Ralph Wiechers et al.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardAug 12, 20212020003303 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 12, 2021) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 15/787,449 10/18/2017 Ralph Wiechers 511347 7665 53609 7590 08/12/2021 REINHART BOERNER VAN DEUREN P.C. 2215 PERRYGREEN WAY ROCKFORD, IL 61107 EXAMINER HAILE, BENYAM ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2688 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 08/12/2021 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): RockMail@reinhartlaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte RALPH WIECHERS and CHRISTIAN IBACH Appeal 2020-003303 Application 15/787,449 Technology Center 2600 Before BIBHU R. MOHANTY, BRADLEY W. BAUMEISTER, and JENNIFER MEYER CHAGNON, Administrative Patent Judges. Opinion for the Board filed by Administrative Patent Judge CHAGNON. Opinion Dissenting filed by Administrative Patent Judge BAUMEISTER. CHAGNON, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–21. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We REVERSE. 1 Appellant refers to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Deutsche Post AG. Appeal Br. 2. Appeal 2020-003303 Application 15/787,449 2 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER The claims are directed to a method for averting a danger, where the method is performed by a control apparatus that is part of an unmanned vehicle. Spec.2 ¶¶ 5, 31, 80. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A method for averting a danger or for prompting the averting of a danger, wherein the method is performed by a control apparatus, wherein the control apparatus is part of an unmanned vehicle, and wherein the method comprises: obtaining a plurality of pieces of sensor information; determining, at least depending on the obtained pieces of sensor information, whether a danger exists, wherein it is determined that the danger exists if there is a particular probability of one of damage or unauthorized use of at least one of the unmanned vehicle or a shipment transported by the unmanned vehicle; transmitting or causing the transmitting of a support offer request message if it is determined that the danger exists; receiving or causing the receiving of at least one first support offer message from a first support apparatus in response to the support offer request message; determining, at least depending on the received first support offer message, whether a first support measure of the first support apparatus is suitable for averting the danger; and 2 In this Decision, we refer to the Specification filed October 18, 2017 (“Spec.”); Final Office Action dated July 22, 2019 (“Final Act.”); Appeal Brief filed December 20, 2019 (“Appeal Br.”); Examiner’s Answer dated January 29, 2020 (“Ans.”); and Appellant’s Reply Brief filed March 30, 2020 (“Reply Br.”). Appeal 2020-003303 Application 15/787,449 3 prompting the first support measure if it is determined that the first support measure is suitable for averting the danger. Appeal Br., Claims App’x 1. REFERENCES The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is: Name Reference Date Friesen US 2015/0289122 A1 Oct. 8, 2015 Oshida US 2016/0071418 A1 Mar. 10, 2016 Benraz US 2018/0059688 A1 Mar. 1, 2018 REJECTIONS I. Claims 1–20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Oshida and Friesen. II. Claim 21 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Oshida, Friesen, and Benraz. OPINION We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejection in light of Appellant’s contentions in the Appeal Brief and the Reply Brief that the Examiner has erred, as well as the Examiner’s response to Appellant’s arguments in the Appeal Brief. As discussed below, we are persuaded by Appellant’s contentions of Examiner error. Claim Construction Each of the independent claims requires an “unmanned vehicle.” See Appeal Br., Claims App’x 1 (claim 1), 2 (claim 6), 5 (claim 20). The Examiner contends that the autonomous vehicle of Oshida discloses an Appeal 2020-003303 Application 15/787,449 4 unmanned vehicle. See Final Act. 3 (citing Oshida ¶¶ 37, 105); id. at 16 (citing Oshida ¶¶ 97, 99, 105, 106); Ans. 3–4. In order to determine whether Oshida teaches or suggests an “unmanned vehicle,” we must first interpret this term. In re Geerdes, 491 F.2d 1260, 1262 (CCPA 1974) (“Before considering the rejections . . . , we must first [determine the scope of] the claims.”). During prosecution, claims must be given their broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). “The correct inquiry in giving a claim term its broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the specification is not whether the specification proscribes or precludes some broad reading of the claim term adopted by the examiner.” In re Smith Int’l, Inc., 871 F.3d 1375, 1382–83 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Instead, a proper claim construction analysis endeavors to assign a meaning to a disputed claim term “that corresponds with . . . how the inventor describes his invention in the specification.” Id. at 1383. In the Answer, the Examiner contends that “[t]he ordinary meaning of the term ‘unmanned vehicle’ in the art is a vehicle operating without human intervention for the operation of the vehicle.” Ans. 3. The Examiner continues, “[w]ith the lack of a specific definition in the disclosure, the term ‘unmanned vehicle’ is given the definition as known in the art in light of the current specification.” Id. According to the Examiner, “the examined claim does not have any limitation restricting the vehicle to not have any occupants.” Id. at 4. We disagree. The Specification explicitly describes that “[a]n unmanned vehicle is not intended to transport persons (for example neither Appeal 2020-003303 Application 15/787,449 5 to transport a driver nor to transport passengers).” Spec. ¶ 81; Appeal Br. 6. The Examiner does not provide a citation to any evidence of record in support of the ordinary meaning proposed in the Answer. See Ans. 3; Reply 6–7. Appellant, on the other hand, points to paragraph 81 of the Specification, and to dictionary definitions, arguing: This definition [from the Specification] is also consistent with an actual dictionary definition of “unmanned,” which is “not manned” with the definition of “manned” being “carrying or performed by a human being.” See “Unmanned” and “Manned,” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, available at https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/manned and https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/unmanned; see also “Unmanned,” Lexico.com available at https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/unmanned (“not having or needing a crew or staff”). Reply Br. 7. We find that the Examiner’s proposed interpretation—which allows for a human being to be present in the vehicle as long as they are not intervening in the operation thereof—is not reasonable in view of the express disclosure to the contrary in the Specification. See Spec. ¶ 81. Instead, we construe unmanned vehicle, consistent with how it is described in the Specification, as a vehicle that is not intended to transport persons. This construction also is consistent with the examples in the Specification (see, e.g., id. ¶¶ 56, 107), and the plain meaning of the word “unmanned.” See MPEP § 2111 (“[T]he meaning given to a claim term must be consistent with the ordinary and customary meaning of the term, and must be consistent with the use of the claim term in the specification and drawings” (parenthetical omitted)). Appeal 2020-003303 Application 15/787,449 6 The dissent determines that the “description of an unmanned vehicle [in the Specification] only describes the intended use of the vehicle.” Dissenting Op. 13–14. We respectfully disagree. Rather, the intended use of the vehicle is transporting. Further, the use of “unmanned” connotes certain structure to the vehicle, at least to the extent that it excludes traditional passenger vehicles, such as that taught by Oshida. See, e.g., Spec. ¶ 3 (describing that unmanned vehicles have “a receiving compartment for transporting one or more shipments,” but have “restricted installation space” and “limited complexity”); In re Fought, 941 F.3d 1175, 1178–79 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (reversing the Board’s decision, and finding that towability and inclusion of a living space are structural requirements of a claimed “travel trailer” and are not merely statements of intended use). Obviousness in view of Oshida and Friesen The Examiner relies on Oshida as teaching the claimed unmanned vehicle. Final Act. 3–4. Oshida, however, expressly discloses the system and method for vehicle operation assistance is intended to step in and take over operation of the vehicle in the event of an emergency experienced by an occupant of the vehicle. See Oshida ¶¶ 2–6, 22, 131–132. Based on our construction of “unmanned vehicle,” discussed above, we agree with Appellant that Oshida discloses a manned autonomous vehicle, and does not disclose or suggest an unmanned vehicle as claimed and the rejection is deficient in this regard. See Appeal Br. 6–7; Reply 6–8. Further, Appellant argues that the Examiner has erred because the cited combination “fails to disclose, teach, or suggest determining that a danger exists, transmitting a support offer request message upon determining Appeal 2020-003303 Application 15/787,449 7 the danger, and prompting a support measure to avert the same danger.” Appeal Br. 8 (emphasis added); see id. at 8–9. For the steps of obtaining sensor information, determining that a danger exists, transmitting a support offer request message, and receiving at least one first offer support message (which offers a first support measure), the Examiner relies on an embodiment of Oshida in which “an occupant of a vehicle . . . may be monitored. . . . If an emergency is determined, a request for help may be transmitted 220 based on the occupant status [and] a ‘follow me’ request [is transmitted] to the vehicle” (Oshida ¶ 131). Final Act. 3–4; see also Oshida ¶¶ 31, 45, Fig. 2. Here, when it is determined that an occupant of the vehicle is experiencing an emergency, “the vehicle may perform autonomous ‘following’ or be ‘wirelessly towed.’” Oshida ¶ 132. For the claimed details of the determining that a danger exists step— i.e., “wherein it is determined that a danger exists if there is a particular probability of . . . damage . . . of the unmanned vehicle”3—the Examiner relies on “a separate embodiment” of Oshida in which, according to the Examiner, “the system determines that a danger exists based on detecting an object in direct collision path with the vehicle, [Oshida ¶ 99], which can be implemented as an autonomous vehicle, [Oshida ¶¶ 97, 99, 105, 106] which has a particular probability of damage to the vehicle.” Final Act. 4. 3 As the Examiner recognizes, “[t]he claim recites multiple alternative limitations for determining if a danger exists including a particular probability of one of ‘damage ... of the unmanned vehicle’ or ‘damage ... of a shipment transported by the unmanned vehicle’ or ‘unauthorized use of ... the unmanned vehicle’ or ‘unauthorized use of ... a shipment transported by the unmanned vehicle.’” Ans. 5. “The Examiner elected to examine one of the presented alternatives, ‘damage ... of the unmanned vehicle.’” Id. Appeal 2020-003303 Application 15/787,449 8 According to Appellant, “[i]n the present claims, the ‘danger’ that is determined is the same danger for which a support offer message is transmitted and for which a support measure is prompted for averting that danger.” Appeal Br. 8–9. We agree. The Examiner does not point to any teaching in Oshida that the system transmits a support offer request message or receives any first support offer message, related to the danger of damage to the vehicle. See Final Act. 3–4; Ans. 3–6. Instead, in the Examiner’s rejection, the support offer request message and the first offer support message are related to the danger to the occupant of the vehicle. The Examiner does not explain how or why the different portions of the embodiments of Oshida would be combined to meet the claimed invention. The Examiner does not rely on Friesen as teaching these limitations of the claim. See Final Act. 3–5. The dissent finds that “[m]aking a determination that a driver is experiencing a medical emergency also reasonably constitutes determining that there is a particular probability of damage to the newly unmanned vehicle, as claimed.” Dissenting Op. 16. We respectfully disagree. We note initially that this is not the rejection articulated by the Examiner. MPEP § 2142 (“The examiner bears the initial burden of factually supporting any prima facie conclusion of obviousness.”). In any event, Oshida teaches that, if the occupant experiences an emergency, the vehicle “may automatically pull over” and then transmit a request for a leader vehicle. Oshida ¶¶ 131, 134. If the “danger” is potential damage to the vehicle, due to incapacitation of the driver, as the dissent determines, that danger is averted by “automatically pull[ing] over,” which occurs prior to any help request being transmitted. Id. It is only in response to the “danger” Appeal 2020-003303 Application 15/787,449 9 of an occupant emergency that Oshida teaches transmitting a help request. See Oshida ¶ 131 (“a request for help may be transmitted 220 based on the occupant status” (emphasis added)). As described in Oshida, the request for help 220 (relied upon by the Examiner as teaching the claimed “transmitting . . . a support offer request message”) and the “follow me” request 230 (relied upon by the Examiner as teaching the claimed “receiving . . . at least one first support offer message from a first support apparatus”), do not relate to a danger of damage to the vehicle. Instead, these actions are related to the occupant emergency. See, e.g., Oshida ¶ 136 (The vehicles “may terminate the wireless tow or leader/follower mode upon arrival at an agreed destination, such as a medical facility.”). Any avoiding of obstacles once the vehicle already is in follower mode (i.e., during the wireless tow) is separate and apart from the support offer request message and the first support offer message. Accordingly, for these reasons, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 1, or its dependent claims. Independent claims 6 and 20 include similar limitations and we do not sustain the rejection of these claims, or the claims that depend therefrom, for similar reasons. CONCLUSION The Examiner’s rejections of claims 1–21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 are reversed. Appeal 2020-003303 Application 15/787,449 10 Specifically: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1–20 103 Oshida, Friesen 1–20 21 103 Oshida, Friesen, Benraz 21 Overall Outcome 1–21 REVERSED Appeal 2020-003303 Application 15/787,449 11 Administrative Patent Judge BAUMEISTER, dissenting. I disagree with the Majority that Appellant has established error in the Examiner’s ultimate determination that the cited art renders the claims unpatentable. I would affirm the rejections. I. Appellant argues that the Examiner interprets the claim term “unmanned vehicle” in an unreasonably broad manner to mean “an autonomous vehicle that carrie[]s passengers.” Appeal Br. 6–7; Reply Br. 6–8. More specifically, Appellant initially argues, “the Examiner erred by equating the manned autonomous vehicle of Oshida with the unmanned vehicle of claims 1, 6, and 20.” Appeal Br. 6. Appellant argues that Appellant’s Specification explains, “[a]n unmanned vehicle is not intended to transport persons (for example neither to transport a driver nor to transport passengers).” Id. (citing Spec. ¶ 81) (emphasis added). Appellant subsequently argues, “the Examiner has failed to provide any support for the asserted definition and because the Examiner’s proposed definition is contrary to the definition given in the Specification.” Reply Br. 6. Appellant then restates the passage of its Specification, noted above, and then provides additional evidence of how the term “unmanned” is defined by a general purpose dictionary: This definition [from Appellant’s Specification] is also consistent with an actual dictionary definition of “unmanned,” which is “not manned” with the definition of “manned” being “carrying or performed by a human being.” See “Unmanned” and “Manned,” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam- Webster, available at https://www.merriam-webster.com/ dictionary/manned and https://www.merriam-webster.com/ dictionary/unmanned; see also “Unmanned,” Lexico.com Appeal 2020-003303 Application 15/787,449 12 available at https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/unmanned (“not having or needing a crew or staff”). Reply Br. 7. Appellant’s arguments on this point are unpersuasive for two reasons. First, the dictionary definitions proffered by Appellant support the Examiner’s broader interpretation—not Appellant’s narrower interpretation. More specifically, the Merriam-Webster dictionary provides two possible definitions of “manned”: (1) carrying a human, and (2) performed by a human. The first definition corresponds to Appellant’s proffered narrow construction of “unmanned,” which is not carrying any occupants— driver or passenger. See Reply Br. 7. But the second definition of “manned” corresponds to a broader definition of “unmanned”—it only requires that a human not operate the vehicle. The second definition does not preclude an “unmanned vehicle” from carrying humans as non-operator passengers. And the Lexico definition of “not having or needing a crew or staff” further evidences the reasonableness of Merriam-Webster’s second definition. Restated, these general-purpose dictionaries indicate that one reasonable definition of an “unmanned vehicle” is an autonomous vehicle— a vehicle that does not have a human operating it, but which may be transporting humans. As such, it is immaterial whether the Examiner may have provided sufficient evidence that the broader interpretation is reasonable. By citing the general-purpose dictionaries, Appellant provides sufficient evidence to support the Examiner’s interpretation. Moreover, it is irrelevant whether the first or second definition may be deemed to be a “better” definition. Under the broadest-reasonable- interpretation standard, the Board ascertains the universe of reasonable Appeal 2020-003303 Application 15/787,449 13 interpretations and adopts the broadest one of those interpretations. See In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (During examination of a patent application, pending claims are given their broadest reasonable construction consistent with the Specification.); In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“It is the applicants’ burden to precisely define the invention, not the PTO’s.”); In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404–05 (CCPA 1969) (Appellant always has the opportunity to amend the claims during prosecution, and broad interpretation by the Examiner reduces the possibility that the claim, once issued, will be interpreted more broadly than is justified.). Secondly, even if we were to set aside the extrinsic evidence from these general-purpose dictionaries and interpret the claim term “unmanned vehicle” only in light of Appellant’s Specification, Appellant’s arguments still are not persuasive. As noted above, Appellant relies on the Specification’s description, “[a]n unmanned vehicle is not intended to transport persons (for example neither to transport a driver nor to transport passengers).” Spec. ¶ 81, cited in Appeal Br. 6 (emphasis added). This description of an unmanned vehicle only describes the intended use of the vehicle. But the description does not limit the vehicle’s structure or capabilities. For example, a propane tank truck may be a vehicle that is intended to transport propane gas. But it is still capable of transporting a wanted drug dealer from Albuquerque, New Mexico, to Crawford County, New Hampshire. See Breaking Bad, series 5, episode 15. As a non-fictional example, a music-equipment box may be a container that is intended to transport musical equipment. But it is still capable of being used to smuggle Appeal 2020-003303 Application 15/787,449 14 a fugitive carmaker chairman out of Japan. Ex-Nissan boss Carlos Ghosn: How I escaped Japan in a box, BBC News, July 13, 2021 (available at https://www.bbc.com/news/business-57760993). “It is well settled that the recitation of a new intended use for an old product does not make a claim to that old product patentable.” In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). See also, e.g., Ex parte Masham, 2 USPQ2d 1647 (BPAI 1987) (noting that a claim containing a “recitation with respect to the manner in which a claimed apparatus is intended to be employed does not differentiate the claimed apparatus from a prior art apparatus” if the prior art apparatus teaches all the structural limitations of the claim). More importantly, though, by reciting “for example,” the cited passage of Appellant’s Specification indicates that the recitation, “[a] vehicle [that] is not intended to transport . . . [either] a driver [or] . . . passengers,” is merely one non-limiting example of a type of vehicle that can constitute an “unmanned vehicle,” as claimed. Restated, the relied-upon passage of the Specification does not provide an express definition for the claim term, “unmanned vehicle.” It, at best, constitutes a statement of the intended use of one non-limiting example of unmanned vehicles that falls within the scope of the claims. Appellant does not provide persuasive evidence, then, why the claimed “unmanned vehicle” would fail to read on Oshida’s autonomous vehicle. Once Oshida’s driver becomes disabled and unable to operate the vehicle, Oshida’s vehicle will be in need of a person to “man” the vehicle, as defined by the cited general-purpose dictionaries. Appeal 2020-003303 Application 15/787,449 15 II. Appellant additionally argues, “[t]he Examiner has also erred by failing to demonstrate that the alleged ‘support offer request message’ and the alleged ‘support measure’ correspond to the same danger.” Appeal Br. 8. More specifically, Appellant argues, “the Examiner relies on Oshida’s disclosure of detecting a danger when there is an object in direct collision path of the vehicle as corresponding to determining that a danger exists based a probability of damage to the vehicle as provided in claims 1, 6, and 20.” Appeal Br. 9 (citing Final Act. 16). Appellant further argues, autonomous driving actions may be generated to mitigate collision with the object in its path. While Oshida does take a support measure in response to the detection of the collision object, Oshida does not disclose that a support offer request message is transmitted in response to the detection of the collision object, i.e., the alleged “danger” related to the support measure. Appeal Br. 9 (citing Oshida ¶ 99). I agree with Appellant and the Majority that the present claims require that the determined “‘danger’ . . . is the same danger for which a support offer message is transmitted and for which a support measure is prompted for averting that danger.” Appeal Br. 8–9; Majority Opinion 7. And I agree the Examiner has not established sufficiently how Oshida’s separate embodiments can be combined to teach or suggest the claim limitation, “wherein it is determined that [a] danger exists if there is a particular probability of . . . damage . . . of the unmanned vehicle.” But this is not the end of the inquiry. The Examiner finds that Oshida transmits a support offer request message based upon determining that a danger exists. Final Act. 3 (citing Appeal 2020-003303 Application 15/787,449 16 Oshida ¶¶ 45, 131; Fig. 2, step 220). Oshida explains “the communication component 160 may submit a request for help or a help request when one or more other components determines that the driver of the vehicle . . . is experiencing an emergency, such as a medical emergency.” Oshida ¶ 43. Making a determination that a driver is experiencing a medical emergency also reasonably constitutes determining that there is a particular probability of damage to the newly unmanned vehicle, as claimed. Oshida describes the scenario in more detail, as follows: FIG. 2 is an illustration of an example flow diagram of a method 200 for vehicle operation assistance, according to one or more embodiments. At 210, an occupant of a vehicle or automobile may be monitored. For example, vital signs of the occupant may be recorded. Based on respective vital sign information, a status of the occupant may be determined to indicate whether the occupant is experiencing an emergency. If an emergency is determined, a request for help may be transmitted 220 based on the occupant status and the vehicle automatically stopped. Emergency response vehicles, such as a potential leader vehicle may arrive at the scene. The potential leader vehicle may transmit a “follow me” request to the vehicle. According to one or more aspects, verification of the potential leader vehicle may be implemented. Regardless, when the “follow me” request is accepted (e.g., either automatically through help center assistance or via one or more vehicle components or manually via an interface of the vehicle and occupant approval), the vehicle may enter or enable follower mode 240. In follower mode, the vehicle may establish a connection, such as a wireless connection, with the leader vehicle (e.g., previously a potential leader vehicle when the “follow me” request was still pending or not yet accepted). Using this wireless connection or connection, the vehicle may perform autonomous ‘following’ or be ‘wirelessly towed’ by the now leader vehicle. According to one or more aspects, hazard mitigation may be performed using one or more sensors on[] the Appeal 2020-003303 Application 15/787,449 17 vehicle itself or preemptively avoiding hazards detected by sensors of other vehicles (e.g., which may include, but are not necessarily the leader vehicle). Oshida ¶¶ 131–32 (emphasis added). To summarize, Oshida explains that the vehicle may transmit a request for help 220 based on the driver experiencing a medical emergency. Oshida ¶ 131. This request results in the now unmanned car coming to a stop and a leader car escorting the unmanned car to some destination. Id. ¶¶ 131–32. One of ordinary skill would understand that a car stopped in the middle of a street can present an accident danger to the vehicle and its occupant. As such, the request for assistance 220, not only addresses a medical emergency, but additionally averts a particular probability of damage to the unmanned vehicle, as claimed. As such, the additional reliance on Oshida’s other embodiment is unnecessary to establish that the claims are unpatentable. For these reasons, Appellant has not demonstrated error in the Examiner’s determination that the claims are unpatentable over the cited art. I, therefore, would affirm the rejection. Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation