Reba E. Modena, Appellant,v.Louis Caldera, Secretary, Department of the Army, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMar 26, 1999
01982749_r (E.E.O.C. Mar. 26, 1999)

01982749_r

03-26-1999

Reba E. Modena, Appellant, v. Louis Caldera, Secretary, Department of the Army, Agency.


Reba E. Modena, )

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Appeal No. 01982749

) Agency No. BKEQFO9801I0020

Louis Caldera, )

Secretary, )

Department of the Army, )

Agency. )

______________________________)

DECISION

On March 4, 1998, appellant filed a timely appeal with this Commission

from a February 2, 1998 final agency decision (FAD), pertaining to

her complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in violation of

�501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �791

et seq. In her complaint, appellant alleged that she was subjected to

discrimination on the bases of physical disability (injured right arm)

and in retaliation when:

On September 24, 1997, appellant received a Decision Day suspension to

decide whether she would be able to continue her employment;

On October 1, 1997, appellant signed an Employee Decision and Commitment

Letter because she was told that she must sign the letter and abide by

its terms, or resign;

Appellant was the only manager with a dress code;

Appellant was paid less than any other management employees, and had

not received a raise despite promises to the contrary; and

On October 21, 1997, appellant received a letter of separation, effective

November 3, 1997.

The agency dismissed allegations (1) - (4) pursuant to EEOC Regulation

29 C.F.R. �1614.107(a), for failure to state a claim, and dismissed

allegation (5) pursuant to EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.107(d),

for raising the same claim previously settled in a grievance

proceeding. Specifically, the agency found that allegation (1) did not

state a claim because the Decision Day action did not adversely affect a

term, condition, or privilege of her employment. According to the agency,

the Decision Day suspension merely gave appellant the opportunity to

improve her performance and appearance before any adverse action was taken

against her. The agency also notes that the Decision Day action was given

after appellant received a Caution Memo September 8, 1997. Similarly,

allegation (3) was dismissed because it did not involve an adverse action,

and allegation (2) was found to cause no harm because appellant �did sign

the letter and therefore did not suffer any loss in pay or benefits.�

The agency dismissed allegation (4), because appellant was aware of the

terms and conditions of her position when she accepted the agency offer

of employment, and because the agency's mere words (promise of raise)

were not enough to render appellant aggrieved. The agency found that

a grievance had been filed regarding her termination in allegation (5),

and a final decision had been issued on the matter. The agency reasoned

that appellant chose to pursue her discrimination allegation through the

grievance process when she agreed, in settlement of the grievance, to two

(2) additional weeks of paid leave before her termination took effect.

Finally, the agency dismissed appellant's basis of retaliation because

she had no prior EEO activity.

A review of the record reveals that appellant also alleged in her

formal complaint that she was being harassed by her business manager.

Specifically, appellant complained that every time she told her employees

to do something, the business manager would change her orders, and that

the business manager often called appellant into her office to scold

her. The Counselor's Report includes several notes from appellant,

listing various problems that she has had with the business manager.

The agency's final decision does not address this issue.

The record contains a copy of the September 24, 1997 Decision Day

letter, and the October 1, 1997 Employee Decision and Commitment

letter. The Decision Day letter informed appellant that she was

being given one day off to decide the status of her future employment.

It noted appellant's deficient performance and professional appearance.

The Decision Day letter also threatened that any failure to adhere to

performance and professional standards for twelve months �following this

decision� may result in appellant's immediate termination.

The Employee Decision and Commitment Letter appears to memorialize the

standards appellant would be required to meet. It stated that failure to

follow its standards �will result in immediate termination.� Appellant

signed the Employee Decision and Commitment letter, i.e., agreed to its

terms, because her only other option was resignation, as evinced by the

first line of the letter, which states, �I have decided to keep my job.�

The record also contains a letter dated November 3, 1997, referring to

appellant's grievance on her separation; determining that the separation

was justified for business reasons; and approving an extension of

appellant's original separation date to December 5, 1997. We note,

however, that a copy of the collective bargaining agreement is not

contained in the record.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.107(a) provides, in relevant part, that

an agency shall dismiss a complaint, or portion thereof, that fails to

state a claim. An agency shall accept a complaint from any aggrieved

employee or applicant for employment who believes that he or she has been

discriminated against by that agency because of race, color, religion,

sex, national origin, age or disabling condition. 29 C.F.R. �1614.103;

�1614.106(a). The Commission's federal sector case precedent has long

defined an "aggrieved employee" as one who suffers a present harm or loss

with respect to a term, condition, or privilege of employment for which

there is a remedy. Diaz v. Department of the Air Force, EEOC Request

No. 05931049 (April 21, 1994).

First, an allegation must be within the purview of the EEO process,

meaning that the complainant must allege employment discrimination on

a basis set forth in one of the statutes enforced by the Commission.

Cartrett v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05950744

(Feb. 8, 1996). Then, to state a claim under the Commission's

regulations, a complainant must show an �injury in fact.� Diaz, EEOC

Request No. 05931049 (citing Hackett v. McGuire Bros., 445 F.2d 447

(3rd Cir. 1971).

Despite appellant's retention of all pay and benefits during her

Decision Day action, appellant has been rendered aggrieved by the action.

See Pasatiempo v. Department of Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 01980893 (Oct. 16,

1998) (holding that employee placed on administrative leave, while

retaining full pay and benefits, to contemplate his proposed removal,

was sufficiently aggrieved to state a claim). Because appellant has

alleged that the adverse action was based on a disability, she has raised

an allegation within the purview of the EEOC regulations. Accordingly,

appellant stated a claim and the agency's dismissal of allegation (1)

is REVERSED.

Allegation (2) states a claim for similar reasons. The Commission finds

that the Employee Decision and Commitment Letter altered the terms,

conditions, and privileges of her employment by, in effect, guaranteeing

appellant that her failure to meet all standards would result in immediate

termination. Because appellant has alleged that the adverse action was

based on a disability, she has raised an allegation within the purview

of the EEOC regulations. Consequently, the agency's decision to dismiss

allegation (2) is REVERSED.

Regarding allegation (3), the disparate application of a dress code

states a claim. See Renteria v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal

No. 01961122 (Nov. 8, 1996); Rappleyea v. United States Postal Service,

EEOC Appeal No. 01951469 (Sept. 1, 1995) (claimant alleging that dress

code is only enforced against her states a claim); Parisot v. Treasury,

EEOC Appeal No. 01941601 (Nov. 23, 1994). Therefore, the agency's

decision to dismiss allegation (3) is REVERSED.

In its analysis of allegation (4), the agency failed to properly

characterize the allegation. Appellant in essence claims that she was

entitled to a raise, and did not receive one although similarly situated

managers were paid more. Therefore, the Commission construes allegation

(4) as stating that the agency failed to award appellant a raise because

of her physical disability. As defined herein, allegation (4) states a

claim within the purview of the EEOC regulations. See Davis v. Navy,

EEOC Appeal No. 01973974 (Jan. 23, 1998) (finding that allegation

in which complainant alleges that she had been promised a raise, but

had not received any pay increases, states a claim). Accordingly, the

Commission finds that allegation (4) states a claim, and the agency's

dismissal of the allegation is REVERSED.

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.301(a) states that when a person is

employed by an agency subject to 5 U.S.C. �7121(d) and is covered by a

collective bargaining agreement that permits allegations of discrimination

to be raised in a negotiated grievance procedure, a person wishing to file

a complaint or grievance on a matter of alleged employment discrimination

must elect to raise the matter under either part 1614 or the negotiated

grievance procedure, but not both. An aggrieved employee who files

a grievance with an agency whose negotiated agreement permits the

acceptance of grievances which allege discrimination may not thereafter

file a complaint on the same matter under this part 1614, irrespective

of whether the agency has informed the individual of the need to elect,

or whether the grievance has raised an issue of discrimination.

The agency has provided no evidence of a collective bargaining agreement

permitting allegations of discrimination to be raised, and absent such

proof, an allegation cannot be dismissed for having been the subject

of a negotiated grievance process. Therefore, the agency's dismissal

of allegation (5) pursuant to EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.107(d)

is REVERSED.

The Commission notes that the agency failed to address appellant's

allegation concerning harassment from her business manager; the Commission

deems the agency's action to be tantamount to a dismissal of that matter.

Specifically, appellant alleges that the business manager undermined

appellant's supervisory authority, and frequently called appellant

into her office to scold her. Appellant's submissions on appeal reveal

that the EEO Office was notified of the issue by the counselor's review

of appellant's notes attached to the Counselor's Report, and appellant

referenced the matter in her formal complaint. Accordingly, the agency's

dismissal of appellant's allegation of harassment is REVERSED.

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.103(a) provides that individual and

class complaints of employment discrimination and retaliation prohibited

by Title VII (discrimination on the bases of race, color, religion,

sex and national origin), the ADEA (discrimination on the basis of

age when the aggrieved individual is at least forty years of age), the

Rehabilitation Act (discrimination based on the basis of disability),

or the Equal Pay Act (sex-based wage discrimination) shall be processed

in accordance with this part. EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.101(b)

provides that no person shall be subject to retaliation for opposing any

practice made unlawful by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (Title VII)

(42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.), the Equal Pay Act or for participating in

any stage of administrative or judicial proceedings under these statutes.

The Commission finds no evidence to indicate that appellant engaged in

prior EEO activity. Accordingly, the agency's dismissal of appellant's

basis of reprisal is AFFIRMED.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the agency's final decision is MODIFIED. The decision to

dismiss allegations (1) -(5) and the allegation of harassment is REVERSED.

Allegations (1)-(5) and the allegation of harassment are REMANDED for

further processing in accordance with the Order below. The dismissal

of the basis of reprisal is AFFIRMED.

ORDER (E1092)

The agency is ORDERED to process the remanded allegations in accordance

with 29 C.F.R. �1614.108. The agency shall acknowledge to the appellant

that it has received the remanded allegations within thirty (30) calendar

days of the date this decision becomes final. The agency shall issue to

appellant a copy of the investigative file and also shall notify appellant

of the appropriate rights within one hundred fifty (150) calendar days

of the date this decision becomes final, unless the matter is otherwise

resolved prior to that time. If the appellant requests a final decision

without a hearing, the agency shall issue a final decision within sixty

(60) days of receipt of appellant's request.

A copy of the agency's letter of acknowledgment to appellant and a copy

of the notice that transmits the investigative file and notice of rights

must be sent to the Compliance Officer as referenced below.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0595)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)

calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action.

The report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to

the appellant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's

order, the appellant may petition the Commission for enforcement of

the order. 29 C.F.R. �1614.503(a). The appellant also has the right

to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's

order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement.

See 29 C.F.R. ��1614.408, 1614.409, and 1614.503(g). Alternatively,

the appellant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying

complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File

A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. ��1614.408 and 1614.409. A civil action for

enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to

the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. �2000e-16(c) (Supp. V 1993). If the

appellant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the

complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated.

See 29 C.F.R. �1614.410.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,

the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (T0993)

This decision affirms the agency's final decision in part, but it also

requires the agency to continue its administrative processing of a

portion of your complaint. You have the right to file a civil action

in an appropriate United States District Court on both that portion of

your complaint which the Commission has affirmed AND that portion of the

complaint which has been remanded for continued administrative processing.

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the

date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action

is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30)

CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult

an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction

in which your action would be filed. In the alternative, you may file

a civil action AFTER ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY (180) CALENDAR DAYS of the

date you filed your complaint with the agency, or your appeal with the

Commission, until such time as the agency issues its final decision

on your complaint. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE

DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD

OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND

OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case

in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and

not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

March 26, 1999

____________________________

DATE Ronnie Blumenthal, Director

Office of Federal Operations