Raygun Limitedv.Planet 9 Studios, Inc. and SapientX Inc.

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

May 27, 2020

92064727 (T.T.A.B. May. 27, 2020)

KIM
May 27, 2020

Cancellation No. 92064727

Raygun Limited

v.
Planet 9 Studios, Inc. and
SapientX Inc. (joined as party-defendant)1

Before Mermelstein, Bergsman and Larkin,
Administrative Trademark Judges

By the Board:
This matter comes up on Petitioner’s combined motion2 for summary judgment on
its pleaded claim of abandonment and for discovery sanctions in the form of judgment
for Respondent’s failure to comply with an order of the Board.3 The motion is fully
briefed.

1 An assignment of the registration at issue from Planet 9 Studios, Inc. (“Planet 9”) to
SapientX Inc. (“SapientX”) was executed on May 1, 2018, and recorded in the Assignment
Recordation Branch at Reel/Frame 6324/0448. As the registration was assigned after the
commencement of this proceeding, SapientX Inc., as assignee, has been joined as a party
defendant in accordance with the Board’s usual practice. See W. Worldwide Enters. Grp., Inc.
v. Qinqdao Brewery, 17 USPQ2d 1137, 1138 n.4 (TTAB 1990) (assignee joined based on
assignment executed after commencement of proceeding). Planet 9 and SapientX will jointly
be referred to as Respondent.
2 16 TTABVUE.
3 10 TTABVUE.
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
P.O. Box 1451
Alexandria, VA 22313-1451
General Contact Number: 571-272-8500
General Email: TTABInfo@uspto.gov
THIS ORDER IS NOT A
PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB
Cancellation No. 92064727

2
Background
On October 28, 2016, Petitioner filed a petition4 to partially cancel Registration
No. 40497325 as to the goods in International Class 9 on the ground of abandonment.
A discovery conference was held on January 11, 2017, with the Board’s participation.6
As part of the conference and in view of Respondent’s pro se status, the Board
discussed with Respondent7 the technical and highly specialized nature of Board
practice, that the Board does not provide legal advice, and that the Board holds pro
se parties to the same standards and deadlines applicable to parties represented by
counsel.8 Notwithstanding, Respondent confirmed that it would proceed pro se in this
matter.9
On February 24, 2017, discovery opened,10 and Respondent filed an amended
answer denying the salient allegations of the petition for cancellation.11 Petitioner
served its initial disclosures on February 27, 2017, and its first set of interrogatories,

4 1 TTABVUE.
5 For the mark RAYGUN in standard characters for, in relevant part, “computer application
software for mobile phones” in International Class 9. The underlying application was filed on
July 16, 2009, under Section 1(a) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), for the Class 9
goods and registered on the Principal Register on November 1, 2011. Section 8 affidavit
accepted.
6 6 TTABVUE.
7 The Board in its institution order advised Respondent that unrepresented parties secure
the services of an attorney in prosecuting or defending matters before the Board. See 2
TTABVUE 5.
8 6 TTABVUE.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 6.
11 7 TTABVUE.
Cancellation No. 92064727

3
requests for production of documents and requests for admission on February 28,
2017.12
On April 4, 2017, Respondent untimely served responses to Petitioner’s requests
for admission and otherwise declined to respond to the interrogatories and requests
for production on the grounds that “they are exceedingly onerous and may take many
months to respond to as is.”13 After attempting, without success, to meet and confer
with Respondent concerning the outstanding discovery,14 Petitioner moved on May
10, 2017, to compel responses from Respondent.15 Respondent did not respond to
Petitioner’s motion. Instead, on May 31, 2017, after the expiration of the time for
responding to the motion, Respondent served responses, with objections, to
Petitioner’s interrogatories and requests for production.16
On August 9, 2017, the Board granted Petitioner’s motion to compel as conceded
and ordered Respondent to respond to Petitioner’s outstanding discovery requests in
full and without objection on the merits no later than September 11, 2017.17 Despite
this directive, Respondent failed to do so. One week following the expiration of the

12 17 TTABVUE 3.
13 Id. at 40.
14 Id. at 38-40.
15 8 TTABVUE.
16 16 TTABVUE 6; 17 TTABVUE 4.
17 10 TTABVUE.
Cancellation No. 92064727

4
deadline and forty days after issuance of the Board’s order, Respondent filed an
untimely request for reconsideration of the order,18 which the Board denied.19
Petitioner’s Motions
Petitioner seeks summary judgment on its claim of abandonment based on the
deemed admissions of Respondent as well as Respondent’s failure to adduce evidence
of bona fide use of the subject mark in commerce for at least the three years
immediately preceding the filing of the petition for cancellation. Alternatively,
Petitioner seeks terminating sanctions in the form of judgment for Respondent’s
failure to comply with a Board order compelling responses to Petitioner’s
interrogatories and requests for production.20
Summary Judgment Standard
A motion for summary judgment is a pretrial device intended to save the time and
expense of a full trial when the moving party is able to demonstrate, prior to trial,

18 11 TTABVUE.
19 20 TTABVUE.
20 By the Board’s order of April 29, 2019, Respondent was allowed thirty days to respond to
Petitioner’s motion. 20 TTABVUE. Respondent filed a response on May 29, 2019, but
attached no evidence in support thereof. 21 TTABVUE. Instead, Respondent provided a
hyperlink to a Google Drive folder to which Respondent presumably uploaded evidence. Since
the contents of such a drive are subject to change, Respondent cannot make the drive contents
of record by simply providing an Internet link to the drive. See TV Azteca, S.A.B. de C.V. v.
Martin, 128 USPQ2d 1786, 1790 n.15 (TTAB 2018) (“The Board does not accept Internet links
as a substitute for submission of a copy of the resulting page.”); In re Olin Corp., 124 USPQ2d
1327, 1332 n.15 (TTAB 2017) (“Because the information displayed at a link’s Internet address
can be changed or deleted, merely providing a link to a website is insufficient to make
information from that site of record.”). However, on June 29, 2019, Respondent re-filed its
response with exhibits, 23 TTABVUE, and on July 9, 2019, Petitioner filed a reply. 24
TTABVUE. Although the exhibits filed as part of Respondent’s renewed response are
untimely, in view of Petitioner’s reply brief in support of its motion addressing the exhibits,
we find that Petitioner has waived any timeliness objection to the exhibits and we have
considered them as part of our determination of Petitioner’s motion.
Cancellation No. 92064727

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that there is no genuine dispute of material fact, and that it is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317
(1986); Opryland USA Inc. v. Great Am. Music Show Inc., 970 F.2d 847, 23 USPQ2d
1471 (Fed. Cir. 1992); and Sweats Fashions Inc. v. Pannill Knitting Co., 833 F.2d
1560, 4 USPQ2d 1793 (Fed. Cir. 1987). The evidence on summary judgment is viewed
in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and all reasonable inferences are
drawn in the nonmovant’s favor. Lloyd’s Food Prods., Inc. v. Eli’s, Inc., 987 F.2d 766,
25 USPQ2d 2027, 2029 (Fed. Cir. 1993). A factual dispute will be deemed genuine if,
on the evidence of record, a reasonable fact finder could resolve the matter in favor of
the nonmoving party. See Olde Tyme Foods, Inc. v. Roundy’s, Inc., 961 F.2d 200, 22
USPQ2d 1542, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The Board does not resolve disputes of material
fact on summary judgment; rather, the Board only ascertains whether disputes of
material fact exist. See Univ. Book Store v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 33 USPQ2d
1385, 1389 (TTAB 1994); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249
(1986) (“at the summary judgment stage the judge’s function is not himself to weigh
the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there
is a genuine issue for trial.”).
Where, as here, the party moving for summary judgment on a claim bears the
burden of proof at trial on that claim, the moving party “must lay out the elements of
its claim, citing the facts it believes satisfies those elements, and demonstrating why
the record is so one-sided as to rule out the prospect of the nonmovant prevailing.”
Cancellation No. 92064727

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10A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE Civil
§ 2727.1 (4th ed. 2019).
If the moving party is able to meet this initial burden of production, the burden
shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate the existence of specific genuinely
disputed facts that must be resolved at trial. The nonmoving party may not rest on
mere allegations or assertions but must designate specific portions of the record or
produce additional evidence showing the existence of a genuine dispute of material
fact. Should the nonmoving party fail to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to
an essential element of the moving party’s case, judgment as a matter of law may be
entered in the moving party’s favor.
Abandonment
A claim of abandonment requires a showing that the party against whom the
claim of abandonment is made “is not using the mark with its goods and services, and
has no intent to resume use.” Lewis Silkin LLP v. Firebrand LLC, 129 USPQ2d 1015,
1020 (TTAB 2018). A showing of three consecutive years of nonuse is sufficient to
establish a prima facie case of abandonment. See Trademark Act Section 45, 15
U.S.C. § 1127; Double Coin Holdings Ltd. v. Tru Dev., 2019 USPQ2d 377409, *15
(TTAB 2019). Thus, in order for Petitioner to prevail on its claim of abandonment on
summary judgment, Petitioner must establish that there is no genuine dispute of any
material fact that it has standing to maintain the proceeding and that (1) there has
been no bona fide use of the mark in commerce by Respondent for three consecutive
Cancellation No. 92064727

7
years, or (2) that Respondent has ceased using its mark in commerce and has no
intent to resume such use.
Standing
Standing is a threshold issue that must be proven by a plaintiff in every Board
inter partes case. See Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Gen. Cigar Co., 753 F.3d 1270,
111 USPQ2d 1058, 1062 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092, 50
USPQ2d 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1999). To establish standing, the plaintiff must demonstrate
that it has a “real interest,” i.e., a direct and personal stake, in the outcome of the
proceeding and a reasonable basis for its belief of damage. Ritchie, 50 USPQ2d at
1025-26. Petitioner has pleaded that its Application Serial No. 87009692 was refused
registration based on Respondent’s registration21 and has submitted copies of its
application and the Office’s refusal of registration based on Respondent’s
registration.22 Additionally, Respondent has admitted in its answer that Petitioner’s
“proposed registration was denied by the USPTO.”23 Accordingly, there is no genuine
dispute of material fact that Petitioner has standing to petition to cancel the subject
registration. See Parfums Nautee Ltd. v. Am. Int’l Indus., 22 USPQ2d 1306, 1307
(TTAB 1992) (petitioner has standing to seek cancellation of registration cited against
its application).

21 1 TTABVUE 4.
22 17 TTABVUE 18-35.
23 7 TTABVUE 2.
Cancellation No. 92064727

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Motion for Summary Judgment
Petitioner initially seeks summary judgment based on its requests for admission,
which Respondent failed to timely answer. By operation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(3), a
requested admission is deemed admitted unless a written answer or objection to the
request is served within thirty days of service of the request. See Fram Trak Indus.
v. Wiretracks LLC, 77 USPQ2d 2000, 2005 (TTAB 2006). That Respondent ultimately
served responses to Petitioner’s requests for admission does not cure the untimeliness
of Respondent’s response and the requests will stand admitted unless Respondent
can demonstrate that its failure to timely respond to the requests was the result of
excusable neglect, or Respondent moves to withdraw or amend the admissions
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(b). Respondent has done neither.
Instead, Respondent merely claims that it attempted to participate in the
discovery process in good faith and contends that Petitioner’s discovery requests were
served on “a San Francisco residence that I have not lived at for (at that point) five
years.”24 This argument is not well taken.
First, it is the responsibility of Respondent to maintain current and accurate
correspondence information for its registration. See Trademark Rule 2.18(c), 37
C.F.R. § 2.18(c). It is neither the responsibility of Petitioner nor the Board to verify
that the correspondence information reflected on the registration is the most current
for Respondent. Indeed, if, as Respondent contends, it had relocated to a new address
at least five years prior to when Petitioner served its discovery requests on February

24 21 TTABVUE 3.
Cancellation No. 92064727

9
28, 2017, Respondent had well over four years prior to the filing of the petition to
update its physical address but failed to do so and did not raise the issue or otherwise
mention any change in its address to either the Board or Petitioner during the parties’
discovery conference on January 11, 2017.25
Notwithstanding, it appears that Respondent’s email address remained
unchanged and that Respondent received both the petition for cancellation and the
Board’s institution order as evident from Respondent’s filing of its initial answer on
the deadline for doing so.26 Moreover, in view of the changes to the Board’s rules of
practice as of January 14, 2017, including the requirement for service by email, of
which Respondent was apprised during the discovery conference,27 Respondent is
incorrect in its claim that it “was never properly served.”28 The certificates of service
accompanying Petitioner’s discovery requests show that service was properly made
on Respondent’s email address of record,29 the accuracy of which is not disputed by
Respondent.
In view thereof, Petitioner’s requests for admission stand admitted. Pursuant to
those admissions, in particular Requests for Admission Nos. 1-4, Petitioner has

25 Although Respondent alleges in its response that it “corrected my address with the USPTO
multiple times,” id., the statement is neither verified nor supported by any evidence.
26 2 TTABVUE 3; 4 TTABVUE.
27 6 TTABVUE 1, 8-9.
28 21 TTABVUE 3.
29 17 TTABVUE 51, 59 and 69.
Cancellation No. 92064727

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established that Respondent did not use the mark RAYGUN in the sale of its Class 9
goods in interstate commerce from 2013 to 2016.30
In addition to these admissions, Petitioner has also put forth evidence in further
support of its claim that there was no use of the mark in commerce by Respondent
for the three years immediately preceding the filing of the petition for cancellation,
i.e., October 2013 through October 2016.31 Specifically, Petitioner points out that
Respondent “has produced no documents showing sales of goods or services of any
kind in connection with the Mark between 2013 and the present” despite requests for
documents directed to such information and that Respondent has “steadfastly
refuse[d] to answer interrogatories directly asking when and how it has used the
Mark in commerce.”32 For instance, in its untimely response to Document Request
Nos. 9, 15 and 18, which respectively sought “[a]ll invoices, contracts or other sales
documents evidencing sales of goods or services bearing Registrant’s Mark from 2011
to the present, by year,” “[a]ll documents, records, and things that illustrate, reflect,
relate, or refer to the pricing of any goods and/or services that have been sold under
Registrant’s Mark, and the dates of applicability of such prices,” and “[p]roof of sales
of products or services using Registrant’s Mark to [companies] as set forth in

30 Requests for Admission Nos. 1-4. 17 TTABVUE 61-62.
31 Since the underlying application that matured into Respondent’s registration was filed
under Section 1(a), the period of nonuse may be measured from no earlier than the filing date
of the application, i.e., July 16, 2009. See ShutEmDown Sports, Inc. v. Lacy, 102 USPQ2d
1036, 1042 (TTAB 2012).
32 16 TTABVUE 11.
Cancellation No. 92064727

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paragraph 4 of your Answer to Cancellation Petition filed on December 12, 2016,”33
Respondent declined to produce any responsive documents on grounds that the
requests were “exceedingly burdensome, time consuming and costly to produce” and
further added in response to Request No. 18 that Respondent “purge[s] most records
beyond 7 years … includ[ing] most of what you ask for.”34 Similarly, in response to an
interrogatory seeking sales information under the subject mark, Respondent was
unable to provide the information requested.35
Under Section 45 of the Trademark Act, three consecutive years of nonuse gives
rise to the presumption of an intent not to resume use. See Lewis Silkin, 129 USPQ2d
at 1020. Petitioner’s showing is sufficient to discharge its initial burden on summary
judgment to demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact on its claim
of abandonment, shifting the burden of production to Respondent to demonstrate the
existence of a genuine dispute of material fact.36 As there are two elements to an

33 Id. at 9-10.
34 Id. Because Respondent designated the whole of its discovery responses as confidential,
Petitioner submitted the responses as exhibits under seal but has quoted in its brief
Respondent’s objections without redaction. Accordingly, we have not cited directly to the
confidential exhibits but instead have cited to the excerpts quoted in Petitioner’s brief insofar
as they have been accurately reproduced.
35 Id. at 11.
36 While the sale of goods is not the only means by which use in commerce may be shown, see
Section 45 of the Trademark Act (mark deemed to be in use in commerce when goods bearing
the mark “are sold or transported in commerce”), Respondent has admitted in its answer that
its goods are in the nature of “white-label” software which is not branded with the RAYGUN
mark. 7 TTABVUE 3; see, e.g., CEATS, Inc. v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 526 Fed. Appx. 966,
107 USPQ2d 1606, 1608 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (observing that “white-label” products are “versions
sold without branding so the purchasing entity can brand the product itself”). Since a
“required element of use in commerce is some element of open or public use,” 3 J. Thomas
McCarthy, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 19:118 (5th ed. 2020),
that Petitioner may not have presented evidence of Respondent’s failure to adduce evidence
Cancellation No. 92064727

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abandonment claim, i.e., nonuse of the mark and intent not to resume use,
Respondent can avoid summary judgment by demonstrating the existence of a
genuine dispute as to either element. See ShutEmDown Sports, 102 USPQ2d at 1042.
For its part, Respondent references “43 documents”37 it has produced to Petitioner
that putatively demonstrate sales of its goods under the RAYGUN mark.38 Of those
documents, only five fall within the relevant 2013-2016 time period, with the
remainder pre-dating 2013.39 Two of the five are of no probative value as there is no
mention of the mark or indication that they concern “computer application software
for mobile phones,”40 and the third is merely a set of agreements to assign and
transfer, inter alia, the subject mark from Planet 9 to SapientX41 which, while
perhaps probative of title, is not probative of Respondent’s use of the mark in
commerce.

of use based on transport of the goods will not preclude Petitioner from meeting its initial
burden on summary judgment.
37 While we have not undertaken to confirm the accuracy of Respondent’s count, all of the
documents provided as part of Respondent’s response have been considered.
38 21 TTABVUE 5.
39 Alexa + White Paper Draft [23 TTABVUE 14-24], Watts Towers contract with the Los
Angeles County Museum of Art [Id. at 46-47], Visteon email correspondence from March 2016
[Id. at 51-54], assignment and transfer and stock purchase agreements between Planet 9 and
SapientX wherein David Colleen, Planet 9’s representative, is listed as President of each
company [Id. at 124-146], and an Internet Archive capture from October 31, 2014 [Id. at 50].
40 Watts Towers contract and Visteon email.
41 Curiously, Planet 9 contends that SapientX is not a wholly owned subsidiary [21
TTABVUE 5] yet the document “Action by Unanimous Written Consent of the Board of
Directors of Planet 9 Studios, Inc.” [23 TTABVUE 137] identifies SapientX as a wholly owned
subsidiary of Planet 9.
Cancellation No. 92064727

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As to the two remaining documents, the Alexa + White Paper appears to be no
more than a draft white paper or proposal wholly unrelated to the goods in question
and internal to Respondent with no indication that it was presented or otherwise
disseminated to potential consumers. The Internet Archive capture is insufficient,
standing alone, to demonstrate use of the mark in commerce in connection with the
subject goods. Such documents, like other Internet documents, are of limited
probative value and may be used to demonstrate what they show on their face but
cannot be relied on for the truth of the matters asserted therein. See Safer, Inc. v.
OMS Invs., Inc., 94 USPQ2d 1031, 1039-40 (TTAB 2010). Respondent has presented
no declarations or proof concerning the nature of the page, the goods offered therein,
whether the page was made available to the public, and, if so, the extent to which the
page was viewed.
Accordingly, we find none of the evidence provided by Respondent competent to
show use of the mark in commerce during the statutory three-year period.
On the question of Respondent’s intent not to resume use, Respondent points to
documents “used in discussions with Intel’s investment arm” for the purpose of
attracting investment.42 These documents are not probative of Respondent’s intent
during the period in question as they are from 2008 and 2009. Additionally, only the
emails between Respondent and Intel mention the RAYGUN mark but, like the other
documents, have nothing to do with Respondent’s Class 9 goods. The documents are,

42 Although not specifically identified by Respondent, we have identified three sets of Intel-
related documents: 1) Intel Promotional Material Release (“PMR”) Form dated September 1,
2009 [23 TTABVUE 59], 2) correspondence dated June 22, 2009 and revised August 4, 2009
[id. at 60-62], and 3) emails from October 2008 to August 2009 [id. at 164-171].
Cancellation No. 92064727

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therefore, insufficient to establish that a genuine dispute exists on the question of
Respondent’s intent.
As Respondent has failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact on Petitioner’s
claim of abandonment, Petitioner’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED on
its claim of abandonment as to the Class 9 goods.
Discovery Sanctions in the Form of Judgment
Finally, even if we were to find a genuine dispute sufficient to preclude summary
judgment, judgment in favor of Petitioner is warranted in light of Respondent’s
failure to comply with the Board’s order compelling Respondent’s discovery responses
in full and without objection. Under Trademark Rule 2.120(h)(1), 37 C.F.R.
§ 2.120(h)(1), sanctions, including judgment, may be imposed for a party’s failure to
comply with an order of the Board relating to discovery.
By the clear terms of the Board’s order of August 9, 2017, Respondent was
required to serve Petitioner with responses to Petitioner’s interrogatories and
requests for production in full and without objection by September 11, 2017.43
Respondent failed to do so, choosing instead to file, one week after the Board-imposed
deadline for response, an untimely request for reconsideration of the Board’s order.
In both the request for reconsideration and the response to Petitioner’s motion for
summary judgment, Respondent has raised its pro se status, its unfamiliarity with
Board rules and procedure, its alleged good faith in its attempts to respond, its
attempts to seek assistance from the Board, and the Board’s putative unwillingness

43 10 TTABVUE 2.
Cancellation No. 92064727

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to assist Respondent, as exculpatory circumstances that, in essence, should preclude
the imposition of sanctions against Respondent.
Notwithstanding Respondent’s claimed difficulty in navigating the Board’s rules
and procedures, the Board’s directive was uncomplicated and the deadline was clear,
yet Respondent failed to timely comply. Furthermore, Respondent was placed on
notice at the start of this proceeding of the potential difficulties that lay ahead for a
pro se litigant. Nevertheless, Respondent made a conscious choice to continue to
proceed without counsel and therefore cannot avoid the adverse consequences of that
choice. See Yanopoulos v. Dep’t of Navy, 796 F.2d 468, 470 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“Petitioner
chose to proceed pro se and must accept the consequences of that decision.”).
Additionally, we must comment on Respondent’s less than exemplary interactions
with opposing counsel in this matter. Despite being explicitly advised during the
parties’ discovery conference of the parties’ duty to cooperate and to deal with one
another in good faith,44 Respondent failed to observe discovery deadlines, refused to
meet and confer with opposing counsel, and responded to counsel’s attempts to obtain
Respondent’s discovery responses with unilateral demands and ad hominem
attacks.45 This type of behavior is unwarranted, unjustified and unacceptable.

44 6 TTABVUE 2.
45 In a series of email correspondence between Petitioner’s counsel and Respondent that
began with Petitioner’s service of its discovery requests, Respondent untimely emailed
counsel characterizing counsel’s attempts to obtain discovery as “play[ing] games.” 17
TTABVUE 40. When counsel attempted to explain the Board’s rules and procedures as they
relate to discovery and conveyed her willingness to meet and confer on the issues, id. at 39-
40, Respondent responded as follows:
“Well you do play games and you continue to play them. Making absurd
discovery requests is one of them. Making obtuse and long winded citations to
Cancellation No. 92064727

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Respondent’s failure to cooperate in discovery thus far casts grave doubt on
Respondent’s willingness or ability to cooperate in any further discovery or in the
conduct of any trial of this matter, should one be held.
Since there is no dispute that Respondent failed to comply with the Board’s order
compelling discovery responses and in view of Respondent’s conduct during the course
of discovery, Petitioner’s motion for sanctions in the form of judgment as to the Class
9 goods is also GRANTED. See PolyJohn Enters. Corp. v. 1-800-Toilets, Inc., 61
USPQ2d 1860, 1862 (TTAB 2002) (Board is justified in enforcing procedural
deadlines).
Registration No. 4049732 will be cancelled in due course by the Commissioner for
Trademarks as to the goods in International Class 9 only, but will otherwise remain
unaffected as to the goods and services in International Classes 28, 39, 41 and 45.
* * *

a lay person is another. I find your game playing counter-productive, insulting
and a sign of inexperience.
…
I will respond separately to reasonable discovery requests. If you will not
respond in a professional manner about what is reasonable, I will make that
decision for you.”
Id. at 38-39.