Richard Vermaak et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 27, 2019

14543594 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Sep. 27, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/543,594 11/17/2014 Richard Vermaak 13-1597-US 1822
20306 7590 09/27/2019
MCDONNELL BOEHNEN HULBERT & BERGHOFF LLP
300 S. WACKER DRIVE
32ND FLOOR
CHICAGO, IL 60606
EXAMINER
DUFFY, DAVID W
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3715
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/27/2019 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte RICHARD VERMAAK, THEO NAICKER, and
TERENCE IGESUND1
____________________

Appeal 2018-000861
Application 14/543,594
Technology Center 3700
____________________

Before MICHELLE R. OSINSKI, JEREMY M. PLENZLER, and
GEORGE R. HOSKINS, Administrative Patent Judges.

OSINSKI, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
decision rejecting claims 1–21. An oral hearing was held on September 10,
2019. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 Pridefield Limited (“Appellant”) is the Applicant as provided in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.46 and is identified as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 1.
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THE CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Claims 1, 12, 20, and 21 are independent. Claim 1 is reproduced
below with additional indentations provided.
1. A machine comprising:
a display;
a processor; and
a non-transitory computer-readable medium storing
program instructions, that when executed by the processor, cause
a set of functions to be performed, the set of functions
comprising:
making a determination that a trigger event
occurred;
responsive to making the determination, displaying
on the display (i) a selected symbol table comprising a
plurality of empty symbol cells and (ii) a scene comprising
regions that correspond to respective displayable image
components from a displayable image component set,
wherein the displayable image components from the
displayable image component set are displayable within
the corresponding regions to form an image representing
an object within a portion of the scene;
for empty symbol cells in the selected symbol table:
(i) randomly selecting a multiplier symbol
from a multiplier symbol set comprising different
multiplier symbols that correspond to respective
displayable image components from the displayable
image component set;
(ii) adding the selected multiplier symbol to
an empty symbol cell of the selected symbol table
such that the selected multiplier symbol is displayed
in a given symbol cell, wherein the selected
multiplier symbol corresponds to a particular
displayable image component;
(iii) adding the particular displayable image
component to a selected displayable image
component set when the particular displayable
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image component is not already in the selected
displayable image component set;
(iv) displaying, on the display, the added
particular displayable image component of the
selected displayable image component set in the
corresponding region within the scene such that the
added particular displayable image component
forms a portion of the image; and
(v) determining whether the selected
displayable image component set includes each
displayable image component of the displayable
image component set; and
when (a) the selected displayable image component
set includes each displayable image component of the
displayable image component set or (b) each symbol cell
in the selected symbol table includes a respective selected
multiplier symbol, determining a payout amount.

THE REJECTION2
Claims 1–21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to
patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 3–6.
OPINION
Appellant argues claims 1–21 as a group. Appeal Br. 18–37. We
select claim 1 as the representative claim, and claims 2–21 stand or fall with
claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
The patent laws provide that “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any
new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to
the conditions and requirements of this title.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However,

2 A rejection of claims 1–21 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as indefinite (Final
Act. 2–3) has been withdrawn (Ans. 2) and is not before us on appeal.
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“this provision contains an important implicit exception: Laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.” Alice Corp. v.
CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (citation omitted).
Mayo Collaborative Services established a framework to distinguish
patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas
from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts. Alice,
573 U.S. at 217 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs, Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 77 (2012)). First, we determine whether the claims are directed
to a patent-ineligible concept. Id. If so, we next consider the claim elements
individually and as an ordered combination to determine whether additional
elements transform the claims into a patent-eligible application. Id. This
search for an inventive concept seeks an element or combination of elements
“sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more
than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.” Id. at 217–18.
Recently, the PTO published guidance for evaluating subject matter
eligibility. See 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. 50 (USPTO Jan. 7, 2019) (“Revised Guidance”). Under Step One,
a determination is made whether the claims are in a statutory category of
patentable subject matter, i.e., do they recite a process, machine,
manufacture, or a composition of matter, identified in 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 50, 53–54; see Alice, 573 U.S. at 216;
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 70.
Next, at Revised Step 2A, Prong One, an evaluation is made whether
a claim recites a judicial exception, i.e., an abstract idea as set forth in
Section I of the Revised Guidance, a law of nature, or a natural
phenomenon. Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. To determine if a
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claim recites an abstract idea, specific limitations that recite an abstract idea
must be identified (individually or in combination), and a determination
made whether the limitation(s) fall(s) within one or more of the subject
matter groupings in Section I of the Revised Guidance. Id. (A. Revised Step
2A). The three groupings are (1) mathematical concepts, relationships,
formulas, or calculations, (2) certain methods of organizing human activity,
including fundamental economic principles and practices, commercial
interactions, managing personal behavior, relationships, or interactions and
(3) mental processes and concepts formed in the human mind. Id. at 52.
If a claim recites a judicial exception, Prong Two of Revised Step 2A
requires a determination to be made whether the claim as a whole integrates
the judicial exception into a practical application. Id. “A claim that
integrates a judicial exception into a practical application will apply, rely on,
or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on
the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort
designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” Id. at 53. If a judicial
exception is integrated, the claim is patent eligible. See id. at 54–55.
If a claim does not “integrate” a recited judicial exception, the claim is
directed to the judicial exception and further analysis is required under Step
2B to determine whether the claim contains additional elements, considered
individually or in combination, that provide an inventive concept, such that
the additional elements amount to significantly more than the exception
itself. Id. at 56.
Step One: Does Claim 1 Fall within a Statutory Category of § 101?
The Examiner determines claim 1 is directed to one of the statutory
classes under 35 U.S.C. § 101. See Final Act. 4 (referring to “the claimed
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‘machine’”). Claim 1 recites a machine and, thus, falls within the statutory
categories of 35 U.S.C. § 101. See id.
Step 2A, Prong One: Does Claim 1 Recite a Judicial Exception?
The Examiner determines that claim 1 is “directed to a set of functions
to perform a wagering game by random selection of symbols, determining
an associated image portion and arranging the determined symbol and image
portions into groups.” Final Act. 3–4. The Examiner determines that this
“set of functions” “compare[s] to other ‘fundamental economic practice[s]’
found abstract by the Supreme Court.” Id. at 4 (citing In re Smith, 815 F.3d
816 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). Our reviewing court held in Smith that a claim
reciting “rules for conducting a wagering game” is directed to a
“fundamental economic practice.” Smith, 815 F.3d at 818. A “fundamental
economic practice” is a type of certain method of organizing human activity
that may constitute an ineligible abstract idea. Revised Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 52.
Appellant argues that Smith is not applicable with respect to the
instant claims. Appeal Br. 23–26. More particularly, Appellant asserts that
its claim is “not directed to ‘performing a wagering game.’” Id. at 23. That
is, Appellant asserts that its claim is “not directed to rules for playing a
wagering game or conducting the wagering game itself, but rather a machine
that provides features in connection with an underlying game (i.e., a
structured GUI and functionality related to that structure).” Id. at 25.
We do not find this contention persuasive. Claim 1 recites program
instructions, to be executed by a processor, for causing the following steps to
be performed: “(i) randomly selecting a multiplier symbol” that may
correspond to a particular displayable image component; “(ii) adding the
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selected multiplier symbol” to a table; “(iii) adding the particular displayable
image component” corresponding to a set; “(iv) displaying, on the display,
the added particular displayable image component” so that it forms part of
an image; and (v) “determining a payout amount” when (a) the set includes
each displayable image component of the set or (b) a predetermined number
of multiplier symbols have been randomly selected. Appeal Br. 38 (Claims
App’x). These steps recite rules for the wagering game, specifying how the
multiplier symbols and displayable image components are added and
displayed within the game display, with the last step determining the payout
to be awarded in accordance with how the multiplier symbols and
displayable image components have been added and displayed within the
game display. As such, claim 1, like the claims at issue in Smith, regulate
the exchange of financial obligations and recite a fundamental economic
practice.
Appellant also argues that Appellant’s “claims do not recite ‘resolving
. . . wagers’ between players so as to involve exchanging and resolving
financial obligations” in that they “do not recite any human parties who
exchange and resolve financial obligations.” Appeal Br. 25. Appellant
argues that “the Examiner erred by improperly extending the analysis of In
re Smith to new concepts.” Id. We disagree that the instant claims are
distinguishable from Smith. Although a human player interacts with a
gaming machine, rather than a human, in connection with the instant claims,
the instant claim limitations are directed to exchanging and resolving
financial obligations between a player and an operator of a gaming machine
based on probabilities created during the game, which remains a
fundamental economic practice. Accordingly, we disagree with Appellant’s
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contention that Smith is inapposite to the claims. Instead, we determine that
claim 1, like the claims at issue in Smith, relates to rules for a wagering
game and resolving financial obligations. We therefore determine that claim
1 recites a fundamental economic practice which is one of certain methods
of organizing human activity identified in the Revised Guidance, and thus,
an abstract idea.
Step 2A, Prong Two: Is There Integration into a Practical Application?
Following our Office guidance, having found that claim 1 recites a
judicial exception, namely, a fundamental economic practice, we are
instructed next to determine whether the claim recites “additional elements
that integrate the exception into a practical application” (see MPEP
§§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)). See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54.
Appellant argues that “the claim is not directed to performing the
game itself but instead [is] directed to a machine that include[s] instructions
and other structure to provide specific functionality in connection to the
underlying game when the instructions are executed by the processor.”
Appeal Br. 19–20. Appellant argues that “the functionality includes
providing a specific, structured graphical user interface (GUI) that is updated
dynamically based upon appropriate conditions determined by the machine.”
Id. at 20. Appellant argues that the Examiner “oversimplified claim 1 by
looking at the claim generally and failing to account for the specific
requirements of the claim.” Id.
The additional elements recited in claim 1 include “a display; a
processor; and a non-transitory computer-readable medium storing program
instructions, that when executed by the processor,” perform the above-
referenced steps (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v)(a), and (v)(b), as well as earlier steps
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of determining that a trigger event has occurred and displaying (i) a symbol
table to which the randomly selected multiplier symbols may be added and
(ii) a scene comprising regions that correspond to the displayable image
components of the set. Appeal Br. 38 (Claims App’x). The display, the
processor, and the computer-readable medium are recited at a high level of
generality and their recitation does not integrate the abstract idea into a
practical application. The generic “display,” “processor,” and “computer-
readable medium” limitations are no more than instructions to apply the
judicial exception (i.e., a fundamental economic practice) using generic
computer elements. These generic limitations do not integrate the abstract
idea into a practical application because they do not impose any meaningful
limits on practicing the abstract idea. See MPEP § 2106.05(f) (“Use of a
computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for . . . tasks (e.g., to
receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer
or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea . . . does not
provide significantly more.”).
Moreover, the earlier steps of determining that a trigger event has
occurred and displaying a symbol table and a scene recite only insignificant
extra-solution activity in that they are necessary to the abstract idea of steps
(a), (b), (c), (d), (e)(i), and (e)(ii). Without a determination of a trigger event
and the initial display of a symbol table and a scene, it would be impossible
to add the multiplier symbols and displayable image components and, in
turn, determine a payout amount at a certain time depending on how the
multiplier symbols and displayable image components have been added.
We disagree with Appellant’s contention that “the Examiner’s
analysis could be applied generally to exclude any gaming machine from
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patentability regardless of that gaming machine’s individual features.”
Appeal Br. 22 (emphasis omitted). Rather, the foregoing analysis in Step
2A, Prong Two ensures that the individual features of a gaming machine are
considered in assessing patent eligibility, rather than enabling a broad
exclusion of any and all gaming machines as patent-eligible subject matter.
Appellant argues that the non-precedential “Trading Tech. decision
should be considered highly persuasive in this application, since
[Appellant’s] claims are not directed merely to displaying information as
considered in some other decisions, but rather require a specific structured
graphical user interface paired with prescribed functionality directly related
to the [GUI’s] structure as considered in Trading Tech.” Appeal Br. 27
(citing Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. CQG, Inc., 675 F. App’x 1001 (Fed. Cir.
2017)). Appellant further argues that its “claims are directed to
improvements to gaming machines (or a method operable by a machine) that
have no pre-electronic gaming analog.” Id. at 28. Appellant additionally
argues that “the claims are directed to solve a specific, recurring problem in
the gaming arts, that of maintaining and/or increasing a player’s interest,
anticipation, and excitement in connection with the game.” Id. (citing Spec.
16:7–8, 32:9–12).
Appellant’s reliance on Trading Techs. is misplaced. In Trading
Techs., U.S. Patent Nos. 6,772,132 (“’132 patent”) and 6,766,304 (“’304
patent”) describe “[a] method and system for reducing the time it takes for a
trader to place a trade when electronically trading on an exchange, thus
increasing the likelihood that the trader will have orders filled at desirable
prices and quantities.” ’132 patent, Abstract; ’304 patent, Abstract. In
particular, the Trading Techs. patents describe a trading system in which a
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graphical user interface “display[s] the market depth of a commodity traded
in a market, including a dynamic display for a plurality of bids and for a
plurality of asks in the market for the commodity and a static display of
prices corresponding to the plurality of bids and asks.” ’132 patent, 3:11–
16; ’304 patent, 3:15–20. “The claims require a specific, structured
graphical user interface paired with a prescribed functionality directly
related to the graphical user interface’s structure that is addressed to and
resolves a specifically identified problem in the prior state of the art.”
Trading Techs., 675 F. App’x at 1004. As such, the panel found Trading
Techs.’ “claimed subject matter is ‘directed to a specific improvement to the
way computers operate,’ . . . for the claimed graphical user interface method
imparts a specific functionality to a trading system ‘directed to a specific
implementation of a solution to a problem in the software arts.”’ Id. at 1006.
In contrast to Trading Techs., the problem identified by Appellant in
the Specification is a business problem, and the solution proposed by
Appellant is a business solution implemented with a generic display and
processor, rather than a technological solution to a technological problem.
This is similar to what the court determined to be ineligible in subsequent
precedential decisions in the Trading Technologies line of cases, in which
the generic use of a computer as a tool without improvement of the computer
was determined not to be an integration of an abstract idea into a practical
application. See, e.g., Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1084,
1093–94 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (holding that the patent owner “argues the claims
improve computer functionality by improving on the intuitiveness and
efficiency of prior GUI tools. The specification makes clear that this
invention helps the trader process information more quickly. This is not an
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improvement to computer functionality, as alleged by [the patent owner].”).
In other words, the problem of maintaining and/or increasing a player’s
interest, anticipation, and excitement in connection with a game is not
brought about by technology and does not require technology for resolution.
Appellant’s claimed invention does not “improve the functioning of a known
system” similar to the “interface” improvements that occurred in Trading
Techs. Id. at 1004–05. Any purported improvements are to the underlying
game, not the gaming machine itself or its operation and/or function.
Appellant also analogizes its claim to the representative claim of Core
Wireless, indicating that its claim similarly “disclose[s] a specific manner of
displaying a limited set of information to the user.” Supp. Br. 4. (quoting
Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 880 F.3d 1356, 1362
(Fed. Cir. 2018)). The claim in Core Wireless was directed to “an improved
user interface for electronic devices, particularly those with small screens”
where the improvement was in “the efficiency of using the electronic device
by bringing together ‘a limited list of common functions and commonly
accessed stored data,’ which can be accessed directly from the main menu.”
Core Wireless, 880 F.3d at 1363. The Specification in that case confirmed
these improvements over “the prior art interfaces [that] had many deficits
relating to the efficient functioning of the computer, requiring a user ‘to
scroll around and switch views many times to find the right
data/functionality.’” Id. The Court found that the disclosure in the
Specification regarding the improved speed of a user’s navigation through
various views and windows “clearly indicates that the claims are directed to
an improvement in the functioning of computers, particularly those with
small screens.” Id. In contrast, Appellant does not demonstrate that
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increasing a player’s interest, anticipation, and excitement in connection
with a game is related to an identified improvement in the functioning of
computers. As described above, any purported improvement is to the
underlying game in order to achieve business solutions, not to the gaming
machine itself or its operation and/or function in order to achieve
technological improvements.
We have also considered Appellant’s argument that its problem of
“maintaining and/or increasing a player’s interest, anticipation, and
excitement (so as not to lose players) is similar to the problem addressed in
DDR Holdings, which was that hyperlinks were causing websites to lose
visitors to other sites.” Appeal Br. 28 (citing DDR Holdings, LLC v.
Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). Appellant asserts
that its “claimed GUI [graphical user interface], being necessarily rooted in
computer technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in
the realm of digital gaming machines, is no less technical than the problem
and solution analyzed in DDR Holdings.” Id. at 28–29. We are not
persuaded that the problem and solution in DDR is analogous to the problem
and solution in the instant case.
The claims at issue in DDR addressed the problem of retaining
website visitors who would otherwise be transported away from the host
website after clicking on an advertisement on the host website and activating
a hyperlink. DDR, 773 F.3d at 1257. The DDR claims describe
automatically generating a hybrid web page that permits users visiting a host
website to view and purchase products from a third-party merchant, whose
ads are displayed with hyperlinks on the host website, without leaving the
host website and entering that merchant’s website. Id. The Federal Circuit
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found the claims to be directed to patentable subject matter because they
“specify how interactions with the Internet are manipulated to yield a desired
result—a result that overrides the routine and conventional sequence of
events ordinarily triggered by the click of a hyperlink.” Id. at 1258. Thus,
the solution set forth in the DDR claims “is necessarily rooted in computer
technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm
of computer networks.” Id. at 1257.
In contrast, here claim 1 does not recite a technical improvement tied
to a technical problem in the gaming arts. Instead, the claim is directed to
providing “additional opportunities to win the game, thereby increasing the
player’s interest, anticipation, and excitement in connection with the game.”
Spec. 16:7–9. The functionality of the game set forth in claim 1 is not
technical in nature and does not provide a technical solution to a technical
problem as contemplated by the Federal Circuit in DDR. Contrary to
Appellant’s argument that its “claimed GUI [is] necessarily rooted in
computer technology” (Appeal Br. 29), the claimed rules for the wagering
game, i.e., specifying how the multiplier symbols and displayable image
components are added and displayed within the game, with the last step
determining the payout to be awarded based on how the multiplier symbols
and displayable image components have been added and displayed, is not a
solution “rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a problem
specifically arising in the realm of computer networks.” DDR, 773 F.3d at
1257. Instead, the solution proposed by Appellant is to provide additional
game and payout features. Indeed, the recited method steps could be
physically (i.e., non-electronically) implemented using a physical display
with empty cells to receive physical image components and physical dice, as
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determined by physically rolling the dice, while still increasing the player’s
interest, anticipation, and excitement in connection with the physically
implemented game.
In short, the additional elements of the display, processor, and
computer-readable medium in this case (1) do not improve the functioning
of a computer or other technology, (2) are not applied with any particular
machine, (3) do not effect a transformation of a particular article to a
different state, and (4) are not applied in any meaningful way beyond
generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular
technological environment. See MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h).
Consequently, the claimed invention does not integrate the abstract idea into
a “practical application,” as that phrase is used in the Revised Guidance.
Step 2B: Does Claim 1 Recite an Inventive Concept?
We next consider whether claim 1 recites any elements, individually
or as an ordered combination, that transform the abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application, e.g., by providing an inventive concept. Alice, 573 U.S.
at 217–18. The Examiner determines that:
The claims here require the additional elements of a display, a
processor and a computer-readable medium to carry out the
abstract method of the game. . . . In this case, the claims recite
generic computer structure. . . . Therefore[,] the claims do not
have an “inventive concept” sufficient to “transform” the
claimed subject matter into a patent-eligible application of the
abstract idea.
Final Act. 5.
We agree with the Examiner. The display, processor, and computer-
readable medium of claim 1 are invoked as conventional tools. The display
is recited for its generic function of displaying information. The processor
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and computer-readable medium are similarly recited for their generic
function of executing program instructions and operations. In our view,
claim 1 fails to add a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is
not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field, but instead claim 1
“simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously
known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial
exception.” See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
Courts have held the receipt and display of data, as recited in
particular claims, to be steps that are well-understood, routine, and
conventional functions of a general purpose computer. See MPEP § 2106(d)
(citing Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1334 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) and OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363
(Fed. Cir. 2015)) (supporting that courts have recognized the computer
functions of storing and retrieving information in memory as well-
understood, routine, and conventional functions of a computer); see also
e.g., Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (“[T]he claims’ invocation of computers, networks, and displays does
not transform the claimed subject matter into patent-eligible applications.
The claims at issue do not require any nonconventional computer, network,
or display components, or even a ‘non-conventional and non-generic
arrangement of known, conventional pieces,’ but merely call for
performance of the claimed information collection, analysis, and display
functions ‘on a set of generic computer components’ and display devices.
Bascom [Global Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility, LLC], 827 F.3d
[1341,] 1349–52 [Fed. Cir. 2016].”).
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We have considered Appellant’s argument that the claim elements
“function in concert to recite a machine that includes structure to provide
specific, structured GUI paired with prescribed functionality related to the
GUI when the machine is operated” (Appeal Br. 34) and that “[t]he game
underlying [Appellant’s] claims uses a new and original GUI paired with
prescribed functionality related to the GUI” sufficient to “‘transform[]’ the
claimed subject matter into a patent-eligible application” (id. at 35 (citing
Smith, 815 F.3d at 819 (“We could envisage, for example, claims directed to
conducting a game using a new or original deck of cards potentially
surviving step two of Alice.”)). Although the Smith court recognized that
adding a limitation beyond what is well-understood, routine, conventional
activity in the field (i.e., a new or original deck of cards) may qualify as
significantly more than the judicial exception, here we do not view the GUI
as adding anything beyond what is well-understood, routine, and
conventional activity in the field.
First, the GUI requires no improved computer elements that Appellant
has invented—just already available computer elements with their already
available basic functions, to use as tools for causing the claimed set of
functions to be performed. The Specification describes that “[t]he machine
may take” the form of a “personal computer, desktop computer, laptop
computer” (Spec. 16:21–17) including a “user interface” (id. at 17:3) and
“the user interface . . . may take the form of a GUI and may include output
components such as a speaker and a display . . . , and input components such
as a keypad or a touch-sensitive screen” (id. at 17:8–10). Appellant has not
persuasively explained how its user interface amounts to significantly more
than simply displaying particular information using generic computer
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components. See Trading Techs. Int’l v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d at 1093 (“The
fact that this is a ‘computer-based method’ does not render the claims non-
abstract. The specification indicates the claimed GUI is displayed on any
computer device. . . . As a general rule, ‘the collection, organization, and
display of two sets of information on a generic display device is abstract.’”)
(quoting Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 896 F.3d 1335, 1345 (Fed.
Cir. 2018)).
Second, the idea that “having randomly selected ‘multiplier symbols’
(e.g., faces of a six-sided die) correspond to ‘displayable image components’
that can be joined together to form an image of an object is entirely
unconventional” (Supp. Br. 6) points only to the abstract idea itself— i.e.,
rules for how the multiplier symbols and displayable image components are
added and displayed within the game and determining when the payout is to
be awarded—rather than an additional element that ensures that the claim is
more than the judicial exception. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56
(instructing that additional element(s) should be evaluated to determine
whether they (a) add specific limitations that are not well-understood,
routine, and conventional in the field, or (2) simply append well-understood,
routine, and conventional activities previously known to the industry (citing
MPEP § 2106.05(d)). See Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839
F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90) (a finding
that the claims are novel and nonobvious in light of an absence of evidence
does not conflict with the Examiner’s conclusion under 35 U.S.C. § 101
because “a claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea”); see also
Trading Techs. Int’l v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d at 1093 (“The abstract idea itself
cannot supply the inventive concept, ‘no matter how groundbreaking the
Appeal 2018-000861
Application 14/543,594

19
advance.’”) (quoting SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1171
(Fed. Cir. 2018)).
For the reasons discussed above, we find no element or combination
of elements recited in claim 1 that contains any “inventive concept” or adds
anything “significantly more” to transform the abstract concept into a patent-
eligible application. Alice, 573 U.S. at 221.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s decision rejecting claim 1,
and claims 2–21 falling therewith, under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed
to patent-ineligible subject matter.

DECISION
The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–21 under 35 U.S.C. § 101
as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED