Republic Jet Center LLCDownload PDFTrademark Trial and Appeal BoardMay 10, 201987414987 (T.T.A.B. May. 10, 2019) Copy Citation Mailed: May 10, 2019 UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE _____ Trademark Trial and Appeal Board _____ In re Republic Jet Center LLC _____ Serial No. 87414987 _____ David B. Sunshine of Cozen O’Connor P.C., for Republic Jet Center LLC. Daniel Stringer, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 103, Stacy Wahlberg, Managing Attorney. _____ Before Bergsman, Ritchie and Heasley, Administrative Trademark Judges. Opinion by Bergsman, Administrative Trademark Judge: Republic Jet Center LLC (Applicant) seeks registration on the Principal Register for the mark REPUBLIC JET CENTER, in standard characters, for the services listed below: Providing general aviation services, namely, aircraft loading and unloading; skycapping in the nature of porter services; ground transportation of aircraft passengers and goods by various means; airport wheelchair services in the nature of transportation of passengers by wheelchair; rental of cars at the fixed base operation; rental of aircraft hangar space; mislanded baggage delivery services; delivery of catering goods and newspapers, in Class 39; and This Opinion Is Not a Precedent of the TTAB Serial No. 87414987 - 2 - Providing aircraft ground-support services, namely, aircraft fueling services, providing toilet, water tank and lavatory cleaning services for aircraft; providing a ground power unit to supply power to a parked aircraft while its engines are turned off in the nature of battery charging services, in Class 37.1 Applicant disclaimed the exclusive right to use the term “Jet Center.” The Examining Attorney refused to register Applicant’s mark under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the ground that Applicant’s mark so resembles the registered marks listed below, owned by the same entity, as to be likely to cause confusion or mistake, or to deceive: 1. Registration No. 3323331 for the mark REPUBLIC AIRLINES, in standard characters for “transportation services, namely, passengers and delivery of goods by air,” in Class 39. Registrant disclaimed the exclusive right to use the word “Airlines.”2 2. Registration No. 4446692 for the mark REPUBLIC AIRWAYS, in standard characters, for “air transportation services, namely the transportation of cargo, freight and passengers; airline transportation services,” in Class 39. Registrant disclaimed the exclusive right to use the word “Airways.”3 3. Registration No. 4687026 for the mark REPUBLIC AIRWAYS HOLDINGS and design, reproduced below, for “air transportation services, namely the 1 Application Serial No. 87414987, filed April 18, 2017, under Section 1(b) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b), based on Applicant’s claim of a bona fide intent to use the mark in commerce. 2 Registered October 30, 2007; renewed. 3 Registered December 10, 2013. Serial No. 87414987 - 3 - transportation of cargo, freight and passengers; airline transportation services,” in Class 39. Registrant disclaimed the exclusive right to use the phrase “Airways Holdings.”4 Registrant’s description of the mark reads as follows: The mark consists of gray stars forming a circular background behind the stylized wording “Republic Airways” in blue over “Holdings” in red. The color(s) gray, blue and red is/are claimed as a feature of the mark. Our determination under Section 2(d) is based on an analysis of all of the probative facts in evidence that are relevant to the factors bearing on the likelihood of confusion. In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (CCPA 1973) (“du Pont”) cited in B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 113 USPQ2d 2045, 2049 (2015); see also In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2003). We have considered each du Pont factor that is relevant or for which there is evidence of record. See M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006); 4 Registered February 17, 2015. Serial No. 87414987 - 4 - ProMark Brands Inc. v. GFA Brands, Inc., 114 USPQ2d 1232, 1242 (TTAB 2015) (“While we have considered each factor for which we have evidence, we focus our analysis on those factors we find to be relevant.”). “[E]ach case must be decided on its own facts and the differences are often subtle ones.” Indus. Nucleonics Corp. v. Hinde, 475 F.2d 1197, 177 USPQ 386, 387 (CCPA 1973) (internal citations removed). In any likelihood of confusion analysis, two key considerations are the similarities between the marks and the similarities between the goods or services. See In re Chatam Int’l Inc., 380 F.3d 1340, 71 USPQ2d 1944, 1945-46 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (CCPA 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by § 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods and differences in the marks.”); see also In re i.am.symbolic, LLC, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“The likelihood of confusion analysis considers all DuPont factors for which there is record evidence but ‘may focus … on dispositive factors, such as similarity of the marks and relatedness of the goods’”) (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). I. The strength of Registrant’s marks, including the number of similar marks in use in connection with similar services. In determining the strength of a mark, we consider both its inherent strength, based on the nature of the mark itself, and its commercial strength, based on the marketplace recognition value of the mark. See In re Chippendales USA, Inc., 622 F.3d 1346, 96 USPQ2d 1681, 1686 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“A mark’s strength is measured both by its conceptual strength (distinctiveness) and its marketplace Serial No. 87414987 - 5 - strength (secondary meaning).”); Top Tobacco, L.P. v. North Atlantic Operating Co., Inc., 101 USPQ2d 1163, 1171-72 (TTAB 2011) (the strength of a mark is determined by assessing its inherent strength and its commercial strength); Tea Bd. of India v. Republic of Tea Inc., 80 USPQ2d 1881, 1899 (TTAB 2006); MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 11:83 (5th ed. 2019) (“The first enquiry focuses on the inherent potential of the term at the time of its first use. The second evaluates the actual customer recognition value of the mark at the time registration is sought or at the time the mark is asserted in litigation to prevent another’s use.”). Market strength is the extent to which the relevant public recognizes a mark as denoting a single source. Tea Bd. of India v. Republic of Tea Inc., 80 USPQ2d at 1899. In other words, it is similar to acquired distinctiveness. For purposes of analyzing likelihood of confusion, a mark’s renown may “var[y] along a spectrum from very strong to very weak.” Joseph Phelps Vineyards, LLC v. Fairmont Holdings, LLC, 857 F.3d 1323, 122 USPQ2d 1733, 1734 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (internal quotations omitted). The proper standard is the mark’s “renown within a specific product market,” id., and “is determined from the viewpoint of consumers of like products,” id. at 1735, not from the viewpoint of the general public. A. Inherent Strength When making a determination of likelihood of confusion in an ex parte appeal, in order to determine the inherent or conceptual strength of the cited mark, we evaluate its intrinsic nature, that is, where it lies along the generic-descriptive-suggestive- arbitrary-fanciful continuum of words. Word marks that are arbitrary, fanciful, or Serial No. 87414987 - 6 - suggestive are “held to be inherently distinctive.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 54 USPQ2d 1065, 1068 (2000); see also, Chippendales USA, 96 USPQ2d at 1684 (“In general, trademarks are assessed according to a scale formulated by Judge Friendly in Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 189 USPQ 759 (2d Cir. 1976), which evaluates whether word marks are ‘arbitrary’ or ‘fanciful,’ ‘suggestive,’ ‘descriptive,’ or ‘generic.’”). The word “Republic” in Registrant’s mark is defined, inter alia, as “a state in which the supreme power rests in the body of citizens entitled to vote and is exercised by representatives chosen directly or indirectly by them,” “any body of persons viewed as a commonwealth,” and “a state in which the head of government is not a monarch or other hereditary head of state.”5 When used in connection with Registrant’s transportation services, the word “Republic” is arbitrary because it is a “known word used in an unexpected or uncommon way.” Nautilus Grp., Inc. v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 372 F.3d 1330, 71 USPQ2d 1173 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (defining an arbitrary mark as a “known word used in an unexpected or uncommon way” and observing that such marks are typically strong); see also Palm Bay Imps. Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (arbitrary terms are conceptually strong trademarks). 5 Dictionary.com/browse/republic# based on the RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (2019) accessed May 7, 2019. The Board may take judicial notice of dictionary definitions, including online dictionaries that exist in printed format. In re Cordua Rests. LP, 110 USPQ2d 1227, 1229 n.4 (TTAB 2014), aff’d, 823 F.3d 594, 118 USPQ2d 1632 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Threshold.TV Inc. v. Metronome Enters. Inc., 96 USPQ2d 1031, 1038 n.14 (TTAB 2010); In re Red Bull GmbH, 78 USPQ2d 1375, 1378 (TTAB 2006). Serial No. 87414987 - 7 - B. Commercial Strength There is no evidence regarding the commercial strength of Registrant’s REPUBLIC marks. C. The number and nature of similar marks in use in connection with similar services. To show that Registrant’s REPUBLIC marks are weak marks entitled to a narrow scope of protection, Applicant submitted two-third party registrations consisting in part of the word “Republic,” and one third-party website for Republic Airport, “Long Island’s Executive Airport” (republicairport.net).6 The third-party registrations are listed below: 1. Registration No. 3980174 for the mark TRAVEL REPUBLIC (“Travel” disclaimed) for, inter alia, “travel agency services,” in Class 39, and “arranging of holiday temporary accommodation; hotel reservation services; temporary accommodation services relating to villas, apartments; booking of temporary accommodation,” in Class 43;7 and 2. Registration No. 5388917 for the mark ONLINE REPUBLIC (“Online” disclaimed) for, inter alia, “travel agency services for making transportation reservations,” in Class 39.8 While the Federal Circuit has held that “extensive evidence of third-party use and registrations is ‘powerful on its face,’ even where the specific extent and impact of the 6 Applicant’s August 9, 2018 Request for Reconsideration (4 TTABVUE 8-15). 7 Id. at 4 TTABVUE 8. 8 Id. at 4 TTABVUE 10. Serial No. 87414987 - 8 - usage has not been established,” see Jack Wolfskin Ausrustung Fur Draussen GmbH & Co. KGAA v. New Millennium Sports, S.L.U., 797 F3d 1363, 116 USPQ2d 1129, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS Enters. LLC, 794 F.3d 1334, 115 USPQ2d 1671, 1674 (Fed. Cir. 2015)), this record of third-party registrations is not persuasive because neither third-party registration is for Registrant’s type of transportation services, nor is the third-party website. Assuming arguendo, that travel agency services and airport services are related to Registrant’s transportation services, two third-party registrations and one third-party website do not rise to the same level of persuasiveness as the voluminous evidence in Juice Generation and Jack Wolfskin. Because Registrant’s REPUBLIC marks are arbitrary marks that are conceptually strong, we find that Registrant’s marks fall on the strong side “of the spectrum from very strong to very weak.” II. The similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties in terms of appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. We now turn to the du Pont likelihood of confusion factor focusing on the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression. du Pont, 177 USPQ at 567. “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014); accord Krim-Ko Corp. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 390 F.2d 728, 156 USPQ 523, 526 (CCPA 1968) (“It is sufficient if the similarity in either form, spelling or sound alone is likely to cause confusion.”) (citation omitted). Serial No. 87414987 - 9 - In comparing the marks, we are mindful that “The proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead ‘whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression’ such that persons who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.” Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs. Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); see also Midwestern Pet Foods, Inc. v. Societe des Produits Nestle S.A., 685 F.3d 1046, 103 USPQ2d 1435, 1440 (Fed. Cir. 2012); San Fernando Elec. Mfg. Co. v. JFD Elec. Components Corp., 565 F.2d 683, 196 USPQ 1, 3 (CCPA 1977); Spoons Rests. Inc. v. Morrison Inc., 23 USPQ2d 1735, 1741 (TTAB 1991), aff’d mem., 972 F.2d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Applicant is seeking to register the mark REPUBLIC JET CENTER and the Registrant’s marks are REPUBLIC AIRLINES, REPUBLIC AIRWAYS, and REPUBLIC AIRWAYS HOLDINGS and design. The marks are similar because they share the arbitrary word “Republic.” Moreover, the word “Republic” is the dominant part of all the marks. The exclusive right to use the terms “Jet Center,” “Airlines,” Airways,” and “Airways Holdings” have been disclaimed because they are descriptive. It is well- settled that disclaimed, descriptive matter may have less significance in likelihood of confusion determinations. See Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 55 USPQ2d 1842, 1846 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“Regarding descriptive terms, this court has noted that the ‘descriptive component of a mark may be given little weight in reaching Serial No. 87414987 - 10 - a conclusion on the likelihood of confusion.’”) (quoting In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 224 USPQ 749, 752 (Fed. Cir. 1985)); In re Dixie Rests. Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Code Consultants, Inc., 60 USPQ2d 1699, 1702 (TTAB 2001) (disclaimed matter is often “less significant in creating the mark’s commercial impression”). There is nothing improper in stating that, for rational reasons, more or less weight has been given to a particular feature of a mark, such as a common dominant element, provided the ultimate conclusion rests on a consideration of the marks in their entireties. In re Nat’l Data Corp., 224 USPQ at 751; see also In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012). With respect to the design in Registrant’s mark REPUBLIC AIRWAYS HOLDINGS and design, the words are normally accorded greater weight because they are likely to make an impression upon purchasers, would be remembered by them, and would be used by them to request the services. See Viterra, 101 USPQ2d at 1908, 1911 (citing CBS Inc. v. Morrow, 708 F. 2d 1579, 218 USPQ 198, 200 (Fed. Cir 1983)); Sweats Fashions Inc. v. Pannill Knitting Co., 833 F.2d 1560, 4 USPQ2d 1793, 1798 (Fed. Cir. 1987). The significance of the word “Republic” is reinforced by its location as the first word of each mark. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding “the identity of the marks’ two initial words is particularly significant because consumers typically notice those words first”); Palm Bay Imps. 73 USPQ2d at 1692 (“Veuve” is the most prominent part of the mark Serial No. 87414987 - 11 - VEUVE CLICQUOT because “veuve” is the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (upon encountering the marks, consumers will first notice the identical lead word). Because the dominant part of each mark is the word “Republic” followed by a descriptive word, the marks are similar in appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression. “[I]f the dominant portion of both marks is the same, then confusion may be likely notwithstanding peripheral differences.” In re Denisi, 225 USPQ 624, 624 (TTAB 1985). The peripheral differences in this case fail to distinguish the marks. III. The similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the services. Registrant’s marks are registered for airline transportation services. Applicant is a “fixed base operator” or “FBO.”9 A “fixed base operator” is a “commercial business allowed to operate on airport grounds in order to provide services to the airport. In essence, they are private jet terminals located on the grounds of an airport.”10 The services provided by fixed base operators include fueling, baggage handling, aircraft rental, aircraft interior and exterior cleaning and lavatory servicing, providing 9 An excerpt from Applicant’s website (republicjetcenter.com) attached to the February 9, 2018 Office Action (TSDR 140); see also Applicant’s August 9, 2018 Request for Reconsideration (4 TTAVUE 12) (“Welcome to Republic Jet Center: New York’s Newest, State-of-the-Art FBO”). Citations to the examination record refer to the USPTO’s online Trademark Status and Document Retrieval System (TSDR), by page number in the downloadable .pdf format. 10 Presidential-aviation.com attached to the August 28, 2018 Denial of Request for Reconsideration (5 TTABVUE 4). Serial No. 87414987 - 12 - ground transportation, and providing hangar space.11 However, we must consider the services as they are described in the application at issue, and not extrinsic evidence about Applicant’s actual services. See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Octocom Sys, Inc. v. Houston Comput. Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“The authority is legion that the question of registrability of an applicant’s mark must be decided on the basis of the identification of goods [or services] set forth in the application regardless of what the record may reveal as to the particular nature of an applicant’s goods [or services], the particular channels of trade or the class of purchasers to which the sales of goods are directed.”); Paula Payne Prods. v. Johnson Publ’g Co., 473 F.2d 901, 177 USPQ 76, 77 (CCPA 1973) (“Trademark cases involving the issue of likelihood of confusion must be decided on the basis of the respective descriptions of goods [or services]”); compare In re Thor Tech, Inc., 113 USPQ2d 1546, 1547 (TTAB) (using extrinsic evidence to define the description of goods); In re Trackmobile, 15 UPSQ2d 1152, 1154 (TTAB 1990) (if the cited registration contains terms that are not readily understood, the Board may rely on extrinsic evidence explaining the meaning of those terms). To show that the Registrant’s airline transportation services and Applicant’s services are similar, the Examining Attorney submitted copies of 17 use-based, third- party registrations for activities listed in both the application and the cited 11 Id.; SKYbrary website (skybrary.aero) attached to the February 9, 2018 Office Action (TSDR 142); “Fixed-base operator,” Wikipedia.org attached to the February 9, 2018 Office Action (TSDR 143-144). Serial No. 87414987 - 13 - registrations.12 Third-party registrations based on use in commerce that individually cover a number of different services may have probative value to the extent that they serve to suggest that the listed services are of a type that may emanate from the same source. In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co., 29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-1786 (TTAB 1993); In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co. Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 n.6 (TTAB 1988), aff’d mem. 864 F.2d 149 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Representative registrations, with relevant portions of the identifications, are listed below. MARK REGISTRATION NUMBER Services JET SOURCE 2322153 Aircraft fueling and cleaning; air transportation WEST JET 3559405 Aircraft refueling; air charter services ENVOY 4867612 Maintenance of baggage-related facilities; refueling of aircraft; aircraft interior and exterior cleaning and sanitation; air transport AMERICAN AIRLINES 4939082 Maintenance of baggage-related facilities; airport baggage checking; baggage handling; aircraft interior and exterior cleaning and sanitation; air transport of passengers, cargo and freight FLEXJET 2367318 Fueling services; air transportation Also, the Examining Attorney submitted excerpts from 11 websites from companies offering air transportation or charter services as well as FBO services, 12 July 20, 2017 Office Action (TSDR 23-40); February 9, 2018 Office Action (TSDR 22-74). The Examining Attorney submitted copies of 24 registrations in total. However, he submitted Registration No. 4867612 twice. Also, six registrations listed “maintenance” services. “Maintenance” is not listed in Applicant’s description of services and because the Examining Attorney did not define “maintenance” services and show how “maintenance” services are related to the activities listed in Applicant’s description of services, we do not know if it is broad enough to encompass any of the activities listed in Applicant’s description of services. Accordingly, we do consider seven of the registrations that the Examining Attorney submitted. Serial No. 87414987 - 14 - including some of the various activities listed Applicant’s description of services under the same mark.13 Representative third-party websites are listed below: 1. Aero Charter website (aerocharter.com) advertises itself as a full service FBO Operator offering, inter alia, air transportation services, refueling services, “and all other services along with the amenities you’ve come to expect from top FBOs.”14 13 We did not consider the Naples Jet Center website (naplesjetcenter.com) that displayed links to charter services and “FBO” services. July 20, 2017 Office Action (TSDR 41-44). The excerpt that the Examining Attorney submitted did not specifically list any of the activities set forth in Applicant’s description of services. We did not consider the Vail Valley Jet Center website (vvjc.com) that has links to aircraft charter and line services because the Examining Attorney did not define line services so we do not know whether line services include the activities listed in Applicant’s description of services. July 20, 2017 Office Action (TSDR 45). We did not consider the Air Canada (aircanada.com) (July 20, 2017 Office Action (TSDR 46- 49)), the Southwest Airlines websites (swacargo.com, southwest.com, and southwestairlinesinvestorrelations.com) (July 20, 2017 Office Action (TSDR 50-53)) or the United Airlines website (unitedcargo.com and united.com) (July 20, 2017 Office Action (TSDR 54-56)) because we assume that major airlines are going render the activities listed in Applicant’s description of services as an integral part of their airline services. Also, the Southwest Airlines websites did not list any of the activities in Applicant’s description of services. Compare the Delta Airlines websites Delta Private Jet website (deltaprivatejets.com) (February 9, 2018 Office Action (TSDR 137-138)) advertising the company’s FBO services, including providing rental cars, fueling, lavatory servicing, and battery charging services and the Delta website (delta.com) (February 9, 2018 Office Action (TSDR 139) advertising the company’s air transportation services. We did not consider the Florida Jet website (floridajet.com) (February 8, 2018 Office Action TSDR 107-109)) or the Fargo Jet Center (fargojet.com) (February 8, 2018 Office Action (TSDR 114-118)) because neither website listed any of the activities in Applicant’s description of services. 14 February 9, 2018 Office Action (TSDR 75-78). Serial No. 87414987 - 15 - 2. Napa Jet Center (napajetcenter.com) advertises itself as an FBO providing aircraft refueling, hangar and storage, detailing, lavatory, laundry and catering services, as well as aircraft charter services.15 3. Gary Jet Center (garyjetcenter.com) advertises its air charter services and its FBO services, including fueling, aircraft parking, and providing rental cars.16 We find the evidence sufficient to show that the services are related because the same marks are used by others to identify and distinguish air transportation or charter services and any number of the activities listed in Applicant’s description of services. Each of the activities in Applicant’s description of services do not have be used by the third parties. It is sufficient if only some of the activities are used. Cf. Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., 648 F.2d 1335, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (CCPA 1981); Apple Computer v. TVNET.Net, Inc., 90 USPQ2d 1393, 1398 (TTAB 2007). Applicant argues, in part, that the Registrant’s air transportation services and its services are not related because Applicant’s services are rendered to charter aircraft companies who require aircraft servicing at Republic Airport. The owner of the Cited Registrations markets its services to the general public through code-sharing arrangements with the major airline carriers.17 As noted above, we analyze the similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the services based on the description of services in the application and the cited registrations. We 15 February 9, 2018 Office Action (TSDR 79-82). 16 February 9, 2018 Office Action (TSDR 85-87). 17 Applicant’s Brief, p. 8 (8 TTABVUE 13). Serial No. 87414987 - 16 - do not read limitations into the description of services. See i.am.symbolic, 123 USPQ2d at 1748; Squirtco v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 216 USPQ 937, 940 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“There is no specific limitation and nothing in the inherent nature of Squirtco’s mark or goods that restricts the usage of SQUIRT for balloons to promotion of soft drinks. The Board, thus, improperly read limitations into the registration”); In re Thor Tech, 90 USPQ2d 1634, 1638 (TTAB 2009) (“We have no authority to read any restrictions or limitations into the registrant’s description of goods.”). Therefore, we must presume that Applicant’s services may be rendered anywhere and not limited to Republic Airport and that Registrant’s services may be rendered without code-sharing arrangements with the major airline carriers. IV. Established, likely-to-continue channels of trade and classes of consumers. The third-party website evidence discussed above shows that that airplane owners and people or companies that charter planes use FBO services. In fact, the air charter services and FBO services are bundled together as an advertising tool to attract customers. For example, on the Aero Charter webpage focusing on that company’s charter services, the company advertises that it “provides full FBO services, aircraft management, aircraft sales and acquisitions, maintenance, avionics and a full travel agency.”18 We find that air transportation or charter services and the activities listed in Applicant’s description of services are offered in the same channels of trade to the same classes of consumers. 18 February 9, 2018 Office Action (TSDR 77). Serial No. 87414987 - 17 - V. Conditions under which and buyers to whom sales are made. Although there is no evidence regarding how consumers make their purchasing decisions with respect to the relevant services, because Applicant’s services involve general aviation services and aviation ground support services, we assume that consumers will exercise a high degree of care when making their purchasing decision. Nevertheless, in cases where there are similar marks, related goods, and similar channels of trade and classes of consumers, even a careful, sophisticated consumer of these services may not note the differences in the marks. Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 55 USPQ2d at 1846 (“The alleged sophistication of golfers is outweighed by the Board’s findings of strong similarity of marks and identity of goods.”); Weiss Assocs. Inc. v. HRL Assocs., Inc., 902 F.2d 1546, 14 USPQ2d 1840, 1841-42 (Fed.Cir.1990) (similarities in marks and products overshadowed sophistication of purchasers); In re Research and Trading Corp., 793 F.2d 1276, 230 USPQ 49, 50 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (quoting Carlisle Chem. Works, Inc. v. Hardman & Holden Ltd., 434 F.2d 1403, 168 USPQ 110, 112 (CCPA 1970)). Furthermore, careful purchasers who do notice the difference in the marks will not necessarily conclude that there are different sources for the goods, but will see the marks as variations of each other, pointing to a single source. See, e.g., Kangol Ltd. v. Kangaroos U.S.A., Inc., 974 F.2d 161, 23 USPQ2d 1945, 1946 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“What is important is not whether people will necessarily confuse the marks, but whether the marks will be likely to confuse people into believing that the goods they are purchasing emanate from the same source.”) (citations omitted). Accordingly, we find this du Pont factor to be neutral. Serial No. 87414987 - 18 - VI. Conclusion Because the marks are similar, the services are related and are offered in the same channels of trade to the same classes of consumers, we find that Applicant’s mark REPUBLIC JET CENTER for the services listed in the application are likely to cause confusion with the previously registered REPUBLIC AIRLINES and REPUBLIC AIREWAYS marks for air transportation services. Decision: The refusal to register Applicant’s mark REPUBLIC JET CENTER is affirmed. Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation