Reebok International Limited

Trademark Trial and Appeal BoardMar 29, 2021

88172627 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 29, 2021)

This Opinion is Not a Precedent of the TTAB Mailed: March 29, 2021 UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE _____ Trademark Trial and Appeal Board _____ In re Reebok International Limited _____ Serial No. 88172627 _____ John Zaccaria of Notaro, Michalos & Zaccaria P.C., for Reebok International Limited. James Prizant, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 128, Travis Wheatley, Managing Attorney. _____ Before Cataldo, Goodman, and Johnson, Administrative Trademark Judges. Opinion by Johnson, Administrative Trademark Judge: I. Background Reebok International Limited (“Applicant”) seeks registration on the Principal Register of the mark PUREMOVE, in standard characters (“Applicant’s Mark”), for “sports bras” in International Class 25.1 1 Application Serial No. 88172627 filed on October 29, 2018, under Section 1(a) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), based upon Applicant’s claim of first use anywhere and use in commerce since at least as early as August 17, 2018. Citations to the record or briefs are to the publicly available documents in TTABVUE, the Board’s electronic docketing system. See, e.g., Turdin v. Trilobite, Ltd., 109 USPQ2d 1473, Serial No. 88172627 - 2 - The Trademark Examining Attorney refused registration under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the ground that Applicant’s Mark, as applied to the goods identified in the application, so resembles the Registered Mark PUREMOVE (in standard characters) for “armbands specially adapted for personal electronic devices, namely, mobile phones” in International Class 9,2 as to be likely to cause confusion. When the refusal was made final, Applicant appealed and requested reconsideration. After the Examining Attorney denied the request for reconsideration, the appeal resumed. We affirm the refusal to register. II. Likelihood of Confusion—Applicable Law We base our determination of likelihood of confusion under Trademark Act Section 2(d) on an analysis of all of the probative facts in evidence that are relevant to the factors enunciated in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (CCPA 1973) (“DuPont”) (cited in B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 575 U.S. 138, 113 USPQ2d 2045, 2049 (2015)); see also In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2003). We must consider each DuPont factor for which there is evidence and argument. See, e.g., In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 129 USPQ2d 1160, 1162-63 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 1476 n.6 (TTAB 2014). The number preceding “TTABVUE” corresponds to the docket entry number; the number(s) following “TTABVUE” refer to the page number(s) of that particular docket entry, if applicable. Citations to the application record are to pages in the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) database of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). All citations to documents contained in the TSDR database are to the downloadable .pdf versions of the documents in the USPTO TTABVUE Case Viewer. 2 Registration No. 4,631,612, issued November 4, 2014 [hereinafter the “Registered Mark”]. Serial No. 88172627 - 3 - However, “each case must be decided on its own facts and the differences are often subtle ones.” Indus. Nucleonics Corp. v. Hinde, 475 F.2d 1197, 177 USPQ 386, 387 (CCPA 1973). In applying the DuPont factors, we bear in mind the fundamental purposes underlying Trademark Act Section 2(d), which are to prevent confusion as to source and to protect registrants from damage caused by registration of confusingly similar marks. Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 224 USPQ 327, 331 (1985); Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 34 USPQ2d 1161, 1163 (1995); DuPont, 177 USPQ at 566. Varying weights may be assigned to the various DuPont factors depending on the evidence presented. See Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp. Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1688 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“[T]he various evidentiary factors may play more or less weighty roles in any particular determination.”). Two key considerations are the similarities between the marks and the relatedness of the goods. See In re i.am.symbolic, LLC, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“The likelihood of confusion analysis considers all DuPont factors for which there is record evidence but ‘may focus … on dispositive factors, such as similarity of the marks and relatedness of the goods.’”)). Serial No. 88172627 - 4 - III. Likelihood of Confusion – Analysis We now consider the arguments of Applicant and the Examining Attorney, the applicable law, and the evidence of record. The likelihood of confusion factors Applicant and the Examining Attorney discussed are the similarity or dissimilarity of Applicant’s and Registrant’s PUREMOVE marks, the relatedness of the goods associated with the respective marks, and the channels of trade in which the marks and goods travel. We discuss these factors, and more, below. A. The Similarity or Dissimilarity of the Marks Under the first DuPont factor, we determine the similarity or dissimilarity of Applicant’s and Registrant’s marks in their entireties, taking into account their appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. DuPont, 177 USPQ at 567; In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1048 (Fed. Cir. 2018). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (quoting In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)). It is undisputed that Applicant’s Mark, PUREMOVE, is identical to the Registered Mark, PUREMOVE, in its entirety. As a result, the first DuPont factor weighs heavily in favor of a finding of likelihood of confusion. See In re Martin’s Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc., 748 F.2d 1565, 223 USPQ 1289, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“This factor weighs heavily against applicant, as the two word marks are identical … .”). Serial No. 88172627 - 5 - B. The Similarity or Dissimilarity and Nature of the Goods The second DuPont factor concerns the “similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services as described in an application or registration.” When analyzing the second DuPont factor, we look to the identifications of goods in the application and cited registration. Stone Lion Capital Partners v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Houston Comput. Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“The authority is legion that the question of registrability of an applicant’s mark must be decided on the basis of the identification of goods set forth in the application regardless of what the record may reveal as to the particular nature of an applicant’s goods, the particular channels of trade or the class of purchasers to which sales of the goods are directed.”). The goods do not have to be identical or even competitive in order to find that there is a likelihood of confusion. In re Iolo Techs., LLC, 95 USPQ2d 1498, 1499 (TTAB 2010); In re G.B.I. Tile & Stone, Inc., 92 USPQ2d 1366, 1368 (TTAB 2009). The issue is not whether the goods will be confused with each other, but rather whether the public will be confused as to their source. See Recot Inc. v. M.C. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[E]ven if the goods in question are different from, and thus not related to, one another in kind, the same goods can be related in the mind of the consuming public as to the origin of the goods. It is this sense of relatedness that matters in the likelihood of confusion analysis.”). It is sufficient that the goods of the applicant and the registrant are related in some manner or that the conditions surrounding their marketing are such Serial No. 88172627 - 6 - that they are likely to be encountered by the same persons under circumstances that, because of the marks used in connection therewith, would lead to the mistaken belief that they originate from the same source. See, e.g., Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7- Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); On- line Careline Inc. v. America Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Where, as here, the marks of the respective parties are identical, the relationship between the goods need not be as close to support a finding of likelihood of confusion as would be required if there were differences between the marks. In re Shell Oil Co., 26 USPQ2d at 1689; In re Iolo Techs., 95 USPQ2d at 1499. Evidence of relatedness may include news articles or third-party websites showing that the relevant goods are used by purchasers for the same purpose; advertisements showing that the relevant goods are advertised together; or copies of use-based registrations of the same mark for both Applicant’s identified goods and the goods listed in the cited registration. See, e.g., In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d at 1817 (finding pepper sauce and agave related where evidence showed both were used for the same purpose in the same recipes, and thus consumers were likely to purchase the products at the same time and in the same stores). Applicant claims that the “sports bras” offered under its mark, PUREMOVE (shown below), are distinct from the “armbands specially adapted for personal electronic devices, namely, mobile phones” offered under the Registered Mark Serial No. 88172627 - 7 - because “[s]ports bras are not used to store mobile phones and are not worn on an arm.”3 4 3 Applicant’s Appeal Brief, 11 TTABVUE 10. 4 May 13, 2019 Response to Office Action, p. 17, located at www.reebok.com/us. Serial No. 88172627 - 8 - In turn, the Examining Attorney argues that the goods are related because “consumers often encounter them under a single mark, and because they are of particular interest to intersecting classes of consumers, women athletes and runners in particular.”5 To demonstrate such relatedness, the Examining Attorney made of record Internet evidence of webpages showing that it is common for a single entity to offer both sports bras and armbands adapted for mobile phones under the same mark. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 128 USPQ2d at 1051 (relatedness supported by evidence that third parties sell both types of goods under same mark, showing that “consumers are accustomed to seeing a single mark associated with a source that sells both.”). For example: 5 Examiner’s Statement, 13 TTABVUE 6, 10-11. Serial No. 88172627 - 9 - Reebok: 6 6 Nov. 17, 2018 Office Action at pp. 48-50, located at www.reebok.com/us. Serial No. 88172627 - 10 - Mizuno:7 7 July 30, 2019 Final Office Action at pp. 19, 21, located at www.mizunousa.com. Serial No. 88172627 - 11 - Serial No. 88172627 - 12 - Puma:8 8 Nov. 17, 2018 Office Action at pp. 32-38, located at https://us.puma.com/en/us. Serial No. 88172627 - 13 - Sweaty Betty:9 9 July 30, 2019 Final Office Action at pp. 42-47, located at www.sweatybetty.com/us. Serial No. 88172627 - 14 - 1. Evidence from Websites Featuring House Marks Applicant argues that the Examining Attorney’s evidence of relatedness—all showing sports bras and armbands adapted for mobile phones offered under famous10 or 10 Citing DuPont, Applicant contends that “[f]ame, the subject of the fifth DuPont factor, also plays an important role in the evaluation of the evidence offered by the Office.” 11 TTABVUE 11. Applicant’s attempt to apply the fifth DuPont factor, “the fame of the prior mark,” to the Examining Attorney’s Internet evidence is misplaced. The fifth factor is not normally applicable in ex parte proceedings, as the owner of the cited registration (“the prior mark”) is not a party to the ex parte appeal, and the Examining Attorney is under no obligation to demonstrate the fame of the cited registered mark. In re Thomas, 79 USPQ2d 1021, 1027 n.11 (TTAB 2006). So the “fame of the mark” factor generally is treated as neutral in an ex parte context. See In re Mr. Recipe, LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1084, 1086-88 (TTAB 2016). The registered Serial No. 88172627 - 15 - well- known house marks such as Nike, Adidas, Under Armour, Puma, Asics, Fila, Champion, Mizuno, New Balance, and Reebok,11 as well as under house marks that are not well-known, such as Sweaty Betty12—should be given no, or de minimis, weight because house marks are typically used on a wide variety of goods and services, and are not necessarily reflective of the marketplace in general for such goods.13 We acknowledge that the Examining Attorney’s evidence features house marks. However, our approach to weighing such “house mark evidence” here is more nuanced, reflecting the changing consumer marketplace. Over thirty years ago, well before e-commerce was commonplace, we gave “little weight” to third-party registrations for a brick-and-mortar department store and an amusement park because both entities offered a wide variety of goods and services. In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co. Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 n.6 (TTAB 1988). Over twenty years later, the quality of the proffered evidence in another case still persuaded us to find that the Office’s third-party registration and website evidence was not probative of relatedness since it was “from sources which sell a broad range of varied and unrelated goods online.” In re Princeton Tectonics, Inc., 95 USPQ2d 1509, 1511 (TTAB 2010). There, nearly all of the Office’s evidence included websites from international business to business trading platforms mark is treated as valid and entitled to the statutory presumptions afforded by Section 7(b) of the Trademark Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b); In re Fat Boys Water Sports LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1511, 1517 (TTAB 2016). 11 Nov. 17, 2018 Office Action at pp. 6, 10-50; July 30, 2019 Final Office Action at pp. 6-41. 12 July 30, 2019 Final Office Action at pp. 42-56. 13 Applicant’s Appeal Brief, 11 TTABVUE 11-18. Serial No. 88172627 - 16 - featuring a vast variety of goods, and mass online retailers such as Alibaba.com; use- based, third-party registrations for unrelated goods; and house mark registrations for a wide variety of goods. Id. at 1510-12. One third-party house mark registration had an identification of goods that extended over five pages, with disparate items such as agricultural irrigation units, bicycle lights, cotton candy making machines, drinking fountains, cryorefrigerators, electric espresso machines, energy storage plants, nuclear reactors, sewage treatment plants, and hot tubs. Id. at 1511. Here, the Examining Attorney proffered evidence from seventeen Internet websites, all which offer the goods in question featuring the aforementioned house marks. Three websites are for the online operations of brick and mortar mass retailers JC Penney, Nordstrom, and Target. One website is for the mass online retailer Amazon.com; one is for a large online clothing retailer, Asos.com; one is for a large online shoe retailer, Shoebacca.com; and one website is for the online operations of Best Buy, the large consumer electronics and appliance retailer. Like our findings in Mucky Duck and Princeton Tectonics, this evidence has little probative value since it is from sources which sell a broad variety of goods online, and is insufficient to show that consumers would encounter the goods at issue here in circumstances which would lead to a likelihood of confusion. The remainder of the Examining Attorney’s evidence is from the various Internet websites featuring the house marks. The record reflects that sports bras are offered at the Nike, Adidas, Under Armour, Asics, Fila, and New Balance websites under a house mark, a product mark, or a house mark paired with a product mark, and that Serial No. 88172627 - 17 - the aforementioned mass retailers offer armbands adapted for mobile phones featuring the Nike, Adidas, Under Armour, Asics, Fila, and New Balance house marks or distinct product marks. But the record also reflects that both sports bras and armbands adapted for mobile phones are offered at the Puma, Reebok, Mizuno, and Sweaty Betty websites under their respective house marks and/or a product mark. Unlike the house marks that were used to offer the wide variety of disparate goods and services in Mucky Duck and Princeton Tectonics, here, the use of these house marks (Puma, Reebok, Mizuno, and Sweaty Betty) is limited to the sportswear, athletic apparel, and athletic accessories market segments. This limited type of house mark use at consumer-facing web sites could serve to show that consumers could encounter sports bras and armbands adapted for mobile phones in circumstances which would lead to a likelihood of confusion. Moreover, the evidence from the Sweaty Betty website showing a woman wearing both a sports bra and a Sweaty Betty “media armband” is persuasive.14 On balance, we accord the Examining Attorney’s Internet website evidence of relatively less probative value rather than discounting it in its entirety. 2. Third-Party Registrations In turn, Applicant introduced ten pairs of unrelated third-party registrations15 for marks through which sports bras and armbands adapted for mobile phones are 14 See July 30, 2019 Final Office Action at p. 42, located at www.sweatybetty.com/us/shop/accessories/media-armband-SB4250_Black.html. 15 Jan. 29, 2020 Request for Reconsideration After Final Action at pp. 15-16, 20-110. Applicant included one third-party application that has been abandoned (GLITTER TIGER, Serial No. 88064941). An application is only evidence that the application was filed on a particular date. In re Inn at St. John’s, 126 USPQ2d at 1745 (citations omitted). Serial No. 88172627 - 18 - offered, contending that the registrations “demonstrate that nearly identical or very similar marks, held by unrelated third-parties, routinely coexist peacefully for sports bras and armbands adapted for mobile phones… .”16 Prior decisions and actions of other examining attorneys in registering other marks have little evidentiary value and are not binding upon the USPTO or the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board. In re Midwest Gaming & Entm’t, 106 USPQ2d 1163, 1165 n.3 (TTAB 2013) (citing In re Nett Designs, Inc., 236 F.3d 1339, 57 USPQ2d 1564, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 2001)); TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE (TMEP) § 1207.01(d)(vi) (October 2018). Each case is decided on its own facts, and each mark stands on its own merits. See AMF Inc. v. Am. Leisure Prods., Inc., 474 F.2d 1403, 177 USPQ 268, 269 (CCPA 1973); In re Binion, 93 USPQ2d 1531, 1536 (TTAB 2009). Applicant’s third-party registration pairings are “not evidence that the registered marks are actually in use or that the public is familiar with them.” In re Midwest Gaming & Entm’t, 106 USPQ2d at 1167 n.5 (citing In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2010)); Moreover, the application is abandoned. So that application and registration pair has not been considered. Applicant also included one third-party registration that was registered under Section 66(a) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1141f(a) ( , Reg. No. 3,825,393). A third-party registration that is not based on use in commerce, such as one registered under Section 66(a), or one registered solely under Section 44 of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §1126(e), and for which no Section 8 or 71 affidavit or declaration of continuing use has been filed, has very little, if any, persuasive value. See Calypso Tech., Inc. v. Calypso Capital Mgmt., LP, 100 USPQ2d 1213, 1221 n.15 (TTAB 2011); In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1583 (TTAB 2007); In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co., 29 USPQ2d 1783, 1786 (TTAB 1993). So we have not considered that pair of registrations either. 16 Applicant’s Appeal Brief, 11 TTABVUE 19-20. Serial No. 88172627 - 19 - see TMEP § 1207.01(d)(iii). Whatever probative value there is to Applicant’s list of third-party registrations is weighed in conjunction with the Internet website evidence submitted by the Examining Attorney. Cf. In re Thor Tech, Inc., 113 USPQ2d 1546, 1548 (TTAB 2015). The facts here can be distinguished from those in Thor Tech. In that case, applicant’s mark, TERRAIN, for “recreational vehicles, namely, towable trailers,” was refused registration on the ground that applicant’s mark so resembled the cited mark, TERRAIN, for “motor land vehicles, namely, trucks,” as to be likely to cause confusion. Id. at 1546. The Examining Attorney proffered seven third-party registrations of marks for goods including “trucks” and “trailers” as evidence that those goods emanate from the same source. Id. at 1547. Upon closer inspection, we found that five of the seven registrations were of no probative value since they were for recreational vehicle towable trailers. Id. To rebut the Office’s evidence, the applicant proffered fifty pairs of third-party registrations of identical or similar marks for land motor vehicles and for towable recreational vehicle trailers. Id. at 1548-49. After evaluating the evidence, we reversed the refusal, reasoning that the existence of fifty pairs of substantially identical marks for land motor vehicles and for towable recreational vehicle trailers suggested that these goods were distinctive in the marketplace, and confusion between even identical marks was unlikely. Id. at 1549. In addition, we found that purchasers of the goods would exercise a high degree of care in making purchasing decisions because the goods were relatively expensive. Id. at 1551. Serial No. 88172627 - 20 - Here, we only have eight pairs of third-party registrations to consider, the probative value of which depends entirely upon their usage. Palm Bay Imports Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin, 396 F.3d 1369, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1693 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). They are: AERO, Reg. No. 4,623,905 (armbands specifically designed for and holders for cellular phones) and AERO FIT, Reg. No. 6,201,621 (moisture-wicking sports bras); COCO, Reg. No. 5,979,115 (armbands specially adapted for personal electronic devices, namely, mobile phones) and COCOLICIOUS, Reg. No. 4,782,135 (sports bras); DEFY LIMITS, Reg. No. 5,318,049 (armbands especially adapted for personal electronic devices, namely, for holding cell phones) and DEFY, Reg. No. 4,089,917 (sports bras); EMPOWER, Reg. No. 5,686,423 (armbands specially adapted for personal electronic devices, namely, mobile phones) and EMPOWER POSTURECUE, Reg. No. 4,243,710 (sports bras); , 5,395,458 (armbands specially adapted for personal electronic devices, namely, mobile phones) and , 5,175,029 (sports bras); THE ULTIMATE ARMBAND, 4,137,213 (armbands specially designed for and holders for cellular phones) and ULTIMATE SPORTS BRA, 5,352,384 (sports bras); POWER & CO., 5,464,870 (armbands specially adapted for personal electronic devices, namely, smartphones) and POWER CORE, 3,152,082 (sport bras); SLIM-FIT, 4,492,791 (armbands that serve as carrying cases for portable and handheld electronic devices, namely, mobile phones) and SLIMTEK, 5,862,269 (sports bras). Although these third-party registrations are for the goods at issue (or very similar ones), Applicant offered absolutely no evidence showing the extent to which these Serial No. 88172627 - 21 - registrations are actually used in commerce, or consumers’ familiarity with them. “[W]here the ‘record includes no evidence about the extent of [third-party] uses … [t]he probative value of this evidence is thus minimal.” Id. (citing Han Beauty, Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Co., 236 F.3d 1333, 57 USPQ2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 2001)); see Smith Bros. Mfg. Co. v. Stone Mfg. Co., 476 F.2d 1004, 177 USPQ 462, 462-63 (CCPA 1973) (“But in the absence of any evidence showing the extent of use of any of [the third-party registrations] or whether any of them are now in use, they provide no basis for saying that the marks so registered have had, or may have, any effect at all on the public mind so as to have a bearing on likelihood of confusion. The purchasing public is not aware of registrations reposing in the Patent Office and though they are relevant, in themselves they have little evidentiary value on the issue before us.”); see also In re Opus One Inc., 60 USPQ2d 1812, 1814 (TTAB 2001) (citation omitted). In addition, none of the marks are similar in appearance to the PUREMOVE marks at issue here, and there is no evidence of record establishing that there is widespread use of PUREMOVE marks for armbands adapted for mobile phones, which would make the registered mark weak and entitled to only a narrow scope of protection. See Palm Bay Imps., 73 USPQ2d at 1693 (“Evidence of third-party use of similar marks on similar goods is relevant to show that a mark is relatively weak and entitled to only a narrow scope of protection.”). Thus, Applicant’s third-party registration evidence is neutral, at best. 3. Relatedness Overall In general, Applicant “acknowledges that runners wear sports bras and runners wear armbands for mobile phones, and that Reebok itself sells both sports bras and Serial No. 88172627 - 22 - armbands for mobile phones under its REEBOK house mark.”17 But, “there is no evidence of record suggesting that consumers who purchase Reebok’s PUREMOVE sports bras necessarily also purchase Reebok’s armbands for mobile phones. In fact, there is no evidence of record demonstrating that Reebok markets its PUREMOVE sports bras and armbands for mobile phones together.”18 Again, in order to find relatedness of the goods at issue, we only need to find that news articles or third-party websites show that the relevant goods are used by purchasers for the same purpose; advertisements show that the relevant goods are advertised together; or that the record includes copies of use-based registrations of the same mark for both Applicant’s identified goods and the goods listed in the cited registration. See, e.g., In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d at 1817. And, the marks here are identical so the goods need not be as close to support a finding of likelihood of confusion. In re Shell Oil Co., 26 USPQ2d at 1689; In re Iolo Techs., 95 USPQ2d at 1499. We consider Internet web pages only for what they show on their face rather than the truth of the matters asserted therein, but “such materials are frequently competent to show, on their face, matters relevant to trademark claims (such as public perception), regardless of whether the statements are true or false.” Harry Winston, Inc. v. Bruce Winston Gem Corp., 111 USPQ2d 1419, 1427-28 (TTAB 2014); see also In re Mr. Recipe, LLC, 118 USPQ2d at 1087 n.4 (“Internet evidence is 17 Applicant’s Appeal Brief, 11 TTABVUE 15. 18 Id. at 16. Serial No. 88172627 - 23 - generally admissible and may be considered for purposes of evaluating a trademark.”) (citations omitted). The Internet webpage evidence that we have considered shows that sports bras and armbands adapted for mobile phones are frequently offered under the same mark. The Sweaty Betty webpage featuring its Media Armband shows a woman wearing both a sports bra and an armband adapted for a mobile phone, and at the bottom of the webpage a Sweaty Betty Ultimate Sports Bra is offered for sale.19 Applicant even “acknowledges that runners wear sports bras and runners wear armbands for their mobile phones, and that Reebok itself sells both sports bras and armbands for mobile phones under its REEBOK house mark.”20 Based on this evidence, we find that sports bras and armbands for mobile phones, which can be worn simultaneously, are of great utility to female consumers who engage in athletic pursuits, including running. These goods allow for freedom of movement, which enhances a woman’s athletic activities and overall athletic experience. Consequently, the Internet webpage evidence that we have considered—although less probative because it also features house marks that are used in the fields of sportswear, athletic apparel, and athletic accessories—is more persuasive than Applicant’s third-party registration evidence, and still persuades us that sports bras and “armbands specially 19 See Nov. 17, 2018 Office Action at pp. 17; July 30, 2019 Final Office Action at pp. 42-43. We note that other Internet website evidence proffered by the Examining Attorney also shows a model wearing a sports bra and an armband adapted for mobile phones at the same time, but since that evidence is from the websites of mass retailers, it has little probative value. 20 Applicant’s Appeal Brief, 11 TTABVUE 16. Serial No. 88172627 - 24 - adapted for personal electronic devices, namely, mobile phones” are related, particularly when identified by identical marks. This DuPont factor tilts in favor of a finding of likelihood of confusion. C. Channels of Trade There are no limitations as to trade channels or classes of purchasers in the application or cited registration, so it is presumed that the application and registration encompass all goods of the type described, that the goods move in all normal trade channels for those goods, and that the goods are available to all classes of purchasers. In re Linkvest S.A., 24 USPQ2d 1716, 1716 (TTAB 1992); In re Elbaum, 211 USPQ 639, 640 (TTAB 1981). We find the Internet website evidence discussed above, although less persuasive, still shows that sports bras and armbands adapted for mobile phones travel in the same trade channels. This DuPont factor weighs in favor of likelihood of confusion. D. Degree of Consumer Care Finally, even though the Examining Attorney and the applicant did not make any arguments or present any evidence about the degree of consumer care, the Internet website evidence proffered by the Examining Attorney shows that sports bras and armbands adapted for mobile phones are widely available, inexpensive items. For example, Applicant’s Reebok OS Run Media Armband offered at reebok.com is Serial No. 88172627 - 25 - $30.00,21 the Reebok Puremove Bra offered at reebok.com is $60.00,22 the Puma Running Phone Armband at us.puma.com is $27.00,23 Puma sports bras at us.puma.com range in price from $28.00 to $50.00,24 the Mizuno Exercise Arm Band Case is $18.00 at Mizuno.com,25 the Mizuno Women’s Alpha Bra offered at Mizuno.com is $35.00,26 the Sweaty Betty Media Armband at sweatybetty.com is $30.00,27 and the Ultimate Sports Bra, also at sweatybetty.com, is $37.00.28 From this evidence, we infer that purchasers of both sports bras and armbands adapted for mobile phones would exercise a lesser degree of care in making their purchasing decisions, even though sports bras and armbands adapted for mobile phones may be purchased by consumers generally interested in exercise and physical fitness; although particular consumers may be sophisticated, that does not mean they are immune from source confusion. In re Decombe, 9 USPQ2d 1812, 1814-15 (TTAB 1988). Therefore, we find that the lesser degree of consumer care that consumers would exercise when purchasing these goods weighs in favor of a likelihood of confusion. Cf. In re Thor Tech, 113 USPQ2d at 1551 (although neither the applicant nor the examining attorney presented evidence regarding the degree of 21 Nov. 17, 2018 Office Action at pp. 48-49. 22 Id. at p. 50. 23 Id. at pp. 32-33. 24 Id. at pp. 34-38. 25 July 30, 2019 Office Action at p. 19. 26 Id. at p. 21. 27 Id. at p. 42. 28 Id. at p. 43. Serial No. 88172627 - 26 - consumer care, the Board used evidence in the record to find that purchasers would exercise a high degree of care in making decisions to purchase trucks and recreational vehicle towable trailers). IV. Conclusion After considering all of the evidence of record as it pertains to the relevant DuPont factors, even if not specifically discussed herein, we find that confusion is likely. The marks are identical, the goods are related, the channels of trade overlap, and consumers would exercise a lesser degree of care when purchasing the goods at issue. Decision: The refusal to register Applicant’s Mark, PUREMOVE, is affirmed.