0120101406
01-12-2012
Reginald B. Sims, Complainant, v. Tom Kilgore, President and Chief Executive Officer, Tennessee Valley Authority, Agency.
Reginald B. Sims,
Complainant,
v.
Tom Kilgore,
President and Chief Executive Officer,
Tennessee Valley Authority,
Agency.
Appeal No. 0120101406
Hearing No. 420-2009-00205X
Agency No. 04082009032
DECISION
Complainant filed an appeal from the Agency’s January 8, 2010,
final order concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint
alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
The Commission accepts the appeal, according to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a).
For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency’s final
order.
ISSUE PRESENTED
Whether an EEOC Administrative erred in issuing summary judgment, finding
that the Agency did not discriminate against Complainant on the basis
of race (African-American) when it rescinded a conditional job offer
and denied him unescorted access authorization.
BACKGROUND
Conditional Job Offer
On October 7, 2008, Complainant applied to be a System Engineer,
Electrical (Nuclear), in the Nuclear Power Group at Brown’s Ferry
Nuclear Plant, in Decatur, Alabama. In describing his prior work
experience, Complainant wrote that his last job ended in July 2008 because
it was a “temporary service.” Since then, he has been unemployed,
receiving unemployment compensation.
On October 15, 2008, Complainant received a conditional offer for the
job, with employment contingent upon, among other things, satisfactory
results from a security investigation. The security investigation
included a background check, to assure that an applicant was trustworthy
and reliable enough to have “unescorted access” in a nuclear plant.
The Agency could deny an applicant “unescorted access” for several
causes, including:
• refusal to provide, or the falsification of, any personal history
information . . . .
• failure to report any legal actions.
Report of Investigation (ROI), at 297.
Security Investigation: Allegation of Timecard Fraud
After Complainant received the conditional offer, the state agency that
administered unemployment compensation notified Complainant on October 24,
2008, that his previous employer was challenging his claim of unemployment
compensation. Specifically, the previous employer alleged that it had
discharged Complainant for timecard fraud. A hearing was scheduled for
December 18, 2008.
On or around November 13, 2011, the Agency unit responsible for
conducting background checks (“nuclear access services”) received
Complainant’s application. ROI, Exhibit (Ex.) 2, at 212. The unit
contacted Complainant’s previous employer, who indicated that
Complainant had been discharged for timecard fraud.
Because Complainant’s job application stated that his previous
employment had ended because it was a “temporary service,” rather than
timecard fraud, the unit asked Complainant to respond to the discrepancy
between his account and the previous employer’s.
On November 21, 2008, Complainant denied committing timecard fraud.
He explained that his previous supervisor had a liberal policy for
granting leave, and insisted that the previous employer had never
disciplined him for any misconduct or charged him with timecard fraud
while he worked there. When the previous employer terminated his
employment, it had simply told him that his job assignment had ended.
The only proof he could offer to show that he had not been discharged for
misconduct was the fact that he had received three months of unemployment
compensation.
On December 2, 2008, the unit asked Complainant to provide documentation
verifying that his previous employer did not fire him for timecard
fraud. It also asked him why he had failed to appear for various
driving-related charges, and why he had not listed those charges in
his application.
The next day, Complainant explained his actions regarding the
driving-related charges, apparently to the Agency’s satisfaction.
As for the charge of timecard fraud, he reiterated that he had been
a model employee, who had not been disciplined while working there.
His only proof that he had not been discharged for misconduct was the
fact that he had been receiving unemployment compensation for some time.
That same day, the Agency’s nuclear access services unit contacted
the previous employer, seeking more information about Complainant’s
termination. According to nuclear access services, the previous employer
reaffirmed that Complainant had been terminated for timecard fraud and
was not eligible for rehire.
Rescinding of Job Offer and Denial of Unescorted Access Authorization
On December 30, 2008, a different Agency unit, called “shared
resources,” rescinded Complainant’s job offer because he did not
meet the Agency’s nuclear access requirements for employment.
On January 7, 2009, the state agency that administered unemployment
compensation determined that Complainant “did not willfully make
a false statement or representation, or willfully fail to disclose a
material fact to obtain or increase benefits.”
On January 22, 2009, the Agency’s nuclear access services issued its
own letter to Complainant. The unit explained that it was denying him
unescorted access authorization because he had indicated his leaving
his previous job was due to the temporary nature of the position, when
instead he had been terminated for timecard fraud.
Complainant requested an independent administrative review. He argued
that there was not sufficient cause to deny him unescorted access.
Specifically, he maintained that he did not refuse to provide, or
falsify, any personal history information regarding timecard fraud.
At the time he applied for the job, he did not know that his previous
employer believed he had committed time fraud. It was only later,
when his previous employer challenged his eligibility for unemployment
compensation, that he became aware of the allegation of timecard fraud.
This was confirmed by the unemployment compensation agency, which found
that he did not willfully make a false statement or representation
regarding timecard fraud, or willfully failed to disclose a material fact.
On February 23, 2009, the Agency upheld its previous decision to deny
Complainant unescorted access authorization.
EEO Administrative Process
On April 7, 2009, Complainant filed an EEO complaint, and the Agency
accepted for investigation the issue of whether it discriminated against
him on the basis of race (African-American) when it improperly processed
his security clearance that led the Agency to rescind its job offer
to him. At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided
Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of
his right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ).
Complainant timely requested a hearing.
On November 17, 2009, the Agency moved for summary judgment. Twenty days
later, on December 7, 2009, the AJ granted the Agency’s motion for
summary judgment, and issued a decision without a hearing.
The AJ found no evidence that Complainant was treated less favorably
than a similarly situated individual outside of his protected group.
The AJ found that employment was contingent upon satisfactory results
of a security investigation; and that Complainant had not satisfactorily
explained to the Agency the derogatory information that surfaced during
the security investigation. Finally, the AJ found that the Agency
rescinded its job offer, and there is no evidence to infer that the
Agency had been motivated by discrimination.
The Agency subsequently issued a final order, adopting the AJ’s
finding that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected him
to discrimination as alleged.
CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL
On appeal, Complainant maintains that the AJ erred in issuing summary
judgment for several reasons.
Opportunity to Respond to Agency’s Motion for Summary Judgment
First, Complainant contends that the AJ did not give him a full
opportunity to respond to the Agency’s motion for summary judgment.
Under 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g)(2), he had 15 days from the date of
receiving the Agency’s motion to oppose it. Here, he received the
Agency’s motion for summary judgment on November 23, 2009. Fifteen days
later was December 8, 2009. Therefore, he had until December 8, 2009
to file his opposition, yet the AJ issued his summary judgment decision
a day early, on December 7, 2009.
In response, the Agency argues that Complainant never availed himself
of the 15-day opportunity to oppose the Agency’s motion for summary
judgment, in that he never filed an opposition to the motion.
Adequacy of the Record
Second, Complainant contends that the record was not adequately
developed for summary disposition. For example, the EEO investigator
failed to interview Complainant’s former supervisor, who could have
testified whether Complainant had in fact committed timecard fraud at
his previous job. The EEO investigator also failed to obtain documents
referenced by an Agency witness during her deposition, including relevant
personnel policies like the adjudication guideline, and the Agency’s
adjudication of unfavorable information. These two documents would
help a fact finder determine whether there was pretext, that is, whether
the Agency adhered to relevant personnel policies or past practices in
processing his security authorization.
In response, the Agency maintains that the record was sufficiently
developed for summary disposition. Complainant was afforded an adequate
opportunity to engage in discovery to supplement the record, but did not
avail himself of the opportunity. Furthermore, some of the documents
Complainant requested to be included in the record are prohibited from
disclosure, under Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulation 10 C.F.R. §
73.21.
Genuine Issues of Material Fact
Third, Complainant argues that the AJ erred in issuing summary judgment
because there are genuine issues of material fact. For example, he
contends that there is a genuine issue regarding whether the Agency
deviated from applicable personnel policies or past practices that
may be sufficient to support an inference of a discriminatory motive.
Specifically, the relevant policy states that an individual applying
for unescorted access authorization (UAA) to a nuclear plant
shall also be informed of his or her right to review results of the
developed information, and to assure the accuracy and completeness.
The individual applying for UAA has the right to confront the facts
against him or her but not the right to know who provided and confirmed
any potentially disqualifying information. Potentially disqualifying
information obtained from confidential/unnamed sources must be resolved
either positively or negatively and this result documented. Potentially
disqualifying information obtained from confidential/unnamed sources
must be corroborated before it can be used to deny access.
Complainant argues that the Agency did not adhere to this policy
in several ways. First, the Agency merely told him of the general
allegation of timecard fraud, and did not allow him to confront the
“facts against him” that fuelled this allegation (his check-in and
check-out times did not match the video monitoring the same actions).
Second, the record appears to indicate that the Agency rescinded his
job offer on December 30, 2008, before the Agency could corroborate the
potentially disqualifying information on January 12, 2009 and officially
deny him authorization on January 22, 2009.
Furthermore, the sequence of events, in which the Agency rescinded
its job offer before it corroborated the disqualifying information and
denied him access, suggests that the Agency’s articulated reason was
an after-the-fact explanation intended to mask a discriminatory motive.
Finally, Complainant argues that the Agency’s articulated reason for
denying him authorization and rescinding his job offer (the discrepancy
over why he left his previous job), was not legitimate. For Complainant,
the initial decision of the state unemployment compensation agency to
find him eligible for compensation constitutes sufficient proof that he
did not commit misconduct in his previous job.
In response, the Agency reminds the Commission that it is precluded
from reviewing the substance of this security clearance decision, and is
limited to determining only whether the denial of the security clearance
was conducted in a nondiscriminatory manner. Here, there is no genuine
material dispute over whether the Agency adhered to the relevant personnel
policies and past practices in processing his security clearance.
It is undisputed that the Agency informed Complainant that his previous
employer had informed the Agency that Complainant had been discharged
for timecard fraud. The Agency gave Complainant multiple opportunities
to provide evidence that the potentially derogatory information was
inaccurate, or that there were mitigating or extenuating circumstances.
The Agency maintains that Complainant did not provide it with any
documentation establishing that the derogatory information was incorrect
or erroneous. Therefore, the Agency determined that Complainant did not
meet the requirement for unescorted access authorization. Ultimately,
the Agency maintains there is no evidence in the record suggesting that
the Agency’s denial was motivated, in part, by Complainant’s race.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Standard of Review
We review de novo the AJ’s legal and factual conclusions, and the
Agency’s final order adopting them. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a)
(stating that a “decision on an appeal from an Agency’s final
action shall be based on a de novo review . . .”); see also Equal
Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614, at
Chapter 9, § VI.B. (November 9, 1999) (providing that an administrative
judge’s “decision to issue a decision without a hearing pursuant to
[29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g)] will be reviewed de novo”).
This means that we are free to accept (if accurate) or reject
(if erroneous) the factual conclusions and legal analysis of the
AJ and Agency—including the ultimate fact of whether intentional
discrimination occurred, and the legal issue of whether any federal
employment discrimination statute was violated. See id. at Chapter 9,
§ VI.A. (explaining that the de novo standard of review “requires
that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and
legal determinations of the previous decision maker,” and that EEOC
“review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including
any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its
decision based on the Commission’s own assessment of the record and
its interpretation of the law”).
We must first determine whether the AJ appropriately issued a decision
without a hearing on this record. The Commission’s regulations allow
an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing when the AJ finds that there
is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g). This
regulation is patterned after the summary judgment procedure set forth
in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme
Court has held that summary judgment is appropriate where a court
determines that, given the substantive legal and evidentiary standards
that apply to the case, there exists no genuine issue of material fact.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling
on a motion for summary judgment, a court’s function is not to weigh
the evidence but rather to determine whether there are genuine issues
for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of the non-moving party must be
believed at the summary judgment stage and all justifiable inferences
must be drawn in the non-moving party’s favor. Id. at 255. An issue
of fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact
finder could find in favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103,
105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is “material” if it has the potential
to affect the outcome of the case.
If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, issuing
a decision without holding a hearing is not appropriate. In the context
of an administrative proceeding, an AJ may properly consider issuing a
decision without holding a hearing only upon a determination that the
record has been adequately developed for summary disposition. See Petty
v. Dep’t of Def., EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003).
Finally, an AJ should not rule in favor of one party without holding a
hearing unless the AJ ensures that the party opposing the ruling is given
(1) ample notice of the proposal to issue a decision without a hearing,
(2) a comprehensive statement of the allegedly undisputed material facts,
(3) the opportunity to respond to such a statement, and (4) the chance
to engage in discovery before responding, if necessary. According to
the Supreme Court, Rule 56 itself precludes summary judgment “where the
[party opposing summary judgment] has not had the opportunity to discover
information that is essential to his opposition.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at
250. In the hearing context, this means that the administrative judge
must enable the parties to engage in the amount of discovery necessary to
properly respond to any motion for a decision without a hearing. Cf. 29
C.F.R. § 1614.109(g)(2) (suggesting that an administrative judge could
order discovery, if necessary, after receiving an opposition to a motion
for a decision without a hearing).
Opportunity to Respond
We will assume, for the sake of argument, that the AJ prematurely
issued his decision one day early. Because Complainant did not have
the opportunity before this appeal to submit his argument in opposition
to the motion for summary judgment, we will consider his arguments now.
See, e.g., Dow v. Dep’t of Homeland Security, EEOC Appeal No. 0120112629
(Oct. 11, 2011) (the Commission considered on appeal the complainant’s
argument and connected discovery documentation after finding that the
complainant had been deprived of the opportunity to respond to the
agency’s motion for summary judgment when the AJ prematurely issued
summary judgment).
Adequacy of the Record
Before we can determine whether the record was adequately developed for
summary disposition, we must first clarify the legal issue that has to
be addressed by the record.
For security clearance-related claims, we must follow the legal framework
provided by the seminal case Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518,
520 (1988). There, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that the Merit
Systems Protection Board did not have “the authority to review the
substance of an underlying decision to deny or revoke a security clearance
in the course of reviewing an adverse action.” Further, the Supreme
Court noted that “the grant of security clearance to a particular
employee, a sensitive and inherently discretionary judgment call, is
committed by law to the appropriate agency of the Executive Branch.”
Id. at 527. Additionally, the Court held that, since each agency must
have broad discretion to determine who may have access to classified
information, an outside non-expert body could not “review the substance
of a judgment and . . . decide whether the agency should have been able
to make the necessary affirmative prediction with confidence.” Id. at
529. The Court further held that no outside body could determine what
“constitutes an acceptable margin of error in assessing the potential
risk,” and considered it “extremely unlikely” that Congress
intended to “involve the [MSPB] in second-guessing the agency’s
national security determinations.” Id. at 531.
In 1989, the Commission issued policy guidance on the national security
exception, explaining that it is an affirmative defense to a charge of
discrimination. Policy Guidance on the Use of National Security Exception
Contained in § 703(g) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
as amended (EEOC National Security Guidance), EEOC Notice No. N-915-041
(May 1, 1989). As such, employers must raise the affirmative defense
and prove that the employment decision at issue was made because of
national security requirements. Id. Further, the Commission restated
that no one has a right to a security clearance and non-expert bodies
cannot second guess the decisions of agency heads in determining who is
qualified to receive a security clearance. Id. (citing Egan, at 528),
Therefore, the Commission is “precluded from reviewing the substance
of security clearance decisions [and] from reviewing the validity of
the security requirement itself.” EEOC National Security Guidance.
Applying Egan and EEOC National Security Guidance, the Commission has
consistently affirmed the dismissal of employee’s claims alleging that
they were subjected to discrimination due to their security clearance
being revoked or denied, finding that such claims fail to state a claim
pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.107(a)(1), and are outside the purview of
the Commission’s jurisdiction. See, e.g., Rezaee v. Dep’t of the Air
Force, EEOC Appeal No. 01A60451 (Apr. 25, 2006) (citing EEOC National
Security Guidance); Carr v. Dep’t of the Army, EEOC Appeal No. 01A44011
(Nov. 4, 2004) (citing EEOC National Security Guidance).
However, the Commission retains authority to review whether the grant,
denial, or revocation of a security clearance was carried out in a
discriminatory manner. Id.; Schroeder v. Dep’t of Defense (Defense
Mapping Agency), EEOC Request No. 05930248 (Apr. 14, 1994). Reviewable
scenarios include:
• An agency seeks security clearance for a male applicant while
refusing to request security clearance for a female applicant. Here,
the Commission has the authority to determine whether the agency has
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not initiating the security
clearance process for the female applicant.
• An agency does not hire a black applicant, purportedly because
he lacks security clearance. However, the agency then hires a white
applicant, who also does not have a security clearance. The Commission
may determine whether the agency has a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for not hiring the black applicant.
Here, we can review whether the agency, in not hiring Complainant for
the system engineer position because it denied him unescorted access
authorization, hired system engineers of other races, who either did
not have to go through the authorization process at all, or were denied
such authorization after an investigation. See McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
On this issue, we find that the record is adequately developed for a
reasonable fact finder to draw conclusions on whether the unescorted
access authorization requirements were carried out in a discriminatory
manner. Specifically, Exhibit 8 (Ex. 8) of the Report of Investigation
(ROI) contains adequate, relevant comparator evidence. The data shows
that, over a two-year period from 2006 to 2008, the Agency rescinded
four system engineer job offers, including Complainant’s, because the
applicants did not meet nuclear minimum suitability. Besides Complainant,
who is African-American, the Agency rescinded the system engineer job
offers to a Caucasian, an African-American, and a multi-racial applicant.
We find this information to be sufficient for a fact finder to determine
whether there was a difference in treatment of similarly situated
applicants of different races.
Complainant’s additional information requests and arguments essentially
serve a different purpose: to reveal the inadequacies and deficiencies of
the actual security clearance investigation. By asking the Commission to
scrutinize whether the Agency should have done more in its investigation,
like contacting his former supervisor, or whether the Agency adhered
to the investigative procedures outlined by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Complainant is inviting the Commission to address the
substance and merits of the Agency’s decision to deny him security
clearance, which the Commission cannot do.
Because we are limited in this case to reviewing whether the Agency
applied the unescorted access authorization requirements to applicants
in Complainant’s class and those outside his class, we find that the
record was adequately developed for summary disposition.
Genuine Issue
We determine that the AJ did not err in issuing summary judgment because
there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute. To prevail in
a disparate treatment claim, Complainant generally must first establish
a prima facie case of discrimination by demonstrating that he (1) is a
member of a protected class, (2) was subjected to adverse treatment, and
(3) was treated differently than otherwise similarly situated employees
outside of the protected class. Walker v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal
No. 01A14419 (Mar 13, 2003); Ornelas v. Dep’t of Justice, EEOC Appeal
No. 01995301 (Sept. 26, 2002).
If Complainant establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts
to the Agency to articulate legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons
for its actions. Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately prevail, Complainant must prove,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Agency’s explanation is a
pretext for discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.,
530 U.S. 133 (2000); St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519
(1993); Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256; Holley v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs,
EEOC Request No. 05950842 (Nov. 13, 1997); Pavelka v. Dep’t of the Navy,
EEOC Request No. 05950351 (Dec. 14, 1995).
a. Prima Facie Case
We must examine whether the Agency treated Complainant differently
from similarly situated applicants in denying him unescorted access
authorization and rescinding a job offer for the system engineer position.
Generally, a difference in the treatment of similarly situated persons
of different races is probative of discrimination because it tends to
show that the treatment was not based on a nondiscriminatory reason.
Conversely, an employer’s consistent treatment of similarly situated
persons of different races tends to support its contention that no
discrimination occurred.
Here, the comparator evidence shows that the Agency consistently
rescinded job offers to applicants of different races for the system
engineer position, after the Agency determined that they did not
meet nuclear minimum suitability. ROI, Ex. 8, at 280. As such, we
find that Complainant did not establish a prima facie case under a
disparate treatment theory of discrimination. As long as the Agency
nondiscriminatorily applied the requirements of unescorted access
authorization for the position of system engineer to applicants in
Complainant’s class and those outside his class, Complainant has failed
to establish unlawful discrimination.
CONCLUSION
Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on
appeal, including those not specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM
the Agency’s final order, adopting the AJ’s decision finding no
discrimination on the basis alleged.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0610)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the
policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive
for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999).
All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of
Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box
77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as
the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency
head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full
name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal
of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the
national organization, and not the local office, facility or department
in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a
civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative
processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that
the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also
permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other
security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,
29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within
the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney
with the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.
Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits
as stated in the paragraph above (“Right to File a Civil Action”).
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
_1/12/12_________________
Date
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0120101406
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013
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0120101406