RAO, Manoharprasad K. et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Oct 30, 2019

15185833 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Oct. 30, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/185,833 06/17/2016 Manoharprasad K. RAO 83654703 9726
28395 7590 10/30/2019
BROOKS KUSHMAN P.C./FGTL
1000 TOWN CENTER
22ND FLOOR
SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238
EXAMINER
KHATIB, RAMI
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3669
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/30/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@brookskushman.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte MANOHARPRASAD K. RAO,
KWAKU O. PRAKAH-ASANTE, and MARK A. CUDDIHY
____________________

Appeal 2019-001858
Application 15/185,833
Technology Center 3600
____________________

Before JILL D. HILL, LEE L. STEPINA, and
ARTHUR M. PESLAK, Administrative Patent Judges.

PESLAK, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
decision rejecting claims 1–11.2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).

We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Ford Global
Technologies, LLC. Appeal Br. 2.
2 Claims 12–20 are withdrawn from consideration. Final Act. 1.
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THE CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Appellant’s invention relates to an apparatus for inter-vehicular safety
awareness and alerts. Spec. ¶ 1. Sole independent claim 1, reproduced
below, illustrates the claimed invention:
1. A system comprising:
a processor configured to:
detect a local-vehicle malfunction, detected by a
monitoring-vehicle, different from the local-vehicle, sensor in
communication with the processor; and
wirelessly broadcast the local-vehicle malfunction,
including any local-vehicle identifying traits detected by the
monitoring-vehicle sensor or other monitoring-vehicle detection
systems.
Appeal Br. (Claims Appendix 1).

REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Lutter US 2002/0198660 A1 Dec. 26, 2002
Huang US 2007/0152803 A1 July 5, 2007
Denny US 2015/0170429 A1 June 18, 2015

REJECTIONS
1. Claims 1–11 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being
directed to patent ineligible subject matter.
2. Claims 1, 4–7, 9, and 11 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by Denny.
3. Claims 2 and 3 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Denny and Huang.
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4. Claims 8 and 10 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Denny and Lutter.
OPINION
Rejection 1 – Patent Eligibility
The Examiner rejects claims 1–11 under 35 U.S.C. § 101, finding that
the claims are directed to an abstract idea without significantly more. See
Final Act. 2; see also Ans. 4–5. In particular, the Examiner finds that the
claimed method is “automating the process of a driver or a passenger
detecting a malfunction of a preceding or a surrounding vehicle and
broadcasting that information, i.e. speak it out for example.” Ans. 4. The
Examiner determines that the claims do not identify an inventive concept
sufficient to transform the nature of the claims into a patent-eligible
application, because the claims do not include additional elements that
amount to significantly more than the abstract idea. See Final Act. 3. The
Examiner considers that the claims merely recite “a generic computer
component that performs generic computer functions (i.e., detect and
broadcast).” Id.
Appellant only presents arguments for independent claim 1. See
Appeal Br. 5–9. We select claim 1 as representative. Claims 2–11 stand or
fall with claim 1.
Appellant does not challenge the Examiner’s determination that the
claims are directed to an abstract idea. See Appeal Br. 5–9. Rather,
Appellant’s only contention is that the rejection is erroneous because the
Examiner failed to show “that vehicles gathering fault data about other
vehicles using sensors was routine, and that broadcasting detected fault data
along with information identifying the vehicle in which the fault occurred is
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routine.” Id. at 9; see also Reply Br. 2. For the following reasons, we
sustain this rejection.
Section 101 of the Patent Act provides, “[w]hoever invents or
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title.” See 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the Supreme Court has long
interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas’ are not patentable. E.g., Alice
Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573
U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; see also Bilski, 561 U.S. at
611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95
(1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67
(1972)). If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
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step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted).
The PTO recently published revised guidance on the application of
§ 101. USPTO’s January 7, 2019 Memorandum, 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“2019
Revised Guidance”). Under that guidance, we first look to whether the
claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human
activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
Only if a claim: (1) recites a judicial exception; and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
whether the claim;
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to
the judicial exception.
See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg., 54–56.
Appellant’s contention that the Examiner failed to show that certain
elements of the claims were “routine” primarily implicates Step 2B of the
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Guidance, i.e., whether a specific limitation is “well-understood, routine or
conventional.” However, to the extent that it also implicates Step 2A, we
consider Appellant’s contentions as explained below as appropriate.
Step 2A, Prong One
Under the 2019 Revised Guidance, we begin our analysis by first
turning to Alice step one (Step 2A, Prong 1 of the 2019 Revised Guidance).
The 2019 Revised Guidance teaches that nontechnical human activity is
sufficient to illustrate “the basic, longstanding practice that is the focus of
the [patent ineligible] claimed invention.” 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. n.13. We agree with the Examiner that the steps performed by the
claimed processor of “collecting, analyzing, and broadcasting data,” relate to
an abstract idea of a mental process. See Oct. 2019 Update: Subject Matter
Eligibility, 7.3
Claim 1 recites “a processor configured to: detect a local-vehicle
malfunction … and wirelessly broadcast the local-vehicle malfunction.” As
noted by the Examiner, the recited processor is automating the mental
process of collecting, analyzing, and broadcasting data. Ans. 4. The
patentee in FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) claimed a system and method of detecting fraud and/or misuse in
a computer environment, comprising collecting information regarding
accesses of a patient’s personal health information, analyzing the
information according to one of several rules (i.e., related to accesses in
excess of a specific volume, accesses during a pre-determined time interval,

3 Available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.p
df.
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or accesses by a specific user) to determine if the activity indicates improper
access, and providing notification if it determines that improper access has
occurred. Fairwarning, 839 F.3d. at 1092. The court determined that these
claims were directed to the concept of “collecting and analyzing information
to detect misuse and notifying a user when misuse is detected.”
Fairwarning, 839 F.3d. at 1094–95. In this case, claim 1 analogously
collects information about a local-vehicle, analyzes the information to
determine if a local-vehicle malfunction has occurred and then notifies a
user of the vehicle malfunction.
The configuration of the processor as recited in claim 1 is based on
automating a mental process, because a person can notice (detect) a vehicle
malfunction and relay (broadcast) the vehicle malfunction by hand gestures,
or speaking, as appropriate, to the driver of the malfunctioning vehicle or the
police or other road monitoring authority. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. 52.
Claim 1, thus, recites the mental process of collecting, analyzing, and
broadcasting data.
Step 2A, Prong Two
We now turn to prong two of the first step of the Alice analysis and
consider whether the claim integrates this abstract idea into a practical
application. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 51. In doing so, we
consider whether there are any additional elements beyond the abstract idea
that, individually or in combination, “integrate the [abstract idea] into a
practical application, using one or more of the considerations laid out by the
Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit.” See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. 54–55.
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For this prong, “[T]he relevant question is whether the claims here do
more than simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea . . .
on a generic computer.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 225. We agree with the
Examiner that they do not.
Appellant argues that “a first vehicle is detecting the malfunction of a
different vehicle via a sensor.” Reply Br. 2. However, we find no indication
in the Specification, nor does Appellant direct us to any indication, that the
operations recited in the claims invoke any inventive programming, require
any specialized computer hardware or other inventive computer components,
i.e., a particular machine, or that the claimed invention is implemented using
other than a generic processor to perform generic computer functions. See,
e.g., Spec. ¶ 30 (describing “a general purpose processor” that [w]hen
executing code providing instructions to perform some or all steps of the
method, … may be temporarily repurposed as a special purpose processor,
until such time as the method is completed.”).
The function of “detect[ing] a local-vehicle malfunction, detected by a
monitoring-vehicle … sensor” recited in claim 1 is simply a generic step of
data collection, which is insignificant extra-solution activity. See
CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (reiterating “that mere ‘[data-gathering] step[s] cannot make an
otherwise nonstatutory claim statutory.”’ (alterations in original) (quoting In
re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 840 (Fed. Cir. 1989))); see also 2019 Revised
Guidance (identifying “add[ing] insignificant extra-solution activity to the”
abstract idea as an example of when an abstract idea has not been integrated
into a practical application). Nor is any particular type of sensor disclosed.
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See Spec. ¶ 42 (“detection can be made through any number of sensors,
including, but not limited to, vision detection sensors, lidar, radar, etc.”).
Appellant’s Specification also does not specify any particular form for
the broadcast, nor do the claims recite any further limitations of the
broadcast. See, e.g. Spec. ¶ 43 (“the process may use a local wireless
transmission (Wi-Fi, BLE, BT, etc.) to broadcast the identified problem
(malfunction)”); Claims App. 1. Given this breadth of disclosure and
claiming, the broadcast limitation is simply insignificant post-solution
activity, namely, outputting a result of the abstract idea.
Further, we find no indication in the Specification that the claimed
invention effects a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a
different state or thing. Nor do we find anything of record, short of attorney
argument, that attributes any improvement in computer technology and/or
functionality to the claimed invention or that otherwise indicates that the
claimed invention integrates the abstract idea into a “practical application,”
as that phrase is used in the 2019 Revised Guidance.
Appellant argues that a monitoring vehicle detecting the malfunctions
of another vehicle “improves technology of vehicle malfunction
identification by essentially providing an additional sensor suite (leveraging
the monitoring vehicle) for the malfunctioning vehicle, because sensors
onboard the malfunctioning vehicle may not be able to detect the particular
malfunction.” Reply Br. 2. However, Appellant does not explain, nor direct
our attention to, disclosure in the Specification explaining how the system
recited in claim 1 improves the way the sensor functions. Rather, the
sensors appear to be sensing components performing the generic sensor
operation of detecting. See Ans. 4. The portion of the Specification cited by
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Appellant as demonstrating an improvement in technology relates to vision
systems recognizing various vehicle conditions. Reply Br. 2; Spec. ¶¶ 31–
33. This disclosure does not relate to any improvement in the operation of
the vision system itself.
As to Appellant’s insistence that the claimed invention improves
technology of vehicle malfunction identification, the Specification discloses
that because the sensors “may be more highly observant than a driving
human, a higher likelihood of identifying presently existing minor
undesirable conditions is achieved.” Spec. ¶ 40. Automating human
functions is not an improvement to technology. In order for this assertion to
be accorded any weight, Appellant must support the assertion with technical
reasoning or evidence, whether from the Specification or elsewhere in the
record, to demonstrate an improvement in the sensors. See In re Geisler,
116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997). As discussed above, Appellant has
not provided such support, and we find no evidence or indication of such an
improvement in the record before us.
For the above reasons, we determine that no additional element or
combination of additional elements in claim 1 applies, relies on, or uses the
judicial exception (organizing human activity) in a manner that imposes a
meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception. In other words, claim
1 is “directed to” an abstract idea.
Step 2B — Inventive Concept
Finally, we consider whether claim 1 incorporates an inventive
concept, that is, whether any additional claim elements “‘transform the
nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at
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217 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78, 79). This requires us to evaluate
whether the additional claim elements add “a specific limitation or
combination of limitations that are not well-understood, routine,
conventional activity in the field” or “simply append [] well-understood,
routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified
at a high level of generality.” See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 56.
We agree with the Examiner that claim 1 requires only a processor
performing routine steps. Ans. 4.
Appellant argues that “a first vehicle is detecting the malfunction of a
different vehicle via a sensor.” Reply Br. 2. However, we find no indication
in the Specification, nor does Appellant direct us to any indication, that the
operations recited in the claims invoke any inventive programming, require
any specialized computer hardware or other inventive computer components,
i.e., a particular machine, or that the claimed invention is implemented using
other than a generic processor to perform generic computer functions. See,
e.g., Spec. ¶ 30 (describing “a general purpose processor” that [w]hen
executing code providing instructions to perform some or all steps of the
method, … may be temporarily repurposed as a special purpose processor,
until such time as the method is completed.”).
Appellant argues that the Examiner has not shown “how a monitoring-
vehicle sensor detecting a malfunction of another vehicle, in and of itself, is
routine,” and also has not shown that “broadcast of such a malfunction,
detected by a passing vehicle,” is routine. Reply Br. 2. However, no
particular sensor is recited to perform these functions, and the Specification
provides that “detection can be made through any number of sensors,
including, but not limited to, vision detection sensors, lidar, radar, etc.”
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Spec. ¶ 42. Even if collecting and analyzing information (i.e., detecting a
malfunction) is “limited to particular content” or a particular “source,” that
limitation does not make the collection and analysis other than abstract. SAP
Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2018), cert.
denied, 139 S. Ct. 2747 (2019), reh'g denied, (U.S. Aug. 23, 2019); see also
Electric Power, 830 F.3d at 1353, 1355.
In addition, the claimed general purpose processor operates in its
ordinary and conventional capacity to perform the well-understood, routine,
and conventional function of broadcasting. See Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC
v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (the claim recites
“routine functions, such as transmitting and receiving signals, to implement
the underlying idea” of broadcasting content); see also Elec. Power Grp.,
830 F.3d at 1355 (gathering, sending, monitoring, analyzing, selecting, and
presenting information does not transform the abstract process into a patent-
eligible invention); Alice, 573 U.S. at 225 (receiving data (i.e., operating on
new data) and issuing (broadcasting) automated instructions “are ‘well-
understood, routine, conventional activit[ies]’ previously known in the
industry”).
Addressing step two of the Mayo/Alice framework in Berkheimer v.
HP, Inc., 881 F. 3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018), the Federal Circuit held that the
question of whether a claim element or combination of elements is well-
understood, routine, and conventional to a skilled artisan in the relevant field
is a question of fact.4 Id. at 1368. However, under step two of the

4 Appellant contends that “the Examiner must show, by clear and convincing
evidence, that it was routine for vehicles to detect malfunctions of other
vehicles.” Appeal Br. 5 (emphasis added). Appellant does not cite any
authority for the proposition that the Examiner’s burden of proof is by clear
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Mayo/Alice framework, the elements of each claim are considered both
individually and “as an ordered combination” to determine whether the
additional elements, i.e., the elements other than the abstract idea itself,
“transform the nature of the claim” into a patent-eligible application. Alice,
573 U.S. at 217. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73 (requiring that “a process that
focuses upon the use of a natural law also contain other elements or a
combination of elements, sometimes referred to as an ‘inventive concept,’
sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more
than a patent upon the natural law itself (emphasis added)). In other words,
the inventive concept under step two of the Mayo/Alice test cannot be the
abstract idea itself:
It is clear from Mayo that the “inventive concept” cannot be the
abstract idea itself, and Berkheimer . . . leave[s] untouched the
numerous cases from this court which have held claims ineligible
because the only alleged “inventive concept” is the abstract idea.

Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 890 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Moore, J.,
concurring). See also BSG Tech. LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281,
1290–91 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“Our precedent has consistently employed this
same approach. If a claim’s only ‘inventive concept’ is the application of an
abstract idea using conventional and well-understood techniques, the claim
has not been transformed into a patent-eligible application of an abstract
idea.”).
Based on paragraphs 30 and 42 of the Specification as discussed
above, we find no element or combination of elements recited in claim 1
beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine,

and convincing evidence and we are unaware of any such authority. As
discussed below, the Specification supports the Examiner’s determination.
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conventional” in the field or that contains any “inventive concept” or adds
anything “significantly more” to transform the abstract concept into a patent-
eligible application. Alice, 573 U.S. at 221. Accordingly, we sustain the
rejection of claim 1, as well as claims 2–11, which fall with claim 1, under
35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.
Rejection 2 – Anticipation by Denny
Claim 1 recites, inter alia, “detect a local-vehicle malfunction,
detected by a monitoring-vehicle … sensor.”
The Examiner finds that Denny’s “vehicle 120C reads on the local
vehicle and vehicle 120D reads on the monitoring vehicle and that
paragraphs 45–47 of Denny disclose the claimed “detect” limitation. Final
Act. 4.
Appellant argues that “[a]t no point, ever, during the communication
between vehicles (120C) and (120D) does either vehicle ever ‘detect a
malfunction’ of the other vehicle.” Appeal Br. 10. According to Appellant,
Denny relates to “vehicle self-awareness and using that self-awareness to
adjust driving conditions to increase safety,” whereas claim 1 requires
another vehicle “to detect object vehicle malfunctions because of the fact
that there are certain things the object vehicle is incapable of being self-
aware about.” Id.
The Examiner responds that Denny’s “[v]ehicle 120D calculates
operating parameters of vehicle 120C (Paragraph 0046) and detects an alert
condition (Paragraph 0047) … that reads on detecting a local vehicle
malfunction and the malfunction is detected by the monitoring vehicle
120D.” Ans. 6. For the following reasons, we do not sustain this rejection.
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Denny discloses that method 200 includes “a request for vehicle
information,” in which “vehicle 120D may approach a vehicle 120C from
behind and sends a request to vehicle 120C to receive vehicle information
from vehicle 120C.” Denny ¶ 44; Fig. 2. Denny discloses that “method 200
calculates one or more operating parameters of vehicle 120C using the
received vehicle information.” Id. ¶ 46. Denny also discloses that “method
200 detects an alert condition. For example, method 200 may detect that the
distance separating vehicles 120C and 120D is too short given that method
200 has deduced the braking operating parameter of vehicle 120C.” Id. ¶ 47.
Although Denny’s vehicle 120D “detects an alert condition,” the alert
condition is based on information transmitted from vehicle 120C to vehicle
120D, and the Examiner does not explain adequately what structure in
Denny is a sensor that performs the alert condition detecting, or why one of
ordinary skill in the art would have considered vehicle 120D receiving
transmitted information from vehicle 120C to be detection by a sensor.
Appellant’s Specification discloses that “detection can be made
through any number of sensors, including, but not limited to, vision
detection sensors (camera), lidar, radar, etc.” Spec.¶¶ 42–43. Similarly, the
Specification discloses that “[a] vehicle which is equipped with appropriate
surround sensing systems (vision sensors 201, radar 203, lidar 203, and other
sensing systems 205) can use those sensing systems to detect a variety of
conditions in surrounding vehicles.” Spec. ¶ 37; Fig. 2. Although Denny
discloses various sensors, these sensors are on vehicle 120C to gather
information about vehicle 120C for transmission to vehicle 120D, or if on
vehicle 120D, to determine the direction from which vehicle 120C is
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transmitting, or to obtain an image of the transmitting vehicle’s (120C)
license plate. Denny ¶¶ 33–36.
Because Denny’s detection of an alert condition is based on
transmission of data from vehicle 120C to vehicle 120D and not based on a
sensor in vehicle 120D detecting the condition of vehicle 120C, the
Examiner’s finding that Denny discloses a local-vehicle malfunction
detected by a monitoring-vehicle sensor is not supported by a preponderance
of the evidence. We thus do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims
1, 4–7, 9, and 11 as anticipated by Denny.
Rejections 3 and 4 – Obviousness
The Examiner rejects claims 2, 3, 8, and 10, which are dependent on
claim 1, based on various combinations of Denny with one of Huang and
Lutter. Final Act. 6–7. The Examiner does not rely on Huang or Lutter to
cure the deficiencies in Denny noted above in connection with claim 1.
Consequently, we do not sustain the rejection of claims 2, 3, 8, and 10 for
the same reasons as stated above.

CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–11 101 1–11
1, 4–7, 9, 11 102(a)(1) Denny 1, 4–7, 9, 11
2, 3 103 Denny, Huang 2, 3
8, 10 103 Denny, Lutter 8, 10
Overall Outcome 1–11

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED