Rea Trucking Co., Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 10, 1969

176 N.L.R.B. 520 (N.L.R.B. 1969)

520 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Rea Trucking Company, Inc. and General Teamsters,
Warehousemen and Cannery Workers Local Union
556, affiliated with International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs , Warehousemen & Helpers
of America , Independent and Rea Trucking
Company, Inc., Shop Grievance Committee. Case
19-CA-3930
June 10, 1969
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, BROWN, AND JENKINS
On February 19, 1969, Trial Examiner William E.
Spencer issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding , finding that the Respondent had
engaged in certain unfair labor practices within the
meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended , and recommending that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set
forth in the attached Trial Examiner ' s. Decision. The
Trial Examiner also found that the'Respondent had
not engaged in certain other alleged unfair labor
practices and recommended dismissal of these
allegations . Thereafter , the Respondent filed
exceptions to the Trial Examiner ' s Decision and a
supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed a
brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a
three-member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner' s Decision , the exceptions and the briefs,
and the entire record in this case , and hereby adopts
the findings , conclusions , and recommendations of
the Trial Examiner.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended , the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the
Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, and
hereby orders that the Respondent, Rea Trucking
Company, Inc., Touchet, Washington, its officers,
agents , successors , and assigns , shall take the action
set forth in the Trial Examiner ' s Recommended
Order.
February 8 and March 22, 1968, by the Union herein, the
General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board,
the latter hereinafter called the Board, issued his
complaint dated April 4, 1968, alleging in substance that
the Respondent herein discharged some twenty of its
employees in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended, hereinafter called the
Act; initiated the formation and dominated the
functioning of a grievance committee in violation of
Section 8(aX2) of the Act; by these, and numerous
statements and acts, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Respondent in its duly filed answer denied having engaged
in any of the alleged unlawful acts.
Pursuant to due notice, a hearing on the aforesaid
complaint was held before me in Walla Walla,
Washington, on June 6, 7, and 18, 1968, with all parties
represented and participating.
Upon the entire record in the case, my observation of
the witnesses, and consideration of the briefs filed with me
by each of the parties respectively, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE RESPONDENTS BUSINESS
Respondent, a Washington corporation, is engaged at
Touchet, Washington, in the manufacture of truck trailers.
It annually received in excess of $50,000 from sale of
trailers to customers located outside the State of
Washington.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
General Teamsters , Warehousemen and Cannery
Workers Local Union 556, affiliated with International
Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauffeurs , Warehousemen &
Helpers of America , Independent , herein called the Union,
is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Interference, Restraint, Coercion
1. Organizational activity
The Union began its organizational efforts among
Respondent's employees in November 1967. On
November 30, the Union petitioned for a Board election.
The election, based on a consent agreement, was held on
January 31. The Union was chosen bargaining
representative by a majority of those voting.
2. The issues
Numerous alleged coercive statements and coercive acts
and conduct by the Respondent; Respondent's alleged
assistance to and control of a "grievance committee" in
violation of Section 8(a)(2) of the Act; and some twenty
alleged discriminatory discharges, some occuring singly,
some in groups.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
WILLIAM E. SPENCER, Trial Examiner: Pursuant to an
original charge and an amended charge filed respectively
3. Respondent's knowledge of union activities and of
the identity of employees engaging therein
It is firmly established that Respondent had knowledge
of its employees organizational activities from the start.
Employee Wilbur Knapp presented an authorization card
176 NLRB No. 67
REA TRUCKING CO., INC. 521
to Truck Foreman Buster Katsel, who rejected it with
suggestions as to that part of the human anatomy where it
might properly be interred. Respondent's vice president,
John Rea, Jr., suggested that employee Arnold Chenoweth
"talk to the men and talk them out of this union thing."
He also told Chenoweth that if the plant went union his
father would lock the doors. On or before December 6,
the Respondent was in possession of the Board's letter
advising Respondent of the filing of the Union's election
petition. This letter was read to the employees at a
meeting called by John H. Rea, Sr., Respondent's
president, on December 6.
4. The December 6 and 12 meetings
issued the threat that the three employees, as instigators
of the Union, had better start looking for another job,
that regardless of the outcome of the scheduled election
their employment would be terminated and all he would
need would be an excuse for their discharge.'
Following his meeting with the three employees, Rea
had all the employees assembled in the lunchroom, where
he singled out several of them for questioning concerning
their interest in the Union, among them Jerry Noblin and
Knapp; said Knapp was poorly qualified to lead the men
in organizational activities and would not long be working
for Respondent because of his union involvements. Also,
according to the General Counsel's witnesses, there was a
considerable repetition of statements made by Rea, Sr., in
the December 6 meeting.
The meeting of December 6 was opened with a
financial report of Respondent's office manager, William
Martin, tending to show that Respondent was losing
money.' During the meeting, Rea, Sr., announced that no
more overtime would be allowed. Overtime was in fact
thereafter discontinued. Rea testified that this
announcement was made in the context of Martin's
statement showing financial loss.' It is established,
however, in the credible testimony of several witnesses,
that during this same meeting, Rea read the letter
announcing the filing of the Union's petition; suggested
that employees take a straw vote to determine whether a
majority wanted union representation - no such vote was
taken; asked why the employees wanted a union, and
when certain employees in answering referred to better
wages, paid holidays, health insurance and the like, stated
that Respondent would not pay an employee for any day
that he did not work, nor would it pay his medical bills,
and that he would lock the doors or sell the business
rather than deal with the Union. He further stated that by
refusing to bargain he would force the Union to strike,
and that he, Rea, an expert marksman, would shoot the
first picket who stepped on company property. In this last
statement he referred a labor dispute at some other
location and damage suffered to his equipment as a result
of that dispute.
Rea met with the employees a second time on
December 12. Apparently, the December 6 meeting was
the first that he had ever held with employees. Prior to the
meeting of December 12, he summoned Employee
Chenoweth to his office and told him, according to
Chenoweth's credited testimony, that he knew Chenoweth
was one of the instigators of the Union; asked Chenoweth
to name four other employees involved with him in the
organizational effort, and when Chenoweth refused,
directed him to summon Wilbur Knapp and Lance Slack.
When the three employees were in his office, Rea
questioned them on why they wanted the Union to
represent them, stated that he would not pay for health
insurance or holidays, and that the employees would
receive lower wages if they chose the Union. He then
N
'Respondent would not stipulate that Martin was a supervisor within the
meaning of the Act . He became office manager in October 1967, and on
numerous occasions served as Respondent ' s spokesman in dealing with
employees I find that in matters material to the issues herein he acted as
Respondent ' s agent and that the employees would reasonably regard him
as representing Respondent.
'Rea testified that he discussed the matter of overtime as an economic
factor , unrelated to the Union ; that overtime had already been cut down
"gradually" since July I; that because of excessive costs in relation to
selling prices, he told the employees that there were three alternatives "to
go out of business , get more production out of the fellows . . . or cut our
crew back to a small volume."
5. Other alleged antiunion statements
It was Employee George Elwell's credited testimony
that on about December 6, after overtime had been
stopped, he told Rea, Jr., that he was not making enough
in wages on a 40-hour week, to which Rea replied, "You
guys should take Bill Knapp out and nutted [sic] him for
bringing the Union in. Don't blame me." Office Manager
Martin twice interrogated Frank Moss on how he would
vote in the election, and said if the employees chose the
Union everyone would be out a job and Rea, Sr., would
close down the business.
6. Concluding findings on alleged coercive statements
and conduct
The findings above are based on a composite view of
credible testimony of the several witnesses for the General
Counsel, whose testimony while differing in details,
repetitive to a degree, and at times somewhat confused in
such matters as dates, was on the whole, and in material
respects, mutually corroborative. No reliance has been
placed on testimony that I considered of doubtful
credibility. Rea, Sr., without specifically denying many of
the antiunion statements attributed to him, gave a
different version of the two meetings he had with
employees in December, but even if his explanations were
credited in full there would remain enough of
uncontradicted testimony to establish his strong antiunion
bias, interrogations of employees under coercive
circumstances, and threats of retaliatory actions in the
event the employees chose union representation. His
testimony that his announcement of overtime was
unrelated to the employees' organizaional activities, was
hardly credible considering the entire context of his
remarks in which the announcement was made, and his
threat to shoot the first picketing employee who set foot
on his property was both gratuitous and coercive in view
of his prior statements that by refusing to bargain with
the Union he would force it to strike. His explanation of
the threat of discharge made during his interview with
Chenoweth, Knapp, and Slack, I find unacceptable
because the thrust of the entire interview was to
interrogate these employees concerning their union
activities and to express his resistance to union demands.
In such a context his threat of discharge would reasonably
be construed as having its base in their union affiliation,
'Rea admitted that his meeting with the three employees occurred, that
he questioned them about the Union, and that at the end of the meeting he
told them that if they did not get their production up they might just as
well look for another job.
522 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
whether or not it was as pointed and emphatic as it would
appear to have been in the testimony of the three
employee witnesses. The threats to close the plant rather
than deal with the Union, made by both himself and
subordinates , harkens back to an earlier day in labor
relations when there was little novelty in this type of
employer reaction to his employees ' organizational
activities . In all, we have in Respondent ' s statements and
conduct the grossest sort of interference with its
employees' right to organize . Independently of the
discharges , such statements and conduct are flagrantly
violative of Section 8(axl) of the Act, and it is so found.
7. The incentive pay increases
On January 12, 1968, only a little more than 2 weeks
prior to the election of January 31, the Respondent
announced to its employees that it was instituting an
incentive pay program , by which a 20-cents-an-hour bonus
to be increased as the number of hours to construct a
trailer decreased , would be paid employees . This increase,
without parallel in Respondent ' s history , under other
circumstances may well have been viewed as economically
motivated, but when it is viewed in the light of layoffs
occurring on February 1 and thereafter, and Respondent's
open hostility to its employees ' organizing activities, its
timing can only be seen as still another effort by
Respondent to influence the results of the forthcoming
election . Accordingly , it is found that the granting of the
increases was violative of Section 8(aXl) of the Act.
Promise of benefits and threats of reprisal are, under the
decisions , equally coercive.
8. Alleged 8(a)(2)
At the December 6 meeting , after questioning his
employees on their reasons for wanting a union , Rea, Sr.,
suggested the formation of a "grievance committee";
called for nominations for places on such a committee;
and with the nominees out of the room , in the presence of
Rea, Sr ., Martin, and Katsel , the employees elected
Chenoweth and Jack Gawith, with George Elwell as
alternate , to constitute a committee to represent
employees in presenting grievances to management. Rea,
Sr., directed the employees to channel all complaints to
him through this committee. The Committee thus
constituted met twice with Rea, Sr ., and at these meetings
discussed a heating problem and the matter of overtime
pay-
It is obvious, I think, that Rea, Sr., proposed the
formation of this committee as a substitute for union
representation and that under the conditions attending its
formation it was incapable of functioning as a bona fide
labor organization . The fact is, however, that it had no
constitution , no bylaws , and that after the meetings it
ceased to function . The probabilities of its revival as a
labor organization are so remote that I do not deem a
disestablishment order justified . In fact , I am unable to
consider that in its brief existence it ever functioned as a
labor organization . However, Rea's action with respect to
it was an unlawful interference with his employees'
organizational rights and a restraint upon those rights. I
shall accordingly find an 8(aXl ) violation, while
recommending dismissal of the alleged 8(aX2).
B. The Discharges
1. Richard Angell
Beginning with May 29, 1967, Angell was employed by
the Respondent as a draftsman, a fulltime employee until
the fall college term began, and thereafter until he was
discharged about December 16 on a part-time basis. In
June, according to Angell, he asked Martin what he
thought would happen if the plant was organized and
Martin said Rea, Sr., would close it. Angell at that time
expressed the opinion that a union might be a good thing
for the employees. It is by no means clear, however, that
Martin at that time occupied a supervisory position. Rea,
Sr., testified that Angell was employed as "summer help"
but following Respondent's practice of helping its student
employees, was kept on for part-time work, with the
understanding that he would keep regular hours. In late
November, a dispute arose between Angell and Rea, Jr.,
about his keeping regular hours and Rea , Jr., told him
that he was discharged. Due to the intervention of Rea,
Sr., he was kept on and there appears to have been no
further question about the regularity of his working hours.
Admittedly, however, there was friction between Angell
and Martin over the preparation of a parts book. To
resolve their differences, Angell went to Rea, Sr., and the
upshot was that Rea, Sr., told him that if he could not
work out his differences with Martin satisfactorily one of
them would have to go. On the morning following this
conversation Rea, Sr., discharged Angell. This was a few
days after the December 12 meeting of Rea, Sr., with his
employees. Angell testified that on the occasion of his
discharge, Rea, Sr., referred to him as a "trouble maker"
and said that he should never have let him and Knapp
come back.
There is no evidence that Angell ever affiliated with the
Union, and the only testimony elicited from him on direct
examination relating to a union was the conversation he
had with Martin in June 1967. On redirect, however, he
testified that he had numerous conversations of like nature
with Martin. His characterization of these conversations
was that "they were just friendly and across the board,
sort of. ." Concerning the only conversations he had
about the Union with Martin after the latter became
office manager, he testified:
We talked about what people in the shop were saying
about the union , what I had heard and what he heard
to a certain extent. I didn't reveal any names. I just
said what they wanted, benefits and things like this, and
I remember talking to him about they wanted paid
holidays and asking him it won't be so bad if John
would go along with some paid holidays, meaning John
Rea, Sr. He said that would never happen. And we
talked about the things that had happened in the
meetings . And this was just over the board, an
exchange of opinions like it had been before.
Any discharges involving employees known to Rea as
favoring the Union , occurring after Rea's remarks to his
employees at the December meetings, require careful
though objective scrutiny, but there is enough substance to
Angell's friction with Martin over the parts book that I
find it as reasonable to believe that it was this which
precipitated his discharge as to attribute it to his union
activities, which as far as we know, consisted entirely of
what he described as a friendly give-and-take of opinion
with Martin. It is not even certain that he would have
been included in the voting unit. If it was Rea's intention
to get rid of the most active of the union adherents - and
REA TRUCKING CO., INC. 523
there is good reason in his own statements to believe that
he would undertake this - there still would remain a
doubt as to why he would single out part-time employee
Angell . Knapp 's testimony that Martin said Angell was
discharged for his union activity was not very convincing
in view of his placing the alleged statement on a date
prior to Angell ' s actual discharge , and in view of the
actual friction which developed between Martin and
Angel , friction serious enough that Angell bypassed
Martin and went to Rea, Sr ., with his complaint . This is
another of those times when I must recommend dismissal
of a case while harboring some doubts as to the actual
causation of the discharge.
2. Wilbur Knapp
Knapp , known to the Respondent as one of the
instigators of the organizational movement, was in
Respondent ' s employ from May 1966 to December 14,
1967. In late November , he was given a "probational"
wage increase . Rea, Sr ., testified : "during that next week
he refused to do some of the jobs that he was told to do,
or asked to do politely. On numerous occasions he refused
to do the work for the individuals that needed the
material , so he just plain told them to go to the devil. He
didn ' t really care . . .And when Friday rolled around that
week , why, . I called him into my office , and I told
him that he hadn ' t proved to me that he was doing his
best at the job, and I was going to take the 10 cents an
hour away." This occurred about December 1. Knapp
admitted on cross-examination that in late November he
had a dispute with Martin about keeping time records,
and when Rea talked to him about it, he told Rea that
Martin had no business giving him orders because Martin
was only a draftsman , whereupon Rea advised him that
Martin was following his , Rea's, orders . Knapp admitted
that his differences with Martin were "vigorous"; and
questioned on cross-examination : "You swore at him, at
Martin?" testified , " I told him to go . . ." to "Get out of
here and let me do my job ." Knapp also admitted on
cross-examination that on an occasion in September he
was told by his shop foreman that he was on probation.
Coming to the incidents relied on by the Respondent as
precipitating Knapps ' discharge , it appears that on or
about December 16, the Respondent instituted a job
training program for its employees under the
Government ' s Manpower Training and Development
program . In this connection employees were asked to sign
certain forms . James Strand , one of two government
representatives on hand at the time , testified:
Well, we were filling out the personal characteristic
forms and of course the pledge form that he [Knapp]
would agree to report on time and to take part in the
training as outlined in the contract . I explained the
program to him as best I could and he did not seem to
comprehend or he did not seem to sign the forms after
I was through , so I could not quite determine whether
he did not understand or whether he did not want to
sign . He made a statement he did not like to sign a
legal contract . I explained this was not a contract and
he still did not want to sign , so I called John Rea, Jr.,
over to explain , thinking perhaps that he would trust
John Rea a little more than he trusted me. So John
Rea, Jr ., explained it to him and at that time he did
sign it . My thinking , also, is that possibly he did not
quite see the form well enough to sign , because earlier
he claimed to me he did have trouble with his eyes ...
. He did have to find out , on the sheet of paper, where
he was supposed to sign.
After having signed and after having returned to the
shop, Knapp came back a second , and possibly a third,
time. He testified:
I wanted to find out whether I was to be a trainer or
trainee . I thought I understood I was to be trained on
the saw and I had already been there a year and a half,
and there was nothing to train me at in another year.
Phyllis Dial, Respondent's bookkeeper , testified that on
one or both of these later appearances at the office,
Knapp ' s attitude was one of belligerance , that he spoke in
a loud voice , etc. This is borne out to a degree by the
testimony of Ivan Bailey , the second of the government
representatives on hand during the Knapp interview, that
Knapp , on his return trip to the office , seemed "a little
aggravated ," and that he , Bailey , said to Rea, Sr.,
subsequent to Knapp ' s discharge , that Knapp "seemed
kind of worked up."
Concerning the actual discharge , Rea, Sr ., testified that
when Dial reported that Knapp did not want to sign the
training program forms he instructed her to tell Knapp
that he did not have to sign, that it was to his advantage,
not Rea' s. Shortly thereafter , when Dial reported that
Knapp was causing a disturbance about the form, Rea
had Knapp brought to his office where he told him,
according to his testimony , that he was "through," that
Rea had "had enough ." " I instructed him," Rea testified,
"to get his time card and bring it back here and not to
stop and visit along the route , and I followed him out
there to make sure he did ." Knapp testified that on the
occasion of his discharge , Rea referred to him as a
"trouble maker ." Employee Chenoweth , a credible
witness, testified that Rea told him that he had discharged
Knapp because "he was a trouble maker among the
crew."
Granting that from the entire record it may be inferred
that Knapp, aside from his union activities, was to some
extent a troublesome employee , no contention is made
that he was actually incompetent , he continued in
Respondent ' s employ after having been placed on
probation , and his probationary wage increase was
withdrawn subsequent to the time when he had solicited
Foreman Katsel to sign a union authorization card. Not
only was he known to the Respondent as one of the
instigators of the organizational movement , but he was
one of the three employees called to Rea's office on
December 12 where they were questioned by Rea on their
union inclinations and warned by him, according to their
testimony , that they would be out of work as soon as he
could find an excuse for discharging them.4 The discharge
followed two days later and under circumstances that add
to rather than subtract from the equivocal posture of
Respondent 's defense. I am convinced , as Knapp testified,
that the job training program had not been explained to
him in advance to a degree that when asked to sign the
forms he would have been fully acquainted with what he
was signing . Obviously , when he returned to the office
after signing the forms , he was disturbed for fear that he
had signed up to become a trainee on a job in which he
was already proficient . He doubtless was somewhat
As previously found , Rea's version of these remarks was that he told
the three employees "to go back out to the shop and go to work ." that "if
they didn' t get their production up that . . . they had just as well look for
another job." I am convinced that whether or not he used exactly the
words attributed to him by the three employees , that the context of his
remarks was such that the employees would reasonably believe that the
threat of discharge had its basis in their union activities.
524 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
agitated, and may well have spoken in a loud voice, but
there is no evidence that he was profane or abusive, or
deliberately attempting to cause trouble. I can only
conclude that, viewing Respondent's defense in its most
favorable aspect, there was mixed motivation in Rea's
discharge action in which a substantial element was
Knapp's union activities. Accordingly, I find his discharge
in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
3. Jerry Noblin
Noblin, in Respondent's employ from August to
December 18, 1967, worked in Respondent's shop and
when directed to do so drove a truck. The reason
advanced by Respondent for his discharge on December
18 was that he refused orders that he was to haul wheat.
Shortly after he was hired, Noblin told Rea, Sr., that
he would not drive a truck the way the schedule was then
set up, and at that time Rea discharged him. It does not
appear, however, that the discharge became effective.
Noblin testified that he told Rea he thought things could
be worked out, and that he then went ahead and drove
truck in a manner that conformed to his original
suggestion . According to him, he was instructed to work
in the shop on December 18 by Rea, Jr. The previous
week or so, he had hauled wheat and found it
unsatisfactory because some days he was paid only $4,
and some days was unable to haul on account of rain.
Because of this experience he went to Rea, Jr., the
foreman of the shop, and asked if he could return to the
shop. Rea informed him that he could. Noblin admitted
that early in the morning of December 18, Earl Bruskirk,
a truck driver, called him about hauling wheat. Noblin's
explanation of his refusal was that Rea, Jr., was a
foreman whereas Bruskirk was not, and that in reporting
for work in the shop rather than hauling wheat he was but
obeying the orders of his superior.
Truck Foreman Katsel testified that, unable to reach
Noblin on the Thursday previous to the discharge, he told
Bruskirk to instruct Noblin to report for a trucking
assignment, and that Bruskirk later reported to him that
he had reached Noblin, and Noblin "wasn't going to
make the trip." Katsel then assigned another driver to the
job. According to Katsel, he at that time decided to
discharge Noblin for refusing a trucking assignment, but
was unable to reach him until the following Monday,
December 18, when he saw Noblin working in the shop.
Rea, Jr., the shop foreman, admitted that on the occasion
in question he authorized Noblin to work in the shop. He
testified that Noblin came to his house, said he was all
through hauling and didn ' t want to sit around doing
nothing, and wanted to know if there was any work to do
in the shop. Rea replied that there was work in the shop
and that if Noblin was sure he had no more hauling he
should report Monday morning (December 18) for shop
work. According to Rea, Jr., Katsel and Rea, Sr., on the
morning in question , wanted to know of him why Noblin
was working in the shop. It was only then that he learned
that Noblin had refused to haul grain. Noblin was then
called into Rea, Sr.'s office and discharged. Noblin
admitted on cross-examination that he told Rea, Sr., that
he could not make enough money hauling wheat and
wanted to work in the shop. He denied that he refused to
haul.
The General Counsel appears to think that Noblin was
framed or entrapped by Rea, Jr., and Katsel giving him
conflicting directions and then discharging him because he
relied on Rea's instruction rather than instructions relayed
to him by Katsel through truckdriver Bruskirk. Katsel
testified that it was not unusual for him to issue his
instructions through one of the truckdrivers, and I accept
this testimony. In view of Respondent's strong antiunion
bias, the theory of entrapment is interesting though not
quite convincing. Admittedly, Noblin did not like hauling
and this was true from early in his employment when he
was tentatively discharged for insisting on shop work. It
was equally true at the time of his discharge. Upon the
entire evidence, I believe that an equally reasonable
inference is that he refused or evaded instructions to drive
a truck on a job which obviously and admittedly was
distasteful to him. It is true that at the December meeting
with employees, Rea, Sr., specifically asked Noblin what
he thought of the Union, and that Noblin replied in effect
that he thought it was a good thing though he could also
understand Rea's opposition to it. Aside from this one
incident, there is no foundation for finding that Noblin
was active in the organizational movement or contributed
to it in any way further than signing an authorization
card. He admitted as much. It also seemed to me that in
several instances during his examination Noblin's faculty
for recall was restricted somewhat except in matters which
bolstered his case. In all, I must find that the evidence
does not preponderate in establishing that his discharge
was violative of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, and therefore I
shall recommend dismissal of his case.
4. Lance Slack
It is alleged that Slack was constructively discharged on
about December 30, 1967. He was known to the
Respondent as one of the instigators of the organizational
movement and was active in passing out authorization
cards to fellow employees. He was one of the three
employees summoned to Rea, Sr.'s office on December
12, interrogated about union activities and warned of
discharge. Slack testified that on this occasion Rea said,
"You three sitting here might as well start looking for
another job because no matter which way the union vote
goes you are out just as soon as I can find an excuse to let
you. . " Slack testified that after overtime was
eliminated on or about December 8, he suffered a
substantial cut in his total wages. On December 30, Slack
gave a week's notice to Rea, Sr., that he was quitting.
Questioned, 'Did you state any reason at that time why
you were quitting?" he testified, "Just that I had found
better employment." Later he testified, "I don't remember
what I told him. I think I told him that I could find a
better job." He had not actually obtained another job at
that time. He testified that he also told Rea that he was
quitting because of the "confusion" in the shop. In his
prehearing affidavit he referred to confusion in the shop,
and in his testimony to too much "rework" and too"much
confusion because of union activities." In the period
immediately preceding the elimination of overtime he had
worked a considerable amount of overtime, but his total
wages were not thereafter reduced to the degree that he
testified to, and he did not work the entire 40 hours a
week allowed him during all the weeks subsequent to the
elimination of overtime. Furthermore, there is no evidence
that he was discriminated against in the matter of wages,
hours, or working conditions, unless we hold that all
employees were discriminated against because of the
elimination of overtime, in which event he would still
stand in the same position as other employees.
REA TRUCKING CO., INC. 525
It could be argued that any employee who has been
told by his employer that he will be discharged because of
his union activities the first time a pretext is found, is not
required to wait around to find out just when that pretext
occurs, but on the other hand the employer may be using
the threat merely as a tactical device for sidetracking the
union, with no real intention of effectuating it. In short,
Slack never put his employer to the test, and there is no
evidence that subsequent to the interview in which the
threat was made he was singled out in any way for
discriminatory treatment. I shall recommend dismissal of
his case.
5. The group layoffs
On January 30, 1968, within hours after the results of
the bargaining election were published showing that the
Union had won, after consultation with his father who
was then out of town, Rea, Jr., laid off the entire night
shift. The posted notice of the layoff stated that it was
required because of "lack of material and insufficient
funds needed to keep a full crew busy." The notice
continued, "It is the sad decision that a general layoff is
mandatory."
On the following day or a day or so later, there were
further layoffs, the last of which was announced by Rea,
Sr., to a group engaged in having Iun"ch. In all, the
following employees named in the complaint were laid off:
Frank Moss, George Elwell, Jack Gawith, Duane
Hubbs, Del White, Earl Lyons, James Sali, Wilbur
Bundy, Guy Reynolds, Leon Creel, James Bradshaw,
Merritt Benson , Darrel Ard, and Gene Crump.
The last four of these employees named above, and one
more, were reinstated, and it is the Respondent's position
that certain others were reinstated, or offered
reinstatement. These layoffs or discharges, as the case
may be , occurring in quick succession , and the
Respondent offering the same defense as to each, with few
exceptions, need not for purposes of this decision be
broken down into individual groups.
The Respondent's defense to these group layoffs is lack
of work due to shortage in a certain part admittedly
essential to the construction of trailers in which
Respondent is principally engaged. This part was known
as a D-26 cross member or extrusion. According to Rea,
Sr., this part was designed in his shop, was not to be
duplicated by other similar parts, could not be reproduced
in the shop, and a substitution could be made only with
the consent of the buyer. Respondent's order for the part
was placed November 21, 1967, with a prominent steel
company, was promised for delivery in January 1968, by
error the wrong material was delivered in February, and it
was not until April 18, 1968, that the D-26 was actually
received. This is Respondent's story, corroborated to a
degree by its records, and a letter from the steel supply
company with whom the order was placed, dated May 24,
1968 (after the complaint had been filed in this case)
which stated, inter alia , "Your extruded section (die 26)
which was promised for January was not finally received
until early April. This was due to a delay in the approval
of your drawings, and to a mix up at the mill which
resulted in wrong material being shipped to us."
As to the timing of the layoffs, Respondent's defense is
that it held up the layoffs until after the election in order
to avoid the charge of unlawful interference with the
election. It was the testimony of Rea, Sr., and his son,
that the identity of those to be laid off had been
determined in advance of the election.
I do not intend to go into reasons advanced by
Respondent for its choice of certain individuals to be laid
off, because it is clear to me that the motivation for the
layoffs considered in their entirety, regardless of the
individuals affected, is the issue, and that the selection of
certain individuals to be included in the layoffs is not an
issue . If the motivation for the layoffs was solely
economic, we need look no further; if in whole or in part,
the layoffs were motivated by management's desire and
intent to punish its employees for having voted union
representation, and to thwart the processes of collective
bargaining , regardless of the individuals chosen, the
layoffs, and all of them, were illegal.'
I accept Respondent's position that a shortage of the
D-26 cross-member would in time cause some dislocation,
though not necessarily the cessation, of normal production
procedures. There is no probative evidence, however, that
any employee had been idled by this shortage, assuming
that it existed, at any time prior to the January 30
election, or that "makework" had been resorted to to
keep the employees occupied. As was seen in the case of
Noblin, there were jobs to be done other than building
new trailers, though the latter may have been the
mainstay of Respondent's business. There was testimony
from Respondent's witnesses about falling production and
financial losses but little or no record corroboration of
such testimony. It was the credible testimony of Employee
Ronald L. Williams, then and now employed by
Respondent and neither discharged nor laid off at any
time , that a shipment of materials was received at the
plant on January 30, that there had been shortages of
materials at various times in the past without layoffs
(Rea, Jr.'s testimony was to the same effect), and that
there were no more general shortages on January 30 than
on prior occasions. (The D-26 was not included in the
January 30 shipment.)6 He also testified that work had
been stopped on the construction of a single trailer prior
to that date due to the D-26 shortage, but this does not
appear to have idled any employee prior to January 30.
Upon the entire evidence, including the fact that delivery
of the D-26 was not expected until some unspecified date
in January, it seems unlikely that the layoffs were delayed
until after January 30 in order to avoid a charge of
election interference.
As noted, the first of the layoffs occuring within hours
of the announcement of election results, involved the
entire night shift. Rea, Jr.'s testimony that the night shift
was chosen for this initial layoff because it was a
"temporary" arrangement is not to be credited because it
had been operating without layoff for some 7 months, and
was continued after Respondent had shut off all overtime
work. Furthermore, if the entire matter of the layoffs had
'There is no merit in Respondent 's argument that the burden was on the
General Counsel to prove that the employees laid off were affiliated with
or active in behalf of the Union The discharge of these employees
immediately following the Union 's victory at the polls would reasonably
tend to discourage union affiliation , and if the motivation, or any part of
it, was to demonstrate the futility of union representation and to
discourage further participation of employees in organizational activities, it
makes no difference whether the individuals chosen for the layoffs were
actually affiliated with the Union , or voted for it.
'Admitting that he made no inventory of materials, Williams testified,
"There were several times we were short of materials, and there were times
he [Rea, Sr.] deviated from one job site and go to another ,lob," and that
this happened "fairly regularly." Admittedly , there had been no prior
group layoffs, and in fact the record is barren of any prior layoffs due to
shortages of materials.
526 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
already been convassed by Rea, Sr., and his son, prior to
the election, it is to be wondered why the layoffs followed
in separate groups. The last of them, involving some four
employees, was announced by Rea, Sr., to a group of
employees in the lunchroom.'
It was employee Williams' testimony that Rea, Sr., in
announcing further layoffs, said that he hated to spoil the
employees' lunch. Williams did not recall whether Rea
gave a reason for the layoff at that time. It was Williams'
further credited and undisputed testimony that, about
January 25, in Rea's office, he told Rea that if he did not
change his "attitude" soon the employees would vote the
Union in, to which Rea replied, "You don't know what
you are talking about." When Williams asked, "What if
they do vote it in?" Rea replied, "I will either sell out or
close the doors." Williams further testified that at the
meeting (which he placed on February 2) when Rea, Sr.,
announced the last of the layoffs, Rea said, "You fellows
thought I was bluffing as to what I would do if the union
was voted in. If you don't believe me now dust ask Frank
Moss." (Employee Frank Moss, included in the first
group layoff, rented a property owned by a son of Rea,
Sr. When following notice of his layoff he was in the
office for his check, Martin handed him a notice raising
his rent from $35 to $70. He had received no prior notice
of the rental increase .) Duane Hubbs, included in the last
group layoff, testified that in announcing this layoff, Rea,
Sr., said, "You guys thought that I was bluffing on this.
All you s - t on me and I will s - t on you." Employee
Chenoweth testified that Rea said on this occasion, "You
fellows think you have me over a barrel, but I am going
to show you that you don't have me over a barrel, and if
you don't believe me, just ask Frank Moss." Chenoweth
further testified, as did Williams, that on this occasion
Rea repeated what he had earlier said in his December
meetings with employees, that he would not bargain with
the Union, that to gain anything the Union would have to
strike, and that any picket that trespassed on his property
would be shot.
Though there are some variances in the testimony of
the several employees present when Rea, Sr., announced
the last of the layoffs, and though there may have been
some confusion as to dates, I could detect nothing that
seemed rehearsed in concert or fabricated in this
testimony. As we have seen , both in statements made at
the time of the layoffs, and earlier statements made to
employees generally or individually, beginning with his
earliest knowledge of organizational activities among his
employees, Rea, Sr., directly or through his subordinates,
threatened his employees with retaliation in one form or
another if they chose union representation, and repeatedly
stated his intention to close down his operations rather
than recognize and bargain with a union. While the
layoffs beginning almost immediately after the
announcement of election results did not close down all
operations, they did result in loss of employement to a
substantial proportion of Respondent's total employment.
As previously noted, delivery of the D-26 was not
expected until some unspecified date in January, and while
this part when delivered was defective, that delivery did
'Acco Wing to General Counsel' s witnesses , this occurred on February 2.
Contradicting this, Rea, Sr., testified that he had not returned to the plant
on that date . I think it makes little difference whether he made the
announcement of further layoffs on February 2, or 3. or 4. I am convinced,
and find , that he did make the announcement in person under the
circumstances described by Williams and others , on a date in February
prior to February 5.
not occur until after all of the layoffs in question had been
effectuated. Respondent therefore could have had no
knowledge at the time of the layoffs that it would prove
defective. There is no probative evidence that Respondent
at any time in January prior to the layoffs made any
effort to ascertain a date certain on which it might expect
delivery of the D-26, though it would seem that under
normal procedures such effort would have been made
before Respondent decided to lay off a substantial part of
its work crew. Also, the announcement of a wage
incentive program, at the very time when we are asked to
believe that Respondent was expecting the D-26 to be in
short supply and planning a layoff of personnel, does not
increase our confidence in Respondent's defense. When all
the factors most favorable to that defense are weighed
against Respondent's numerous threats and discriminatory
acts preceding the layoffs, as well as Rea, Sr.'s statements
made at the time of, and concurrent with his
announcement of the last layoff, constituting in and of
themselves an admission of improper motivation, the
evidence as a whole preponderates, I believe and find, in
support of the General Counsel's position. Accordingly, I
find that in effectuating the layoffs of the employees
named in this section of the decision, the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(I) and (3) of the Act.'
6. The reinstatements
It is admitted that following their layoff on about
February 2, Bradshaw , Benson , Ard, Moore, and Crump
were reinstated. The General Counsel seeks no
reinstatement remedy with respect to them. The
Respondent contends that Lyons, Halbert, and Creel
refused reinstatement, and that Reynolds, Elwell, and
White made no response to Respondent's inquiry in the
matter. In support of these claims, Respondent relies on a
series of letters sent to these individuals on or about April
3, the first of which bore this text: "Please advise this
office by return mail if you are presently available for
work," the second, where no reply was received to the
first, the following additional text, "You are hereby
notified that if you do not answer the second notice you
will hereafter consider yourself terminated and no longer
subject to recall by Rea Trucking Company, Inc."
Employees who have been discriminatorily laid off or
discharged are entitled to a specific and unequivocal offer
of reinstatement. An inquiry of availability is not such an
offer. A discharged employee lis not to be held to have
refused reinstatement until he has received such an
unqualified offer, or until he has made some statement or
engaged in some conduct which clearly renders such an
offer futile, or relieves Respondent of the obligation of
making it . I do not think the failure to answer
Respondent's query on availability, unaccompanied by an
offer of reinstatement, discharges Respondent's obligation
to make the offer. While the response of Lyons, Creel,
and Halbert to Respondent's inquiry stated that they were
employed elsewhere, I think they are entitled to accept or
refuse reinstatement when the offer is made and none has
yet been made. If after being discharged by Respondent
they did not seek other employment, and accept it when
offered, they would be liable for willfully incurred loss in
'Ieerit in Respondent's claim that Sali. one of those laid off,
quit his employment prior to or at the time of the layoff Admittedly, Sali
was looking for other employment , and this may have been known to
Respondent , but I credit his testimony that he at no time during the period
in question advised the Respondent that he was quitting
REA TRUCKING CO, INC 527
the computation of their backpay In short , I am unable
to accept their respective responses to Respondent's
inquiry as a refusal to return to Respondent ' s employ and
an order of reinstatement will be recommended as to them
along with the others named above who have not yet
received an offer from Respondent
7 Arnold Chenoweth
Chenoweth had been in Respondent's employ about 2
years when he was discharged on about February 5 1968
following the mass layoffs Respondent's defense to the
discharge was (1) that Chenoweth was a supervisor and
(2) that he was habitually late to work
Chenoweth described his position in Respondent's
employ as welder and metal fabricator or welder and
finish man on the cattle trailers ' He was not questioned
on the topic of supervising functions Employee Slack
referred to Chenoweth as his immediate superior or
foreman, and testified that he assigned and checked his
work He also testified "he worked with me' Rea Jr
testified that Chenoweth spent approximately fifty percent
of his time supervising the work of other employees and
had the power to effectively recommend discharge On the
other hand Chenoweth was probably the prime instigator
of the organizational campaign, along with Knapp and
Slack made the first employee contact with a union
organizer was one of three employees called to Rea Sr 's
office on December 12 for purposes of interrogation
concerning their union activities and a recipient along with
the other two of Rea s threats of discharge, was elected to
the grievance committee formed at Rea's suggestion and
apparently voted in the election of January 30 without
challenge Respondent does not appear to have questioned
his inclusion in the voting unit at any time and its
treatment of Chenoweth as an instigator and participant
in union activities is hardly consistent with its present
contention that he was a supervisor, with authority to
effectively recommend the discharge of other employees
Had Respondent so regarded him, it is reasonable to
assume that it would have discharged him the first time it
had a whiff of his organizational activities had his
fellow-employees so regarded him it hardly seems likely
that they would have made common cause with him in
organizing the plant, and had he so regarded himself his
whole course of action in defiance of Respondent's wishes
in the matter would be equivocal to say the least The
matter is made difficult by the General Counsels failure
to develop more fully his duties through Chenoweth's own
testimony and the testimony of others but on the entire
evidence I am persuaded and conclude that he was not a
supervisor within the meaning of the Act
Chenoweth's discharge occurred on a day when he was
some 5 1/2 hours late in reporting for work It appears
that he relied on his own car for transportation to and
from work, and on this occasion he reported that he
would be late due to car trouble Rea Jr , to whom he
reported, told him, "All right, but hurry, we need you
today ' Due to his lateness in reporting Rea Sr
according to his testimony drove by Chenoweth s house
saw Chenoweth's car parked there knocked on the door
but got no response On returning to the plant he found
Chenoweth on the job and then had him brought to his
office He confronted Chenoweth with being late
whereupon Chenoweth explained that he had to go into
town to get a part for his car (a fuel pump), that he had
borrowed his babysitter's car9 for that purpose since his
own car could not be used Rea, after reminding him that
on some previous occasion he had warned all employees
about being late discharged him, after asking him "What
would you do in my case if I were in your seat and you
were in my seat what would you do)" to which
Chenoweth replied, "I think I would let you go" Rea
further testified that in the first week following the
election he had called for the timecards and could `hardly
believe ' that Chenoweth had been tardy so many times
As a matter of fact in the pay periods between January 3
and February 12, 1968 Chenoweth, contrary to his
testimony, had been late in reporting to work on 14
occasions, his tardiness ranging from 6 to 36 minutes to 8
hours on one occasion and 5 hours, 36 minutes on the day
of his discharge This testimony was corroborated by
Respondent's records
Chenoweth's situation as the wifeless father of five boys
was known to the Respondent,10 and there is no showing
that his tardiness was on any occasion unauthorized, or
that he was ever singled out for warning on account of his
tardiness On one occasion he was absent from his job for
8 hours and no contention is made that this absence was
unauthorized or unaccounted for That he took some 30
minutes off during the period of his tardiness on the day
of his discharge to visit the union hall was not known to
the Respondent according to Rea until after the
discharge had been effectuated and there being no further
showing in the matter, no inference adverse or favorable
to Respondent's position is drawn there from It does
appear, however, that Rea, Sr's concern in Chenoweth's
tardiness arose only after the Union's victory at the polls,
though it must have been well known to Rea Jr , the shop
foreman as it occurred, and Rea's general warning to
employees on tardiness is not shown to have occurred
within months of the discharge It is such circumstances
as these that take on significance when the whole
background of Chenoweth's involvement in union
activities is reviewed and in particular the occasion when
he was brought to Rea, Sr's office on December 12
along with Knapp and Slack when, according to
Chenoweth's credited and corroborated testimony Rea
"stated that he knew the three of us were the big
instigators of bringing the union in and we had just as
well start hunting another job because we were out All he
was waiting for was the excuse to discharge us " Rea s
continued identification of Chenoweth as favorable to the
Union is shown in Chenoweth's undisputed testimony,
previously reported of his conversation with Rea in the
latter's office shortly before the election On the entire
evidence I am convinced and find that a substantial
element in Rea's discharge of Chenoweth without
warning was the latter's prominence in organizational
activities and Rea's determination following the election
to thwart the Union in its representation of employee
interests Obviously if Respondent sees fit to promulgate
and enforce nondiscriminatory rules on tardiness that is
its prerogative, but the exercise of such a prerogative does
not fit in with Chenoweth's discharge
'Chenoweth lived alone with five children his wife having left him
'•Chenoweth s undisputed testimony I explained to Mr Rea that
there would be times when I might be a few minutes late because I had to
be there to see that the boys got off to school properly and sometimes
there were little last minute problems that arose that required a few
minutes of my extra time Mr Rea agreed that this would be satisfactory
as long as I got there as soon as possible This occurred in November
1967
528 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with the operations of the
Respondent described in section I, above , have a close,
intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and
commerce among the several States and tend to lead to
labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
The Respondent having discharged certain of its
employees because they engaged in union and concerted
activities and having refused reinstatement to certain of
them for the same reason , or reasons , it will be
recommended that the Respondent offer Wilbur Knapp,
Frank Moss, George Elwell, Jack Gawith, Duane Hubbs,
Del White, Earl Lyons, James Sali, Arnold Chenoweth,
Wilbur Bundy , Guy Reynolds, and Leon Creel immediate
reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent
positions , without prejudice to their seniority and other
rights and privileges , and make them and James
Bradshaw, Merritt Benson , Tom Moore, Darrel Ard, and
James Crump, whole for any loss of pay suffered because
of the discrimination against them, by payment (I) to the
aforesaid Knapp, Moss, Elwell, Gawith, Hubbs, White,
Lyons, Sali, Chenoweth, Bundy, Reynolds, and Creel, of a
sum of money equal to that which they normally would
have earned in Respondent's employ from the date of
their respective discharges, or layoffs, as the case may be,
to the date of Respondent's offer of reinstatement; (2) by
payment to Bradshaw, Benson, Moore, Ard, and Crump,
of a sum of money equal to that which they normally
would have earned in Respondent's employ from the date
of their respective discharges, or layoffs, to the date of
their reinstatement without prejudice to their seniority and
other rights and privileges; (3) less the net earnings, if any,
of each of the above named employees, respectively,
during the said period, or periods. Backpay shall be
computed in the manner set forth in
90 NLRB 289, and Isis Plumbing & Heating Co..
138 NLRB 716.
Respondent ' s statements , conduct , and acts found
herein to constitute violations of the Act , are of such
gravity and scope that a broad cease and desist order is
required to prevent further violations.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
upon the entire record in the case , I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is an employer within the meaning
of Section 2(2) of the Act, engaged in commerce and a
business affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By discharging its employees Knapp, Moss, Elwell,
Gawith, Hubbs, White, Lyons, Sali, Chenoweth, Bundy,
Reynolds, Creel, Bradshaw, Benson , Moore, Ard, and
Crump, and refusing reinstatement to all the aforesaid
employees except Bradshaw, Benson , Moore, Ard, and
Crump, because of their union and concerted activities or
for the purpose of discouraging membership in a labor
organization , Respondent has engaged in, and is engaging
in, unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
4. By coercively interrogating its employees concerning
their union affiliation and activities; threatening them with
reprisals if they chose union representation; threatening
them with refusal to recognize and bargain with a union
of their choice; threatening them if they engaged in
picketing activities; interfering with and restraining them
in a choice of a grievance committee; offering them an
incentive wage program as an inducement to reject the
Union at the polls; and by related statements, conduct,
and acts, the Respondent has engaged in, and is engaging
in, unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(a)(I) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the entire record in the case, and pursuant to
Section 10(c) of the Act, as amended, it is hereby ordered
that Respondent, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discouraging membership of any employee in the
Union, or any other labor organization, by discharging or
in any other manner discriminating against any employee
with regard to his hire or tenure of employment, or any
term or condition of employment, except as authorized in
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
(b) Interrogating in an unlawful manner its employees
concerning their union affiliation and activities;
threatening them with reprisals if they choose union
representation; threatening them with a refusal to
recognize and bargain with a union of their choice in the
event they choose union representation; threatening them
with violence if they engage in picketing activities;
initiating and dominating the formation of a grievance
committee or other organization engaged in the
presentation of employee grievances, or other matters
relating to wages, hours, and conditions of employment;
offering them incentives for the purpose of inducing them
to reject union representation.
(c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing its employees in the right to self-organization, to
form their own labor organization, to loin or assist the
Union, or any other labor organization, to bargain
collectively with representatives of their own choosing, and
to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or for other mutual aid or
protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities
except to the extent that such right may be affected by
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization
as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer Wilbur Knapp, Frank Moss, George Elwell,
Jack Gawith, Duane Hubbs, Del White, Earl Lyons,
James Sali, Arnold Chenoweth, Wilbur Bundy, Guy
Reynolds, and Leon Creel immediate and full
reinstatement to their former or equivalent positions, and
make the aforesaid employees and James Bradshaw,
Merritt Benson , Tom Moore, Darrel Ard, and James
Crump whole for any loss of pay they may have suffered
as a result of the discrimination against them, in the
REA TRUCKING CO., INC. 529
manner set forth in the section above entitled "The
Remedy."
(b) Upon request make available to the Board or its
agent , for examination and copying, all payroll records,
social security payment records, timecards, personnel
records and reports, and all other records necessary to
analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of
this Recommended Order.
(c) Notify any of the said employees not already
reinstated if presently serving in the Armed Forces of
their rights of reinstatement upon application in
accordance with the Selective Service Act and the
Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended.
(d) Post at its place of business in Touchet,
Washington, copies of the attached notice marked
"Appendix."" Copies of said notice, on forms provided by
the Regional Director for Region 19, shall, after being
duly signed by the Respondent's authorized representative,
be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt
thereof and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days
thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken to insure that said notices
are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 19, in
writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision,
what steps it has taken to comply herewith."
"In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
the words "a Decision and Order " shall be substituted for the words "the
Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice . In the further
event that the Board ' s Order is enforced by a decree of a United States
Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of
Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a
Decision and Order."
"In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read : "Notify said Regional Director, in
writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order , what steps Respondent
has taken to comply herewith."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial
Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in
order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our
employees that:
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in General
Teamsters, Warehousemen and Cannery Workers Local
Union 556, affiliated with International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of
America, Independent, or any other labor organization,
by discharging or laying off any of our employees
because of their concerted or union activities or in any
other manner discriminate in regard to their hire or
tenure of employment or any term or condition of
employment.
WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate any of our
employees concerning their union affiliation and
activities; threaten to close the plant or curtail
operations or otherwise threaten them with reprisals if
they choose union representation; threaten them with a
refusal to recognize and bargain with the union of their
choice; threaten them with violence in the event they
engage in lawful picketing; initiate, unlawfully support
or dominate any employee organization engaged in the
presentation of grievances or other matters relating to
wages, hours, and conditions of employment; offer our
employees rewards, incentives, or inducements for the
purpose of causing them to withdraw from, or reject
union representation.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of
their right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
the above-named Union, or any other labor
organization, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, or to engage in
concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to
refrain from any or all such activities.
WE WILL offer immediate and full reinstatement to
Wilbur Knapp, Frank Moss, George Elwell, Jack
Gawith, Duane Hubbs, Del White, Earl Lyons, James
Sali, Arnold Chenoweth, Wilbur Bundy, Guy Reynolds,
and Leon Creel, and will make the aforesaid employees
and James Bradshaw, Merritt Benson, Tom Moore,
Darrel Ard, and James Crump whole for any loss of
pay they may have suffered because of the
discrimination against them.
WE WILL notify the above-named employees not
already reinstated if presently serving in the Armed
Forces of the United States of their right to full
reinstatement upon application in accordance with the
Selective Service Act and the Universal Military
Training and Service Act, as amended, after discharge
from the Armed Forces.
All our employees are free to become, remain, or
refrain from becoming or remaining members of the
above-named or any other labor organization. We will not
discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of employment, or
any term or condition of employment, against any
employee because of membership in or activity on behalf
of any labor organization.
Dated By
REA TRUCKING
COMPANY, INC.
(Employer)
(Representative ) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice
or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate
directly with the Board's Regional Office, Republic
Building , 10th Floor, 1511 Third Avenue, Seattle,
Washington 98101, Telephone 583-7473.