Reeves Bros., Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 29, 1996

320 N.L.R.B. 1082 (N.L.R.B. 1996)

1082
320 NLRB No. 133
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1 The Respondent and the Union have excepted to some of the
judge’s credibility findings. The Board’s established policy is not to
overrule an administrative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless
the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us
that they are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544
(1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully exam-
ined the record and find no basis for reversing the judge’s findings.
2 We adopt the judge’s findings that the Respondent did not threat-
en that it would refuse to bargain in good faith or otherwise deal
with the Union or threaten that bargaining would be futile if employ-
ees selected the Union to represent them for purposes of collective
bargaining. Further, in the absence of exceptions, we adopt the
judge’s finding that Supervisor Trapp did not threaten Lucius Davis
with the futility of being represented by the Union or with plant clo-
sure and the judge’s finding that Supervisor Plumley did not threaten
employee Maxcine Felder with termination in retaliation for engag-
ing in union activities.
3 At the hearing, the parties resolved issues related to the chal-
lenged ballots and the remaining unresolved challenged ballots are
not determinative of the outcome of the election.
4 All dates refer to 1994 unless otherwise noted.
Reeves Brothers, Inc., Bishopville Finishing Division
and International Union of Operating Engi-
neers, Local 465, AFL–CIO. Cases 11–CA–
16065, 11–CA–16188, and 11–RC–6018
March 29, 1996
DECISION, ORDER, AND DIRECTION OF
SECOND ELECTION
BY CHAIRMAN GOULD AND MEMBERS BROWNING
AND FOX
On June 29, 1995, Administrative Law Judge Philip
P. McLeod issued the attached decision. The Union
filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the Re-
spondent filed cross-exceptions, a supporting brief, and
an answering brief to the Union’s exceptions. The
Union also filed an answering brief to the Respond-
ent’s cross-exceptions.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated
its authority in this proceeding to a three-member
panel.
The Board has considered the decision and record in
light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions2
only to the extent consistent with this decision, to
adopt the recommended Order as modified, and to di-
rect a second election.
For the reasons set forth below, we find that the Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by threat-
ening employees with loss of work, layoffs, and plant
closure in a captive audience meeting and in individual
meetings with supervisors, and interrogating an em-
ployee regarding his union sympathies. We find that
these unfair labor practices also constitute objection-
able conduct warranting the setting aside of the elec-
tion.
A. Background
This case arises from allegations of unfair labor
practices and from objections to an election that re-
sulted in a vote of 114 in favor, and 136 against, the
Union.3 The Respondent ran an admittedly strong
antiunion campaign that included frequent captive au-
dience meetings. At some of the captive audience
meetings, the Respondent presented letters that it re-
ceived from its two largest commission customers.
The letter from Centennial Textiles, Inc. stated in
relevant part:
If the union is brought in, we will have to give
strong consideration to giving some, if not all, of
your work to other finishers who are non-union.
A strike at Reeves could be devastating to us.
The letter from the president of Pressman-Gutman Co.,
Inc. stated in relevant part:
I am extremely upset that there is going to be a
union vote at your plant. We have no use for
unions. . . . I am putting you on notice that our
partnership with Reeves . . . may cease if the
union is voted in. I am sorry, but we may simply
choose to not continue our partnership if Reeves
goes union. Hopefully everyone at Bishopville
will come to their senses before it is too late.
In addition to presenting these letters at some of the
captive audience meetings, the Respondent posted cop-
ies of the letters throughout the facility with the fol-
lowing additional phrases: ‘‘When our customers
speak. . . . We’d better listen.’’ There is no evidence
in the record that the Respondent solicited the cus-
tomer letters.
The June 19944 election was postponed because the
Union filed unfair labor practice charges. After ten-
tative settlement of those charges, the election was re-
scheduled for August 25. The Respondent held a sec-
ond series of captive audience meetings prior to the
August election and again presented the customer let-
ters to the employees. In addition, the Respondent en-
larged the letters to 8 by 10 feet and hung the resulting
banners from the ceiling near the entrance to the em-
ployees’ canteen.
The judge found that, in the absence of evidence
that the Respondent solicited the letters, the Respond-
ent was privileged to share the letters with the employ-
ees under NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575
(1969), and thus, that the Respondent’s use and em-
phasis of the letters during the campaign did not vio-
late the Act nor did it interfere with the employees’
freedom of choice. We find that the judge mis-
construed the General Counsel’s argument. The Gen-
eral Counsel argued in its brief to the judge, and the
Union argues in its exceptions to the Board, that state-
ments made by the Respondent’s representatives at the
1083REEVES BROS., INC.
captive audience meetings and during individual em-
ployee meetings were not founded on the customer let-
ters but were instead overstatements that misled and
coerced the employees in violation of the Act. We find
merit in the Union’s exceptions.
B. Violations of the Act
1. President Cartagine’s statements
The judge credited employee Lucius Davis’ testi-
mony that the Respondent’s president, Cartagine, read
the customer letters aloud to employees during a cap-
tive audience meeting and then stated that if the Union
was voted in to represent employees, those customers
would no longer want to do business with the Re-
spondent. Davis testified that Cartagine then stated,
‘‘[I]f we lose those two customers, we would probably
be working three days a week.’’ Cartagine did not tes-
tify. Although he credited Davis’ testimony, the judge
did not analyze whether Cartagine’s statements con-
stituted unlawful threats and objectionable conduct. We
find that Cartagine’s statements violated the Act.
The applicable standard for analyzing Cartagine’s
statements was set forth by the Supreme Court in
Gissel Packing:
[A]n employer is free to communicate to his em-
ployees any of his general views about unioniza-
tion or any of his specific views about a particular
union, so long as the communications do not con-
tain a ‘‘threat of reprisal or force or promise of
benefit.’’ He may even make a prediction as to
the precise effect he believes unionism will have
on his company. In such a case, however, the pre-
diction must be carefully phrased on the basis of
objective fact to convey an employer’s belief as
to the demonstrably probable consequences be-
yond his control or to convey a management deci-
sion already arrived at to close the plant in case
of unionization.
Id. at 618. The judge found that Cartagine stated that
Centennial and Pressman-Gutman would pull their
business in the event of the Respondent’s unionization
and that the employees would then probably work a 3-
day workweek. The customers, however, stated in their
letters only that they would consider taking work away
from the Respondent if the employees voted in the
Union. Cartagine did not state that it was possible that
Centennial and Pressman-Gutman would pull their
business if the employees voted for the Union. Thus,
Cartagine’s statements went beyond the objective facts
(what was actually said in the customer letters) and be-
came a threat of reprisal if the employees chose to be
represented by the Union.
The facts of the instant case are distinguishable from
those in CPP Pinkerton, 309 NLRB 723, 724 (1992),
in which the Board found the following employer
statements not to be a threat of reprisal:
U.S. Steel [the customer] . . . can place their
work elsewhere if we try to raise our wages too
high. . . . If the union demands an increase, the
client is completely free to cancel our contract
and take its business elsewhere. Then we would
no longer have any jobs at the U.S. Steel facility.
The employer made these statements based on con-
versations it had with U.S. Steel managers and based
on the provisions of its contract with U.S. Steel. In
holding that such language was not a threat of reprisal,
the Board emphasized that the employer described the
possibility, not the probability, of third-party action.
The Board noted that the employer ‘‘did not state that
any adverse consequences would occur if the employ-
ees chose to unionize.’’ Id. at 724 (Emphasis in the
original.)
In contrast, in this case, Cartagine stated that the
customers would remove their business and, as a result,
employees would probably work fewer hours.
Cartagine’s characterization went well beyond the
statements actually made by the customers in their let-
ters to the Respondent. Having gone beyond the cus-
tomers’ actual statements, the Respondent cannot rely
on the letters in claiming that its predictions are based
on objective fact. As the Court in Gissel Packing stat-
ed:
[The employer] can easily make his views known
without engaging in ‘‘brinkmanship’’ when it be-
comes all too easy to ‘‘overstep and tumble over
the brink.’’ Wausau Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 377
F.2d 369, 372 (7th Cir. 1967). At least he can
avoid coercive speech simply by avoiding con-
scious overstatements he has reason to believe
will mislead his employees.
Id. at 620. Cartagine’s statements went over the brink
and transformed the customers’ concerns into coercive
language threatening the employees with loss of work
in retaliation for choosing the Union and therefore vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
2. Supervisor Stokes’ interrogation of
Joseph Davis
The judge credited employee Joseph Davis’ testi-
mony regarding a conversation he had with his super-
visor, Bud Stokes, following one of the captive audi-
ence meetings. According to the credited testimony,
Stokes read the customer letters aloud to Davis and
asked Davis if he understood them. Stokes stated,
‘‘[O]ur paychecks depend on these two customers’’
and then asked Davis, ‘‘Are you with me on this?’’
Stokes then asked if Davis (an outspoken union sup-
porter) would talk to his brother, Lucius Davis, about
1084 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
5 In finding that Supervisor Stokes’ interrogation of employee
Davis violated Sec. 8(a)(1), Chairman Gould finds it unnecessary to
rely on Rossmore House.
6 The Union has excepted to the judge’s dismissal of that portion
of the complaint that alleges that Supervisor Ray Kelley threatened
employee Willie Price with plant closure if the Union prevailed in
the election. The judge’s ruling was based on his credibility resolu-
tions and, based on our review of the record, we find no basis for
reversing those credibility resolutions. See Standard Dry Wall Prod-
ucts, supra. Thus, we adopt the judge’s dismissal of this portion of
the complaint.
7 We note that in the final paragraph of sec. II,D of his decision
the judge credited the employees’ versions of these conversations,
but then summarized those conversations as follows: ‘‘I find that
Trapp did state Respondent might lose business if the Union came
in, that he and Diane Gregg might both need to look for other jobs,
that hours might be cut back, and even that the plant might close.’’
(Emphasis added.) We do not rely on the judge’s summary of these
conversations because it does not accurately describe the testimony
credited by the judge.
8 The Union also contends that Supervisor Stokes threatened Jo-
seph Davis with loss of jobs and layoffs and threatened Simon with
loss of business and layoffs and that the Respondent’s overstate-
ments of the customer letters tainted the Respondent’s continued use
helping the Respondent to defeat the Union. Stokes
said that if the Respondent lost Centennial’s and Press-
man-Gutman’s business, Stokes and Davis both would
probably be out of a job, and there would probably be
some layoffs. The judge found that Stokes’ statements
were reasonable predictions based on objective fact
and dismissed this portion of the complaint, citing
Rossmore House, 269 NLRB 1176 (1984), affd. 760
F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1985). The judge found that
Stokes’ comments did not reasonably tend to interfere
with Davis’ Section 7 rights, relying on the fact that
Davis was a well-known union supporter. We disagree
with the judge’s conclusions regarding the conversa-
tion between Stokes and Davis.
The judge’s analysis suggests that the Board has a
per se rule against finding unlawful interrogations of
active, open union supporters. The Board does not
have a per se rule but instead examines all the cir-
cumstances to determine if the interrogation could rea-
sonably tend to restrain, coerce, or interfere with rights
guaranteed by the Act. Id. at 1178 fn. 20.
Examining all the circumstances of Stokes’ ques-
tioning of Davis, we find that this questioning would
reasonably tend to restrain, coerce, or interfere with
Davis’ Section 7 rights. Nothing in the record suggests
that Stokes’ questioning was made in a joking or sar-
castic manner. Further, Davis responded to Stokes’
question in an evasive manner, suggesting that Davis
did not feel comfortable discussing the topic with
Stokes. Moreover, although Stokes may have been
aware of Davis’ feelings about the Union, Stokes ques-
tioned Davis to determine the effect that the customer
letters were having on Davis’ support for the Union
and attempted to elicit Davis’ support in convincing
his brother to campaign against the Union. We find
that in these circumstances Stokes’ questioning of
Davis would reasonably tend to restrain, coerce, or
interfere with Davis’ Section 7 rights and thus con-
stituted an interrogation in violation of Section
8(a)(1).5
3. Supervisor Trapp’s conversations with
Diane Gregg, Lewis Simon, and Eric Gregg6
We agree with the judge that Supervisor Wayne
Trapp, in individual conversations with Diane Gregg,
Lewis Simon, and Eric Simon, threatened reduced
hours and possible plant closure if the employees elect-
ed to be represented by the Union. The judge credited
Diane Gregg’s, Lewis Simon’s, and Eric Gregg’s ver-
sions of their individual conversations with Trapp. Ac-
cording to the credited testimony, Trapp: (1) told
Diane Gregg that if the Union came in, both Trapp and
Gregg would have to look for another job; (2) told
Lewis Simon that if the Union came in, the plant
would probably shut down; and (3) told Eric Gregg
that if the Union was voted, in the plant would close
down and the Respondent would not be competitive
with other companies and that if the Union was elected
hours would be cut back.7 The judge found that these
statements constituted unlawful threats.
In agreeing with the judge, however, we do not rely
on his analysis. The judge noted that Diane Gregg,
Lewis Simon, and Eric Gregg were active union sup-
porters and were each related by marriage to Super-
visor Trapp. The judge ‘‘suspected’’ that because of
their relationship to Trapp the employees knew that
Trapp was only expressing his personal opinions. The
judge found that it was an ‘‘extremely close call’’
whether Trapp’s statements violated the Act, but
weighing the circumstances and arguments, he found
‘‘it is better to err on the side of protecting employee
rights within the meaning of the Act.’’
In determining whether a statement constitutes a
threat in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, the
Board does not consider subjective factors but rather
whether, under all the circumstances, the statement rea-
sonably tends to restrain, coerce, or interfere with em-
ployees’ rights guaranteed under the Act. Sunnyside
Home Care Project, 308 NLRB 346 fn. 1 (1992).
Under this test it is clear that Supervisor Trapp threat-
ened employees with loss of jobs, plant closure, and
reduced work hours if the employees chose the Union.
Trapp’s statements were made in the absence of any
discussion of the customer letters or any other arguably
objective fact and were not couched in terms of the
possible consequences of unionization. To the contrary,
Trapp told the employees that unionization would re-
sult in loss of jobs, plant closure, and reduced hours.
Under all of these circumstances, we find that Trapp’s
statements constituted unlawful threats in violation of
Section 8(a)(1).8
1085REEVES BROS., INC.
and emphasis of these letters and thereby violated the Act. In light
of our findings, we find it unnecessary to pass on these contentions
because any additional findings in this regard would be cumulative
and would not affect the remedy.
AMENDED REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in
certain unfair labor practices, we will order the Re-
spondent to cease and desist therefrom and to take cer-
tain affirmative action designed to effectuate the poli-
cies of the Act. We have found that the Respondent,
through both its president and its supervisors, threat-
ened employees with plant closure, job losses, and a
reduced workweek and reduced hours if the employees
selected the Union. We have also found that the Re-
spondent unlawfully interrogated an employee. Each of
these 8(a)(1) violations took place during the critical
period preceding the election. Further, the threat to re-
duce the employees’ workweek was made by one of
the Respondent’s highest ranking officials at a captive
audience meeting attended by many employees. Under
these circumstances, we find that the Respondent’s
violations of the Act had a tendency to interfere with
the employees’ freedom of choice and thus constituted
objectionable conduct. See, e.g., Waste Automation &
Waste Management, 314 NLRB 376 (1994). Therefore,
we find it necessary to set aside the election and to di-
rect a new election.
AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent Reeves Brothers, Inc., Bishopville
Finishing Division is, and has been at all times mate-
rial, an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local
465, AFL–CIO is, and has been at all times material,
a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
3. In a meeting with employees, the Respondent,
through President Cartagine, threatened to reduce the
employees’ workweek if the employees selected the
Union to represent them for purposes of collective bar-
gaining in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. The Respondent, through Supervisor Bud Stokes,
interrogated Joseph Davis concerning his union activi-
ties in violation of Section 8(a)(1).
5. The Respondent, through Supervisor Wayne
Trapp, threatened employees Diane Gregg, Eric Gregg,
and Lewis Simon that hours would be cut back, that
employees would have to look for other jobs, and that
the plant would close if employees selected the Union
to represent them for purposes of collective bargaining,
and the Respondent thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act.
6. The Respondent’s violations of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act had a tendency to interfere with the employ-
ees’ freedom of choice in the election and constituted
objectionable conduct.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified below and orders that the Respondent,
Reeves Brothers, Inc., Bishopville Finishing Division,
Bishopville, South Carolina, its officers, agents, suc-
cessors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in
the Order as modified.
1. Substitute the following for paragraph 1(a).
‘‘(a) Threatening employees with loss of work, re-
duced work hours, reduced workweeks, layoffs, or
plant closure if the employees select the Union to rep-
resent them for purposes of collective bargaining.’’
2. Insert the following as paragraph 1(b), and reletter
the subsequent paragraph.
‘‘(b) Interrogating employees concerning their union
activities.’’
3. Insert the following as paragraph 2(b).
‘‘(b) Notify the Regional Director in writing within
20 days from the date of this Order what steps the Re-
spondent has taken to comply.’’
4. Substitute the attached notice for that of the ad-
ministrative law judge.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the election in Case
11–RC–6018 is set aside and the case is remanded to
the Regional Director for Region 11 to conduct a new
election when he deems the circumstances permit the
free choice of a bargaining representative, as directed
below.
[Direction Of Second Election omitted from publica-
tion.]
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or-
dered us to post and abide by this notice.
Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid and protec-
tion
To choose not to engage in any of these pro-
tected concerted activities.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees that hours might
be cut back, that the workweek will be reduced, that
1086 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1 All dates are in 1994 unless otherwise indicated.
employees will be laid off, that employees will need
to look for other jobs, or that the plant will close if
employees select the Union to represent them for pur-
poses of collective bargaining.
WE WILL NOT interrogate employees concerning
their union activities.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
REEVES BROTHERS, INC., BISHOPVILLE
FINISHING DIVISION
Jasper C. Brown, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Terry A. Clark, Esq. and Thomas H. Keim Jr., Esq. (Ed-
wards, Ballard, Bishop, Sturm, Clark & Keim), of
Spartanburg, South Carolina, for the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
PHILIP P. MCLEOD, Administrative Law Judge. I heard this
case in Bishopville, South Carolina, on March 14 and 15,
1995. On April 28, 1994,1 the Union filed a petition in Case
11–RC–6018 seeking to represent production and mainte-
nance employees employed by Respondent at its Bishopville,
South Carolina facility. An election was scheduled to be held
by the Board among those employees on June 16, but due
to unfair labor practices charges filed in Case 11–CA–16065,
the election was postponed. The parties reached a tentative
settlement agreement in Case 11–CA–16065, and the election
was rescheduled for and held on August 25. At that time,
114 votes were cast for union representation, 136 votes were
cast against union representation, and 36 ballots were chal-
lenged. At the hearing, the parties resolved issues related to
a sufficient number of challenges so that the challenged bal-
lots would no longer affect the outcome of the election.
The Union filed objections to the election and the unfair
labor practice charge in Case 11–CA–16188, which raised
similar issues. On October 20, an order consolidating cases
and complaint and notice of hearing issued. Issues raised by
the objections are consolidated for hearing. On October 13,
the Regional Director revoked his prior approval of the set-
tlement agreement in Case 11–CA–16065 because of the al-
leged violations raised in Case 11–CA–16188.
In its answer to the consolidated complaint, Respondent
admitted certain allegations, including the filing and serving
of the charges; its status as an employer within the meaning
of the Act; the status of International Union of Operating En-
gineers, Local 465, AFL–CIO as a labor organization within
the meaning of the Act; and the status of certain individuals
as supervisors and agents of Respondent within the meaning
of Section 2(11) of the Act. Respondent denied having en-
gaged in any conduct which would constitute an unfair labor
practice within the meaning of the Act.
At the hearing, all parties were represented and afforded
full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine
witnesses, and to introduce evidence. On April 18, 1995,
counsel for the General Counsel and Respondent filed timely
briefs, which have been duly considered. On the entire record
in this case, and from my observation of the witnesses, I
make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Reeves Brothers, Inc., Bishopville Finishing Division is a
Delaware corporation, with a facility at Bishopville, South
Carolina, where it is engaged in the business of finishing tex-
tile goods. In the regular course and conduct of its business,
Respondent annually purchases and receives at this facility
goods and products valued in excess of $50,000 directly
from points located outside the State, and annually sells and
ships from its facility products valued in excess of $50,000
directly to points located outside the State.
Respondent is, and has been at all times material, an em-
ployer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
II. LABOR ORGANIZATION
International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 465,
AFL–CIO is, and has been at all times material, a labor orga-
nization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
Respondent is engaged in the business of dyeing and fin-
ishing fabric at its Bishopville facility. At this facility, Re-
spondent employees approximately 275 to 300 production
and maintenance employees. As is more fully described
below, a significant portion of its business at this facility is
done on a commission basis.
Commencing in mid-March 1994, the Union began an or-
ganizing drive at Respondent’s Bishopville facility. Within
the facility, the campaign was led by an in-plant employee
organizing committee, made up of people whose names were
supplied to Respondent by the Union.
B. The Customer Letters
Respondent’s two largest commission customers are Cen-
tennial Textiles, Inc. and Pressman-Gutman Co., Inc. When
these two customers learned of union activity at Respond-
ent’s Bishopville facility, both wrote to Respondent in May
1994 expressing concern over their continuing relationship if
the Union should win the Board-conducted election. The let-
ter from Pressman-Gutman states in part, ‘‘In view of our
long friendship, and so there are no surprises, I am putting
you on notice that our partnership with Reeves, Bishopville
Finishing Division may cease if the Union is voted in.’’ The
letter also states, ‘‘I am sorry, but we may simply choose to
not continue our partnership if Reeves goes Union.’’ The let-
ter from Centennial Textiles states in part, ‘‘If the Union is
brought in, we will have to give strong consideration to giv-
ing some, if not all, of your work to other finishers who are
non-union. A strike at Reeves could be devastating to us.’’
Respondent presented the customer letters to employees in
two series of meetings. The first series took place in June
1994 when the election was scheduled to be held that month.
When the election was rescheduled to August 25, Respond-
1087REEVES BROS., INC.
ent held a second series of meetings where employees were
again made aware of the letters. In addition, Respondent
posted copies of the letters on a poster board in its facility,
along with its own comment, ‘‘When our customers
speak. . . . We’d better listen.’’
In August 1994, prior to the Board-conducted election, Re-
spondent enlarged the two letters which were printed on ban-
ners each 8 by 10 feet. The two banners were then hung
from the ceiling of the plant near the canteen/breakroom en-
trance.
Counsel for the General Counsel contends that by Re-
spondent making known and emphasizing to employees the
contents of these letters, and enlarging the letters on banners
hung within the facility, Respondent adopted the contents of
the letters so that Respondent itself threatened employees
with a loss of work and possible plant closure if the employ-
ees elected to be represented by the Union. I reject this argu-
ment. It is essential to note at the outset there is absolutely
no evidence, and indeed counsel for the General Counsel
does not even make the claim, that the letters are not genu-
ine. There is no allegation, and no evidence whatsoever that
Respondent in any way participated in creating these letters
or solicited them for use in the preelection campaign. If such
were the case, I would reach a much different conclusion. As
the record stands, however, no evidence was presented to
even call into question the legitimacy of the customer letters.
Approximately 50 percent of Respondent’s business at the
Bishopville facility is commission work. In commission
work, Respondent is sent fabric by a customer. Respondent
dies and finishes the fabric to specification, and returns the
fabric to the customer. The customer always owns the fabric,
with Respondent performing the value-added process of dye-
ing and finishing. Pressman-Gutman and Centennial Textiles
together comprise approximately 60 percent of Respondent’s
commission business and 70 percent of the total work per-
formed in the dye house department.
The Supreme Court has made it clear that an employer is
free to communicate to his employees any of his general
views about unionism or any of his specific views about a
particular union, so long as the communications do not con-
tain a threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit. NLRB
v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). In that same de-
cision, the Supreme Court made it equally clear that an em-
ployer is also free to make a prediction as to the precise ef-
fects he believes unionization will have on his company pro-
vided the prediction is carefully phrased on the basis of ob-
jective fact to convey demonstrably probable consequences
beyond his control. In Michael’s Markets, 274 NLRB 826
(1985), the employer distributed copies of a letter written by
an employee describing his experiences with a union at a
former employer. Referring to the contents of the letter and
the fact that respondent there distributed it to employees, the
Board stated: ‘‘Of course the employees are free to draw
their own conclusions therefrom, but employee conclusions
are certainly not to be viewed as employer predictions. The
exercise of free speech in these campaigns should not be un-
duly restricted by narrow construction.’’
I find that where there is no evidence whatever that Re-
spondent solicited these letters or participated in their cre-
ation, it was privilege to share with employees these letters
received from customers. By enlarging the size of the letters
and printing them on banners 8 by 10 feet, it can certainly
be said that Respondent was emphasizing the letters. But
where, as here, no evidence is presented to even call into
question the legitimacy of the letters, it is impossible to say
that Respondent over emphasized their importance, either to
it or to employees. Accordingly, I shall dismiss those com-
plaint allegations which allege by posting of these letters Re-
spondent threatened employees with loss of jobs, threatened
employees with loss of business, or otherwise violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act.
C. Respondent’s Meetings with Employees
During the preelection campaign, Respondent held several
meetings with employees. The main spokespersons for Re-
spondent throughout these meetings were Administration
Vice President Patrick Walsh and Manufacturing Vice Presi-
dent William Neal. Apparel Textile Group President Anthony
Cartagine also addressed employees on occasion. Walsh,
Neal, and Cartagine are all from Respondent’s corporate
headquarters in Spartanburg, South Carolina. As a part of
Respondent’s preelection campaign during these meetings,
Respondent presented employees with various statistical in-
formation, copies of the National Labor Relations Act, and
case law. Respondent also covered various topics including
the decline of unions, the significance of a union constitu-
tion, bargaining, and the customer letters already described
above.
Counsel for the General Counsel contends that at these
employee meetings Walsh, Neal, and Cartagine threatened
employees with loss of jobs, threatened employees with loss
of business, threatened that it would refuse to bargain in
good faith with the Union, threatened to reduce the work
hours and workweek of employees, and threatened employ-
ees that bargaining would be futile if they selected the Union
to represent them. Counsel for the General Counsel called
eight witnesses to testify regarding these meetings. Five of
the eight, Carl Parrot, Diane Gregg, Maxcine Felder, Eric
Gregg, and Lewis Simon are all blood relatives. Two more
of the eight, Joseph Davis and Lucius Davis are brothers. All
eight witnesses were active and open supporters of the
Union, and in fact were members of the Union’s organizing
committee.
Joseph Davis testified that he attended an employee meet-
ing held in May during which Neal was the primary speaker.
According to Davis, Neal read the two customer letters from
Centennial and Pressman-Gutman. After reading the letters,
Neal stated that if Respondent lost those two customers,
‘‘We’d all be out of a job.’’ According to Davis, Neal em-
phasized again that employees’ jobs depended on this and
that Respondent did not want to lose these two customers.
On cross-examination, Davis admitted that he was a very
outspoken supporter of the Union. In fact, after the campaign
got well under way, Davis was excluded from attending
meetings which Respondent held with employees. Davis im-
pressed me as candidly biased toward the Union, but cer-
tainly not wholly incredible. On the other hand, I have no
doubt that Davis embellished the facts somewhat in claiming
Neal told employees that if they lost these two customers
employees would be out of a job completely. Lucius Davis,
Joseph Davis’ brother, testified as more fully described
below that Cartagine told employees if Respondent lost these
two customers employees would probably work a 3-day
workweek. I find Lucius Davis’ testimony to be much more
1088 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
logical and credible about the predictions made by any of
Respondent’s managers in meetings with employees.
Employee Lucius Davis testified that he attended a meet-
ing in May during which Cartagine, Walsh, and Neal all
spoke to employees. Cartagine first read the two customer
letters to employees. According to Davis, after reading the
letters, Cartagine told employees that if the Union was voted
in to represent employees those customers would no longer
want to do business with Respondent. According to Davis,
Cartagine went on to say that if Respondent lost those two
customers employees would probably work only a 3-day
workweek. Respondent did not call Cartagine as a witness.
Davis also testified that in this same meeting or another
meeting held in May Walsh addressed employees and told
them that even if employees voted in the Union Respondent
‘‘would not bargain with the Union in fair faith.’’ Based on
my observation of him as a witness, I cannot credit Davis
regarding this alleged statement. Davis’ demeanor convinced
me immediately that he was either guessing at what Walsh
said and/or interpreting what Walsh said as Davis may have
understood it. Davis also testified Walsh stated all he would
have to do is say ‘‘No’’ to everything. On cross-examination,
Davis admitted Walsh told employees that Respondent would
bargain in good faith with the Union, and that in fact Walsh
said this five or six times. Davis admitted Walsh told em-
ployees in the meeting that Respondent simply had the right
to say no to union demands.
Eric Gregg testified that he attended an employee meeting
in May conducted by Walsh and Neal during which Neal is
supposed to have told employees that they could lose all
their benefits if the Union was voted into the plant. Gregg
testified that Neal also stated Respondent would not bargain
with the Union. According to Gregg, Neal told employees
that the first thing a union wants in bargaining is union dues
checkoff. Neal then told employees that Respondent did not
have to agree to anything, and that it would only say ‘‘No.’’
On cross-examination, Gregg repeatedly maintained that Neal
stated Respondent would not bargain with the Union, yet ad-
mitted that Walsh told employees benefits could go up,
down, or remain the same as a result of bargaining. I have
serious problems about the accuracy of Gregg’s testimony,
particularly as it relates to important details, and therefore to
what Walsh and Neal actually told employees. For example,
Gregg testified about one particular poster which Respondent
put up in the campaign concerning ‘‘highways or union
ways.’’ As the record was more fully developed by later wit-
nesses, the evidence showed that Gregg was partially correct
as it related to the overall subject, but very wrong about sig-
nificant details.
Employee Lewis Simon also testified concerning the meet-
ings held by Walsh and Neal in May or June. Simon testified
Walsh told employees that in negotiations there were three
options: that employees could win, lose, or everything could
remain the same. Simon went on to testify that Walsh told
employees all the Company had to do was ‘‘negotiate in
good faith.’’ According to Simon, Walsh continued by say-
ing that if the Union presented a proposal the Company did
not like, all the Company had to do was say ‘‘No.’’
Walsh and Neal both testified concerning their remarks to
employees in meetings throughout the preelection campaign.
Both testified extensively regarding the specific remarks
made to employees during these meetings, and both im-
pressed me as credible. Walsh candidly admitted telling em-
ployees that bargaining was a hardcore business deal, and
that wages and benefits could go up, down, or remain the
same. Walsh also candidly admitting telling employees that
there was no legal obligation to reach an agreement with the
Union. Walsh admitted telling employees that if the Union
made demands with which Respondent did not agree Re-
spondent could and would say no. Similarly, Neal candidly
admitted telling employees Respondent could and would say
no to union proposals that it could not accept. Adding to the
credibility of Walsh and Neal is the fact that Respondent in-
troduced both the transparencies and ‘‘crib notes’’ used by
Cartigine, Walsh, and Neal in meetings with employees.
Walsh and Neal credibly denied ever telling employees that
Respondent would not bargain with the Union or would not
bargain in good faith. I note that two of the General Coun-
sel’s witnesses, Lewis Simon and Lucius Davis, both admit-
ted Walsh told employees Respondent would bargain in good
faith, and David admitted Walsh said this as many as five
or six times. The transparencies introduced by Respondent
also show that in their presentations Respondent’s managers
told employees that Respondent would bargain in good faith.
Similarly, both the credible testimony of Walsh and Neal and
the transparencies themselves show that employees were told
simply Respondent had the right to say no to union demands
with which Respondent did not agree.
As indicated above, Respondent held other meetings with
employees during August as the election approached. Em-
ployee Carl Parrot testified that he attended such an em-
ployee meeting conducted by Walsh and Neal during the
week of the election. According to Parrot, Neal spoke first
to the employees and stated that customers of Respondent
did not want to send goods into a plant that was union be-
cause the quality suddenly drops because of sabotage. Ac-
cording to Parrot, Neal then said it would be in the employ-
ees’ best interest to vote no and keep the Union out. Parrot
testified Neal told employees that the only thing bargaining
in good faith meant was that he was on one side of the table,
and the Union on the other side of the table, and that what-
ever proposals the Union presented, the Company did not
have to agree to anything. Parrot asserted Neal stated that in
response to union proposals all he had to say was ‘‘No.’’
According to Parrot, Walsh also addressed employees con-
cerning the subject of bargaining. Parrot testified that Walsh,
like Neal, said the Company did not have to agree to any-
thing, and all it had to say was ‘‘no’’ to union proposals.
I am convinced that Parrot testified not so much to what
Neal and Walsh actually said, but what Parrot understood
them to mean. Parrot testified on cross-examination; for ex-
ample, Walsh told employees that ‘‘in bargaining you could
end up with the same or less, but not more.’’ Lewis Simon,
on the other hand, admitted that Walsh told employees they
could end up with more, less, or the same. Walsh and Neal
both testified credibly they told employees that bargaining
might result in more, less, or the same for employees. Fur-
ther, the transparencies actually used by Walsh and Neal in
their presentations to employees specifically contain language
showing that they told employees they might end up with
more, less, or the same.
Eric Gregg also testified concerning a meeting conducted
by Walsh and Neal during the week of the election. Accord-
ing to Gregg, Neal again said that he would not bargain with
1089REEVES BROS., INC.
the Union, and that all he had to say was ‘‘No’’ to union
proposals. Both Walsh and Neal credibly denied telling em-
ployees that Respondent would not bargain with the Union.
Walsh and Neal also candidly admitted telling employees
Respondent was not obligated to agree with union proposals
which Respondent thought were unreasonable and that Re-
spondent could say ‘‘No’’ to such proposals. Walsh and Neal
credibly denied telling employees, however, that all Re-
spondent had to do was be present and say ‘‘No’’ to union
proposals. Walsh and Neal both testified, and are corrobo-
rated by some of counsel for the General Counsel’s wit-
nesses, that they told employees Respondent would bargain
in good faith.
It would be naive to believe that Walsh and Neal did not
accentuate some of the most negative aspects of bargaining
during their meetings with employees. It does not follow,
however, that Respondent threatened employees with futility
of selecting a union to represent them. I credit Walsh and
Neal, and I find that they simply described to employees the
reality of collective bargaining, pointing out that wages,
hours, and working conditions could go up, down, or remain
the same. I find that Walsh and Neal did not tell employees
Respondent would refuse to negotiate with the Union. On the
contrary, Walsh and Neal told employees that Respondent
would negotiate in good faith, but that it was not required
to agree with union proposals which Respondent considered
unreasonable. To such proposals Respondent could and
would say ‘‘No.’’ I find that Respondent’s description of
bargaining to employees was protected by Section 8(c) of the
Act. Accordingly, I shall dismiss paragraphs 8(c), (I), (j), and
(k) of the complaint.
D. Conversations Between Supervisors and Employees
Joseph Davis testified that right after one of the employee
meetings in May 1994, his supervisor, Bud Stokes, met with
Davis. Stokes read the letters from Centennial and Pressman-
Gutman to Davis again. Stokes then asked Davis if he under-
stood them. That much is admitted by Stokes. Davis testified
that Stokes then went on to say, ‘‘Our paychecks depend on
these two customers,’’ and Stokes asked Davis, ‘‘Are you
with me on this?’’ Davis testified he told Stokes that he
wanted to hear both sides. According to Davis, Stokes then
asked Davis to talk to his brother Lucius Davis to help the
Company defeat the Union. In response to leading questions
by counsel for the General Counsel, Davis testified that
Stokes then said, referring to Centennial and Pressman-
Gutman, if Respondent lost these customers both Stokes and
Davis would probably be out of a job, and there would prob-
ably be some layoffs, including Stokes and Davis them-
selves.
While Stokes denied mentioning Davis’ brother in this
conversation and denied threatening layoffs, Stokes admitted
telling Davis there might be some ‘‘short time’’ if customers
moved their business elsewhere. On cross-examination,
Stokes admitted he told Davis ‘‘there could be short time
layoffs,’’ albeit in regard to loss of business, unrelated to
union activity. Davis impressed me as accurately describing
this conversation, and I credit his version.
Counsel for the General Counsel contends that, by his re-
marks, Stokes threatened Davis with loss of jobs and layoffs
in retaliation for employee union activity in violation of Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act. I cannot agree with counsel for the
General Counsel. It should first be noted that Joseph Davis
was a very outspoken supporter of the Union and a member
of the Union’s organizing committee. Second, it is quite ap-
parent that the essence of this entire conversation revolved
around the letters from Centennial and Pressman-Gutman,
and the logical implications which followed from those let-
ters. Considering the importance of these two customers to
Respondent, I find that Stokes’ statements to Davis were a
reasonable prediction based on objective facts about what
would probably happen if Respondent in fact lost those two
customers. The other comments by Stokes to Davis must be
placed in the context that Davis was a known outspoken sup-
porter of the Union. In such circumstances, I find that
Stokes’ remarks did not reasonably tend to interfere with
Stokes’ Section 7 rights. Rossmore House, 269 NLRB 1176
(1984).
Employee Lewis Simon testified that Stokes also met with
him privately right after one of the employee meetings in
May 1994. Simon, like Davis, testified that Stokes called him
into Stokes’ office to discuss the customer letters from Cen-
tennial and Pressman-Gutman. Simon, like Davis, was an
avid and open supporter of the Union, and also one of the
members of the Union’s organizing committee. Simon testi-
fied credibly that Stokes read the letters to him and asked
Simon if he understood them. Simon replied that he did, but
that he did not believe the letters and thought they had been
solicited by Respondent. According to Simon, Stokes com-
mented that ‘‘those companies comprised 70 percent of our
business in the dye house and if we lost those customers, he
didn’t see any way we could continue to run it.’’ Simon
added that Stokes said he ‘‘thought the plant would shut
down if we lost those customers.’’ With respect to this last
alleged statement by Stokes, I suspect Simon is stretching the
truth a bit. Stokes admitted he met with Simon, just as he
admitted he met with Davis. Stokes testified he read the let-
ters to Simon and told Simon that the customers would con-
sider ceasing their business with Respondent if the Union
was voted in the plant. Stokes credibly denied threatening
that the plant might close, and candidly acknowledged he
told Simon that their could be some ‘‘short time layoffs’’ if
the customers moved their business. I credit Stokes. Just as
it was in the conversation between Stokes and Davis, the key
to this conversation between Stokes and Simon was clearly
the impact of the customer letters from Centennial and Press-
man-Gutman. In this context, I find that Stokes’ comments
were reasonable predictions based on objective fact protected
by Section 8(c) of the Act under the standards set forth in
Gissel, supra. Accordingly, I shall dismiss this allegation
from the complaint.
Employee Lucius Davis, who works in the finishing lab
and is supervised by Ken Catoe, testified that in May 1994
Supervisor Wayne Trapp approached him one day while
Davis was working. Davis, who was an open and avid union
supporter and on the union organizing committee, could not
recall how the conversation began, but testified that Trapp
‘‘mentioned that if we get a union that it wouldn’t do noth-
ing for us . . . and if the Union was voted in that the plant
probably would close down.’’ Trapp denied even having
such a conversation with Davis. Trapp testified that he had
only one conversation with Lucius Davis concerning the
Union, and that it occurred in the canteen/breakroom on the
day after the Board-conducted election. According to Trapp,
1090 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Davis was telling other employees that Respondent was try-
ing to keep things the way they were in 1940. Trapp told
Davis that if he was going to make such a statement, ‘‘tell
it right.’’ Trapp then pointed out Respondent’s business was
not even there in 1940.
As already mentioned above, I have doubt about the accu-
racy of Davis’ testimony. Davis testified on direct examina-
tion, for example, that Walsh told employees Respondent
would not bargain with the Union, and then admitted on
cross-examination Walsh said Respondent would bargain in
good faith as many as five or six times. I am convinced from
observing Davis as a witness that he was frequently guessing
and consistently interpreting what may have actually been
said to him into words which described what he understood
by what was said to him. I find that I simply cannot rely on
Davis’ description of his conversation with Supervisor Trapp.
It is possible that some conversation did occur, but I have
such doubt about the accuracy of Davis’ testimony that I
simply cannot rely on his description of the specific com-
ments made. Accordingly, I shall dismissed the allegation
that Supervisor Trapp threatened Davis with the futility of
being represented by a union or with plant closure in the
event employees selected a union to represent them.
Supervisor Trapp is alleged to have had conversations with
several employees who are related by blood, and to whom
Trapp is related by marriage. Diane Gregg, Eric Gregg, and
Lewis Simon all testified that Trapp spoke to them about the
Union at various times prior to the Board-conducted election.
As noted, Diane and Eric Gregg are siblings, while Lewis
Simon is their cousin. All of them are related to Trapp’s
former wife, with whom Trapp still maintains a relationship.
Diane Gregg, who is supervised by Bud Stokes, testified that
in a conversation during May 1994 Trapp remarked to her
‘‘that we didn’t need a union in the plant because if the
Union came in, both [Trapp and Gregg would have to] look
for another job.’’ Trapp denied the conversation. According
to Trapp, the only conversation he had with Diane Gregg
concerning the Union was one day when Gregg stopped him
and started asking him questions. According to Trapp, he
told Gregg that he could not talk about that. Gregg is alleged
to have responded that Respondent needs a black female
human resource manager. I have no doubt that the conversa-
tion described by Trapp did take place, but I do not credit
him that this was the only conversation he had with Diane
Gregg concerning the Union. I credit Diane Gregg regarding
the conversation she described.
Lewis Simon testified that he also had a conversation with
Trapp during May concerning the Union. Simon admitted
that he initiated the conversation with Trapp himself, telling
Trapp that as a supervisor he knew what Trapp thought about
the Union. Trapp in turn asked Simon what he thought.
Simon told Trapp he thought he would be better off with a
union. According to Simon, Trapp replied that he did not
think the Union was good for the plant and that if the Union
came in the plant would probably shut down. Trapp admitted
having a conversation with Simon. According to Trapp,
Simon asked him about the Union and Trapp related his un-
pleasant experience as a member of the Teamsters Union.
Trapp denied telling Simon that he thought the plant would
shut down. I credit Simon.
Eric Gregg testified that he had two conversations with
Trapp concerning the Union, one in late May and one the
day prior to the Board-conducted election. Gregg’s descrip-
tion of the first conversation is much like the conversation
between Trapp and Lewis Simon. Gregg testified that Trapp
stopped to talk to him at Gregg’s work station. Trapp told
Gregg about having previously been involved with a union,
and stated that a union could not do anything for employees.
Gregg testified that Trapp then told him the plant would
close down and the Company would not be competitive with
other companies if the Union was voted in the plant. Trapp
acknowledged having a conversation with Gregg about the
Union. Trapp admitted he told Gregg that if the Union came
in, the plant might lose its competitiveness. Trapp denied
making a statement to Gregg that the plant would close
down. I credit Gregg.
Gregg testified that in the second conversation with Trapp,
on the day prior to the Board-conducted election, Trapp told
Gregg that he hated to see him through away his future, and
if the Union was elected, hours would be cut back. Trapp
asked Gregg how he was going to vote. In response, Gregg
showed Trapp the union T-shirt Gregg was wearing. Trapp
denied threatening Gregg with reduced hours. Trapp admitted
having a conversation with Gregg about 3 days before the
election in which he tried to explain a sample ballot to
Gregg. According to Trapp, when he offered to go over the
sample ballot with Gregg, Gregg responded that Trapp could
not tell him how to vote. Trapp contends he simply told
Gregg to vote his choice and the conversation ended. I find
that both conversations took place.
As noted, Trapp admits certain conversations and denies
others with these three individuals. Trapp contends that each
of these three individuals lied under oath regarding certain
statements attributed to him because they are hostile toward
him for divorcing his former wife, their relative. Trapp has
been separated from his wife for the past 8 years. According
to Trapp, he nevertheless attended a Gregg family reunion
with his former wife in July 1994 where some family mem-
bers showed animosity toward him. Trapp admitted, how-
ever, that neither Diane Gregg, Eric Gregg, nor Simon has
shown any hostility toward him. Trapp’s would-be defense
concerning family hostility tends to cut both ways. While it
is of course possible that family members would make up
stories about Trapp because of hostility towards him, it is
just as possible that he would make statements to such peo-
ple, either because of the family relationship or because of
hostility toward them, which he might not make to other em-
ployees.
As indicated, Trapp admits certain of these conversations,
denying only specific remarks attributed to him. Considering
all the evidence, I am convinced that Trapp in fact had the
various conversations described above with these ex-in-laws
who he well knew were active supporters of the Union. I
find it an extremely close call as to whether Trapp’s state-
ments in these conversations can reasonably be said to have
objectively tended to interfere with employees’ Section 7
rights and therefore violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. On the
one hand, I find that Trapp did state Respondent might lose
business if the Union came in, that he and Diane Gregg
might both need to look for other jobs, that hours might be
cut back, and even that the plant might close. These are often
described as ‘‘hallmark violations’’ of the Act. On the other
hand, all of these employees were extremely active union
supporters and on the Union’s organizing committee, in addi-
1091REEVES BROS., INC.
tion to being Trapp’s relative by marriage. Often times it was
the employees who started these conversations, not Trapp. I
strongly suspect that Diane Gregg, Lewis Simon, and Eric
Gregg all knew full well because of their longstanding rela-
tionship to Trapp that he was simply expressing a personal
opinion which could in no way be attributed to Respondent.
That is particularly true of the conversation between Lewis
Simon and Trapp. For whatever reason, however, Respondent
did not develop this point on cross-examination as it might
have. Weighing all the circumstances, and recognizing full
well the weight of argument on both sides, I believe it is bet-
ter to err on the side of protecting employee rights within the
meaning of the Act, which is its stated purpose. Accordingly,
I find that Trapp’s comments to these employees, including
threats of reduced hours and possible plant closure, violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
E. Alleged Threat By Supervisor Bud Plumley to
Maxcine Felder
Maxcine Felder has been employed by Respondent for ap-
proximately 6 years. During 1993, she took time off work for
maternity leave. On her return to the plant, Felder worked on
several jobs pursuant to Respondent’s job bid procedure.
Also on her return to work, Felder became actively involved
with the Union. Felder wore union buttons in the plant and,
like other witnesses called by counsel for the General Coun-
sel, Felder was a member of the Union’s organizing commit-
tee.
Felder testified that in late May or early June 1994 she
worked on the Themosol machine for a brief period under
the supervision of Bud Plumley. According to Felder, during
the brief period she was under Plumley’s supervision,
Plumley approached her at the Themosol machine one day
and told her that if she did not learn the job in 10 days, she
would have to leave. Felder testified that it normally takes
approximately 6 weeks to learn how to operate this machine.
Felder viewed Plumley’s statements to be an unreasonable
demand, and from this she concluded she was being threat-
ened and discriminated against because of her support for the
Union. Counsel for the General Counsel makes the same ar-
gument.
Cliff Neal testified that Plumley had retired approximately
1 month prior to the hearing and, despite its best efforts, Re-
spondent was unable to locate Plumley to testify. Respondent
acknowledged that Felder was an open supporter of the
Union.
When Felder was ready to return to work from maternity
leave in November 1993, there were no jobs immediately
available, and she was placed on temporary layoff. Felder
was called back and returned to work in May 1994. After her
return to work, Felder was placed in numerous jobs for short
periods. From May 2 to 10, she worked as a material handler
in the shipping warehouse. When she was unable to ade-
quately perform this job, Felder was transferred to a material
handler’s job in the Themosol or continues dye range depart-
ment, where she worked from May 11 to 22. It was in this
job that she worked under the supervision of Bud Plumley,
not as an operator of the Themosol machine but as a material
handler simply bringing fabric to the machine. When this job
did not go well either, Felder was transferred to the dye
house as a machine operator, where she worked from May
23 to June 5. Within the dye house, she then transferred on
June 6 to a scutcher operator position which she still holds.
Felder’s wages were increased to the top pay for that job on
June 23, 1994.
During the time that Felder was on layoff status, Respond-
ent instituted a job bidding procedure which became effec-
tive January 1, 1994. Respondent held meetings with em-
ployees to explain the procedure and maintains a copy of the
job bidding policy on the bulletin board. Felder, however,
was off work when this procedure was instituted. The job bid
policy, introduced as an exhibit by Respondent, specifically
provides that employees must make satisfactory progress
within a 10-day period in any new position. Although Felder
remembered that there was a job bid policy posted on the
bulletin board, Felder claimed that it did not contain the pro-
vision employees had 10 days in which to make satisfactory
progress in a position. I do not credit this aspect of Felder’s
testimony.
Felder’s own testimony shows that she was not doing well
on any of her first three jobs on her return to work in May.
Respondent continued to move Felder from job to job until
she was able to adequately perform one. Shortly thereafter,
Respondent gave Felder top pay on that job. Respondent’s
treatment of Felder is completely inconsistent with her claim,
and that of counsel for the General Counsel, that Felder was
threatened or discriminated against because of her union ac-
tivity. Respondent made no effort whatever to take action
against Felder although it is clear she had problems with sev-
eral of the jobs assigned her on her return to work. Rather,
Respondent made every effort to accommodate Felder. While
Respondent was unable to locate Plumley to testify in this
proceeding, the facts presented show that the remark Plumley
made to Felder, even as described by Felder, is reasonably
attributable to the job bid procedure which requires that an
employee show progress within a 10-day period. I reject the
assertion that Felder was unlawfully threatened or discrimi-
nated against in any way by Respondent, and I shall dismiss
that allegation from the complaint.
F. Incident Between Supervisor Ray Kelley and
Willie Price
Employee Willie Price is employed in the maintenance de-
partment. During the union campaign, Price’s supervisor was
Clark Lange. Price was an active supporter of the Union,
regularly wearing union T-shirts and a union cap. Price was
also on the union organizing committee.
Price testified that on August 25, the day of the election,
Supervisor Ray Kelley had no fewer than three conversations
with Price in Kelley’s office. According to Price, Kelley
called him in to Kelley’s office and told Price that the Union
‘‘couldn’t do nothing for us.’’
Price testified that in the second conversation with Kelley
on the day of the election, Kelley threatened that if the
Union did come in the plant would close down. Price testi-
fied that he was ‘‘playing along with [Kelley’s] game’’ be-
cause Price had already voted. Consequently, according to
Price, he deceived Kelley into believing he was contemplat-
ing changing his mind about the Union. According to Price,
he even told Kelley during the third conversation that he had
voted against the Union. I find Price’s testimony incredible.
Much more credible was Kelley’s testimony in which he
described how Price seemed to intentionally attempt to irri-
tate him about the Union. Kelley testified credibly that he
1092 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
had no conversation with Price on the day of the election,
but that he did have a conversation with Price on August 23,
2 days prior to the election. Kelley testified that as he was
walking toward his office, Price flipped his union badge on
his cap, and said to Kelley, ‘‘Ain’t that pretty?’’ Kelley ad-
mits he called Price into his office, pointed at the cap and
told Price ‘‘We don’t need this thing.’’ Price then asked
Kelley what would happen if the Union was voted in, and
specifically would the plant close down. Kelley testified
credibly that he responded, ‘‘No, the plant won’t close down
because of this union or any union. Our customers is what
we stay in business for. We need our customers and only our
customers can close the plant down. A union won’t close the
plant down. If we don’t have the business and we don’t have
customers, that’s the only thing that will ever close this plant
down.’’
I have no trouble crediting Kelley over Price. Kelley was
extremely candid in admitting that Price regularly irritated
him by various remarks concerning the Union, Price’s union
cap, and union buttons. I have no doubt Price made every
attempt to provoke Kelley by asking Kelley directly what
would happen if the Union was voted in and whether the
plant would close down. I found Kelley altogether credible,
and I credit his testimony regarding his response to Price’s
questions. I find that Kelley did not threaten plant closure or
other retaliation in response to employee union activity, and
I shall dismiss that allegation from the complaint.
Analysis and conclusions
It is the Board’s usual policy to direct a new election
whenever an unfair labor practice occurs during the critical
period between the filling of the representation petition and
the Board-conducted election. Conduct violative of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act is considered, a fortiori, to interfere with
the exercise of a free and untrammeled choice in an election.
The Board, however, has departed from this policy in recent
years where it is virtually impossible to conclude that the
misconduct could have affected the election results. Counsel
for the General Counsel and Respondent agree that in deter-
mining whether the election should be set aside, several fac-
tors should be considered, including the number of violations
of the Act, their severity, the extent of their dissemination,
the size of the bargaining unit, and other factors which might
be relevant. Clark Equipment Co., 278 NLRB 498 (1986);
Super Thrift Markets, 233 NLRB 409 (1977).
In the instant case, I have dismissed the vast majority of
allegations that Respondent threatened the futility of select-
ing a union, threatened a refusal to bargain with the Union,
threatened plant closure, or otherwise threatened retaliation
against employees for selecting the Union to represent them.
The only violations which I have found occurred in con-
versations between Supervisor Trapp and three employees
who are related to him by marriage. The incidents involving
these three employees occurred in a bargaining unit of almost
300 employees, and in my view represent isolated incidents
which are not sufficient to affect the results of the election.
There is no evidence whatever that statements by Trapp were
disseminated beyond the individuals directly involved. See
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 232 NLRB 717 (1977). Accord-
ingly, I dismiss the Union’s objections to the election and
recommend the Board certify the election results.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent, Reeves Brothers, Inc., Bishopville Fin-
ishing Division is, and has been at all times material, an em-
ployer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 465,
AFL–CIO is, and has been at all times material, a labor orga-
nization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By posting letters from customers, Respondent did not
threaten employees with loss of jobs, threaten employees
with loss of business, or otherwise violate Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act, and those allegations are dismissed.
4. In meetings with employees, Respondent did not threat-
en employees with loss of jobs, threaten that it would refuse
to bargain in good faith or otherwise deal with the Union,
unlawfully threaten to reduce the workweek and work hours
of employees, or threaten employees that bargaining would
be futile if employees selected the Union to represent them
for purposes of collective bargaining in violation of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act, and those allegations are dismissed.
5. Respondent, through Supervisor Bud Stokes, did not
threaten employees with loss of jobs or layoffs, threaten em-
ployees employees with loss of privileges or benefits, interro-
gate employees concerning their union activities, or threaten
employees with plant closure in violation of Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act, and those allegations are dismissed.
6. Respondent, through Supervisor Wayne Trapp did not
threaten employee Lucius Davis with futility of being rep-
resented by the Union or with plant closure in violation of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, and that allegation is dismissed.
7. Respondent, through Supervisor Wayne Trapp did
threaten employees Diane Gregg, Eric Gregg, and Lewis
Simon that hours might be cut back, that employees might
need to look for other jobs, and that the plant might close
if employees selected the Union to represent them for pur-
poses of collective bargaining, and Respondent thereby vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
8. Respondent, through Supervisor Bud Plumley, did not
threaten employees with termination if they failed to meet a
more stringent standard of performance in retaliation for en-
gaging in union activities in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act, and that allegation is dismissed.
9. Respondent, through Supervisor Ray Kelley, did not
threaten plant closure or other retaliation if employees se-
lected the Union to represent them, and that allegation is dis-
missed.
10. Respondent did not otherwise violate the Act.
11. The unfair labor practices which Respondent has been
found to have engaged in are isolated incidents which are not
sufficient to affect the results of the Board-conducted elec-
tion. Accordingly, the Union’s objections to the election are
dismissed, and it is recommended that the Board certify the
election results.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act, I shall recommend that it be ordered to cease and desist
and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate
the policies of the Act.
1093REEVES BROS., INC.
2 If no exceptions are filed as provided by 102.46 of the Board’s
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.
3 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court
of appeals, the words in the notice reading ‘‘Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board’’ shall read ‘‘Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order
of the National Labor Relations Board.’’
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on
the entire record, I issue the following recommended2
ORDER
The Respondent, Reeves Brothers, Inc., Bishopville Finish-
ing Division, Bishopville, South Carolina, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Threatening employees that hours might be cut back,
that employees might need to look for other jobs, and that
the plant might close if employees select the Union to rep-
resent them for purposes of collective bargaining.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Post at its Bishopville, South Carolina facility copies
of the attached notice marked ‘‘Appendix.’’3 Copies of the
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Re-
gion 11, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized
representative, shall be posted by the Respondent imme-
diately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days
in conspicuous places including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.