[Redacted], Mathew R., 1 Complainant,v.Louis DeJoy, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Pacific Area), Agency.Download PDFEqual Employment Opportunity CommissionDec 17, 2020Appeal No. 2020000501 (E.E.O.C. Dec. 17, 2020) Copy Citation U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 Mathew R.,1 Complainant, v. Louis DeJoy, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Pacific Area), Agency. Appeal No. 2020000501 Agency No. 4F-920-0028-19 DECISION On September 17, 2019, Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency’s August 26, 2019 final decision concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency’s final decision. BACKGROUND At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a City Carrier, 02/D, at the Agency’s Del Rosa Station in San Bernardino, California. On February 21, 2019, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against him and subjected him to a hostile work environment on the bases of race (Asian), national origin (Vietnamese), sex (male), and color (Yellow) when: 1. on November 9, 2018, Complainant was issued a Seven-Day Suspension for Unacceptable Work Performance; 1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website. 2020000501 2 2. on November 11, 2018, Complainant left work for medical reasons and was not allowed to return until he provided acceptable medical documentation; and 3. on November 29, 2018, Complainant was issued a 14-Day Suspension for Unacceptable Work Performance dated November 20, 2018. The record contains a copy of the Seven-Day Suspension in Claim (1). Therein, Complainant’s supervisor (S1) explained that Complainant was involved in an accident on October 22, 2018, in which Complainant drove his postal vehicle into a fire hydrant, “shearing off its flange.” As a result, the water department was forced to suspend service in the neighborhood until the hydrant could be fixed. S1 said Complainant’s actions disrupted mail delivery and cost the Agency money by requiring overtime compensation. As a result, Complainant violated the Agency’s policies on safety and safety practices. Complainant claimed that there was no damage to his vehicle. In Claim (2), Complainant explained that the matter actually occurred on November 17, 2018, and that he told S1 that he was going home sick. Complainant asserted that he went to the doctor and was placed off work. He then returned to work with a doctor’s note, but S1 did not accept the note. Complainant then went back to his doctor, who placed Complainant off work for approximately 11 more days. Complainant claimed that S1’s actions created a hostile work environment for him. S1 explained that Complainant was required to carry overtime on his assignment that day but said that he had a party to go to at 4:00 p.m. and would not cover it. After Complainant met with his union steward, he requested leave on the basis of stress. Therefore, S1 requested medical documentation to support the leave request. S1 denied harassing Complainant and asserted that Complainant “was just being mandated to work that time on his route because there was no available help to take that time off his route.” A review of the record does not reveal any medical documentation to support Complainant’s request for leave. The record does contain a copy of a request for leave that appears to be dated November 10, 2018 and signed by a supervisor on November 17, 2018; the supervisor’s name is not readily identifiable. The request sought annual leave and notes that it was for “stress leave.” The request is marked as approved. In the 14-Day Suspension in Claim (3), S1 explained that Complainant engaged in unacceptable work performance when he drove without a seat belt. S1 did not accept Complainant’s explanation that he was moving only a couple of feet. Complainant argued that he should not have been suspended because he did not wear his seat belt for only one delivery and because S1 was spying on him. S1 noted that it was state law to wear a seat belt. At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of his right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). When Complainant did not request a hearing within the time frame provided in 29 C.F.R. § 1614.108(f), the Agency issued a final decision pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b). The decision concluded that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected him to discrimination as alleged. 2020000501 3 ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b), the Agency's decision is subject to de novo review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a). See Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614, at Chapter 9, § VI.A. (Aug. 5, 2015) (explaining that the de novo standard of review “requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker,” and that EEOC “review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission’s own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law”). Disparate Treatment To prevail in a disparate treatment claim, Complainant must satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Complainant must initially establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that he was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). Proof of a prima facie case will vary depending on the facts of the particular case. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n.13. The burden then shifts to the Agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately prevail, Complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Agency's explanation is pretextual. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S. Ct. 2097 (2000); St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993). This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the Agency has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether Complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the Agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983); Hernandez v. Dep’t of Transp., EEOC Request No. 05900159 (June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Dep’t of the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990). In this case, regarding Claim (1), S1 explained that Complainant was issued the Seven-Day Suspension because he ran his vehicle into a fire hydrant, which caused the flange to shear off and caused the water department to cease service to the neighborhood until the fire hydrant could be repaired. With respect to Claim (2), although the record seems to indicate that Complainant was ultimately granted leave, we nonetheless note that S1 also explained that Complainant originally wanted to leave early to attend a party, and when that was denied, requested leave on the basis of stress. Therefore, S1 believed Complainant needed medical documentation to support his request. As to Claim (3), S1 issued Complainant a 14-Day Suspension after observing Complainant not wearing a seat belt, which violated Agency policies and state law. 2020000501 4 Following a review of the record, we find that Complainant has not met his burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Agency's articulated reasons for its actions were pretextual, or that Agency officials harbored any discriminatory animus towards his protected bases. Accordingly, the Commission finds that Complainant was not subjected to discrimination as alleged. Furthermore, to the extent that Complainant claimed that he was subjected to a hostile work environment in connection with the above-discussed incidents, the Commission finds that under the standards set forth in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) that Complainant's claim of hostile work environment must fail. See Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (Mar. 8, 1994). A finding of a hostile work environment is precluded by our determination that Complainant failed to establish that any of the actions taken by the Agency were motivated by discriminatory animus. See Oakley v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01982923 (Sept. 21, 2000). CONCLUSION Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including those not specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the Agency’s final decision. STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0920) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider this appellate decision if Complainant or the Agency submits a written request that contains arguments or evidence that tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the agency. Requests for reconsideration must be filed with EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. If the party requesting reconsideration elects to file a statement or brief in support of the request, that statement or brief must be filed together with the request for reconsideration. A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days from receipt of another party’s request for reconsideration within which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). Complainant should submit his or her request for reconsideration, and any statement or brief in support of his or her request, via the EEOC Public Portal, which can be found at https://publicportal.eeoc.gov/Portal/Login.aspx. Alternatively, Complainant can submit his or her request and arguments to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, via regular mail addressed to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail addressed to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. 2020000501 5 In the absence of a legible postmark, a complainant’s request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if OFO receives it by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. An agency’s request for reconsideration must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). Either party’s request and/or statement or brief in opposition must also include proof of service on the other party, unless Complainant files his or her request via the EEOC Public Portal, in which case no proof of service is required. Failure to file within the 30-day time period will result in dismissal of the party’s request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted together with the request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610) You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815) If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. 2020000501 6 Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations December 17, 2020 Date Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation