Reeves Distribution Service, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 20, 1976

223 N.L.R.B. 995 (N.L.R.B. 1976)

REEVES DISTRIBUTION SERVICE 995
Reeves Distribution Service , Inc. and Local Union No.
745, affiliate of International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, Chauffeurs , Warehousemen and Helpers of
America . Case 16-CA-5958
April 20, 1976
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MURPHY AND MEMBERS FANNING
AND PENELLO
On December 30, 1975, Administrative Law Judge
Henry L. Jalette issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding and, on January 13, 1976, he issued an
Erratum. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions
and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order.'
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby
orders that the Respondent, Reeves Distribution Ser-
vice, Inc., Irving, Texas, its officers, agents, succes-
sors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the
said recommended Order.
The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by-the
Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to over-
rule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to credibility
unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us
that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91
NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3, 1951). We have carefully
examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
2 Respondent's request for oral argument is hereby denied as the record
and Respondent's brief adequately set forth the issues and positions of the
parties.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ee, the layoff of two other employees, and by threats and
promises of benefit. The proceeding was initiated by a
charge filed by the above-named Union on March 6, 1975,'
which was amended on March 19, and pursuant to which
complaint issued on April 30. On October 6, hearing was
held in Dallas, Texas.
Upon the entire record, including my observation of the
witnesses , and consideration of the briefs filed by General
Counsel and Respondent, I hereby make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Alleged Interference, Restraint, and Coercion
1. The alleged threat of closure
Respondent is a Florida corporation with places of busi-
ness in various states of the United States, including a ter-
minal at Irving, Texas, the location of the instant dispute,
where it is engaged in the warehousing and distribution of
goods' In January-February, one Gene Payne was termi-
nal manager. On or about January 30, he received a letter
from the Union asserting its designation by a majority of
Respondent's drivers as their collective-bargaining repre-
sentative and requesting recognition. The letter named the
drivers and enclosed copies of the union authorization
cards they had signed. Payne immediately called L. S.
Warmack, Respondent's vice president whose office is in
Calhoun, Georgia. Warmack told him to say nothing.
Payne testified that a few days later he spoke to
Respondent's president, Oliver Reeves, who asked him if
he thought the men would vote for the Union. Payne said
he thought they would and Reeves told him to let it be
known if they did select the Union the place would be shut
down. Payne testified that 2 days later, about February 4,
in the warehouse with Warehouse Manager Dan Mitchell,
he told driver Clifton Seigh that if the men voted in the
Union the terminal would be closed. Payne testified Mit-
chell made a like statement.
Respondent does not dispute that a statement such as
described by Payne is violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act, as alleged in the complaint, but it asserts that Payne's
testimony that he made the statement should not be cred-
ited. Payne was discharged by Respondent on or about
February 11, and Respondent asserts that he was biased
against it by reason of his discharge. Moreover, Warehouse
Manager Mitchell denied the occurrence of any incident
such as Payne described and driver Seigh did not testify to
such a conversation with Payne and Mitchell.
Respondent's assertions have been carefully considered; as
a former supervisor summarily discharged, Payne could
well have wanted to do injury to Respondent and the fact
that Seigh did not corroborate him would appear to belie
HENRY L. JALETTE, Administrative Law Judge: This case
involves allegations that the above-named Company en-
gaged in unfair labor practices in violation of Section
8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by the discharge of one employ-
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all dates are in 1975.
2 Jurisdiction is not in issue . The complaint alleges, the answer admits,
and I find, that Respondent meets the Board 's standards for the assertion of
jurisdiction over employers operating as essential links in the transportation
of goods in interstate commerce.
223 NLRB No. 150
996 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the occurrence of any incident such as he described. De-
spite these circumstances, I credit Payne.
The possible bias of Payne is counterbalanced by a pos-
sible bias on the part of Mitchell who, as a supervisor pres-
ently employed by Respondent, would have a motive to be
responsible for a finding of an unfair labor practice against
Respondent. Moreover, it appears to me that had Payne
wanted to fabricate a conversation he would not have in-
cluded another supervisor in it and would have avoided the
possibility of a contradiction as occurred here. As to
Seigh's failure to corroborate Payne, I am persuaded it is
attributable to General Counsel's lack of care in his exami-
nation of the witness. For the foregoing reasons, and the
fact that Payne impressed me more favorably than Mit-
chell, I credit Payne and find that Respondent threatened
to close its Irving, Texas, facility if the employees selected
the Union to represent them and thereby violated Section
8(a)(l) of the Act.
2. The alleged threat of more onerous working conditions
On February 4 or 11, Tyler Wood replaced Payne as
terminal manager.3 At the start of the workday, he con-
vened the employees to introduce himself and in the course
of his remarks adverted to the Union. According to Don
Hill, who was employed as a tractor-trailer driver at the
time, Wood remarked that there must have been a problem
in the terminal that the drivers felt could be solved in no
other way for the drivers to go union. He indicated this was
the view of Warmack and Reeves. Wood stated it did not
matter to him one way or another whether the Union came
in, but that if it did come in that Calhoun would probably
come down on him pretty hard, and in the event that hap-
pened he would have to come down on them.
The complaint alleges a threat by Wood of more onerous
working conditions if the Union was selected as the repre-
sentative of the employees and Wood's remark about com-
ing down on the employees if the home office came down
on him is the predicate for the allegation.
Wood admitted convening the employees as described
by Hill and speaking to them, including the fact that the
Union was mentioned. He denied threatening employees
with more onerous working conditions, but was not asked
about the specific remark attributed to him by Hill. I was
not impressed by Wood's testimony generally, whereas Hill
impressed me as a truthful witness. I credit him and I find
that Wood's remark about "coming down" on the employ-
ees constituted an unlawful threat. While Wood did not
describe how he would come down on them, the only infer-
ence the employees could draw was that some undesirable
actions would be taken against them if they selected the
Union to represent them. Accordingly, I find that Respon-
dent violated Section 8(axl) of the Act, as alleged.
3. The alleged promise of a wage increase
The complaint alleges that on or about March 3, Wood
3 Payne testified it was February 11; Wood testified February 4. The
precise date is not critical else I assume the parties would have attempted to
fix the date with more persuasive evidence.
told employees they would be granted a wage increase if
the Union was not selected as their representative. This
allegation is predicated on the testimony of Hill that, at the
first meeting of the employees with Wood described below,
Wood said he just wanted to get the problem ironed out,
whatever it was. The drivers told him what it was, namely,
they had been cut back in hours. One afternoon some time
thereafter, Wood told all the drivers, according to Hill, that
he had been talking to Calhoun and that he was going to
try to get them a 25-cent on-the-trailer raise. At first, Wood
said "if the Union didn't go in," but then he rephrased his
statement to say whether it came in or not. Hill suggested
an increase in hourly rates instead, but Wood said he did
not think Calhoun would go for it.
Wood denied telling employees they would be granted a
wage increase if the Union was not selected as their repre-
sentative; however, he was not expressly asked about the
conversation which Hill had described. I credit Hill's testi-
mony and I find that Wood did state that he would try to
get the employees a wage increase if the Union was not
selected as their bargaining representative. As Hill's testi-
mony demonstrates, however, Wood immediately retracted
his statement and told the employees he would try to get
them a wage increase regardless of their decision about
union representation. Under the circumstances, although I
find a violation, I do not base my finding on the fact that
he said he would try to get them a wage increase if the
Union did not get in; rather, I base my finding of a viola-
tion on the evidence that the motive for the promise was to
persuade the employees to abandon their support of the
Union. Thus, Wood acknowledged stating "Well, if you
did have to go to someone to bargain for you, you must
have problems," and "I'd like to straighten any problem
out that I possibly could and make the Company run
smooth," and "I'd like to see you get more money." In
short, Wood confirmed Hill's testimony that the problem
the employees had about which they went to the Union
was their low earnings and he wanted to do something
about it. Under the circumstances, the conclusion is inesca-
pable that, when Wood told the employees about trying to
get them a wage increase a few days later, his promise was
related to the discussion at the first meeting and was for
the purpose of straightening out their problem and thereby
inducing them to abandon their support of the Union. A
promise of a wage increase so motivated is violative of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
B. The Alleged 8(a)(3) Violations
1. The alleged termination of benefits
The operations of Respondent at Irving, Texas, consist
principally in picking up and delivering trailers to custom-
ers using Respondent's tractors. The record indicates that
at a time antedating the Union's organizational activities
the tractor drivers were permitted to drive the tractors
home on occasion. For example, if a driver was making a
delivery or a pickup at or near the end of the workday at a
location close to his home he was permitted, upon request
of the terminal manager, to drive the truck home overnight
instead of returning to the terminal or coming to the termi-
REEVES DISTRIBUTION SERVICE 997
nal in the morning to pick it up. After an accident by a
driver while off duty , Respondent abandoned that practice
until about October 1974, when , according to former ter-
minal manager Payne , he requested and received permis-
sion to resume the practice . According to Hill , on the day
Wood introduced himself to the employees as the new ter-
minal manager he told them there were going to be some
changes and that they would not be allowed to drive the
tractors home at night . Hill was corroborated by driver
Bruce Price.
Respondent's defense to the allegation of the complaint
on this issue is not entirely clear . It appears to suggest that
there was no change in the practice before and after the
employees' union activities , without , however , adverting to
the uncontradicted testimony of Payne that the practice
was in effect in February and that of Hill and Price that on
the day Wood introduced himself to the employees he told
them they would no longer be allowed to take the trucks
home . Such testimony establishes clearly a change in work-
ing conditions . The record indicates that Wood may have
relented sometime thereafter , because driver Nash after a
period of I week was permitted to take a tractor home and
on one occasion so was Price . It does not appear , however,
that Wood ever rescinded his statement and if the an-
nouncement of the change was unlawfully motivated the
employees are entitled to notification.
In support of a finding that the announcement of a
change was motivated by unlawful considerations , General
Counsel adverts to the timing of the announcement
(Wood's first day as terminal manager) and the absence of
any explanation for the change . In light of those circum-
stances , the substantial evidence in the record of
Respondent's hostility to the unionization of its employees
as demonstrated by Payne's testimony described above
and the unlawful discharges discussed hereinafter, the in-
ference is warranted , and I find , that the change was attrib-
utable to the employees ' union activities and that Respon-
dent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by
terminating the practice of permitting employees to take
tractors home.
2. The layoff of Bruce Price and Don Hill
Price and Hill were tractor drivers employed by Respon-
dent . Price was employed from August 1974 to about Au-
gust 1975 and Hill from November 1974 to July 1975. On
March 17, the Board conducted an election in a unit of
Respondent 's drivers in which a majority of the eligible
employees voted for union representation.
Hill testified that after the election on March 17, as he
was about to leave to go home , Wood told him that as of
Friday , March 21 , he would be laid off . Wood told Hill
that Reeves was going to send all the tractors back to
Georgia except one and one bobtail truck for carpet deliv-
ery. He said only driver A. D. Nash, the most senior driv-
er, would be retained . The next day Hill had another con-
versation with Wood in which Wood told him Reeves had
decided he was not going to shut everything down. He was
going to shut down only the piggy-back service that was
not profitable . Either in this conversation or the next day,
Wood explained that Hill would be on layoff status and
would be worked only when needed , that is , each day
Wood would start with the most senior driver and call each
driver in order of seniority as needed . Wood explained that
Reeves had been upset with the way the election went, but
he had had time to cool off and have second thoughts
about it and had decided not to close the terminal down.
He was just going to place the drivers on a casual basis.
On the day of the election , driver Bruce Price was also
laid off by Wood . Price asked Wood why and he said they
were cutting back . Wood said Reeves did not like the way
the drivers had taken over things , that they had voted the
Union in and caused him to come to Irving to straighten
out the situation .4
Price and Hill continued to work on a casual basis for an
indeterminate period of time until , in Hill 's case, he was
promoted to assistant warehouse manager , and in Price's
case , until his separation.
The complaint alleges that Price and Hill were laid off
because of their union activities . Respondent notes that
neither employee was terminated and contends that such
change as did occur was attributable to changes in the
economy and the nature of Respondent 's business . I reject
Respondent 's contentions and find that albeit Price and
Hill were not terminated there was a change in their status
and this change was motivated by unlawful considerations,
namely , the fact that a majority of the employees had vot-
ed for union representation in the election conducted on
March 17 . This finding is predicated on the timing of the
notification of layoff (immediately after the election) and
the uncontradicted testimony of Hill that Wood told him
Reeves had been upset with the way the election went and,
at one point , was threatening to move all the tractors to
Georgia , and that of Price that Reeves did not like the way
the drivers had taken over things and had voted the Union
in.
Respondent 's contention that the decision to change the
drivers to casual was motivated by economic consider-
ations is predicated on Wood's testimony above . Signifi-
cantly, not a single record was submitted to establish eco-
nomic necessity . While it is not the burden of Respondent
to prove it did not violate the Act, where the General
Counsel has shown union animus and the timing of layoffs
coincides with an election in which a majority of the em-
ployees voted for union representation, the absence of any
books and records to support an assertion of economic
necessity suggests that the assertion is not true . Actually,
the record as a whole does indicate a reduction in the
amount of work to be done during the period preceding the
election . As a matter of fact , the reduction in the amount
of work was one of the reasons the employees were dissat-
isfied and sought union representation. However , this is no
defense to the layoffs where there is no showing that condi-
tions were any different on March 17 than they had been
in January and February.
Moreover , Respondent has not shown a savings was ef-
fected by placing Price , Hill, and a third driver , Gerald
Gilley, on layoff status. Prior to the change , they only
worked when there were deliveries to be made ; after the
° Reeves had come to Irving in February to discharge Payne.
998 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
change they were subject to call. In either case, no econo-
mies were effected by the change of status. According to
Price and Hill, however, they did work less after the change
in status . This may have been attributable solely to the
economic situation , or it may have been attributable to the
discriminatory distribution of the workload as a result of
the change in their status. As I find the change of status
was unlawful, its effects on Price and Hill are a matter of
compliance with the order set forth below. There is a sug-
gestion in the record that the change in the status of Price
and Hill may have removed them from insurance coverage
and this may well have been Respondent's purpose in
changing their status in reprisal for the selection of the
Union in the election. If Price and Hill did suffer loss of
insurance coverage by reason of the unlawful change in
their status this can also be disposed of in compliance. In
short, I do not credit Wood's testimony about his reason
for changing the status of Price and Hill, nor his explana-
tion for the timing of the action, and I find that the status
of Price and Hill was changed because of the employees'
selection of the Union as their bargaining representative in
the election on March 17, and that Respondent thereby
violated Section 8(axl) and (3) of the Act.
3. The termination of Clifton Seigh
a. The evidence
Seigh was employed by Respondent in May 1973, and
worked as a driver of a bobtail truck delivering carpet in
the Dallas and Fort Worth area. He signed a union card, a
copy of which was enclosed in the Union's letter to Re-
spondent demanding recognition. On February 28, he was
discharged by Wood for violating the following company
rules:
1. Insubordination-refusing to satisfactorily per-
form a reasonable task or duty assigned.
2. Inefficiency.
5. Stopping work before quitting time . Washing or
preparing to leave before the proper time.
12. Leaving job during working hours without au-
thority or a reasonable excuse.
14. Absence from work without an acceptable satis-
factory excuse.
Seigh told Wood that the charges were not true. As to
the charge of insubordination, he told Wood he had not
refused to obey orders; rather, that he had tried to do so,
but he could not.
As to the charge of inefficiency, Seigh could recall no
discussion.
As to. the charge of violating rule 5, he admitted washing
his hands before punching out, but stated this was in ac-
cord with instructions from Payne when he was terminal
manager which Wood had not rescinded.
As to the charge of violating rule 12, Seigh testified that
on one occasion, he, Wood, Warehouse Manager Mitchell,
and driver Harold Morton were unloading carpet and
Wood called a break and sent Morton out to get some cold
drinks and snacks . Seigh told Wood he had not had lunch
and that he was going to run out to the store. Wood said
OK and Seigh left for about 15 or 20 minutes. On his re-
turn, nothing was said to him.
As to the charge of violating rule 14, Seigh testified he
was never absent from work.
Seigh testified that when he told Wood the charges were
not true, Wood said, "Well, I tried to put enough pressure
on you to make you quit." Seigh replied, "Well, I wish you
had. Would have been better than this because it is not
true." Wood then said, "Well, I'm still sorry about it. Had
you rather me just tear this up and just say you resigned?"
Seigh said no.
b. Analysis and conclusions
Respondent asserts that Seigh was discharged for cause
and General Counsel asserts that the reasons given for dis-
charge were a pretext to discharge Seigh because he was a
union supporter. On the basis of the entire record, I con-
clude that the evidence preponderates in favor of the Gen-
eral Counsel's position.
There is no legal issue presented. Employees may be dis-
missed for any reason, or no reason, as long as union activ-
ity is not the basis for the discharge, and the burden of
proving an improper motive is upon the General Counsel.
While the fact that a discharged employee was a union
adherent gives him no shield against discharge, neither
does the existence of a justifiable reason for discharge pro-
vide his employer with a license to discharge him if the real
motive for the discharge is his union activities. As a rule,
decision as to the actual motive depends principally upon
an evaluation of a body of circumstantial evidence.
In making an evaluation of the evidence relating to
Seigh's discharge, I have weighed the fact that Respondent
has been found elsewhere in this Decision to have commit-
ted other unfair labor practices demonstrating a strong
hostility to unionization of its employees, including the lay-
off of two of the four unit employees immediately upon
learning the election results. In determining motive, an-
tiunion bias and demonstrated unlawful hostility are prop-
er and highly significant factors for evaluation by the trier
of the facts. N.L.R.B. v. Durant Sportswear, Inc., 358 F.2d
729 (C.A. 5, 1966).
As to the asserted reasons for discharge, it has been diffi-
cult to assess the merits of the charges against Seigh and to
evaluate their significance because of the way in which
Wood testified. In particular, although he had listed five
reasons for discharge, and although he stated he discussed
each of the reasons with Seigh, he never did state what
specific act each charge was based upon, nor did he state
what he told Seigh or how Seigh replied. For example,
while the record contains two written warnings to Seigh for
failing to turn in daily truck reports, Wood did not state
that such failures played a part in the decision to discharge
Seigh. Given all the circumstances surrounding Seigh's
case, were the warnings relied on as a basis for discharge I
would view such reliance as pretextuous to support an un-
lawfully motivated discharge. In this connection, I note
that Seigh explained that his failure to file reports was due
to his misunderstanding of the requirement when he drove
a truck other than the one he usually drove.
As to the charge of breaking rule 5, Wood did not con-
REEVES DISTRIBUTION SERVICE 999
tradict Seigh 's testimony that his practice of washing be-
fore quitting time was pursuant to the former terminal
manager's policy. I must conclude , therefore, that Seigh's
explanation was true and Wood's failure to strike that
charge from the asserted reasons for discharge suggests he
was using the rule as a pretext to discharge Seigh for his
support of the Union.
As to the asserted violation of rules 12 and 14, Wood
admitted there were not two violations and claimed it was
because of managerial inexperience that he cited both
rules . I do not credit this explanation . Wood was a supervi-
sor before his transfer to the Irving , Texas , facility. In my
judgment , the use of two charges for one alleged breach of
rules is an indication of unlawful motive.
The incident on which the charge was predicated was the
same incident described by Seigh when carpets were being
unloaded . According to Wood , however , he left the work
area for a few minutes and on his return Seigh was gone.
Wood asked Mitchell where Seigh was and Mitchell said
he did not know . When Seigh returned , Wood asked him
where he had been and Wood said he had gone to take
care of some personal business . Wood did not ask how
long Seigh had been away and did not testify that he repri-
manded him. Mitchell was called as a witness on one ele-
ment of Seigh 's discharge but was not examined on this
point . I credit Seigh 's version . Apart from the favorable
impression Seigh made on me and my disbelief of Wood
generally, I have great difficulty in believing Seigh would
simply walk off the job without saying a word.
As to the charge of insubordination, refusing to perform
tasks assigned , I surmise that it is based on an incident
which Wood described as having occurred about 2 days
before Seigh 's discharge when Warehouse Manager Mit-
chell told him that Seigh had told him he would not drive
piggy-back . However , he admitted that , when he spoke to
Seigh about the statement , Seigh told him he would drive
piggy-back . Under the circumstances, it is difficult to find
a reason for discharge here ; moreover , as discussed below,
the piggy -back assignments were discriminatorily motivat-
ed.
In the final analysis , the principal reason assigned by
Wood for discharging Seigh was inefficiency . This ineffi-
ciency consisted in taking too much time to do the work
assigned to him . Wood did not expressly correlate inci-
dents in Seigh 's work performance with the charge of inef-
ficiency , but there is evidence of certain incidents from
which I infer Wood based his charge . Thus , there is evi-
dence of an incident when Seigh got "hung up" on a trailer
and the delay in freeing the tractor caused him to be late
on delivery ; there is evidence of an incident about 1 week
before his discharge when he failed to pick up and deliver
a trailer ; and there is evidence of an incident where Seigh
needed help in backing a tractor up a ramp because he
stalled the motor of the tractor . There is no dispute about
the first incident which Seigh attributed to his inexperi-
ence . As to the second incident , Seigh denied any fault
claiming that he picked up and delivered the only trailer
for which he was given a number . As to the third incident,
there is some dispute about Seigh's responsibility for the
stalling motor , with Seigh attributing the problem to a
truck defect . In my judgment , whatever culpability at-
tached to Seigh with regard to any of these incidents need
not be resolved , because on Seigh 's admission he was not
qualified to drive a tractor-trailer and to handle piggy-back
deliveries . He was inefficient , as charged by Wood.
The finding that Seigh was inefficient as a tractor -trailer
driver does not, however , end inquiry into Respondent's
motive for discharging him. The record indicates that Seigh
was a bobtail truckdriver delivering carpets before Wood
became terminal manager , and he rarely drove a tractor-
trailer . He told Wood the first day Wood took over the
terminal that he was no tractor -trailer driver and he repeat-
ed the statement to Wood when Wood criticized him about
one of his deliveries . Despite this , and despite the fact that
the need to make carpet deliveries continued after Wood
became terminal manager , for some unexplained reason
Wood kept assigning Seigh to tractor -trailer jobs. I say
unexplained reason , because Wood's only explanation was
that all employees are required to be all-purpose . That's an
explanation of a policy, but it does not explain why partic-
ular assignments to Seigh were made . If Wood were to be
believed , during this very period when Seigh was being as-
signed tractor -trailer jobs , work was so slow that he wanted
to lay off some drivers and was only deterred from doing
so by the pendency of the election . Why then was he as-
signing Seigh to work for which Seigh considered himself
unqualified when experienced tractor-trailer drivers were
experiencing a reduction in hours? The answer can only be
that expressed to Seigh on February 28; namely, "Well, I
tried to put enough pressure on you to make you quit."
In short , I conclude that Seigh was assigned to tractor-
trailer work either to cause him to quit or to afford Wood
with a pretext to discharge him. I further conclude that the
motive for this action was Wood's desire to rid the compa-
ny of a union adherent in advance of the election sched-
uled for March 17.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Reeves Distribution Service , Inc., is an employer en-
gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and
(7) of the Act.
2. Local Union No. 745, affiliate of International Broth-
erhood of Teamsters , Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and
Helpers of America is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
3. By threatening employees with more onerous working
conditions and with plant closure if they selected the
above-named Union as their representative for the purpos-
es of collective bargaining , and by promising them a wage
increase to induce them not to support the above-named
Union, Respondent engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Sections 8(a)(1) and
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
4. By discharging Clifton Seigh and laying off Bruce
Price and Don Hill , and by discontinuing its policy re-
specting driving company vehicles home at the end of a
workday, because of the union activities of its employees,
Respondent engaged in , and is engaging in, unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Sections 8(a)(1) and (3)
and 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
1000 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the
Act, I find it necessary to order Respondent to cease and
desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action de-
signed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
As I have found that Respondent discharged Clifton
Seigh because of his union activities, I shall order it to offer
him immediate and full reinstatement to his former job or,
if such job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent
position, without prejudice to his seniority or other rights
and privileges, and to make him whole for any loss of earn-
ings he may have suffered by reason of his unlawful dis-
charge by payment to him of a sum of money equal to that
which he normally would have earned as wages, from the
date of his discharge to the date of the offer of reinstate-
ment , less net earnings, to which shall be added interest at
the rate of 6 percent per annum in accordance with the
formula set forth in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB
289 (1950), and Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB
716 (1962).
As to Bruce Price and Don Hill, who I have found were
laid off because of their union activities, but who contin-
ued to work thereafter until they voluntarily quit, I shall
order Respondent to make them whole for any loss of
earnings or employee benefits they may have suffered by
reason of their unlawful layoff.
As to the discontinuance of the policy of permitting em-
ployees to drive company vehicles home, I shall order Re-
spondent to resume the policy and to apply it under the
same circumstances it was applied prior to the unlawful
discontinuance.
The unfair labor practices committed by Respondent
strike at the very heart of employees' rights safeguarded by
the Act. I shall therefore place Respondent under a broad
order to cease and desist from in any manner infringing
upon the rights of employees guaranteed in Section 7 of the
Act. N.L.R.B. v. Entwistle Mfg. Co., 120 F.2d 532, 536
(C.A. 4, 1941).
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, conclu-
sions of law, and upon the entire record in this case, I
hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDERS
Respondent, Reeves Distribution Service Inc., Irving,
Texas, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Threatening employees with more onerous working
conditions if they select the Union as their bargaining rep-
resentative.
(b) Threatening employees with closing of the facility if
they select the Union as their bargaining representative.
(c) Promising employees a wage increase to induce them
to withdraw support from the Union.
(d) Discouraging membership in, or activities on behalf
of, Local Union No. 745, affiliate of International Brother-
hood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Help-
ers of America, or in any other labor organization, by dis-
charging or laying off employees, discontinuing the policy
of permitting employees to take company vehicles home,
or otherwise discriminating in regard to hire or tenure of
employment or any terms or conditions of employment of
its employees.
(e) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing employees in the exercise of their rights to self-
organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other mutual aid or protection,
or to refrain from any and all such activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed and
found necessary to effectuate the policies of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended:
(a) Offer to Clifton Seigh immediate, full, and uncondi-
tional reinstatement to his former job or, if such job no
longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without
prejudice to his seniority or other rights or privileges, and
make him whole for any loss of pay he may have suffered
by reason of the discrimination against him by payment to
him of a sum of money equal to the amount he normally
would have earned as wages from the date of his discharge
to the date of his reinstatement in the manner set forth in
the section entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Make Bruce Price and Don Hill whole for any loss
of earnings or employee benefits they may have suffered
by reason of the discrimination against them.
(c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board and its agents, for examination and copying, all pay-
roll records, social security payment records, timecards,
personnel records and reports, and all other records rele-
vant and necessary to a determination of the amounts of
backpay due under the terms of this recommended Order.
(d) Post at its Irving, Texas, place of business copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix." 6 Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 16, after being duly signed by the Respondent's
representative, shall be posted by it immediately upon re-
ceipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive
days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Rea-
sonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure
that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material.
(e) Notify the said Regional Director, in writing, within
20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent
has taken to comply herewith.
5 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes.
6 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board."
REEVES DISTRIBUTION SERVICE 1001
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing in which both sides had the opportunity to
present their evidence , the National Labor Relations Board
has found that we violated the law and has ordered us to
post this notice.
WE WILL NOT discharge or layoff employees because
of their activities on behalf, or support, of Local
Union No. 745, affiliate of International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Help-
ers of America, or any other labor organization.
WE WILL offer Clifton Seigh his job back or, if his
job no longer exists , a substantially equivalent job,
and we will pay him the wages which he lost because
we discharged him unlawfully.
WE WILL make Bruce Price and Don Hill whole for
any loss of earnings or employee benefits they may
have suffered because we laid them off unlawfully.
WE WILL resume our policy of permitting employees
to drive company vehicles home.
WE WILL NOT threaten to close the Irving, Texas, fa-
cility if employees select the Union to represent them.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees with more difficult
working conditions if they select the Union to repre-
sent them.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended.
WE WILL Nor promise employees a wage increase to
induce them to withdraw support from the Union.
You are free to become and remain members of Local
Union No. 745, affiliate of International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Help-
ers of America or any other labor organization.
REEVES DISTRIBUTION SERVICE, INC.,