 have had problems with the cranks and pedal
3 In general, I found Gardner to be a highly credible witness. He ap-
peared to be candid and to try to recount events accurately, and I there-
fore credit him except where otherwise indicated
4 Nebel did not testify
bolts not being properly heattreated to the hardness nec-
essary to meet Consumer Product Safety Commission
standards and are therefore hazardous to the American
consumer." Enclosed with the letter was a list prepared
by Kuhl, which showed the number of cartons of items
shipped from Taiwan and converted, the Taiwanese
model, the new model number, and the date code on the
converted cartons.
The record shows that the labeling controversy con-
tinued into the fall of 1986. Thus, on 21 September an
article appeared in a newspaper in Evansville, Indiana,
which, among other things, referred to Gardner's origi-
nal letter to the FTC and stated that after receiving that
letter the FTC had begun a criminal investigation of the
matter. The following day an article appeared in an
Olney newspaper, also citing Gardner's letter as prompt-
ing an FTC investigation.
On 25 September Gardner, along with Union Presi-
dent Terry Groves and other union representatives, at-
tended a regularly scheduled union-management meeting
with officials of the Respondent. Gardner and Groves
both credibly testified 5 that after reviewing the agenda
Groves asked why other items were not included; and
that Plant Superintendent Howard Atkison replied that it
seemed that every time he gave the Union information, it
was repeated in the newspapers or on television.
Gardner further credibly testified that following the
meeting some reporters from WTHI Channel 10 televi-
sion in Terre Haute, Indiana, asked to speak to him and
that, in consequence, he met that afternoon with a re-
porter. That evening the WTHI news broadcast showed
Gardner speaking to the reporter about the labeling
matter. The next day, according to Gardner, his supervi-
sor, George McDonald, told him that he had seen the
broadcast.
Gardner's appearance on television news was also
brought to the attention of other members of manage-
ment. John Drugas, the Respondent's chief road service
technician, credibly testified that he attended a meeting
of salaried personnel during the fall of 1986 and that at
that meeting a videotape of Gardner's television appear-
ance was shown. Drugas, who was not a supervisor at
the time of the meeting, further credibly testified that
after the videotape was played ,Nebel addressed the
meeting and said that Gardner was "like a cancer."
Drugas was a disinterested witness who was still em-
ployed by the Respondent at the time he testified and, as
noted above, Nebel did not testify. I credit Drugas' ac-
count of this incident.
The only other evidence of the Respondent's reaction
to Gardner's statements to the press and the newspaper
accounts described above was the following paragraph in
the Respondent's holiday 1986 greeting to employees,
mailed about 19 December:
[I]n completing our fourth year of operating in
Olney, we have provided the area with over four
thousand man years of employment and our outlook
for the long term is excellent. This is in spite of dis-
5 Like Gardner, Groves impressed me as a forthright witness who ac-
curately recounted events. I therefore credit him unless otherwise stated.
1200 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
toned and harmful campaigns in local newspapers
and in prompted government investigations. You
should know that every government investigation
thus far has resulted in no meaningful adverse reac-
tion, and in many cases government officials have
complimented our factory operations. Copies of the
newspaper articles heralding their destructive claims
were mailed to some customers by unknown spite-
ful people, jeopardizing your jobs. Since we do not
communicate with you through the newspapers,
you have never read of our responses or results; for
example, the Taiwan criminal charges the newspa-
pers made so much of were recently dismissed.
C. Gardner's Discharge
1. The Dennis Bishop grievance
As mentioned above, Gardner was secretary-treasurer
of the Union and a member of its executive board. 6 He
credibly testified that the executive board decided which
grievances would be submitted to arbitration and that he
generally wrote the letter advising management of the
Union's desire to arbitrate.
Gardner also credibly testified that on 6 October em-
ployee Dennis Bishop telephoned the union hall to talk
to him about filing a grievance because he had been dis-
charged. Gardner was not at the hall, and Bishop was
told to call back. Bishop did call back and talked to
Gardner, who told him to contact his supervisor, appar-
ently to comply with step 1 of the grievance procedure.
That evening, according to Gardner, 7 he called
Bishop, but Bishop apparently was not home and Gard-
ner talked to his son, who was unable to provide much
information. Consequently, still according to Gardner, he
tried again, but unsuccessfully, to contact Bishop on 7
October, and so he wrote up the grievance and signed
Bishop's name to it. Gardner credibly testified that he
signed Bishop's name so that the grievance would not be
untimely and the Union would not run the risk of being
sued on grounds that it had failed in its duty of fair rep-
resentation. According to Gardner, he was concerned
about the time limits because he had written three griev-
ances since the Respondent had implemented its final
offer and two of them had been rejected on timeliness
grounds.
Gardner further testified that on 8 October he tried to
fmd Russell Gentry, the general foreman and Bishop's
supervisor, but was unable to do so, so he gave the
grievance to Don Johnson.8
Groves and Gardner both credibly testified that Gard-
ner discussed Bishop with Groves on either 6 or 7 Octo-
ber. According to Gardner, he told Groves that he was
reluctant to write the grievance because Bishop had
crossed the picket line during the strike and had not been
paying union dues. Nonetheless, according to both
Groves and Gardner, Groves responded that the Union
had an obligation to represent all employees in the bar-
6 The executive board also functioned as the negotiating committee
and the grievance committee.
Bishop did not testify.
8 Earlier, Gardner referred to a Don Johnson who was the Union's
recordmg secretary. It is not clear whether this is the same individual.
gaining unit, and that it was Gardner's job to write the
grievance.
2. The events of 15 October
Atkison, the plant superintendent, testified that on 14
October Labor Relations Assistant Kathy Copper and
General Foreman Russell Gentry told him that there was
a problem with Bishop's grievance because Bishop had
said that he did not tell anyone to sign a grievance for
him and did not know that a grievance had been filed in
his behalf. Atkison further testified that he told Copper
to contact Gardner and ask him to come to the office.
Atkison did not favorably impress me as a witness: he
was frequently evasive in his answers to questions from
counsel for the General Counsel and the Charging Party,
and he appeared to be more interested in expressing the
Respondent's position in this proceeding than in accu-
rately recounting what occurred. Accordingly, I do not
rely on Atkison's testimony except for background or
where it is corroborated by other, more credible wit-
nesses. I find it unnecessary to determine whether Atki-
son in fact had this conversation with Copper and
Gentry because, in any event, it is clear that at some
point management became aware that Gardner had
signed Bishop's name to the grievance.
Gardner credibly testified that about 2:30 p.m. on 15
October McDonald told him that Copper wanted to see
him in. her office. When Gardner arrived, Copper,
Gentry, and Atkison were there, and Atkison said he
wanted to discuss the filing of Bishop's grievance. Ac-
cording to Gardner, he told the management officials
about his conversation with Bishop, including his advice
that Bishop contact Gentry, and Atkison asked who had
signed the grievance. Gardner said that he had and Atki-
son asked why. Gardner responded the he had signed the
grievance to ensure its timeliness and to protect the
Union from any allegation that he had mishandled the
matter. According to A tkison, he asked Gardner if he
thought signing Bishop's name was misleading, and
Gardner "indicated that he knew it was misleading."
Gardner, however, testified that he did not recall Atki-
son asking him that question, but also testified that he
"might have admitted" that he did not handle the griev-
ance properly. Gardner further testified that he repeated-
ly told Atkison that he should have indicated on the
grievance that he was signing it for Bishop. For the rea-
sons discussed above, I credit Gardner.
Gardner also credibly testified that at that point there
was some discussion about the difference between the ex-
pired contract and the implemented final proposal with
respect to the requirement that grievances be signed by
an employee. Then Gardner asked Atkison "where we
were going with all of this," and Atldson said that once
a grievance was filed it became a company record, that
Bishop's recollection of the telephone conversation with
Gardner was different from Gardner's, and that he was
going to call Bishop in to give his account. Gardner then
said that if Bishop was going to come into the meeting,
he wanted Groves present also.
It is undisputed that Groves and Bishop were then
called into the meeting, arriving at the same time Atki-
ROADMASTER CORP. 1201
son asked Bishop if he had given Gardner authority to
sign or file a grievance on his behalf and Bishop replied
that he had not. Atkison then told Bishop to go back to
work and he left the meeting. Atkison, Copper, and
Gentry went into another room for 5 or 10 minutes, and
then came back into Copper's office. Atkison again asked
Gardner if he had signed or written a grievance for
Bishop and Gardner said that he had. Gardner credibly
testified that he told Atkison that he had been a union
representative since 1979 and had always told union
members to be honest with management, that he had
himself told the truth about the Bishop grievance, and
that he was not denying that he had signed it. Gardner
and Groves further testified that Atkison said that once a
grievance was filed, it became a company record and
that he felt that Gardner had thus falsified a company
record by signing Bishop's name. Groves then said that
he had also signed grievances for other employees.
Groves testified that then Atkison asked him which
grievances he had signed for someone else and that he
replied that most of the time he would write "per" or
"for" and then his own name as well as that of the griev-
ant.9
Atkison then said that he was suspending Gardner,
subject to termination and pending further investiga-
tion."
Atkison testified that following the 15 October meet-
ing he asked Copper to pull the grievance files for 1986
and that an examination of those files showed that
Groves added the word "per" and his own name when
signing for another employee and that two grievances, in
addition to Bishop's, had been signed by Gardner.i
3. Gardner's discharge
On 20 October Gardner filed a grievance over his sus-
pension and a second-step grievance meeting was held 23
October and attended by Atkison, Gentry, Copper,
Gardner, and Groves. It is undisputed that Groves began
by reading a prepared statement to the effect that the
Union had a statutory duty to represent unit employees
fairly and that Gardner had signed the Bishop grievance
in order to prevent it from being untimely. Atkison then
mentioned the two other grievances Copper had found
that Gardner had apparently signed, one for employee
Bill Rotramel, which arose in December 1985, and one
for employees Gary Sachau and Ralph Harris, which
had been filed in early January 1986. Atkison asked
Gardner who had signed the employees' names as griev-
ants and the supervisors' names indicating step 1 action,
but Gardner did not respond, credibly testifying that he
9 Gardner testified that he did not recall Groves referring to adding
"per" or "for" on the signature line, but Copper and Atkison testified
that, after saying he had signed grievances for employees, Groves said he
had signed grievances for employees possibly 15 times, but then paused
and said, "But I always put 'per Terry Groves." I credit Groves
10 Bishop had been reinstated by the Respondent on 15 October Ac-
cording to Atlason, the decision to reinstate him was made during his
conversation with Copper and Gentry the day before in which they in-
formed him that Bishop had said that he had not authorized the griev-
ance. Atkison also testified that on some unspecified date Gardner attend-
ed a second-step meeting on that grievance. However, Gardner credibly
denied attending such a meeting.
" I credit Atkison on this point.
had been advised by the Union's attorney not to say any-
thing at this meeting.
According to Gardner and Groves, Groves asked why
they were discussing a grievance from December 1985,
and Atkison replied that Gardner's admission at the 15
October meeting that he had signed the Bishop grievance
had prompted management to see if other grievance
committeemen had also signed employees' names to
grievances. Groves further credibly testified that he told
Atldson that the Union would reply to his questions
through counsel, and Gardner and Groves both testified
that Atkison then told Copper, who was taking notes of
the meeting, that her notes were to reflect that manage-
ment would have to infer guilt from the Union's silence.
Groves and Gardner also credibly testified that during
the meeting Atkison told them that he had affidavits
from Supervisors Jerry Harman and Larry Mitchel and
employees Rotramel and Bishop stating that Gardner
had signed their names to grievances without their au-
thorizing him to do so, and read one of the affidavits out
loud. It is undisputed that Atkison did not supply copies
of any of the affidavits to the union representatives.
The meeting ended without any statement from man-
agement about the discipline to be imposed on Gardner.
Groves further testified that Atkison asked if the union
representatives knew what the penalty was for falsifying
records, and he replied that he knew the penalty was a
discharge. 12 According to Groves, Atkison asked why
the Respondent should handle the situation any different-
ly from how it would handle any other case of falsifying
company records but he could not recall whether he re-
plied. Atkison also asked if the union representatives
knew of any other cases where an employee who had
falsified records had not been discharged. On direct ex-
amination, Groves testified that he replied that it was not
for him to know company rules and policies. On cross-
examination, however, Groves testified that either he
said nothing or he told Atkison that the Union would
answer through counsel. Atkison testified that there was
no response to this question. I find it unnecessary to de-
termine that, if anything, Groves said on this point be-
cause, in any event, it is clear that he did not attempt to
list employees who had engaged in a violation of the rule
and not been discharged. Atkison then told Copper that
the Union's response implied guilt.
It is undisputed that Gardner in fact signed Rotramel's
name when filing his grievance and also signed Supervi-
sor Mitchell's name on the line indicating action at step 1
of the grievance procedure. It is also undisputed that
Gardner signed the names of employees Gary Sachau
and Ralph Hams to their grievance and signed the name
of their supervisor, Jerry Harman, to show step 1 action.
Gardner credibly testified that he signed the supervisors'
names because, at the time the grievances were filed, the
Respondent did not recognize the Union and no step 2
grievance meetings were being held. Accordingly, Gard-
ner's procedure was to discuss grievances with the super-
visor, sign the supervisor's name to show that the griev-
12 This discipline is stated in the Respondent's work rules, a copy of
which was on the table during the meeting.
1202 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ance had been discussed, and then, if the matter was not
resolved at step 1, to send the grievance to the Respond-
ent, return receipt requested, pending resolution of the
question of whether the Respondent would recognize the
Union. Gardner credibly testified that he discussed each
grievance with the supervisor whose name he signed, but
that he did not ask either of them if he could sign their
names or tell them that he had done so. Gardner also
credibly testified that there was no discussion of either
grievance after it was mailed to the Respondent, that he
had no intention of deceiving the Respondent by signing
the grievances, that he had never considered grievances
to be company documents, and that, under the grievance
procedure in the expired contract, the supervisors and
grievants would have been present for the second-step
meetings and would have seen the grievances with their
names on them."
The Respondent filed a second-step answer to Gard-
ner's grievance, stating that by signing Bishop's name
Gardner committed the "dischargeable offense" of "falsi-
fying the grievance," that there was evidence that Gard-
ner had signed the names of employees and management
personnel in other grievances, and that "[M]anagement
has always terminated an employee who was found falsi-
fying personnel records or any other company records."
Accordingly, the answer concluded that it was manage-
ment's decision to discharge Gardner effective immedi-
ately.
On 28 October Atkison hand delivered Gardner's ter-
mination letter to him at the union hall. The letter stated
that Gardner was discharged, effective that date, for fal-
sifying company records.
Atkison testified that he made the decision to dis-
charge Gardner and that the only reason for that deci-
sion was Gardner's signing of grievances which, accord-
ing to Atkison, became company records once they were
filed at step 2. Atkison further testified that he discussed
his intention to discharge Gardner with Atkison's super-
visor, Edward Shake, the Respondent's vice president of
operations, who concurred, and that he met with Shake
and Robert Zinnen, the Respondent's executive vice
president, in the latter's office and that zinnen said he
would "stick by" Atkison's decision. Atkison conceded
that he did not take into consideration whether Gardner
intended to deceive management by signing grievances,
nor did he consider either Gardner's work record or his
seniority in making the decision.
4. Discipline of other employees who falsified
company records
There is some evidence of the discipline imposed on
other employees who falsified company records, Specifi-
cally, Linda Stewart was discharged in November 1981
for altering a note from her physician to make it appear
that she was to return to work 10 days later than the
physician had specified; Mark Montgomery was dis-
Atkison testified that at the 23 October meeting he asked the union
representatives if they realized that grievances were company documents
and that "he [there is no indication whether Atkison meant Groves or
Gardnerj indicated with a nod that it was a Company document." I do
not credit Atkison on this point and find that neither Gardner nor
Groves conceded that grievances were company records.
charged in March 1982 for excessive absenteeism and for
falsifying a doctor's note; Daniel Whited was fired in
November 1984 for excessive absenteeism and forging a
note from his physician; Keith Jennings was discharged
in October 1985 for falsifying unspecified personnel
records and "deliberately restricting output"; and Timo-
thy Parker was discharged in November 1985 for falsely
stating on his employment application that he had never
been convicted of a crime.
There was also evidence that employee Tom Hemrich
was suspended for 2 days in October 1984 for signing a
leadman's initials to a "downtime slip." According to
Atkison, Hemrich was not discharged because he advised
the leadman before the end of the shift that he had
signed the leadman's initials because the latter was not in
the area. Atkison also testified that he was not aware of
any other employees who falsified a company document
and were not discharged.
D. Analysis and Conclusions
1. The contentions of the parties
The General Counsel contends that, assuming that
Gardner was in fact discharged for signing other per-
son's names to grievances, that conduct was protected
under the Act because signing the grievances was part
and parcel of his grievance processing activity; the griev-
ance forms should not be considered "company records"
within the meaning of the Respondent's work rules;
unlike the other situations when employees falsified doc-
uments, Gardner derived no personal benefit from sign-
ing the grievances; and, in any event, Gardner's signing
grievances "served only to set the machinery in motion
whereby personnel actions would be subject to further
consideration, and without any expectation that the Re-
spondent would take further personnel actions in reliance
on the entries made on the grievances." The General
Counsel further contends that even if Gardner's signing
of grievances was not protected by the Act, his dis-
charge was nonetheless unlawful, because signing griev-
ances was not the sole reason for his discharge; rather,
the Respondent must be found to have had a mixed
motive for terminating Gardner, the General Counsel
made a prima facie showing that Gardner was dis-
charged because of his protected concerted activity, and
the Respondent has not rebutted that showing.
The Respondent, on the other hand, argues that (1) the
General Counsel has failed to make a prima facie case
that Gardner's protected conduct was a motivating
factor in his discharge, because the instant case is a so-
called dual-motive case, and the appropriate test, stated
by the Board in Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), is
that first the General Counsel must make a prima facie
showing that protected conduct was a motivating factor
in the decision to discharge, and that the burden then
shifts to the Respondent to show that it would have
taken the same action in the absence of the protected
conduct; (2) under Associated Milk Producers, 259 NLRB
1033 (1982), in order to make a prima facie case the Gen-
eral Counsel must show (a) protected activity by Gard-
ner, (b) the Respondent's knowledge of that activity, and
ROADMASTER CORP. 1203
(c) that the Respondent harbored animosity against the
Union; (3) although the Respondent concedes that Gard-
ner engaged in protected activity and that it was aware
of such activity, the General Counsel has not shown that
the Respondent was motivated by antiunion animus; and
(4) assuming, arguendo, that the General Counsel has es-
tablished a prima facie case, the Respondent has demon-
strated that it would have discharged Gardner even if he
had not engaged in protected concerted activity, as is
shown by its record of discharging employees who falsi-
fy company records, its fair and thorough investigation
of Gardner's misconduct, and the undisputed evidence
that Gardner violated a company rule and that the penal-
ty for such a violation was discharge.
2. Conclusions
As the Respondent concedes, Gardner's activities as
union financial secretary officer, committeeman, and
spokesman were concerted and protected, as were his ef-
forts to bring what he viewed as improper conduct by
the Respondent with respect to labeling to the attention
of Government agencies and the press. As the Respond-
ent also concedes, these activities were well known to
management officials. As noted above, the Respondent
nonetheless contends that the General Counsel has not
established a prima facie case because she has not proven
that antiunion animus was a factor in the decision to dis-
charge Gardner. I disagree.
The Respondent does not deny that its president,
Nebel, announced at an employee meeting that Gardner
was "like a cancer," but contends that the comment was
irrelevant because Nebel was not involved in Gardner's
discharge. Whether Nebel WM directly involved in the
decision to discharge Gardner is not the issue, for it
would be disingenuous in the extreme to assume that
other management officials, including Atkison, were un-
aware of Nebel's blatant animosity toward this outspoken
employee, or that they were incapable of making the
connection between a cancer that must be excised and a
vocal employee who must be silenced." Further, the
comments quoted above from the Respondent's holiday
message to employees demonstrate management's anger
at the newspaper accounts of the mislabeling controver-
sy, which, as discussed above, were prompted by Gard-
ner's letters to the FTC. I therefore fmd, contrary to the
Respondent, that the General Counsel has shown that
the Respondent was hostile to Gardner's activities and
that the General Counsel has made a prima facie show-
ing that these protected concerted activities were a moti-
vating factor in the Respondent's decision to discharge.
I further find that the Respondent has not rebutted this
prima facie case. As also discussed above, I have cred-
ited Gardner's testimony that he never thought of griev-
ances as company documents and have also credited his
testimony as to say he signed the grievances at issue. As
pointed out by the General Counsel, Gardner, unlike the
employees who were discharged for falsifying docu-
14 Indeed, one is reminded of Henry II of England and his query to his
courtiers, "Who will nd me of this turbulent priest?" which resulted in
the murder of the Archbishop of Canterbury, Thomas a Becket, on 29
December 1170.
ments, derived no benefit whatsoever from signing these
grievances, and there is neither contention nor evidence
that Gardner intended to deceive anyone, nor that
anyone was in fact either deceived or harmed by his
action. Further, there is no evidence that prior to 15 Oc-
tober any member of management had ever claimed that
grievances became company documents once filed. In
these circumstances, and especially as the assertion that
Gardner had committed a dischargeable offense was first
raised 3 weeks after he was quoted in front-page newspa-
per articles and interviewed on television news broad-
casts, I think it fair to infer that the Respondent was
looking for an excuse to discharge Gardner and, thanks
to Bishop, found one. I therefore find that the assertion
that Gardner had falsified documents was pretextual and
that the real reason the Respondent suspended and later
discharged him was his protected concerted activity.15
Consequently, I further find that the suspension and dis-
charge violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
On the basis of the above findings of fact and the
entire record in this proceeding, I make the following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.Roadmaster Corporation is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and
(7) of the Act.
2. Production and Maintenance Employees' Local 504,
affiliated with Laborers' International Union
of North America is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(3) of the Act.
3.By suspending employee John David Gardner on 15
October 1986, and by discharging him on 28 October
1986, the Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3)
of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in cer-
tain unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it be
ordered to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain
affirmative action necessary to effectuate the purpose of
the Act.
Having found that the Respondent unlawfully suspend-
ed and later discharged John David Gardner, I shall rec-
ommend that the Respondent be ordered to offer him
immediate and full reinstatement to his former job or, if
that job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent
job, without prejudice to his seniority or other rights and
privileges previously enjoyed. I shall further recommend
that the Respondent be ordered to make him whole for
any loss of earnings he may have suffered as a result of
the discrimination against him by payment to him of the
amount he would normally have earned from the date of
his termination until the date of the Respondent's offer of
reinstatement, less net interim earnings, in accordance
with E W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), to
which shall be added interest, to be computed in the
manner prescribed in Florida Steel Corp., 231 NLRB 651
15 Having so found, I find it unnecessary to pass on the General Coun-
sel's contention that Gardner's sigmng other persons' names to grievances
was protected concerted activity under the Act.
1204 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(1977). I shall also recommend that the Respondent be
ordered to remove from its files any reference to the un-
lawful suspension and discharge of Gardner.
Finally, as is customary in these cases, I shall recom-
mend that the Respondent be ordered to post the usual
notice."
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and
on the entire record, I issue the following recommend-
ed17
ORDER
The Respondent, Roadmaster Corporation, Olney, Illi-
nois, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Suspending, discharging, or otherwise discriminat-
ing against employees because they engage in union or
other protected concerted activity.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Offer John David Gardner immediate and full rein-
statement to his former job or, if that job no longer
exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without prej-
udice to his seniority or any other rights or privileges
previously enjoyed, and make him whole for any loss of
earnings he may have suffered as a result of the Re-
spondent's discrimination against him in the manner set
forth in the remedy section of this decision.
(b) Remove from its files any reference to the suspen-
sion of John David Gardner on 15 October 1986, or his
discharge on 28 October 1986, and notify him in writing
that this has been done and that the evidence of this dis-
charge will not be used as a basis for future personnel
actions against him
(c) Preserve and, on request, make available to the
Board or its agents for examination and copying, all pay-
roll records, social security payment records, timecards,
personnel records and reports, and all other records nec-
essary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the
terms of this Order.
16 The General counsel has requested that the remedy in this case in-
clude a visitatorial clause. In the circumstances of this case, I find it un-
necessary to include such a clause.
17 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board's
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided m Sec. 102 48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.
(d) Post at its Olney, Illinois facility copies of the at-
tached notice marked "Appendix."" Copies of the
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 14, after being signed by the Respondent's au-
thorized representative, shall be posted by the Respond-
ent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 con-
secutive days in conspicuous places including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Rea-
sonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure
that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material.
18 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation-
al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of
the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National
Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or-
dered us to post and abide by this notice.
WE WILL NOT suspend, discharge, or otherwise dis-
criminate against you because you engage in union or
other protected concerted activity.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL offer John David Gardner immediate and
full reinstatement to his former job or, if that job no
longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, with-
out prejudice to his seniority or other rights or privileges
previously enjoyed, and WE WILL make him whole for
any loss of earnings and other benefits resulting from his
suspension and discharge, less any net interim earnings,
plus interest.
WE WILL notify John David Gardner that we have re-
moved from our files any reference to his suspension or
discharge, and that the suspension and discharge will not
be used against him in any way.
ROADMASTER CORPORATION